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Introduction
I n the early seventeenth century, shortly aer invading Japanese soldiers had been expelled from Chosŏn Korea, Chŏng Inhong (1535–1623), a leader of a righteous militia, was called to account for his relationship with 
several Ming Chinese soldiers, deserters from the armies sent by the Ming to 
help ght the Japanese. Perhaps the most controversial relationship was one he 
had with Shi Wenyong, a geomancer to whom, it was said, Chŏng had forced 
into marrying the daughter of a woman who had been raped by the Japanese. 
Those who were hostile to Chŏng Inhong pointed to the shamefulness of mar-
rying “someone from a foreign state,” while those who supported Chŏng alluded 
to Chŏng’s own ancestry. Chŏng, as it happens, claimed descent from a Song 
merchant from Zhejiang who had settled in Korea during the Koryŏ dynasty 
(918–1392). Chŏng Inhong’s actions, they declared, were thus in accord with a 
fully understandable desire on his part to support “hometown friends,” for the 
Chinese soldiers who he helped were without exception from Zhejiang.
Such support gave Shi Wenyong in	uence during the reign of Kwanghae-gun 
(r. 1608–1623), when Chŏng Inhong’s faction was dominant, but aer Injo’s (r. 
1623–1649) coup d’état of 1623, Shi Wenyong was executed along with his for-
mer protector Chŏng Inhong. However, Shi Wenyong’s execution was not the 
last word for him, for during the eighteenth century his memory was revived 
and his descendants raised in status, from the disreputable ranks of descendants 
of deserting Ming troops to ritual representatives of the glorious Ming and of 
Chosŏn’s undying loyalty to the Ming and to the Sinitic/Confucian tradition. 
Thus, the late Chosŏn monarchs, all heirs of Injo, had the descendants of one of 
Injo’s victims appear as ritual representatives of Chosŏn’s loyalty to the Ming, in 
rites practiced in the presence of the monarch himself.
In this book I seek to understand the process underlying the transformation 
of foreigners and people of foreign ancestry in Chosŏn Korea in order to ex-
plore the changing nature of the collective identity and worldview of Chosŏn’s 
sajok aristocracy. I analyze these changes in relation to the greater bureaucra-
tization and centralization of late Chosŏn Korea, and indeed of Eurasia as a 
whole, during the eighteenth century. Shi Wenyong was one of many foreign-
ers who made their home in Chosŏn. From the very foundation of the Chosŏn 
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dynasty, people whose origins lay outside of the Korean peninsula played a va-
riety of roles within it, as technical specialists, soldiers, and diplomats. Indeed, 
the early Chosŏn (which for convenience I date from 1392 to 1592) had been the 
center of an extensive network of Jurchens and Japanese, with varying degrees 
of aliation with the Chosŏn state, both inside and outside Chosŏn’s borders. 
These networks were disrupted and transformed with the large-scale entrance 
of foreigners during the Imjin War (1592–1598), which brought both Ming Chi-
nese and Japanese soldiers onto Chosŏn soil and the Ming-Manchu wars of early 
seventeenth century Liaodong, which drove both Jurchen and Sinophone Lia-
odongese refugees south into Chosŏn. Aer the wars, armies retreated and refu-
gees were expelled and repatriated, but some soldiers deserted and some refugees 
evaded detection to become part of the population of the Chosŏn state.
How were these foreigners treated? A common assumption, re	ected in much 
scholarship, is that the Chosŏn state would have treated Chinese migrants much 
better than Jurchens and Japanese.1 This view ts in well with our understand-
ing of Chosŏn as a Sinocentric state, loyal to the Ming Chinese hegemon. It is 
true that the Chosŏn monarchy was assiduous in sending envoys to oer submis-
sion to the Ming court, indeed dispatching at least three diplomatic missions a 
year. In return the Chosŏn monarch received from the Ming monarch the Ming 
calendar and the investiture of the Chosŏn monarch with the title of “king” or 
“prince of state” (K. kugwang, Ch. guowang) to which the Chosŏn monarch 
responded by referring to himself as “subject” (K. sin, Ch. chen) in ocial com-
munications to the Ming emperor and accepting the Chosŏn state’s status as 
fan (vassal) of the Ming empire. Having accepted Chosŏn’s subordination, the 
Ming monarch respected the autonomy of the Chosŏn monarch in domestic 
matters and indeed interfered only rarely in Chosŏn’s relationships with other 
neighboring states.2 This was no mere pro forma submission, however, for as Pae 
Usŏng has discussed, Chosŏn elites also internalized the centrality of Chinese/
Confucian traditions3—which I will term, following South Korean scholarship, 
Chunghwa, the Korean pronunciation of the Chinese Zhonghua. With this I 
do not refer to the modern concept of a Chinese nation-state, although that is 
the current meaning of Zhonghua, but rather to Zhonghua as “central eores-
cence,” a term with a range of overlapping “civilizational” meanings encompass-
ing the broad corpus of rituals, writings, and “Confucian” philosophical ideas 
that originated in China; a universal standard of civilization; Chinese political 
formations; and the geographic space of the north Chinese plain.4
Although they were frequently less enthusiastic about individual emperors 
and Ming ocials, Chosŏn sajok aristocrats fully accepted the vital civilizational 
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role of idealized emperors centered in China, acting peacefully, in the manner of 
Mencian sage kings, across the divide between the civilized and barbarians (Ch. 
hua-yi zhi bian, K. hwa-yi chi pyŏn) and bringing barbarians to pay tribute and 
receive the transforming edication of civilization. By the early Chosŏn, Korea 
had also obtained for itself the sobriquet Lesser Chunghwa (Sojunghwa), which 
might be translated, following Sixiang Wang, as “small central eorescence.”5
Most of the government documents produced by the Koryŏ and Chosŏn courts 
were composed in Literary Sinitic, and most literary and historiographic texts 
were not only written in Literary Sinitic but followed Chinese literary and his-
toriographic genres. The dominant philosophical tradition during much of the 
Chosŏn period was Zhu Xi’s (1130–1200) interpretation of the Chinese Con-
fucian tradition, which Chosŏn sajok aristocrats made their own, with most 
rejecting as heretical the Ming enthusiasm for Wang Shouren’s (1472–1529) phi-
losophy.6 Moreover, such was the devotion of Chosŏn’s sajok elites to the Ming 
that aer the fall of the Ming to the Manchu Qing, the Chosŏn court continued 
to full its status as Lesser Chunghwa by engaging in ritual commemoration 
of the Ming emperors. Despite outwardly submitting to the Qing, the Chosŏn 
court maintained a continued connection to the Ming in the form of an altar 
within the palace complex at which Chosŏn monarchs oered sacrice in per-
son. Additionally, Chosŏn sajok aristocrats expressed their rejection of Qing 
hegemony by dating documents according to the reign of the last Ming emperor, 
the Chongzhen emperor, who committed suicide in 1644. By the eighteenth 
century, Chosŏn sajok aristocrats considered themselves to be the last remnant 
of Chunghwa culture and political order, continuing a tradition that the Qing 
empire, as a barbarian Manchu dynasty, could not possibly represent.
Yet, as I show in this book, despite the enthusiastic participation of Chosŏn’s 
sajok aristocracy in Chunghwa cultural and political norms, they did not extend 
this enthusiasm to individual Chinese people or Chinese migrants in Chosŏn—
the hostile reception of Shi Wenyong by some sajok was not an exceptional case. 
During the large-scale entrance of foreigners during the late sixteenth and early 
seventeenth centuries, the Chosŏn state did not welcome Chinese over Jurchens 
and Japanese, but, if anything, showed a notable preference for its established 
subjects, the Jurchens. Even aer Chosŏn submitted to the Manchu Qing empire 
in 1637, the Chosŏn court continued to administer all three groups according 
to the same tax category of submitting-foreigners (hyanghwain), which granted 
them protection from most personal taxes but which otherwise provided them 
with very little prestige. It was only following the mid-eighteenth century that 
the Chosŏn court actively sponsored those who, like Shi Wenyong’s descendants, 
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could claim Ming origins. This gave the descendants of Ming migrants higher 
status, better access to low-ranked positions in the bureaucracy, and the privilege 
of participation in court-sponsored Ming loyalist rituals.
What caused this change in attitudes toward Chinese migrants? The pur-
pose of this book is to explain this transition—to explore why Jurchens, Japa-
nese, and Chinese were categorized together as submitting-foreigners until the 
mid-eighteenth century, aer which Chinese descendants were clearly distin-
guished from other people with foreign ancestors. This shi cannot be under-
stood as driven by “Sinocentrism” or “Confucianization,” for the mid-eighteenth 
century is two centuries aer the rise of activist Neo-Confucianism during the 
sixteenth century, and well aer the growth of Neo-Confucian ritualism during 
the seventeenth. The reason for these changes, and how they relate to cultural, 
political, and ideological shis in Chosŏn, must thus be explained in some 
other manner.
Nationalism and Sinocentrism in Korean History
The presence of foreigners in Chosŏn, and the response of Chosŏn to those 
foreigners, has interesting implications for understanding the nature of the 
imagined community of late Chosŏn Korea. A major (although by no means 
universal) thread in twentieth-century Korean historiography has been to read 
the sense of a unied, homogenous Korean nation backward into the distant 
past, to the supposed reign of the mythical king Tan’gun. Such nationalist histo-
riography is dominant in North Korea,7 although it is increasingly marginalized 
among academic historians in South Korea. Even in South Korea, until recently 
grade-school students were taught that they were part of a homogeneous race, 
the descendants of Tan’gun, who had preserved their homogeneity through the 
supposed 5,000 years of Korean history.8 The presence of foreigners as a constit-
uent part of the late Chosŏn state cannot but be a challenge to what was once 
the orthodoxy of South Korean public education and forces a reconsideration of 
the imagined community of Chosŏn Korea.
South Korea itself has become, since the early 1990s, an increasingly multicul-
tural society, with people of diverse origins, especially from other regions in East 
and Southeast Asia, making their homes in South Korea, intermarrying with 
South Korean citizens, and indeed becoming South Korean citizens themselves.9
This has spurred academic interest in uncovering a multicultural past for Korea. 
The foreign presence in late Chosŏn has certainly been part of this trend. Quite 
a number of scholars, writing in Korean and English, have noted the acceptance 
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of foreigners in Koryŏ and early Chosŏn as clear evidence that claims of “pure 
blood” are an anachronistic obsession of twentieth-century historians, and that 
in pre-modern Korea, people had no such concern.10 This interest in multicul-
tural pasts, indeed, has extended beyond purely academic publications to works 
directed toward the broader reading public.11 The emergence of imperial subjects 
such as Shi Wenyong’s descendants—court-honored representatives of the Ming 
dynasty—has generally been explained as an example of Chosŏn’s Sinocentrism, 
with anthropologist Kyung-koo Han arguing that Jurchens and Japanese were 
still discriminated against by a Sinocentric Chosŏn state that was positively 
inclined toward Koreans and Chinese. Consequently, the Chosŏn state, Han 
argues, may not have been nationalist or racist in the modern sense, and it may 
even have been multicultural, but it was nevertheless characterized by ethnic 
discrimination.12 John B. Duncan, by contrast, argues that the shi toward im-
perial subject status reveals the development of a “proto-national consciousness” 
in late Chosŏn Korea. As he imagines that submitting-foreigner (hyanghwain) 
status had been primarily concerned with assimilation, he sees what he believes 
to be the disappearance of this status, and its replacement with an ethnicized 
imperial subject status, to signal the end of assimilationism in Chosŏn Korea, 
and perhaps the emergence of an idea of “pure blood-lines.”13
Such scholarship, emerging in the 1990s, was reacting against a considerable 
accumulation of scholarship that, since 1894, had sought to naturalize the con-
cepts of race and nation within Korean history. Beginning with the intellec-
tual ferment that followed the Sino-Japanese War (1894–1895), and continuing 
through much of the twentieth century, many historians viewed Korean history 
as characterized by the struggle of the Korean ethnic nation under pressure from 
outside powers and evaluated gures according to how well they protected the 
autonomy, the native culture, and the territorial integrity of Korea. Above all 
else, Chosŏn’s cultural engagement with Chinese civilization, and political sub-
ordination to various Chinese dynasties, has oen been considered shameful, 
with many (following the trend of Japanese historians of Korea) seeing it as a 
sign of a 	aw in the Korean character and a tendency toward toadyism (sadae-
juŭi) or “serving the great.”14 For the pioneering modern historian Sin Ch’aeho 
(1880–1936), who believed that the subject of history was the ethnic-nation 
(minjok), this shameful toadyism and betrayal of its national identity had been 
imposed upon Chosŏn by Sinophilic elites at key points in Korean history. For 
Sin Ch’aeho, as well as for other nationalist historians in	uenced by Social 
Darwinism, it was self-evidently the case that an ethnic nation, understood in 
almost biological or racial terms, was in constant competition with other ethnic 
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nations. Chosŏn’s acceptance of Chinese culture was thus an abandonment of 
natural law and the extinction of the self (understood to mean the ethnic nation 
as a whole) in favor of the other or non-self (pi’a).15
Such attempts to downplay the signicance of foreign in	uence, and espe-
cially Chinese in	uence, has been a frequent aspect of much later South Korean 
scholarship and has attracted considerable attention from scholars working in 
the English language, who oen treat the matter unproductively as an either-or 
between admiration for China and a sense of national identity. Studies of dip-
lomatic relations with later Chinese states have oen been at pains to assert the 
pro-forma nature of the submission of Korean states, to treat it as simply a diplo-
matic strategy, for the weak to manipulate the strong.16 Han Yŏngu, for instance, 
in his study of the early Chosŏn ocial Yang Sŏngji (1415–1482), argues that 
when Yang used the term “serve the great” (sadae) in the context of Chosŏn’s re-
lationship to the Ming emperor, he was thinking exclusively in terms of practical 
diplomacy, with no implication of cultural or political subservience to the Ming, 
and in the context of the full assertion of Chosŏn’s “self-determination and inde-
pendence” (chaju tongnip).17 Such scholarship, of course, has not been without its 
critics, and in English, a substantial body of work has specically attempted to 
take Korean scholarship to task for its nationalism, and to argue, with reference 
to Benedict Anderson, for a strong rupture in identities between “pre-modern 
Korea,” on the one hand, and twentieth-century nationalism, on the other. Such 
scholars have frequently opposed the “Sinocentrism” of pre-modern Korean 
elites to twentieth-century nationalism, arguing that sajok aristocrats of the 
Chosŏn period had no Korean identity but rather an attachment to “a cosmo-
politan civilization centered in China.”18
This unhelpful binary between the Sinocentric past and the nationalist pres-
ent distorts the reality of Sino-Korean relations during the Chosŏn period. To 
be sure, ocials in the Ming and Qing both referred oen to the Chosŏn model 
when constructing their relationships with other fan (vassal states).19 As Hyewon 
Chae, however, has argued, such was the diversity of relations with smaller coun-
tries pursued by the Ming and Qing that it is nearly impossible to identify any 
standard or model “tribute practices,” including those pursued by Chosŏn—es-
pecially as key aspects of Chosŏn’s tribute practices, such as its three diplomatic 
missions a year, were in fact asserted despite the initial opposition of the Ming 
empire. In general, Chosŏn’s relationship with China was oen tumultuous and 
characterized by controversy and ill-faith.20 As discussed in chapter 1, Chosŏn 
pursued relations with Japanese and Jurchens not only in violation of Ming de-
mands but sometimes in open rivalry with the Ming. As is discussed in chapter 5, 
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during the late Chosŏn, the Chosŏn court developed ritual practices that denied 
the Qing empire’s right to rule even as they also sent diplomatic missions to the 
Qing capital formally accepting Qing hegemony.
Recent South Korean scholarship, especially, has transformed our under-
standing of Chunghwa ideology. Ch’oe Chongsŏk has pointed out that the pe-
riod of Mongol hegemony saw the beginning of a general acceptance by Koryŏ’s 
sajok aristocrats of the right to rule an empire based in China, even while they 
in no way abandoned their own prerogatives and rights as members of the ruling 
class of Korea.21 This ideological shi continued into the period of Ming hege-
mony, during which, as Kim Sunja has argued, civil bureaucrats had begun to 
speak of China as having an exclusive right to empire that was not available to 
peoples such as the Mongols who originated from outside of Chinese territory.22
Ultimately, the concept of China as civilization, or Chunghwa, was in part geog-
raphy, but also included rites, manners, clothing, hierarchical political organiza-
tion, and association with a body of literature that might be called Confucian.
Moreover, subject kingdoms, including Chosŏn, could and did claim mastery 
over cultural symbols of Chunghwa. As Don Baker points out, the eenth cen-
tury in Chosŏn was ideologically complex, and monarchs could appeal to a mix 
of Confucian, Buddhist, and Daoist justications for their rule and could even 
allow for language that implied that the Chosŏn royal house had received a sep-
arate mandate of heaven.23 As Pae Usŏng argues, Chosŏn sajok aristocrats and 
intellectuals envisioned Chosŏn as both an autonomous state and part of the 
broad realm of Chunghwa culture and politics. Even as Chosŏn’s ruling elites 
saw themselves as participants within a broader Chunghwa sphere, they by no 
means lacked particularist identities or loyalties, nor were their identities entirely 
subsumed into the Sinocentric cosmopolis. Rather, Chosŏn sajok aristocrats 
clearly dened themselves as having membership within a Korean historical en-
tity, seen as having existed since early times in the constant geographic location 
of the Korean peninsula, which thus naturally possessed cultural and linguistic 
dierences with China.24 They referred to this historical and geographic entity 
with such names as Haedong (East of the Sea), Tongguk (Eastern Kingdom), 
Chwahae (Le the Sea), or Samhan (Three Han)—which certainly represented 
Korea by using its geographic relation to China but which also were terms that 
referred to Korea without regard to individual dynasties.25
In fact, many contentious issues during the Chosŏn period, which are now 
seen as revealing a divide between nativists and Sinocentric understandings, 
can in fact be shown to have been concerned with topics that do not t clearly 
with present-day obsessions or fall neatly alongside current fault lines. Debates 
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during the early Chosŏn—for instance, concerning whether or not to oer sac-
rices to heaven directly or concerning the use of the vernacular alphabet hun-
min chŏngŭm—which are oen interpreted now as debates over dependence on 
China versus autonomous culture and politics, were actually debates on subjects 
that now seem obscure and hard to t into modern categories, and in contexts 
that assumed both the existence of an independent Chosŏn culture (in part de-
termined by geographic dierence) and the cultural and political preeminence of 
Ming China.26 Late Chosŏn intellectuals, like twentieth-century intellectuals, 
made revanchist claims on the Liaodong region of the Qing empire, asserting 
that it was properly Chosŏn territory—but unlike the twentieth-century na-
tionalist intellectuals, they did so because the Qing conquest had broken the 
Chunghwa unity that they imagined had linked early Chosŏn with Ming Lia-
odong.27 For that matter, as Hŏ T’aeyong has argued, late Chosŏn intellectuals 
explored not only symbols related to China but also such Korean heroes as the 
Koguryŏ general Ŭlchi Mundŏk who was known for defeating the Chinese Sui 
dynasty in 612 C.E. In the twentieth century, Ŭlchi Mundŏk became a national 
symbol of nativist resistance to China. In this, modern historians were building 
on the work of late Chosŏn historians, who also admired Ŭlchi Mundŏk, but 
who saw him as a symbol of military strength and loyalty that needed to be 
revived in an East Asia in which the barbarous Qing had conquered China. In 
other words, late Chosŏn intellectuals remembered Ŭlchi Mundŏk as both a 
source of pride as a Korean military hero and as a paragon of Chunghwa and 
Confucian civilization.28
My purpose here is not to wade into the debate between those who Anthony 
D. Smith calls primordialists and modernists,29 or indeed to continue the debate 
on whether Chosŏn can properly be called a “nation” or a “proto-nation.” Rather 
than trying to read twentieth-century nationalism back to the Chosŏn period, I 
intend to dene the changing nature of collective identities during the Chosŏn 
period. If the Chosŏn monarchy was dierent from the states of nineteenth-and 
twentieth-century Europe, it was also organized very dierently from prena-
tionalist medieval and early modern Europe. As Jahyun Kim Haboush says, 
much of the discussion of nations and nationalism is irreducibly Eurocentric 
and applies poorly to the circumstances of East Asian states.30 A similar point 
is made by Nicholas Tackett, who makes use of Benedict Anderson’s concept 
of an imagined community31 to compare Song self-identity to modern nation-
alism. Tackett points out that the Song had abandoned the universalistic goals 
of the Tang and was content to govern only those regions inhabited by Sino-
phone Huaxia (Chinese). Song’s governing elite, the shidafu, were, unlike the 
Introduction 9 
capital-based ruling class of the Tang, from all ends of Song territory and were 
bound together, in part through meritocratic exam competition, to each other 
by horizontal bonds. In this they resembled the colonial bureaucrats and creole 
elites of nineteenth-century European colonies, whose identities, following An-
derson, were in part determined by the colonial territory to which their careers 
were restricted. During the Song, educated people who did not pass, or even 
write, the exams were nevertheless linked as part of a broad imaginary commu-
nity via commercial printing—in much the same manner as, following Ander-
son, the new European and American nations of the nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries were formed by print media. As Tackett argues, although the resulting 
society was notably dierent from the national communities of the nineteenth 
and twentieth centuries, the Song should not be understood as either pre-na-
tionalist or proto-nationalist, but rather on its own terms, as a dierent form of 
imagined national community.32
No reading of Chosŏn dynasty texts could possibly lead one to the thor-
oughly indefensible claim that Korea in the abstract is an entirely modern con-
cept. Rather, in many ways, Chosŏn resembles the Song as discussed by Tack-
ett, with an elite operating exclusively within the boundaries of the Chosŏn 
state and linked together by statewide networks. To be sure, in contrast to late 
imperial China, Chosŏn was characterized by a far more rigid system of social 
status, with an endogamous hereditary aristocracy that nevertheless advanced 
into the higher ranks of bureaucracy only through competing in challenging 
examinations. Chosŏn sajok were organized into descent-groups marked by a 
combination of a surname (sŏng) and clan seat (pon’gwan), which referred to 
the power base of the descent-group’s supposed founding ancestor (sijo), oen 
from the late Silla or early Koryŏ periods, and which had nothing to do with the 
residence of members of a descent-group, or indeed with the place of residence 
of any recent ancestor. A member of the Munhwa Yu in the eenth century, 
for instance, might have no recent connections at all to the administrative dis-
trict of Munhwa in Hwanghae province.33 At the same time, during the Koryŏ 
and early Chosŏn periods, sajok status had a close relationship with success in 
the examinations and participation in ocialdom. Indeed another term for 
sajok is yangban, referring to the “two orders” (pan) of ocialdom, civil and 
military—sajok status thus had a close connection to participation in the civil 
(munkwa) or military examinations (mukwa), with civil examinations having 
much greater prestige.34 An additional set of examinations, the chapkwa (mis-
cellaneous examinations)—on languages, medicine, math, and other technical 
subjects—was avoided by Chosŏn sajok and was thus generally the province of 
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those outside of the ruling elite; by the seventeenth century, though, families 
who took the chapkwa had also formed their own social status grouping, that 
of the chungin specialists, who were below the sajok in social terms but stood 
clearly above commoners and slaves. Commoners made up the majority of the 
population and carried most of the burden of taxation and corvée labor, while 
base people (ch’ŏnmin) made up approximately 30 percent of the population and 
included private slaves—“the hands and feet of the yangban”—public slaves, and 
hereditary practitioners of various base professions.35
What mobility had existed in the late Koryŏ between rural strongmen 
(hyangni) traveling from the countryside and the capital-based aristocracy lo-
cated in Kaesŏng came to an end with the establishment of various laws during 
the early Chosŏn specically designed to narrow the range of those who could 
take the civil examinations and participate in the higher ranks of the bureau-
cracy. Hyangni, reduced steadily to the ranks of petty subbureaucrats, were xed 
to their home locales and suered signicant restrictions in taking exams, while 
the descendants of yangban men and base-born secondary wives, the so-called 
sŏŏl, were simply banned from participation in the civil examinations—both 
became, in broad terms, part of the chungin class. No restrictions were placed on 
commoners taking the examinations, but that was simply because, in practice, 
commoners lacked the resources necessary to take even the various preliminary 
examinations. The sajok aristocracy further cemented their unity through inter-
marriage, as is made evident by the earliest surviving genealogies, which reveal 
an extremely high level of intermarriage between sajok descent-groups during 
the early Chosŏn.36
This ruling elite, it should be noted, was entirely bound within the Korean 
peninsula, in both their aristocratic and bureaucratic identities. Although some 
sajok descent-groups did claim distant Chinese ancestors, there was rarely any 
solid evidence, or even detailed descriptions, concerning those supposed distant 
ancestors or the generations immediately following them, to the extent that the 
historical reality of these ancestors generally is to be doubted. By contrast, the 
actual formation of sajok descent-groups, and the development of more than 
one branch within their genealogies, almost always occurred in Korea during 
the Koryŏ period, and the clan seats themselves invariably referred to a location 
within the Korean peninsula. By the Chosŏn period, sajok descent-groups did 
not seek to marry people from beyond Korea, and ocials, whether civil or mil-
itary, pursued their careers exclusively within Korea. Though many sajok did 
have strong connections to particular locales, the regions themselves were not 
administered, as in Europe, by prominent local aristocrats, but by exam-passers 
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selected by the central court and dispatched from the capital. Chosŏn’s sajok, for 
all their mastery of Literary Sinitic and of texts from the “Chinese” tradition, 
pursued their careers exclusively within the territory of the Chosŏn state and 
maintained social networks that only rarely and to a distinctly limited extent 
passed over into China.37 They also generally did not speak Chinese—a tech-
nical skill that was handed over to their interpreters, their social inferiors and 
members of the chungin specialist class.38
To be sure, the Chosŏn sajok aristocracy became more and more dierentiated 
during the later Chosŏn. Military yangban, for instance, became increasingly 
distinguished from civil yangban, with the lower ranked military ocials not 
placed within the ranks of the sajok aristocracy. Politically, during the sixteenth 
century, sajok also divided by factions centered on key private schools (sŏwŏn). 
This process began with the split between Sŏin (Westerners) and Tongin (East-
erners) in 1575, followed by the ssuring of the Tongin into Pugin (Northerners) 
and Namin (Southerners) in 1589, and the division of the Sŏin into the Noron 
(Old Doctrine) and Soron (Young Doctrine) during the late seventeenth cen-
tury. Although factions were by no means impermeable social barriers, they 
went beyond mere political rivalries to include divergent scholarly traditions 
and were also key factors in forming marital alliances. They also had a regional 
aspect, as Namin and Pugin, on the losing end of the factional con	ict, were gen-
erally based in Kyŏngsang province far from the capital. Otherwise, during the 
late seventeenth century, a small number of capital-based sajok descent-groups, 
generally from the Noron faction, increasingly dominated all signicant bureau-
cratic positions. This le rural sajok, oen resident in single-surname villages 
and associated with private schools with specic factional identities, to organize 
themselves through local governance associations and pursue prestige and social 
status without any relationship to bureaucratic advancement.39
Much as Tackett has for the Song, Rian Thum has identied the development 
of an imaginary community among the Turkic-speaking people of Western 
China who are now called Uighur. He accepts, of course, that the modern cate-
gory of Uighur, which was revived from the medieval Uighur empire, is indeed 
a new creation. However, he also traces the development of an earlier Altishari 
identity formed through handwritten manuscripts and visits to Islamic shrines 
among the Turkic people of the oases of what is now Xinjiang. In addition to 
the modern national community, Thum argues, we should “look for other kinds 
of imagined community and other associations between such identities and 
common historical contexts.”40 Similarly, even aer Chosŏn’s sajok fractured 
into separate factions, their networks continued to be primarily restricted to 
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Chosŏn, and the subjects concerning which they disputed were also overwhelm-
ingly Korea-centered, including questions of court rites, disputes over royal mar-
riages, policy concerning slavery, and the debates over the merits of dierent 
Korean Confucian teachers.41 To be sure, Chosŏn sajok were not engaged in the 
search for national uniqueness that is characteristic of modern nationalists,42
and indeed their education linked them to the Chinese tradition. Yet from the 
beginning of the dynasty until the end, their careers and social networks were 
overwhelmingly located within the Korean peninsula. They hardly doubted the 
existence of a dynastic tradition specic to Korea, or that their primarily loyal-
ties were to the Chosŏn state. With Chosŏn, as with the Song and the Altishari 
Turks, the proper question is not when a “nation” was born in Chosŏn Korea, 
but how people imagined the boundaries of the Chosŏn state, how this imag-
ined community related to the social and political organization of Chosŏn, how 
this imagined community changed over time, and how this changing imagined 
identity determined who was accepted as an insider and who was excluded as 
an outsider.
Aliens and Subjects:  
Social Status and Belonging in Late Chosŏn
Identity throughout the late medieval and even early modern periods was gener-
ally 	uid and relational, with key markers of dierence and group connection—
language, clothing, religion—operating with only limited relationship to formal 
political divisions.43 During the early modern period, however, some European 
states sought to strengthen their control by imposing exclusionary religious and 
national identities on the diverse subjects under their control. For instance, 
Anthony Marx argues that the formation of the exclusionary religious identity 
of early modern states in western Europe developed through the elimination, 
assimilation, and marginalization of domestic religious minorities. According 
to Marx, the early modern French collective identity was formed through the 
violent purging of the Protestant minority, the early modern Spanish identity 
through the purging of Jews and Muslims, and the early modern English iden-
tity specically through attacks on Catholics—developments that were vital, as 
they allowed the growing early modern states to mobilize securely their heter-
ogenous populations.44 Similarly, Peter Sahlin has shown that the concept of ab-
solute citizenship—dened as absence of the disabilities suered by noncitizens 
(aubain), and embracing French subjects regardless of class—had already come 
into being in the late sixteenth century.45
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As the risk of reinforcing the Eurocentric assumptions that Western Europe 
is the norm, it is protable to compare the circumstances of Chosŏn Korea with 
that of early modern Europe. Despite the complete disestablishment of Bud-
dhism during the sixteenth century, the hostility among Chosŏn’s sajok elites 
and bureaucracy to shamanistic popular religious practices, and following the 
late eighteenth century, the purges of the tiny Catholic community, little in 
Chosŏn history resembles the vigorous purges of large religious minorities of 
early modern Europe. However, Chosŏn, especially the early Chosŏn, was not 
a homogenous realm, nor was homogeneity an imagined goal, and attitudes 
toward migrants from outside of the peninsula were markedly dierent from 
those of twentieth-century South Korea. For instance, one of the key foundation 
myths of the Korean dynastic tradition during the Chosŏn period involved a 
migrant, namely Kija (Ch. Jizi). Along with Tan’gun, the reputed founder of the 
Old Chosŏn state during the reign of the legendary King Yao, Kija was treated 
as a secondary founder, the one who brought moral civilization and “Confu-
cian” rites and laws to Korea. The story varied, but, roughly, Kija/Jizi was a loyal 
Shang ocial who had 	ed to Old Chosŏn to avoid serving the new Zhou dy-
nasty, but who later nevertheless oered tribute to King Wu. He also provided 
King Wu with instruction, the “Great Plan” (Ch. Hongfan, K. Hongbŏm), an 
apocryphal text and a chapter within the Venerated Documents (Ch. Shangshu,
K. Sangsŏ). Although the connection between Kija and Chosŏn seems to have 
entered into Chinese historiography only during the Han period,46 by the late 
Koryŏ, this story had become an accepted part of the Korean historical tradi-
tion,47 with both Tan’gun and Kija receiving ritual honors—Tan’gun, as founder 
of the Korean dynastic tradition and Kija as the one who provided moral edica-
tion and the beginnings of a Korean Confucian tradition. Disputes concerning 
their relative priority in state-sponsored rituals were unrelated, as Pae Usŏng has 
shown, to debates of nativism versus Sinocentrism, but were rather concerned 
with disputes about the proper priority between Tan’gun as initial ruler and 
Kija, as unrelated subsequent ruler who was nevertheless signicant enough to 
gain supreme honors himself.48
The treatment of these two gures strongly diverged following the develop-
ment of modern historical scholarship and Korean nationalism. Tan’gun was 
reinvented, not as a dynastic founder but as a racial ancestor—with Koreans 
describing themselves increasingly as “descendants of Tan’gun” (Tan’gun ŭi cha-
son). By contrast, Kija was frequently ignored, his historicity denied while the 
even more incredible accounts of Tan’gun were asserted as undeniable historical 
truth; even when Kija’s historicity was accepted, he was nevertheless seen as a 
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problem for the national narrative that was in need of explanation, at times even 
by transforming him into a Korean.49 Kija, as migrant, could be a representa-
tion of a Korean historical continuity and Chosŏn’s collective identity during 
the Chosŏn period, but was rendered inappropriate for just this role during the 
twentieth century by the very fact that he was a migrant.
Not surprisingly, considering that the early Chosŏn court traced the Korean 
dynastic tradition itself to a migrant, it showed little of the discomfort concern-
ing foreign elements that characterized twentieth-century Korea. As I discuss 
in chapter 1, the early Chosŏn state emerged, like the Ming, from the collapse 
of the Mongol empire. During the period of submission to the Mongols, Koryŏ 
subjects had been full participants in the Yuan empire, competing against and 
working with the Eurasian elite who governed the Yuan. With the collapse of 
the Mongol empire, rst the Koryŏ and then the Chosŏn state competed for the 
loyalties of former Yuan subjects, including especially Koreans, but also Jurchens 
and others. In fact, many of foreign ancestry allied themselves with the Korean 
monarchy during the chaos of the Yuan-Ming transition. Notably, the found-
ing monarch of the Chosŏn dynasty, Yi Sŏnggye, was himself from a family of 
Korean administrators of the Yuan empire who had operated in the culturally 
diverse world of Korea’s northeast.
The early Chosŏn state, especially during its rst century, was tasked with 
governing not only Koreans but also diverse Yuan subjects within its territory 
and Jurchens and Japanese on its frontiers. Chosŏn ocials established a diverse 
apparatus of techniques to exert in	uence on Jurchens located in Chosŏn’s cha-
otic northern borderlands and Japanese from the Japanese islands, which were 
then decentralized and oen in a state of civil war. The Chosŏn court encour-
aged borderlanders to replace raiding with trade (to adapt a phrase by Kenneth R. 
Robinson) and brought their leaders into a formal relationship with the Chosŏn 
court by oering them titles, positions in the Chosŏn bureaucracy, tribute visits 
to the Chosŏn capital of Hansŏng, and positions in the palace guard.50 In fact, 
outsiders were also allowed to settle on Chosŏn soil, in exchange for which they 
were granted submitting-foreigner status, which involved protection from most 
taxes and the granting of land, farm tools, and oen wives. Ultimately, through 
these techniques, the Chosŏn state created networks of people, inside and out-
side territory directly administered by the Chosŏn court, who had varying de-
grees of political, cultural, and economic connections to the Chosŏn court, and 
who linked the Chosŏn state, through informal ties, to the outside world. In 
addition to ruling Chosŏn, the Chosŏn monarch placed himself at the center 
of a number of small and semi-independent polities, including Jurchen towns 
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and small Japanese states, and most famously including the island of Tsushima 
located between Japan and Korea.51
Such divisions had their ideological aspect as well. The Chosŏn court de-
pended heavily on these informal ties, which also raised the status of the Chosŏn 
monarch by situating it as a civilizing center, operating in much the same man-
ner as the Ming empire to which Chosŏn was subordinate. The ritualized sub-
mission of outsiders in the Chosŏn capital of Hansŏng established the Chosŏn 
monarch as the center of Chunghwa civilization in its own right. Indeed, oen 
the Chosŏn court made rhetorical use of the Confucian distinctions between 
civilized (Ch. hua, K. hwa) and barbarian (Ch. yi, K. i), although this logic was 
imposed variably according to the particular needs of the Chosŏn court at the 
time. By no means was a strict distinction drawn, and Jurchens or Japanese were 
not necessarily unwelcome or marginalized by the Chosŏn state. In fact, ulti-
mately Jurchens and Japanese were weakly controlled subjects of the Chosŏn 
court who nevertheless played a vital role in Chosŏn’s defense, diplomacy, and 
ideology, and they thus could not be simply excluded or condemned.
The Chosŏn court’s tools for managing its frontiers were put to the test 
during the half century following 1592, when rst the Japanese, and then the 
Jurchen, coalesced to form powerful and centralizing states, which eliminated 
the diverse polities that had previously controlled the island of Japan and the 
Jurchen regions to Chosŏn’s north. This in turn brought war, and large num-
bers of foreign soldiers, into Chosŏn territory. In chapter 2, I discuss the rst of 
these wars, the Imjin War of 1592–1598, which brought large armies of invading 
Japanese into Chosŏn, followed by a similarly large and culturally diverse Ming 
military force, which came to defend Chosŏn. A signicant number of these 
soldiers remained in Chosŏn aer the war and were integrated into the Chosŏn 
state. Chapter 3 continues the discussion of foreign invasions, focusing on the 
early seventeenth-century wars associated with the rise of the Manchu khanate, 
which was formed initially from a coalescence of Jurchen groups, including for-
mer Jurchen subjects of the Chosŏn court. As the Manchu khanate expanded, 
eventually forming itself into the Qing empire that invaded the Ming empire 
between 1644 and 1661, it drove diverse peoples into Chosŏn territory, including 
Chinese-speaking refugees from Ming Liaodong and Jurchen refugees from the 
Tumen River.
Within this chaos, the Chosŏn court continued to make use of much the 
same techniques for administering foreign subjects that it had employed before 
1592. The Chosŏn court continued to compete actively for the loyalties of Jap-
anese and Jurchens, especially as the Japanese brought military skills that the 
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Chosŏn court needed. In fact, the Chosŏn court was if anything less welcoming 
to deserters and refugees from Chosŏn’s Ming hegemon. Ming deserters and 
Liaodongese refugees, like Japanese deserters, were welcomed by the Chosŏn 
court, especially if they had valuable skills. However, in contrast to Japanese and 
Jurchens, whose submission to the Chosŏn court could be envisioned, much as 
it had before 1592, as submission to the Confucian edication of the Chosŏn 
monarch, the submission of the Ming migrants and refugees carried with it the 
implication of disloyalty to the Ming state to which the Chosŏn court was, sup-
posedly, loyal. As for common people, I have found less evidence of ethnic resis-
tance than of cultural 	uidity, and indeed, the ease with which large numbers of 
Ming, Jurchens, Japanese, and border-crossing Koreans were able to move across 
cultural boundaries—by changing clothes or learning new languages—became 
a source of anxiety for the Chosŏn court. Whether Liaodongese, Japanese, or 
Jurchen, the Chosŏn court was concerned to prevent them from passing to easily 
across social, cultural, and political barriers, and through that, outside of the ad-
ministrative control of the Chosŏn court. Thus, more important than questions 
of civilized versus barbarian were questions of outsiders and insiders, which is to 
say, the question of who could, and who could not, be trusted to participate loy-
ally under the Chosŏn monarch and within Chosŏn’s system of social hierarchy.
New Identities in the Age of Centralizing Empires
Pamela Kyle Crossley has argued that the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries 
were an age of civilizing empires, as such military formations as the Qing, the 
Ottomans, and the Saavids made elaborate claims to their inheritance of the 
grand classical traditions of earlier empires and religious revelations.52 Taking 
advantage of much expanded literacy and availability of texts, these empires also 
sought to create new typologies for the peoples under their control, in the case 
of the Qing, “inventing coherent if formulaic cultural identities for its historical 
constituencies of Uighurs, Mongols, Manchus, Tibetans and Chinese, and pro-
ducing histories of the origins of them as homogeneous peoples.”53 These new 
identities and histories, of course, were brought under the grand and overarch-
ing imperial project. Her argument accords well with scholarship by Alexander 
Woodside and Victor Lieberman, who note a worldwide trend toward territorial 
consolidation, notable in the decline of small polities in Southeast Asia and the 
rise of large states such as Burma, Vietnam, and Thailand. Woodside and Li-
eberman also discuss the vernacularizing of high culture, whereby in East and 
Southeast Asia elite cultural norms (Confucian in Vietnam, Buddhist in Siam 
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and Burma) were extended over minority populations and lower-class commu-
nities, even as distinctions in social status themselves were preserved.54 Evelyn 
S. Rawski and Laura Hostetler, similarly, point to the role that new technolo-
gies and economic structures, in some cases originating from maritime Europe, 
played in the construction of increasingly centralized states in East Asia.55
Social and political developments in the late Chosŏn show much similarity 
to those happening elsewhere in the early modern world. To be sure, the late 
Chosŏn monarchy had pretensions to universality but was not an empire in the 
manner of the Qing, or indeed in the manner of the emerging Southeast Asian 
states.56 In contrast to the early Chosŏn, late Chosŏn’s in	uence was limited to 
the eight provinces that it governed directly through civil and military ocials 
dispatched from the center aided by hereditary local petty subocials and the 
local sajok aristocracy. Unlike the Qing empire, and indeed unlike Edo Japan 
and unlike Vietnam, the late Chosŏn monarchy did not have border peoples, 
minorities, or conquered populations over which to exert its civilizing mission. 
Yet the late Chosŏn monarchy, at once the subject and rival of the Qing empire, 
nevertheless maintained a community of foreign subjects—Jurchen, Japanese, 
and especially Chinese—who were governed and understood, initially at least, 
using much the same language that had been employed for foreigners during the 
early Chosŏn, even as the domestic and international contexts were completely 
dierent. Indeed, Chosŏn’s 1637 submission to the Qing brought to an end its 
active participation in the wars and con	icts of East Asia and signaled an end 
to the arrival of migrants. As both Japan under the Tokugawa shogunate and 
Manchuria and China under the Qing were reorganized under centralized con-
trol, the small polities with which Chosŏn had previously pursued its network 
of foreign aairs vanished, with the single exception of the island of Tsushima. 
Chosŏn claried its own boundaries, establishing a joint border with the Qing 
in 1712, and generally policing border crossing closely in coordination with both 
the Qing empire to the north and the Tokugawa shogunate to its south.57
Nevertheless, as I discuss in chapter 4, although very few migrants continued 
to arrive in Chosŏn, submitting-foreigner status, which had become essentially 
hereditary, continued to be used to administer migrants who had arrived be-
fore 1637. It was imposed identically on all foreigners and their descendants, 
Chinese, Japanese, and Jurchens, and it continued to be expressed rhetorically, 
by both Chosŏn court ocials and by submitting-foreigners themselves, as a 
protected status granted to outsiders who sought the Confucian edication of 
the Chosŏn monarch. As a tax status, it certainly became part of the centralizing 
tax reforms of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, as the Chosŏn court 
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sought to assert greater control over all of its subjects. However, except for a few 
submitting-foreigners who gained signicant positions in the military or as in-
terpreters, it was also a status notably lacking in prestige, such that its recipients, 
who inherited their status on the maternal line just like slaves, were frequently 
exposed to the extralegal exactions of petty functionaries.
Change in the status of submitting-foreigners did not occur until the 
mid-eighteenth century. The eighteenth century saw an ideological shi in the 
Chosŏn court. Through much of the seventeenth century aer Chosŏn’s sub-
mission to the Qing, the Chosŏn court engaged in secret and largely ineec-
tual plotting against the Qing empire, which they considered to be a barbarous 
usurper of the Ming legacy. With the fall of the last Ming successor in 1683, this 
plotting had gradually shied to a belief that Chosŏn was the last remaining 
representative of the Chunghwa tradition, a belief that was expressed ritually 
through an altar, the Taebodan, established in the Chosŏn palace complex, and 
through the active involvement of eighteenth-century monarchs in these rituals. 
This ritualization of the Chosŏn court’s Ming loyalism resulted, as is discussed 
in chapter 5, in the transformation of the social status of those submitting-for-
eigners who could claim Ming migrant origins. Those who could were recate-
gorized as “imperial subjects,” given preferment in military examinations, and 
encouraged by the Chosŏn court to participate actively in rituals in the Tae-
bodan. These changes beneted the Chosŏn court by strengthening its claim to 
inheritance of the Ming mantle. It was benecial also to the imperial subjects 
themselves, who gained a much-improved social status as a result.
Clearly, one cannot treat these developments as simply a re	ection of the 
Confucian nature of Chosŏn’s monarchy and sajok aristocracy, for the simple 
reason that there had been no obvious growth of Confucianism during the 
eighteenth century that could account for such a shi. Nor should it be seen, 
supercially, as simply a response to changes in court ritual, or as an aspect of the 
rise of Ming loyalist ideology.58 Rather, these developments were deeply bound 
up with broader trends occurring both domestically and internationally. Do-
mestically, the developments were related to the scal reforms of the eighteenth 
century and were part of a series of attempted reforms of the tax system. In this 
sense, as Kimura Takao has argued recently, the development of imperial sub-
ject status was related to the general attempts during the eighteenth century to 
strengthen the monarchy.59 It may thus be seen as a part of broader state activity 
to expand the reach of the central state by rationalizing the tax system, register-
ing the unregistered, and extending state surveillance of frontier regions and 
oshore islands.60
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Internationally, these reforms were linked to attempts by increasingly central-
ized empires to dene the identities of the peoples under their control. Above 
all, the rise of imperial subject status has echoes in the Qing empire, which, 
unlike the Ming empire, governed as a multiethnic empire over diverse peo-
ples: Manchu, Mongol, Tibetan, Uighur, as well as Han Chinese. During the 
eighteenth century, the Qing court increasingly sought to mold these formerly 
	uid and relational subject identities into absolute bureaucratic categories clearly 
under Qing control. Both by weeding out those with the wrong genealogy, and 
by standardizing Manchu and Mongol customs, the Qing created new categories 
for these groups, which were under the direction of the Qing court. For instance, 
the Qing court actively sought to clear out those with Han Chinese genealogies 
from the Manchu banners. In fact, although the Qing had only defeated the 
Ming through the support of the Ming defectors, during the eighteenth century 
these same defectors were posthumously condemned for betraying the Ming, 
by the Qing court, which by this time saw itself as the only proper heir to the 
Ming.61 The formation in Chosŏn of imperial subject status, a court-dened, 
ritualized identity, predicated on the absolute nature of their ancestors’ loyalty 
to the Ming, must be seen as a parallel development. Indeed, considering the ex-
tensive interaction between the Qing and Chosŏn courts, Chosŏn trends should 
be seen in part as responding to Qing developments.
There is a signicant quantity of sources available concerning foreigners in 
late Chosŏn, although this is to some extent obscured by the fact that the dif-
ferent sources reveal a very dierent image of migrants. Especially for the early 
Chosŏn, the bulk of surviving sources are ocial court records, including the 
Journal of the Royal Secretariat (Sŭngjŏngwŏn ilgi), The Transcribed Records of 
the Border Defense Command (Pibyŏnsa tŭngnok), and the Journal of the Oce 
of the Custodian of Foreign Visitors (Chŏn’gaeksa ilgi), as well as legal documents 
and Household Registry documents. These texts re	ect the position of foreign 
groups and their descendants at the time that they were written from the per-
spective of high ocials, and the institutional challenges in managing foreign-
ers. Broadly speaking, they reveal above all the generally low social status of most 
foreigners, and the diculties from the point of view of the Chosŏn court in 
administering them, although they also reveal considerable shis over time in 
the Chosŏn court’s response, with those written post-1750 increasingly re	ecting 
the development of imperial subject status. Also in this category are the Veri-
table Records (sillok) for each reign, which were compiled at the death of each 
monarch and made up of court documents, organized chronologically according 
to date, edited, simplied, and frequently sanitized, eliminating doubt, debate, 
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and views and information that were uncomfortable to the editors, although 
the extent of this sanitization varied from reign to reign. Somewhat dierent 
from these ocial sources were notes and private writings of scholars who en-
countered foreigners and foreign descendants before the 1750s. These private 
writings, appearing in the collected works of prominent scholars, in private his-
tories, or in collections of stories, were inevitably more personalized than ocial 
documents and less concerned with matters of policy.
Especially beginning with the 1750s, however, a new category of text appears: 
biographies of Ming Chinese migrants produced either under court auspices 
or by private authors, including Ming migrants themselves. As I discuss rst in 
chapter 5, and in greater detail in chapter 6, the formation of imperial subject 
status required the compilation of new texts and new archival materials. These 
new texts were sometimes based on edited versions of earlier documents, and 
sometimes, seemingly, entirely fraudulent new documents. Earlier records, es-
pecially those produced by private historians, could result in the Chosŏn state 
looking for the descendants of a Ming migrant to honor. At the same time as 
the Chosŏn state discovered new claimants to imperial subject status, it oen 
uncovered documents—at times of doubtful veracity—to conrm their claims. 
Genuine documents that had undergone editing and reinterpretation were gath-
ered together along with fraudulent documents in new archival collections, such 
as the late eighteenth-century Traces of the Acts of Imperial Subjects (Hwangjoin
sajŏk). They were also edited and fashioned into biographies contained with 
the court-sponsored Collected Texts on Honoring the Zhou (Chonju hwip’yŏn), 
or into collections produced by Kyujanggak scholars such as the Noble Pur-
pose (Noeroe nangnak) by Yi Tŏngmu (1741–1793) or the Biographies of Rem-
nant Subjects of the Imperial Ming (Hwangmyŏng yumin chŏn) by Sŏng Haeŭng 
(1760–1839). While the contents of the biographies diered, they all agreed in 
treating Ming migrants as a coherent category. Instead of the low-status refugees 
in shing villages, intermarrying with base-born Chosŏn women, that we nd 
in seventeenth-century sources, these palace-sponsored narratives created elite 
and educated Confucian paragons whose retreat to Chosŏn was entirely deter-
mined by their hostility to the Qing and their recognition of Chosŏn’s exclusive 
inheritance of Chunghwa civilization.
As will be discussed in chapter 6, during the nineteenth century impe-
rial subjects themselves took control in this process, actively internalizing 
court-sponsored narratives and developing them further in oen incredible 
directions, oen far beyond what the palace scholars had been willing to ac-
cept, even as they further strengthened their ritualized Ming loyalist identity by 
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creating their own Ming loyalist shrines and altars. Through this process, new 
texts were written, based in part upon the ocial court narratives but frequently 
involving 	ights of fancy that went far beyond what the court would accept, 
including The Record of Remnant Subjects of the Imperial Dynasty (Hwangjo
yumin nok) by Wang Tŏkku, or the improved and expanded Collected Works 
of Mohadang (Mohadangjip), which provided a much more orthodox history 
for a key Japanese defector lineage in Chosŏn. By doing so, these foreign de-
scent-groups fully accepted the historical identities the Chosŏn court had 
imposed upon them. This represented a vernacularization of the Chunghwa 
ideology of Chosŏn’s sajok aristocracy. These texts have continued to be repro-
duced by the descendants of imperial subject families, who have gathered them 
together in easily accessible form,62 and they have in turn attracted a certain 
amount of scholarly attention, including excellent studies by U Kyŏngsŏp and 
Liu Chunlan, with Liu especially using them to provide a pioneering survey of 
the key migrants and descent-groups.63 On face value, they seem to have very lit-
tle relation to the records from the period of migration or from the seventeenth 
century, and it can thus seem as if we suer from a dearth of records on Ming mi-
grants to Chosŏn.64 However, read carefully, these texts reveal echoes of the very 
dierent circumstances of the seventeenth century and also provide a window 
into the later social processes experienced by the migrants. Much like the spread 
of norms of widow chastity among low-status people, the spread of surnames 
among slaves, and cultural assertions of chungin specialists and petty function-
aries during the same period,65 this involved a spread of elite norms to nonelites. 
Imperial subjects were not a diasporic community of Chinese rediscovering their 
identities, but Koreans, of generally foreign ancestry and of low or middling 
status, internalizing a narrative provided for them by the Chosŏn court.
Chosŏn’s sajok aristocracy formed an imagined community that was markedly 
dierent from that of the modern nation-state, and certainly with only limited 
resemblance to the racialized nation-state of twentieth-century Korea. During 
the early Chosŏn, despite the presence of the admired Ming empire that most 
sajok aristocrats agreed in honoring, Chosŏn formed its own rival Chunghwa 
centricity, through which it encompassed Jurchens, Japanese, and indeed Ming 
deserters who it brought under its control. The late Chosŏn saw a shi, not to 
nationalism, but to a more bureaucratic and centralized relationship with people 
seen as foreign, as the Chosŏn court, which at this point considered itself to be 
the only remnant of Chunghwa civilization, dened some of its foreign subjects 
as “imperial subjects” and representatives of the fallen Ming. Understanding mi-
grants and foreigners during the Chosŏn period requires us to look beyond the 
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clichés of Western nationalism and rather to consider the changing ideological 
and administrative contexts of the early modern Chosŏn state.
A Note on Names, Languages, and Dates
An omnipresent challenge when writing about border-crossers is the question 
of names. Many of the people I discuss began their careers in China and ended 
them in Korea. In the sources, their names are written in Chinese characters, 
but when writing in English it is necessary to choose between pinyin roman-
ization (which represents them as Chinese) and McCune-Reischauer (which 
represents them as Korean). My general solution is to romanize the names of the 
original migrants in pinyin, while occasionally placing the McCune- Reischauer 
in parentheses—for instance, Kang Shijue (K. Kang Sejak). However, in the 
case of the Shang migrant Kija (Ch. Jizi), I use the McCune-Reischauer be-
cause the story of Kija had become so thoroughly Koreanized. Titles of books 
published in Chosŏn containing the name of the migrant are also rendered in 
McCune-Reischauer (for instance, Kang Sejak chasul), as are the names of the 
Korean-born descendants of the migrants. In some cases, this will result in the 
surnames of the original migrants becoming confusingly dierent from their 
descendants—thus, the surname of the Uighur Xie Xun is pronounced “Sŏl” 
in Korean.
Most foreign terms and titles used in this book are Korean, with some in 
Chinese. In some cases, I provide both Korean and Chinese romanizations: for 
instance, Chunghwa (Ch. Zhonghua). When I refer to Japanese (Ja.), Jurchen 
(Ju.), Russian (R.), Mongol (Mo.), or Manchu (Ma.) terms, I generally indicate 
this specically unless it is otherwise obvious. As a general rule, foreign terms 
are Korean (K.) unless noted otherwise.
My translation of terminology follows a mix of authorities, referring to Huck-
er’s A Dictionary of Ocial Titles in Imperial China,66 as well as the online glos-
sary provided by the Academy of Korean Studies67 and Sun Joo Kim’s “Korean 
History Glossary,”68 which themselves are compiled based on the work of earlier 
authorities.
This book discusses a considerable diversity of premodern nationalities, or 
ethnies, to use Anthony Smith’s terminology.69 Perhaps the most dicult eth-
nie to refer to consistently are Koreans. Although it may seem anachronistic 
to some, it is simply impossible not to use the term Korean, for instance to dis-
tinguish Korean subjects of the Chosŏn court from those of Japanese, Jurchen, 
and other origins who had also become subject to the Chosŏn court. It is also 
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necessary to use “Korean” when referring to people across dynastic traditions. Of 
course, as I have discussed in this introduction, there were terms such as Tongguk
that did indeed refer to Korea without respect to dynastic boundaries, so it is 
not perhaps as anachronistic as some might imagine. The group that I refer to as 
Jurchens, for that matter, was both internally diverse and, especially in Chosŏn 
records aer the late eenth century, frequently referred to very simply as ho, 
hoin, or yain—northern nomads or wild people. My use of “Jurchen” is thus an 
anachronistic simplication, but also hard to avoid.
Finally, most dates within this text refer to the lunar-solar calendar in stan-
dard use in early modern Korea and China. I do provide the year in the Grego-
rian calendar that corresponds to most of the East Asian lunar-solar year. How-
ever, as the Gregorian year and the East Asian lunar-solar year are not precisely 
identical, there is some mismatch—so, the thirtieth day of the twelh month 
of the pyŏngja year under Injo is in fact early 1637 according to the Gregorian 
calendar, not 1636. I only rarely make note of such inconsistencies.
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Foreign Communities in Early Chosŏn
A lthough the Chosŏn state oen appears in the history books as a homogenous regime, it in fact included a considerable foreign com-munity and was linked to networks of people extending far beyond 
Chosŏn’s borders. The new Chosŏn state emerged from the Koryŏ state that 
had been fully integrated as a subordinate kingdom into the cosmopolitan Yuan 
dynasty and inherited some of this diversity, including the Northeast Asian o-
cialdom of the Yuan empire. Furthermore, both the northern terrestrial frontier 
of the Chosŏn state and its southern maritime frontier with Japan were cha-
otic, violent spaces, characterized by small polities and independent actors who 
subsisted partly through plunder. The early Chosŏn state responded to these 
circumstances by organizing petty rulers among the Jurchens to their north and 
the Japanese to their south into a subordinate relationship with the Chosŏn 
monarchy. It also encouraged outsiders to settle on Chosŏn soil as subjects of 
the Chosŏn monarch.
Although the early Chosŏn monarchy accepted its subordination to the Ming em-
pire, it also asserted its own independent status. This was reected by the institu-
tion that it employed to settle foreigners on its soil, namely submitting-foreigner 
(hyanghwain) status. This status not only encompassed a series of bureaucratic 
practices for settling foreign migrants in Chosŏn but also was imbued with ideo-
logical content, namely the idea that the Chosŏn monarch was his own civiliz-
ing center, edifying outsiders who submitted to the Chosŏn state and bringing 
moral transformation not only to Jurchens and Japanese, but even in some cases 
to Chinese who chose to reside in Chosŏn.
The complexities of the Chosŏn court’s ideological position vis-à-vis China is 
also reected in its dealings with those of its subjects and their descendants who 
had entered the state from China and Inner Asia in the period of Yuan domi-
nance, during which time Koryŏ had become part of a vast international empire 
centered on the Yuan capital of Daidu. Links established at that time continued 
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aer the fall of the Yuan, and the descendants of the Yuan newcomers were in 
high demand at the early Chosŏn court, where they played a vital role as techni-
cal specialists in language, law codes, and rites, albeit in positions subordinate to 
those of the sajok aristocrats, who alone had access to the top positions.
Yuan Subjects of Koryŏ and Chosŏn
In 1388, Yi Sŏnggye, a general from a Korean family that had served the Mon-
gols in Ssangsŏng in northeastern Korea, refused to ght the Ming armies sent 
against Koryŏ, and instead turned his army against King U. By 1392, Yi Sŏnggye 
established a new dynasty, called Chosŏn; aer a stormy beginning, under his 
son, Yi Pangwŏn (1367–1422), posthumously known as T’aejong (r. 1400–1418), 
relations with the Ming empire to Chosŏn’s west were nally stabilized. No lon-
ger integrated into the vast Eurasian Yuan empire, and free from the chaos of 
the Yuan-Ming transition, the Chosŏn state continued to host remnants of the 
period of Yuan domination—descendants of the Eurasian ocialdom of the 
Yuan period who were integrated into the Chosŏn state in a subordinate posi-
tion within the Chosŏn status hierarchy.
The early Koryŏ court had generally accepted the overall supremacy of the 
various Chinese empires, but, thanks to the disunion of China, was able to main-
tain considerable independence in its relations with them. Aer Koryŏ submit-
ted to the Yuan in 1259, it was deeply integrated, in the manner of other subor-
dinate kingdoms, into the Yuan state, with considerable exchange in ocials 
and overlapping administrative structures.1 During the reign of King Kongmin 
(r. 1351–1374), the Koryŏ state reoriented itself toward the new Ming empire. 
Although the deep integration that had characterized relations with the Yuan 
came to an end, the late Koryŏ and early Chosŏn accepted a far more thorough 
subordination to the Ming than the Koryŏ had oered Chinese dynasties be-
fore the Mongol conquest.2 The submission of the Koryŏ and Chosŏn courts 
to the Ming, moreover, went beyond realpolitik and involved the acceptance by 
both court and sajok aristocracy that the Ming emperor had achieved his posi-
tion through the mandate of heaven and was required by his position to act as 
a transformative force over subject kingdoms. Like earlier Chinese dynasties, 
the Ming’s right to hegemony was seen to be based on the Ming dynasty’s posi-
tion as civilized and civilizing center (Ch. hua, K. hwa). In return, the barbarian 
(Ch. yi, K. i) kingdoms on its frontiers, also known as vassal, fence, or boundary 
kingdoms (Ch. fan, K. pŏn), were supposed to act as a defensive shield for the 
Chinese empire.
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Yet, despite accepting such seemingly ethnicized distinctions between Chi-
nese and non-Chinese, and despite placing itself securely within the category of 
vassal to the Ming, rst the Koryŏ court and then the Chosŏn accepted migrants 
from China in distinctly subordinate roles, clearly marking them below the Ko-
rean sajok aristocracy that controlled the civil bureaucracy of the Chosŏn state. 
Even before its submission to the Mongols, Koryŏ had been the recipient of di-
verse migrants of all classes and origins, including Parhaeans, Jurchens, Khitans, 
Turks, Japanese, and Song Chinese traders. Once in Koryŏ, these migrants were 
frequently oered a range of benets to encourage their settlement, including 
land, tax reductions, and even wives. Korean surnames were frequently granted 
to those who did not have them, and even Song people and others who already 
had Chinese-style names and surnames could be given new ones. Prominent mi-
grants of all origins were granted titles and ocial positions to strengthen their 
loyalty. Although the overwhelming objective for the Koryŏ court seems indeed 
to have been to increase its tax-paying population, migrants entering Koryŏ were 
oen employed in the military and as crasmen. Others were brought in spe-
cically for their particular skills, with some notable migrants, especially Song 
merchants, also gaining prominent positions in the bureaucracy.3
The period of Mongol supremacy was characterized by especially intense 
population exchange. As with other subordinate states, Koryŏ sent its crown 
princes to the Mongol capital to serve in the Yuan keshig (palace guard), Koryŏ 
ocials to serve in the Yuan capital, and Koryŏ women and eunuchs to serve 
in the palace in Daidu. In exchange, Koryŏ received Chinggisid princesses as 
royal brides, and Yuan darughachi as administrators who linked Koryŏ’s internal 
administration with the administration of the broader Yuan empire. Regions 
on the frontiers of Koryŏ came under direct Yuan control for varying lengths of 
time, including Tongnyŏng in present-day North P’yŏngan Province in Koryŏ’s 
northwest, T’amna on the island of Cheju to Koryŏ’s south, and Ssangsŏng com-
mandery in present-day Hamgyŏng in Koryŏ’s northeast.4 Members of Koryŏ’s 
sajok aristocracy took the civil service exams in the Yuan or otherwise gained 
extensive experience in the Yuan capital. In fact, Yi Sŏnggye himself came from a 
Korean family that had served the Mongols over several generations in Manchu-
ria and Ssangsŏng; his father, Yi Chach’un (1315–1361) submitted to Koryŏ under 
Kongmin (r. 1351–1374) in 1356 as Mongol power declined and Koryŏ occupied 
Ssangsŏng commandery.5
Not only did Koryŏ ocials serve the Yuan, but Chinese and Inner Asians 
served in the Koryŏ court during the period of Mongol supremacy, with many 
continuing to serve with the Chosŏn monarchy as well. Ideologically, even as 
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the Koryŏ court was subject to the Chinese emperor, Koryŏ and Chosŏn civil 
bureaucrats saw their monarch as receiving subordinate people from abroad who 
were attracted to Korea’s civilized culture and manners. Thus, before and during 
submission to the Yuan, the Koryŏ monarch granted outsiders, whatever their 
origins, Korean names and clan seats (pon’gwan), marking them as subjects of 
the Koryŏ court even if their ancestors originated somewhere else and allowing 
them to establish minor oce-holding descent-groups.6
A somewhat anomalous case is that of the southern island of Cheju, which, 
as T’amna, was under direct Yuan administration following 1273 and under 
joint Koryŏ-Yuan administration following 1294. As discussed by Kim Iru, 
during the period of Mongol and joint Mongol-Koryŏ rule, the area received 
extensive inuence from the Yuan at a popular level, in the form of Mongol 
soldiers, prisoners, and horse breeders on the island and intermarriage between 
Mongols and local Cheju people. Already culturally distinct from Koryŏ, and 
having been under a semiautonomous ruler, Mongol inuence brought even 
greater distinction. As Kim describes, the names of islanders appearing in The 
History of Koryŏ (Koryŏsa) are oen Mongol in origin, suggesting that they are 
either Mongol descendants or from mixed Mongol-Cheju households.7 Such 
cultural eclecticism carried with it political implications, as the T’amna horse-
breeder (Mo. hachi) elites, of mixed Mongol-Cheju parentage, had a connection 
to the Yuan empire that was unmediated by Koryŏ or Chosŏn. As a result, 
during the period of Koryŏ orientation against the Yuan, the hachi elites re-
volted several times, notably in 1375 when King Kongmin, in response to Ming 
commands, attempted to supply Cheju horses to the Ming war eort against 
the Northern Yuan.8
Nor did the eventual suppression of the hachi revolts bring an end to the 
cultural hybridity of Cheju. The Ming Hongwu emperor continued to entertain 
claims on Cheju even aer it was restored to Koryŏ rule. Although actual Ming 
claims could be deected, the Ming not only demanded special tribute in horses 
but also continued the Yuan practice of using the island as a prison island—exil-
ing to Cheju, on the assumption of good treatment, defeated Mongol rivals and 
also members of the defeated Yunnan kingdom that formed aer the collapse of 
the Yuan empire.9 Reecting this fact, in The Augmented Survey of Korean Geog-
raphy (Sinjŭng Tongguk yŏji sŭngnam), included among the surnames for Cheju 
are those such as Cho, Yi, and Sŏk that are listed as having the clan seat Wŏn 
(implying Mongol origins) and those such as Yang, An, Kang, and Tae, whose 
clan seat is listed as Unnam (Yunnan), which in a note is explicitly connected to 
the exile of the leaders of Yunnan during the early Ming.10
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Outside of the unusual context of Cheju, there were also Yuan ocials who 
continued to serve the Koryŏ and Chosŏn courts. An example of the persistence 
of Yuan-period networks during the early Chosŏn may be seen with ocials 
originating among the Uighurs, the Central Asian people who gave the Mongols 
their script and frequently served in a scribal capacity within the Mongol empire. 
The best-known Uighur ocial in Koryŏ and Chosŏn is Xie Xun (K. Sŏl Son). 
Xie’s original name was Xie Boliaoxun. He was from a prominent family of Ui-
ghur semuren,11 ocials based in the lower Yangzi who had a notable tradition 
of exam success. Like other Uighur semuren in the Yuan, the Xie continued to 
play an important administrative role as Uighur ocials even aer they were 
cut o from their homeland, the Uighur kingdom of Qocho (Ch. Gaochang), 
when it fell to the Chaghatai khanate in 1275.12 Xie Xun himself advanced both 
through his mastery of the Confucian knowledge and through his status as 
a semuren, the later identity linking him through patronage networks to the 
Mongol-dominated court. As with many semuren, he began rst as a valet (Mo. 
sügürchi) to the Yuan khan, but then showed his mastery of the Chinese literary 
tradition by passing the jinshi exam in 1345, aer which he held such positions 
as compiler in the Yuan Hanlin academy and a judge in the Bureau of Tibetan 
and Buddhist Aairs. He also obtained a position as a corrector of documents 
in the imperial heir apparent’s study, for which both his knowledge of the Zhu 
Xi school of Neo-Confucianism and his facility in Uighur were likely useful. 
In 1356, the collapse of the Yuan and the rise of the Red Turban rebels drove 
him to Koryŏ from his residence north of Beijing. Not only was his family’s 
home near Nanjing rendered inaccessible by the growing civil unrest, but Xie 
Xun had formed a connection with the king of Koryŏ, King Kongmin, when, 
as crown prince, he had been stationed in the imperial keshig in Daidu. King 
Kongmin thus welcomed Xie Xun upon his arrival in Koryŏ in 1358, granting 
him the titles of Marquis of Puwŏn (Puwŏnhu). In a nod to Xie Xun’s Uighur 
origins, Kongmin also granted him the title Earl of Gaochang (Koch’angbaek), 
with this linking Xie to the Uighur homeland that had been under the control 
of the Chaghatai khanate since before he was born. As Michael C. Brose argues, 
it is likely that, beyond pure personal connections, King Kongmin was eager to 
benet from the inuence and connections of an important Yuan ocial from 
a large Yuan Uighur ocial family, an advantage cut short by Xie Xun’s death 
soon aer his arrival.13
Indeed, while some prominent foreign families fell into obscurity during the 
Chosŏn period, a signicant number of Yuan-origin ocials, many of whom 
were eeing the chaos of the Red Turban uprising, continued to serve under the 
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Chosŏn court, employing their skills especially in diplomacy and the military, 
while providing the benet of their linguistic abilities and their connections. 
These ocials included Na Se, a Mongol, who served loyally under Yi Sŏnggye 
in a military capacity, participating in the campaigns against Japanese pirates 
both during the late Koryŏ and early Chosŏn and dying in the harness at the age 
of seventy-eight in 1397, ve years aer Chosŏn’s founding.14 Another notable 
example is Xie Xun’s son Xie Changshou (K. Sŏl Changsu, 1341–1399). He began 
his career in Yuan, but took his examinations under King Kongmin and par-
ticipated in diplomatic exchanges with the Ming. He may have lost some of his 
prominence aer the assassination of King Kongmin, but he emerged once more 
in an inuential position during the later years of King U, gaining particular 
importance aer Yi Sŏnggye deposed King U in 1388.15 Notably, Xie Changshou 
maintained his ancestor’s connection to China and uency in Chinese, as may 
be seen in the letter that Xie Changshou received from the Hongwu emperor in 
1387 aer a diplomatic mission. Intermixed with numerous criticisms, the em-
peror did state that, in contrast to the low-ranking interpreters that the Koryŏ 
court had previously sent to the Ming capital of Nanjing, Xie Changshou was of 
an old ocial family and could be expected to communicate properly his com-
mands to the Koryŏ court.16 Aer 1388, Xie continued to play a prominent diplo-
matic role, defending Yi Sŏnggye’s overthrow of King U to the Ming’s Hongwu 
emperor. As Im Sŏnbin points out, the fact that his uncle was serving as envoy 
on the Ming side was likely a key reason for the selection of Xie Changshou, as 
was his ability in foreign languages; indeed, he was sent on diplomatic missions 
to the Ming capital of Nanjing eight times.17 In Chosŏn, his linguistic skills 
were put to use when he was employed as a supervisor (chejo) in the Interpret-
ers’ Bureau (Yŏgwŏn), a role in which he contributed to organizing education in 
Chinese, Mongolian, and the Uighur script.18 Socially, he intermarried with a 
Korean aristocratic family and maintained extensive connections with promi-
nent ocials in the Koryŏ and Chosŏn courts.19
Other members of what became the Sŏl descent-group continued to play a 
prominent role in the late Koryŏ and early Chosŏn, acting both as linguistic and 
ideological experts on Chunghwa civilization for the Korean court. Sŏl Kyŏngsu 
(b. 1376) and Sŏl Maesu (. 1370s–1420s), for instance, both worked as inter-
preters but also served in the Oce for Special Councilors (Hongmun’gwan), 
an institution concerned not only with literary matters but also with providing 
advice on policy based on the tradition of Chinese classics and statecra. In the 
following generation, Sŏl Sun (d. 1435) gained especial prominence, eventually 
rising to the position of governor of Kangwŏn Province. More signicantly, he 
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obtained a position in the Academy of Worthies (Chiphyŏnjŏn), the institution 
that, under King Sejong, became a central organ for royal advice and for research 
on statecra, legal matters, and indeed linguistics and natural philosophy. In 
this capacity, Sŏl Sun was commissioned by King Sejong (r. 1418–1450) to com-
pile a guide to Neo-Confucian morality—The Illustrated Conduct of the Three 
Bonds (Samgang haengsil do).20
By no means was the Sŏl descent-group unique. Other Yuan ocials and 
their descendants acted as ocials, generally in a diplomatic capacity, frequently 
showing their ability specically in such technical matters that were usually be-
neath the notice of prominent civil ocials of Korean origin. A common feature 
uniting many Yuan-origin ocials in Chosŏn was their close association with 
Yi Sŏnggye before he gained control of the Koryŏ state in 1388. For instance, Yi 
Hyŏn (?–1415) was another Uighur who, on account of his Chinese language 
ability, participated extensively in diplomatic exchanges with the Ming on 
Chosŏn’s behalf. He seems to have been the grandson of a man named Bayan 
who came to Koryŏ as retainer of the Chinggisid princess Cheguk, the daughter 
of Khubilai, who arrived in Koryŏ in 1286 as the bride of King Ch’ungnyŏl (r. 
1274–1308). The precise history of Bayan’s descendants is not clear, but it seems 
that they maintained their Eurasian character, for Yi Hyŏn was employed during 
the early Chosŏn as both diplomat and interpreter.
As well, there were several Han Chinese–origin ocials. For instance, Wu 
Jin (K. O Chin), of Han Chinese origin, played an active role as interpreter 
during the early Chosŏn, even rising to the loy heights of second rank. This 
fact was pointed out in 1430, when Wu’s wife was punished brutally for com-
mitting adultery with another ocial. Court discussion of this case noted that 
the old interpreter Wu Jin “was not originally of an ocial family,” and despite 
his high rank had “failed to distinguish inner [feminine] and outer [masculine] 
spheres in administering his household.”21 Another interpreter, Li Mindao (K. 
Yi Mindo, 1336–1395), the descendant of a prominent Yuan ocial, Li Gongye, 
rose to prominence during the late Koryŏ as a supporter of Yi Sŏnggye. Aer 
Yi Sŏnggye had established the new dynasty, Li Mindao was granted the status 
of merit subject and was enfeoed by Yi as Lord of Sangsan (Sangsan’gun), the 
hometown of his Korean wife. He reformed the clothing style according to Chi-
nese precedent during the late Koryŏ and showed his skill in both fortune-telling 
and medicine.22 Tang Cheng (K. Tang Sŏng, 1337–1413), also of Chinese ori-
gin, showed a knowledge of legal statutes (yullyŏng). In a hagiographic account 
written aer his death, he was remembered for bravely challenging Yi Sŏnggye’s 
rival Ch’oe Yŏng, who was ignoring the law to pursue a personal vendetta. Tang 
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Cheng also demonstrated his skill at writing diplomatic documents to be sent 
to the Ming court.23 Finally of note is Mae U, whose grandfather Mei Junrui 
(K. Mae Kunsŏ) ed the collapse of the Yuan and served in an ocial capacity 
during the late Koryŏ, as did both Mae U himself and his father, Mae Wŏnjŏ.24
The presence of ocials skilled in translation was vital for the early Chosŏn 
state as it negotiated its position in a turbulent Northeast Asia. The Ming did 
not, however, encourage the private movement of people that had characterized 
the Yuan. Indeed, a few decades aer Chosŏn’s foundation, the almost invariable 
response of the Chosŏn court to the arrival of Chinese in its borders was to repa-
triate them to the Ming. This limited movement of people resulted in a lack of 
expertise for the court in either spoken Chinese (Hanŏ or Hwaŏ) or the written 
vernacular of the Ming bureaucracy (imun). Under T’aejong, worry was speci-
cally expressed that the Chosŏn court was so dependent on Tang Cheng’s ability 
in the written vernacular that Tang’s death would be disastrous for Chosŏn’s 
diplomatic capabilities.25 During the reign of Sejong, the contribution of the 
migrants from the Yuan, such as Xie Changshou, in maintaining spoken Chi-
nese language skills among Chosŏn interpreters was well recognized.26 In fact, 
the Chosŏn court under Sejong twice went against the ordinary precedent of 
repatriating to the Ming any Chinese captives of the Jurchen recovered by the 
Chosŏn court, in both cases specically pointing to the dearth of competent 
Chinese interpreters.27 Such cases, however, were rare and should be seen as un-
usual exceptions to the rule.
Frontier Peoples in Early Chosŏn
Although Chinese and other Inner Asians largely ceased to migrate to Chosŏn 
aer the turmoil of the Ming-Qing transition, migration itself to Chosŏn did 
not cease. The early Chosŏn state was bounded by zonal frontiers and charac-
terized by a mismatch between the territory claimed by the monarch and the 
regions in which the monarch could exert eective administrative jurisdiction. 
Partly as a result, the early Chosŏn monarch ruled over culturally heterogenous 
peoples, including Jurchens from the Hamgyŏng region, Japanese from the is-
land of Tsushima that was claimed, but not administered, by the Chosŏn mon-
arch, and diverse peoples who arrived from beyond the administrative reach of 
Chosŏn in order to pursue trade or other opportunities.
Through its relationship with these peoples, Chosŏn maintained its own 
separate and autonomous system of foreign aairs, whereby Chosŏn acted as 
the civilizing Chunghwa to barbarian peoples on its frontiers. As Kenneth R. 
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Robinson has said, “the King of Chosŏn Korea showed dierent faces to dier-
ent people,” and even as it subordinated itself to the Ming emperor, it acted as 
an equal under the same Ming-centric order with the king of Ryukyu and the 
shogun of Muromachi Japan, and acted as a supreme ruler in charge of his own 
domain with Jurchen clan leaders on its northern border and petty Japanese and 
Ryukyuan potentates on its maritime frontier.28 These networks provided an 
extension of Chosŏn’s monarchical authority beyond the lands directly under 
its eective administrative control and created a class of intermediate people, at 
once subjects of Chosŏn and foreigners.
Chosŏn and Maritime Peoples
The Koryŏ-Chosŏn transition coincided with disorder in the maritime world 
by Korea’s coastal regions. As the Kamakura Bakufu (1185–1333) of Japan went 
into collapse in part because of the challenge of the Yuan invasions of the late 
thirteenth century, new potentates asserted their independent control within 
the maritime world of Northeast Asia. These potentates gained power in key lo-
cations near signicant shipping routes and were able to lead multiethnic crews 
Northern Korea and Six Garrisons during the Early Chosŏn.  
(Draed by Thomas Quartermain.)
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of maritime peoples on raids not only within Japan but also further aeld against 
Chinese and Korean coasts. This disorder continued aer the formation of the 
Muromachi Bakufu (1336–1573) in Japan.29
Partly in response to this chaos, during the late fourteenth century the Ming 
empire turned away from the active support for international commerce that 
had characterized the Yuan dynasty. Beginning in 1371, the Ming empire banned 
private travel overseas and restricted commerce to tribute trade at a set num-
ber of ports. This forced the Muslim merchants based in China’s coastal cities 
who wished to pursue overseas trade to move to other countries entirely, espe-
cially Southeast Asia.30 In their place, the Ming cultivated sea lords based in the 
Ryukyu island chain between Kyushu and Taiwan, allowing former raiders and 
pirates based on those islands to act as intermediaries in China’s maritime trade, 
culminating in the formation in 1429 of a single kingdom based on the island of 
Okinawa. Whether in its disunited form or as a unied kingdom, Ryukyu main-
tained a regular tribute relationship and benecial trading connections with the 
Ming, which in turn hoped to redirect the potentates of islands away from piracy 
and toward peaceful trade.31
In Korean records, piratical groups based in Japan and Ryukyu are referred to 
as Japanese raiders (K. waegu, Ja. wakō), the term with which they are most oen 
known in current scholarship. Beginning in 1350, and with increasing regularity 
aer 1370, Koryŏ and Chosŏn suered numerous attacks from these Japanese 
raiders, who came in eets ranging from y to two hundred ships, at times 
striking deep inland, causing great destruction in southern Korea especially and 
interrupting tax-grain shipments to the capital.32 Both Koryŏ and Chosŏn re-
sponded militarily to the threat and some of Yi Sŏnggye’s early successes were 
against Japanese raiders. These campaigns continued aer Yi Sŏnggye’s ascent to 
the throne, even extending to direct attacks onto the island of Tsushima (K. Tae-
mado), located almost equidistant from Japan’s Kyushu and Chosŏn’s Kyŏng-
sang Province. These military campaigns culminated in a successful attack on 
Tsushima in 1419.33
In addition to such military means, the Chosŏn court also attempted to use 
diplomacy to bring order to its coasts, initially forming relations with the state 
with which it could relate as a status equal, namely the Muromachi Bakufu. 
Chosŏn’s ties with the Bakufu, generally described as neighborly (kyorin) rela-
tions in Japanese and Korean scholarship, were of little ecacy, as the Muroma-
chi shogun had only weak control over the Japanese potentates of Kyushu and 
southwestern Honshu, who were especially vital for maintaining the security 
of Chosŏn’s maritime frontier. As a result, Chosŏn formed direct relationships 
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with these potentates, whereby the Chosŏn monarch received tribute and pro-
vided in exchange bureaucratic titles, trading rights, and indeed the right to 
visit the Chosŏn capital. Through these ties, the Chosŏn monarch sought to 
eliminate the threat of Japanese raiders.
The Chosŏn court received the Japanese and Ryukyuan potentates with 
whom it formed relationships into four hierarchical grades, with the highest 
grade granted to the kings of Ryukyu and Japan; the next grade granted to 
powerful families of southwestern Honshu and Kyushu, such as the Ōuchi and 
Shōni families; the third grade granted to the governor (Ja. shugo) of Tsushima 
and the regent (Ja. tandai) of Kyushu; and the fourth to islanders from Tsu-
shima and Iki as well as those Japanese who had been granted a military post 
by the Chosŏn court. These reception grades, along with the bureaucratic ranks 
that the Chosŏn court granted its Japanese allies, integrated Japanese potentates 
as members of the Chosŏn bureaucracy and thus subjects of the Chosŏn state. 
Beyond that, Chosŏn also actively promoted and participated in the reception 
of Japanese monk-envoys and the submission of Buddhist texts and objects to 
Japan and Ryukyu. By cultivating subjects in Japan, the Chosŏn court estab-
lished interlocutors through whom it could, for instance, repatriate Chosŏn 
subjects who had been captured by raiders, and, indeed, prevent the actions of 
Japanese raiders in the rst place. From the perspective of those Japanese poten-
tates who had been granted such status, tribute missions to the Chosŏn capital 
were, above all, opportunities for trade.34
Especially following its 1419 invasion of Tsushima, Chosŏn centralized much 
of its diplomatic engagement with Japan on the island itself. Tsushima had played 
the role of intermediary between the Koryŏ court and Japanese regimes from 
the twelh century until the attempted Mongol invasion of Japan from Korea. 
Located close to southern Korea (to the extent that it is visible from Pusan on a 
clear day), but otherwise infertile, it became a major center for the Japanese raid-
ers during the late Koryŏ. In the early Chosŏn, it was under the control of the Sō 
family of governors, to whom, by the mid-eenth century, the Chosŏn court 
granted the right to mediate nearly all trade and diplomatic relations between it 
and the Japanese and Ryukyuans, including issuing passports to Japanese envoys 
and traders who wished to trade with Chosŏn and controlling access to the three 
southern ports at which much of the trade with Japan occurred.
The governor of Tsushima’s position as intermediary between Chosŏn and 
Japan was made possible because the Chosŏn court considered it to be originally 
part of Korea. This view contrasted with the attitudes of the Koryŏ court (which 
had recognized Tsushima as a foreign state) and, moreover, did not imply a real 
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attempt by the Chosŏn administration to impose any actual administration 
upon the islands. The court did dispatch ocials for the purpose of investigation 
(kyŏngch’agwan), reception (sŏnwisa), and inspection (chech’alsa). Although these 
oces primarily served a diplomatic purpose, the terms of their mandate were 
domestic, rather than diplomatic.35 Tsushima, in the language of the Chosŏn 
court, was a hedge or fence (pŏlli or pŏn) for Chosŏn, informing it of matters in 
Japan and acting on its behalf to facilitate the return of Chosŏn people who had 
been abducted during raids or whose ships had run ashore in Japan. Tsushima 
was at once part of, and foreign to, Chosŏn.
Chosŏn and Northern Peoples
Similar processes also occurred in Chosŏn’s relationship with the Jurchens resid-
ing, together with other related groups, in the forested regions on the northern 
border of Korea and in present-day Manchuria, where they practiced a mix of ag-
riculture, herding, and hunting. They played a signicant role in Korean history, 
especially during the Koryŏ period, when control over the Jurchens was a key 
point of contention and rivalry between the Khitan Liao and Koryŏ. Jurchens 
also served in Koryŏ armies and were brought in to ll bureaucratic positions 
within Koryŏ, while those outside of Koryŏ itself were granted bureaucratic and 
other specialized positions.36 Such active inuence by Koryŏ over Jurchens was 
inevitably curtailed with the rise of a Jin state based among the Jurchens in the 
twelh century and later by the annexation of Jurchen lands in both Koryŏ 
and Manchuria by the Mongols in the thirteenth. Aer the collapse of Mongol 
rule in Northeast Asia, Jurchens formed independent polities in the land north 
of Ming Liaodong and northwest of Korea, with economies depending in part 
on raiding against the sedentary peoples—Chinese and Koreans—with whom 
they shared borders. Their rise thus required a range of military and diplomatic 
responses by Chosŏn to defend its northern frontier.
In contrast to Chosŏn’s almost exclusively defensive and economic relation-
ship with its southern maritime frontier, its relationship with the Jurchens was 
shaped by the fact that the Chosŏn royal family itself had its original base in the 
northeast and extensive connections with Jurchen groups of the region that be-
came Hamgyŏng Province. When Yi Sŏnggye’s father, Yi Chach’un, submitted 
to Koryŏ, he brought with him an army of personal retainers of diverse back-
grounds, including Jurchens.37 When Yi Sŏnggye expanded his own power, he 
maintained his base of support in Hamgyŏng, then simply called Tongbung-
myŏn (Northeastern District). One of his key supporters was a Jurchen leader 
named Kulun Turan Timur (1331–1402), known more usually as Yi Chiran 
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(sometimes Yi Turan), a Korean-style name that presumably was granted to him 
by the Koryŏ court. Yi Chiran’s father, Ara Buka, was a leader of a thousand 
(minghan) under the Yuan. By submitting to Koryŏ in 1371 during the reign 
of King Kongmin, Yi Chiran was thus allowed by the Koryŏ court to inherit 
his father’s position.38 Having chosen to take the side of Koryŏ during the tur-
bulent Yuan-Ming transition, he also served Koryŏ loyally under the direction 
especially of Yi Sŏnggye, for whom Yi Chiran achieved victories against the 
Japanese raiders in 1377 and 1380, and against a rival Jurchen leader called Ho-
baldo in 1383, obtaining merit subject status as early as 1385 under King U. Most 
important, in 1388, he supported Yi Sŏnggye when the latter turned his armies 
around at the Yalu in order to overthrow King U. He also assisted the Ming in 
1392 in military activities against other Jurchens and played what Yi Sŏnggye 
considered to be a positive role in the political strife of the early Chosŏn. As a 
result, he was also one of the most decorated of merit subjects, even being hon-
ored by the Ming.
Although the early Chosŏn court had a closer historical relationship with 
the Jurchens than with the Japanese, Jurchens nevertheless launched raids on 
Chosŏn’s northern borders, especially in the chaos following the collapse of the 
Yuan. Just as in its approach to the Japanese, Chosŏn sought to reduce Jurchen 
raiding activity by binding Jurchens to the Chosŏn state through the granting 
of bureaucratic positions and by encouraging trade and visits to Hansŏng by 
Jurchen leaders. Through this, the court hoped to give them a material rea-
son for avoiding conict and transform them, like Yi Chiran, into subjects of 
the Chosŏn state. Yi Chiran, especially, brought with him the loyalty of the 
so-called native Jurchens (t’och’ak Yŏjin), who resided to the south of Kilchu 
(which the Jurchens called “Haiyen”) in such districts as Hamhŭng (Ju. Hal-
lan) and Tanch’ŏn (Ju. Tulu). Other Amurian peoples generally categorized as 
Jurchens—the Uriankhais (K. Orangk’ae), the Odolis, and the Udihas—who 
came south to the frontiers of Chosŏn aer the collapse of the Yuan, were also 
brought into the Chosŏn social and economic orbit, through the granting of 
titles and trading rights, and above all the privilege of tribute missions (naejo) 
to the Chosŏn capital.39
Thus, in the 1380s, Möngke Timur of the Odoli moved south and settled 
in the region of Hoeryŏng (Ju. Omohoi), even as other Jurchen leaders moved 
to Chosŏn’s vicinity, including Ahacu of the Hurka and Burhu of the Udiha. 
Following their arrival, the Odoli, along with Uriankhai Jurchen groups, raided 
Koryŏ’s territory, but they were successfully brought under control by the 
Chosŏn court, generally through the granting of rank and trade privileges. In 
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1392, Chosŏn granted court rank to Uriankhai leaders and, in 1395, received the 
tribute of Möngke Timur, who was given an honorary military rank in 1404. 
Ahacu, similarly, submitted to the Chosŏn court during the 1390s.40
Chosŏn, however, was not the only power competing for inuence among 
the Jurchens. Chosŏn’s hegemon, the Ming empire, was in fact deeply suspi-
cious of Chosŏn’s inuence in the region. The Ming, having gained control 
over Liaodong, placed it under a regional military commission (Ch. duzhihui
shishi), thereby making it the frontline of the Ming’s defenses against Mongols 
and Jurchens in the northeast. The Regional Military Commission of Liaodong 
also served as a key organ for managing the Ming relationship with Chosŏn. 
Additionally, the Ming court under Yongle (r. 1402–1424) established an addi-
tional Regional Military Commission of Nurgan, in theory to control Jurchens 
who were residing outside of Liaodong. In practice, it was largely ineective and 
fell into terminal decline by the late eenth century.41 Further aeld, various 
Jurchen groups, including the Haixi from the vicinity of Harbin, the Jianzhou 
from the frontier region between the Ming Liaodong and Chosŏn, and the Wild 
Jurchens (Ch. ye’ren, K. yain) to Chosŏn’s north, were organized into guards 
(Ch. wei). These guards did not in fact allow for direct Ming control or admin-
istration of these Jurchen groups, but rather, like the bureaucratic titles granted 
by the Chosŏn court to its own Jurchen allies, they organized them into a sub-
ordinate relationship to the Ming court and facilitated Jurchen trade and tribute 
with the Ming.42
Despite its subordination to the Ming, the Chosŏn actively competed against 
the Ming for control over the Jurchens, with the competition at times approach-
ing the level of a proxy war. Especially during the reign of T’aejong, the Chosŏn 
court attempted to counter the growing interest of the Yongle emperor in form-
ing relations with the Jurchens, as the Chosŏn monarchy believed the Jurchens 
to be properly under Chosŏn authority and thus actively competed against the 
Ming to maintain its inuence. The Ming did have considerable success in lur-
ing Jurchen leaders into its own sphere of inuence, notably attracting Ahacu, 
whose daughter was in the Yongle emperor’s harem, away from the Chosŏn 
sphere of inuence in 1403 by granting him control over the Jianzhou guard, 
while his son Möngke Buka was put in charge of the Maolian guard among the 
Uriankhais of the upper Yalu on the Chosŏn border. The Ming even sought 
to exert its inuence over those Jurchens who lived to the south of the Tumen 
River. In 1403 the Ming employed a Jurchen leader formerly associated with Yi 
Sŏnggye to lure Jurchens in the Tumen River region over to Ming authority and 
demanded that Chosŏn transfer to Ming authority even Jurchens from regions 
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south of the river that were clearly under Chosŏn control. Chosŏn, however, 
successfully resisted the Ming demands both by providing inducements and re-
wards to Jurchens to keep them clearly under Chosŏn control and by presenting 
arguments to the Ming that Hamgyŏng Jurchens had had close relations with 
the Chosŏn royal family, had intermarried with other Chosŏn subjects, and 
were paying both tax and corvée to the Chosŏn court.43 This did not bring the 
competition to an end, however—even Möngke Timur was lured into the Ming 
sphere in 1405. In response, the Chosŏn state briey closed the Kyŏngwŏn bor-
der market through which they had traded with Möngke Timur and launched 
attacks against Jurchens who had abandoned Chosŏn for the Ming. Fearing 
similar revenge attacks, Möngke Timur moved with his tribe to Fengzhou, se-
curely within the Ming sphere of inuence, where he was made leader of the 
Le Jianzhou guard.44
Such competition for inuence did not cease with the defection of Möngke 
Timur in 1405, who, in fact, moved back into the vicinity of Chosŏn in 1423, 
seeking out a position between the Chosŏn and Ming spheres until his assas-
sination in 1433. Especially aer the reign of Sejo, Chosŏn generally conceded 
the Jianzhou Jurchens to Ming inuence, in part because the Ming were hos-
tile to Chosŏn interference and attempted to prevent Chosŏn from asserting 
its inuence within this region. Additionally, Chosŏn viewed P’yŏngan Prov-
ince, through which Jianzhou Jurchen had to travel for tribute missions to the 
Chosŏn capital, to be far too sensitive a region militarily to allow for the passage 
of potential enemies, which caused ocials under Sŏngjong (referring to early 
policy under Sejo) to call for all interaction with the Jianzhou Jurchen to be redi-
rected via the “back gate of Hamgil.”45 Otherwise, the Ming, weakened by their 
defeat at the hands of the Oirat in 1449, began to see Chosŏn less as a rival than 
as a possible ally in the control of the Jurchens, and, in fact, asked for Chosŏn 
support in suppressing troublesome Jurchen leaders. Among them was a descen-
dant of Ahacu, Li Manchu, who rose in revolt along with other Jurchens in 1449, 
and who was defeated by a joint Ming-Chosŏn expedition in 1467, bringing an 
end to powerful Jurchen leaders for nearly a century.46
Even as Chosŏn’s inuence over the Jianzhou Jurchens waned, it remained 
strong over the Jurchens of the Tumen River region throughout the eenth 
and sixteenth centuries. Between 1433 and 1444, Chosŏn established the six 
garrisons (yukchin), including Puryŏng on the Hamgyŏng range, Hoeryŏng on 
the upper Tumen, and then, farther downstream on the Tumen, Chongsŏng, 
Onsŏng, Kyŏngwŏn, and Kyŏnghŭng. Chosŏn settlers from the southern 
provinces of Kyŏngsang and Chŏlla were moved north to settle within this 
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territory, while a line of fortications was also constructed along the Tumen 
River through which Chosŏn sought to regain control over the home region of 
the Chosŏn royal family. These fortications in turn involved the creation of 
a dense network of ties with Jurchen groups on both sides of the Tumen River, 
to which the Ming court largely acquiesced.47 In 1454–1455, for instance, the 
Chosŏn court compiled a census of the peoples on its border, recording their 
numbers, the names of their leaders, the bureaucratic ranks they had received, 
as well as their ethnic aliations.48 Later records tended to omit ethnic al-
iations but did nevertheless describe a signicant number of Jurchen villages 
near Chosŏn’s fortications. Much like Tsushima to the south, these Jurchen 
allies played the role of the eyes and ears of the Chosŏn court, acting both as a 
fence or hedge (pŏn) against Jurchens farther o—the deep-dwelling Jurchens 
(simch’ŏ hoin)—and as a source of information concerning them. They also be-
came a source of luxury products—sable furs and ginseng—that were prized in 
the Chosŏn court.49 They became known during the sixteenth century as the 
“Jurchens in the vicinity of the fortications” (sŏngjŏ hoin) or, by the reign of 
Sŏnjo (r. 1567–1608), as Pŏnho (fence, border, or vassal Jurchens).50 As also in the 
case of Tsushima, these Pŏnhos were on the outer fringes of Chosŏn’s eective 
administration—indeed, the Chosŏn court sent investigation and inspection of-
cials to them but did not attempt to administer directly their internal aairs.51
The Jurchens and Japanese who interacted with Chosŏn operated at least in 
part out of the desire for trade and prot, and no doubt also prestige. Their re-
lationship with Chosŏn provided Jurchens and Japanese not only trading rights 
but also the ability to send tribute missions to the Chosŏn capital of Hansŏng. 
Alternately, receipt of a bureaucratic title from the Chosŏn court did not on its 
own result in much limitation to the autonomy of the Jurchen or Japanese poten-
tates, as is revealed by the numerous Jurchens, especially before the mid-eenth 
century, who simultaneously held both Ming and Chosŏn bureaucratic titles,52
and the very large number of fraudulent identities, especially during the six-
teenth century, assumed among Japanese and Jurchens seeking to engage in 
trade with Chosŏn. 53
For the Chosŏn court, however, these relationships were in part motivated 
by the desire to maintain peace on its frontiers. Thus, it frequently turned a 
blind eye to fraudulent Japanese, Jurchen, and Ryukyuan envoys because estab-
lishing connections with fraudulent envoys nevertheless served the purpose of 
encouraging peaceful exchange over conict.54 These ties also raised the status 
of the Chosŏn monarch himself. Tribute missions to Hansŏng by Japanese 
and Jurchens at set times of the year were structured according to established 
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guest rituals, similar to Chosŏn’s own diplomatic missions to the Ming capi-
tal. Jurchens would enter via Chosŏn’s military establishments on the Tumen 
River, follow a set route along the post road via Kyŏngsŏng, then proceed down 
the eastern coast through Kangwŏn Province, turning inland at Yangyang and 
from there to Hansŏng, where they were presented before the Chosŏn monarch. 
Along the way, they were put up in guesthouses especially designed for them 
and they participated in receptions (chŏptae) with Korean ocials during which 
both Koreans and Jurchens were organized according to rank.55 A similar pro-
cess occurred with Japanese envoys, who arrived rst at one of the three ports 
in the south, aer which they were directed along set routes at Chosŏn expense 
until they could pay court to the Chosŏn monarch at Hansŏng, where they were 
feasted and entertained with music in exchange for their submission.56 Indeed, 
eenth-and sixteenth-century records refer with great frequency to a diversity 
of foreigners assembling before the monarch—with Jurchens (oen specied 
as divided into the categories Udiha, Uriankhai, and Odoli), Ryukyuans, Japa-
nese, and others.57 Foreigners living in Chosŏn—as well as foreign envoys—also 
participated in the manggwŏllye (Rites at a Distance from the Palace) at the 
birthdays of the Ming emperor.58
Such guest rituals themselves, as Robinson, following Catherine Bell, points 
out, integrated Jurchens and Japanese into the Chosŏn court hierarchy while 
distinguishing them, as foreigners, from other ocials, and clearly locating them 
in a network of power relations centered on the Chosŏn monarch.59 Indeed, in 
the case of the manggwŏllye rituals, Jurchens and Japanese were brought into 
the hierarchy linking them to the Ming emperor via the Chosŏn monarch. The 
ritual participation thus had a signicant ideological meaning for the Chosŏn 
court, something that was expressed clearly by Cho Chun’s (1346–1405) eulogy 
to T’aejo shortly aer he took the throne, in which Cho Chun declared that 
the arrivals of envoys from raiders from across the sea, as well as from Ryukyu 
and Southeast Asia, were proof of the moral transformation achieved by T’aejo’s 
rule.60 The ideological meaning was also visible in instructions given by Sejo (r. 
1455–1568) to Kwak Yŏnsŏng (?–1464), the deputy provincial commander of 
Hamgil Province (as Hamgyŏng was then known), shortly aer Sejo had seized 
the throne from his nephew Tanjong (r. 1452–1455):
Jurchens (yain) and Japanese (waein) are at once our fence, and our subjects. 
A monarch looks upon them with equanimity and makes no distinctions, 
making use of their strength or the information that they provide. One 
must not allow small errors to discourage them from coming to submit. 
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Since I have ascended to the throne, a great many people from among the 
southern Man barbarians and the northern Di barbarians (namman puk-
chŏk) have wanted to become my children. That occurred through the con-
nivance of Heaven, and not through my own wisdom or strength.61
As Pak Chŏngmin argues, this statement by Sejo reveals the prestige that the 
arrival of Jurchen and Japanese envoys provided to the Chosŏn monarch. By 
stating that the arrival of Jurchens and Japanese was not the result of his own 
strength or wisdom but happened thanks to the connivance of heaven, Sejo was 
employing the rhetoric of the Mandate of Heaven, treating the submission of 
Jurchens and Japanese as signs of heaven’s approval for his rule.62 To be sure, Sejo 
was an unusual case. In the process of seizing power from his nephew, he had 
killed a number of ocials with particular expertise on the Jurchens of north-
ern Hamgyŏng and thus needed to take an especially active policy vis-à-vis the 
Jurchens.63 He was also unusually willing to assert his own monarchical author-
ity through ritual means.64 Yet, in this, Sejo diered only in degree from other 
monarchs of the early Chosŏn, for whom the ritual submission of Jurchens, Jap-
anese, and other foreigners served to advertise their own role as monarchs of a 
kingdom that acted as its own civilizing center, even if its civilizing activities 
were part of the broader Ming empire.
Submitting-Foreigner Status
Chosŏn’s relations with Jurchen and Japanese potentates were shaped by the rit-
ual structures whereby these potentates were submitting to the court as subjects, 
oen accepting positions in its bureaucracy. These structures in turn created 
diverse categories of foreign subjects of the Chosŏn court. On its frontiers, the 
Chosŏn court cultivated the formation of fences or vassals among its Jurchen al-
lies to the north and the island of Tsushima to the south, establishing subjects of 
the court who were nevertheless outside of its direct administrative jurisdiction, 
and who were given special privileges in exchange for acting as intermediaries 
in Chosŏn’s foreign relations. For foreigners who settled farther inland, Chosŏn 
employed a separate tax category of submitting-foreigners, which conrmed the 
Chosŏn monarchy’s role for transforming barbarians from abroad.
Among the bureaucratic tools available to the Chosŏn court for settling 
people from outside the peninsula and Chosŏn states was submitting-foreigner 
(hyanghwain) status. Hyanghwa (Ch. xianghua), literally turning or moving 
toward transformation or edication, envisioned peoples from the unstable 
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frontiers traveling to Chosŏn in order to receive the transformative inuence of 
the Chosŏn monarch. The term, along with equivalent terms such as kwihwain
(Ch. guihuaren—to turn to edication or turn to civilization), t’uhwain (Ch. 
touhuaren—to submit to edication), and hyanggugin (Ch. xiangguoren—to 
submit to the state) originated in Chinese antiquity.65 As Donald S. Sutton 
points out in his discussion of the Qing administration of the Miao of South-
west China during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, such terms concep-
tualized the submission of outsiders to a Chinese polity in terms of voluntary 
surrender to the moral edication of the monarch, even as the actual practice of 
encouraging the submission was oen notably violent.66
In Korea, submitting-foreigner status had origins preceding the Chosŏn dy-
nasty. It was adapted from Tang models already employed during the Three 
Kingdoms period and was used extensively during the Koryŏ period, especially 
in the forms of t’uhwa (submit to edication) and nae’tu (come to submit), al-
though kwihwa (turn to edication) was also used—and was employed with 
little regard to the origin of the migrant in question, whether Jurchen, Khitan, 
Parhaean, Turk, or indeed Chinese.67 The term “hyanghwa” became dominant 
during the Chosŏn period, when the primary recipients of the status were Jurch-
ens or Japanese. The Myŏngjong-era’s (1545–1567) Annotations on the Great Code 
for State Administration (Kyŏngguk taejŏn) glossed hyanghwa as “those among 
Jurchens and Japanese who have submitted to transformation (t’uhwa) with re-
gard to the kingdom (hyangguk).”68 Descriptions from the early Chosŏn suggest 
that submitting-foreigners were settled by granting them, according to their sta-
tus, land, clothing, Korean surnames, and, because of the incongruity of impos-
ing military service obligations on those who had come from abroad, exemption 
from military service.69 Although Chosŏn imposed its authority in part through 
force, as in China, submission was usually phrased rhetorically as the voluntary 
act of outsiders in response to the moral suasion of the Chosŏn monarch. As 
No Sasin (1427–1498) said in 1497 during his discussion of Jurchens from the 
borders of P’yŏngan Province who wished to submit and become members of 
Chosŏn’s royal guard, “Since antiquity, emperors and kings did not refuse any 
outside peoples who, longing for morality, came to submit to transformation. 
However, I have not yet heard of a case of [outside peoples] coming to submit in 
response to one who [deliberately] sought to obtain [their submission].”70
Duncan and Sŏ Kŭnsik, among others, have discussed submitting-foreigner 
relations in Chosŏn as an example of the early Chosŏn’s freedom from the na-
tionalistic ideology of pure blood and “homogenous ethnicity” that dominated 
South Korean ocial discourse before the 1990s.71 Submitting-foreigner status 
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should not, however, be confused with naturalization of immigrants or the 
assimilationist practices of modern states. The status, rather, marked foreign 
subjects in Chosŏn as clearly distinct from the rest of the population, which 
itself was divided into distinct social groupings. Above all, it tended to become 
a hereditary status. Although the Great Code for State Administration, which 
was completed in 1485, simply states that “submitting foreigners are freed from 
tax for three years,”72 other sources suggest that several generations could enjoy 
aspects of that status. During the reign of Sejong, submitting-foreigner status, at 
least insofar as it applied to the examination of talents, was specically limited 
to one generations aer migration, with the grandchildren of migrants no longer 
allowed to claim the status.73 This rule seems to have had only limited ecacy, 
as during the reign of Sŏngjong, the court debated imposing military service on 
the grandchildren of Jurchens and Japanese who had submitted (t’uhwa)—this 
was considered improper by a number of ocials, who considered that doing 
so violated the principle of “treating well those who had come from afar” upon 
which Chosŏn’s guest rituals were based. Eventually the opinion of the Board 
of Rites was followed, which is to say that, while it was considered improper to 
impose military service on the grandchildren of those who had come to submit, 
it would be acceptable to impose it upon the great-grandchildren.74
A number of scholars have argued that the ideological content of “submitting 
to edication” implied by the term “hyanghwa” could not, for this reason, be 
used to refer to Han Chinese.75 This is understandable, considering the language 
of the sixteenth-century annotation to the Great Code of State Administration
cited above, but, in fact, both the forms of submitting-foreigner status, and at 
times the terminology, were used to settle Chinese speakers as well. The “Sejong 
Gazetteer” (Sejong chiriji), for instance, lists a number of surnames as those of 
“Chinese who submitted to edication” (Tang t’uhwa sŏng),76 while a request by 
Myŏng Kwisŏk, a descendant of Ming Sheng, for freedom from military service 
and corvée was rejected specically because, according to the precedent for other 
submitting-foreigners (hyanghwa ye), too many generations had elapsed for the 
rule to apply.77
More generally, just as it did with Jurchens, Japanese, and others, the Chosŏn 
court settled Chinese and other Sinophones through the granting of clan seats,78
in the process giving them a status as Chosŏn people and subjects of the Chosŏn 
monarch. The Uighur descendant Yi Hyŏn, for instance, complained during the 
reign of T’aejong that, although his family had received royal grace for several 
generations since its arrival, it still did not have a clan seat located in Korea. 
He thus requested that he be granted a Korean clan seat in the same manner as 
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others who “submitted to the state” (hyanggugin), an equivalent term to submit-
ting-foreigner. In response to this request, the court granted him the clan seat of 
Imju.79 Similar grace was oered to others, including Xie Changshou, who re-
ceived the clan seat of Kyŏngju; Wu Zhen, who was given the clan seat of Haeju 
from T’aejong in 1415; and Li Mindao, whose son apparently received the clan 
seat of Kyŏngju during the reign of T’aejong.80 Most vividly, during the reign of 
Sejong, when a descendant of Mei Junrui requested a clan seat, he lamented that, 
despite the service of his ancestors to both Koryŏ and Chosŏn, their clan seat 
was still located in the central plain. The Board of Personnel responded to this 
case by granting him the clan seat of Ch’ungju, using language, however, that 
would not be out of place in a discussion of Jurchens or Japanese: “The Emperors 
and Kings of Old, when people of dierent regions and unusual customs came 
in admiration [of royal rule], would at times grant surnames (sŏng) and at times 
clan-names (ssi). Through this they revealed their intention of comforting and 
embracing [outsiders].”81
Most foreigners in Chosŏn, however, were frontier people, who could securely 
be described as barbarians submitting to civilized rule, including both Jurch-
ens and other continental peoples from Korea’s north and maritime peoples, 
especially Japanese, but also including Ryukyuans and Muslims from the seas 
to Korea’s south. During the very early Chosŏn, large numbers of Japanese raid-
ers who surrendered to the court were accepted as subjects, with ocial titles 
granted to the leaders of these submitting Japanese and land to the rest. These 
included former raiders, and Japanese merchants, who during the reign of T’aejo 
had no restrictions on their entry into Chosŏn. Ryukyuans also took refuge in 
Chosŏn, including the self-styled son of a deposed king of the southern king-
dom of Sannan, who took residence in Kyŏngsang Province, and who, during 
his relatively short life, was integrated into court ritual.82 While the surrender 
of Japanese raiders largely ceased aer the reign of T’aejong, during the reign of 
Sejong, Japanese were also brought to the Chosŏn court aer the attack by the 
Chosŏn army on the island of Tsushima. Japanese from Tsushima also ed to 
Chosŏn during the reign of Sejong and were accepted as submitting-foreigners. 
Additionally, a group of people called Hoehoe (Ch. Huihui) or Muslims are 
recorded as entering from Kyushu and Western Honshu. Although Muslims 
had entered in signi
cant numbers during the period of Yuan dominance,83 this 
particular community seems to have been part of the Muslim diaspora trading 
community of coastal Chinese cities that had scattered abroad aer the Ming 
court began instituting its policy of maritime prohibition.84 People described 
as Hoehoe formed part of the Chosŏn network of allies in the maritime world, 
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with Hoehoe merchants in Kyushu oering the Chosŏn court tribute,85 and 
Hoehoe people from southwestern Honshu settling in Chosŏn, including one 
man described as a Hoehoe monk (Hoehoe samun), by which presumably shaikh
is meant, who arrived in Chosŏn in 1412.86 Beyond that, Japanese communities 
were established at certain ports on the southern coast, which were formed as the 
Chosŏn court abandoned its earlier policy of allowing Japanese traders to pursue 
unrestricted commerce on Chosŏn’s southern coast. At one point, as many as 
three ports were designated for Japanese merchants, who rose to a total popu-
lation of more than 3,000 people by 1494,87 although eventually (aer Japanese 
residents revolted in the Riot of the Three Ports in 1510) greater restrictions were 
placed on their residency and all were concentrated in the one port of Pusan.88
Jurchens, however, entered Chosŏn with Yi Sŏnggye’s armies, where they be-
came submitting-foreigner royal guards and resided in the capital, later to be fol-
lowed by many other Jurchen and Japanese submitting-foreigners who similarly 
sought out residence in Hansŏng with the status of royal guard. In the northeast, 
the Jurchen communities already present at the founding of the Chosŏn state 
continued to live there and were governed initially through submitting-foreigner 
status—in fact, during the reign of Sejong, the entire population of Hamgyŏng 
north of Tanch’ŏn was described as descendants of Jurchen submitting-foreign-
ers, who had been thoroughly converted into ordinary subjects of the Chosŏn 
state, paying all the required taxes.89 By the sixteenth century, on the outer 
fringes of Chosŏn’s authority, Pŏnho villages had formed that were neither 
fully within Chosŏn authority nor completely outside of it. In 1591, the recorded 
population of Pŏnho villages had risen to 8,523 households. Following Han 
Sŏngju, when this gure is multiplied by an assumed ve people per household, 
this suggests a Pŏnho population of 42,000.90 This gure surely understates the 
actual population of Jurchens in Chosŏn, as in addition to Pŏnho villagers on 
Chosŏn’s northeastern frontier, there would have been Jurchens not registered 
under Chosŏn authority, and, of course, submitting-foreigner Jurchens farther 
inland who did not reside in Pŏnho villages.
Within Chosŏn society, submitting-foreigners pursued diverse roles. Their 
entry itself was at times a reward for helping to repatriate Chosŏn people who 
had been abducted by raiders. In other cases, Japanese monks came to estab-
lish themselves in Chosŏn monasteries, while both Jurchens and Japanese in 
Hansŏng were employed as guards. Otherwise, in addition to farming and 
shing, many were employed in a range of skilled cras such as medicine and 
weapon-making. Ryukyuan boatbuilders were especially prized by the Chosŏn 
state, while among Hoehoe migrants, several are recorded as skilled in mining 
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for crystals and craing gems.91 There were cases of submitting-foreigners rising 
to positions of signicant prominence. One example is Yi Sŏnggye’s Jurchen sup-
porter Yi Chiran, whose son Yi Hwayŏng (?–1424) also became a merit subject, 
and whose family, the Ch’ŏnghae Yi, became a sajok descent-group with partic-
ular success in military matters, even intermarrying with the Chosŏn royal fam-
ily.92 Another less prominent case is that of the Chŏnju Chu family. They were 
the descendants of Chu In and Chu Man, two Jurchen leaders who, along with 
their subordinates, submitted to Yi Sŏnggye,93 with Chu Man being honored as 
a merit subject for his support. Based in Hamhŭng, the Chŏnju Chu became a 
locally important descent-group who were successful especially in military ex-
aminations.94 Beyond that, the “Sejong Gazetteer” lists a number of surnames in 
Hamgyŏng province as pertaining to “those who submitted to the state” (hyang-
guk sŏngssi), including Chu Man’s descendants in Hamhŭng, four surnames in 
Puryŏng, and six in Samsu. Other than the Chŏnju Chu and the Tanch’ŏn Tong 
(whose founder, Tong Allo, married his daughter to Yi Hwayŏng),95 very little is 
now known about the other surnames, except that they were of sucient local 
prominence to be listed in the gazetteer.96
The border-crossing status of many submitting-foreigners made them well 
suited to the roles in diplomacy, intelligence, and trade in which the Chosŏn 
court employed them,97 and there were submitting-Japanese holding ocial 
positions with the Chosŏn court living outside the boundaries of the Chosŏn 
state in Japan.98 Some submitting-foreigners rose to positions of great signi-
cance within Chosŏn’s diplomatic service, comparable to the status received 
by the Chinese. An example of this was P’i Sangŭi. P’i Sago, a Japanese raider 
who had submitted to T’aejo in 1395 and who had served in the royal guard, 
received a junior seventh-rank title before his death in 1399. His son P’i Sangŭi 
was born in 1395, possibly in Chosŏn, and, as the son of a submitting-foreigner, 
was given preferred access to a position in the bureaucracy, without taking ex-
aminations. In particular, as a Japanese-Korean interpreter, he participated in six 
diplomatic missions to Japan, as well as taking an active role in discussions with 
Japanese envoys who arrived in Hansŏng.99 Another notable example was Tong 
Ch’ŏngnye, a submitting-foreigner ocer on patrol (hyanghwa pujang), who, as 
a descendant of Möngke Timur, had many relatives in Jianzhou but was trusted 
by the Chosŏn court. He thus was the obvious intermediary in negotiations 
between Chosŏn and Jianzhou Jurchens.100 Tong led several missions deep into 
Jianzhou during the late eenth century, well aer the Ming had begun to 
actively discourage Chosŏn interaction with Jianzhou.101 Such were his ties to 
diverse Jurchen potentates that, aer he was implicated in a conspiracy against 
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Chungjong and executed in 1508, Chosŏn’s relations with the Jurchens were sig-
nicantly damaged, with some Jurchen leaders threatening revenge.102
For the most part submitting-foreigners were brought in to become part of a 
Chosŏn monarchy that sought not to eliminate dierence but to organize peo-
ple according to hereditary categories. This may be seen in the attempts by the 
Chosŏn state to manage their marriages with Chosŏn people. As a general rule, 
submitting-foreigners were encouraged to marry Chosŏn women,103 and indeed, 
in one of the few actual state-organized demands for assimilation, in 1427, Se-
jong argued that the unusual clothing, and especially headgear, of the Muslims 
in Chosŏn (which at one time must have made for a desirable display during 
court ceremony) prevented their marriage with other Chosŏn subjects. In order 
to further their assimilation, he banned all future use of Muslim clothing and 
brought an end to their prayers during court ceremonials.104 References to Hoe-
hoe in Chosŏn disappear at this point, although no doubt they lingered, outside 
of the interest of the court, for some time aerward. In any case, it is notable 
that the Sejong’s overwhelming concern was to reduce their dierence from the 
surrounding population by encouraging intermarriage.
Actual criticism of intermarriage between foreigners and Koreans seems 
to have been very rare. One unusual case is in 1433, when the minister of the 
Board of Personnel Hŏ Cho (1369–1439) memorialized against allowing two 
Ryukyuan boatbuilders Obo and Yago to take wives, as Chosŏn was a country 
of rites and renement, and thus incompatible with such rustic Ryukyuans. 
However, he was strongly opposed in this matter by Maeng Sasŏng (1360–1438) 
and Hwang Hŭi (1363–1452) who argued that the two Ryukyuans had lived 
in Chosŏn for a long time, and unless they were about to return to Ryukyu 
it would be harmful to prevent their marriage. Ultimately, the monarch de-
clared that they should not be prevented from marrying if they had already 
started making plans in that direction.105 In general, Hŏ Cho’s position seems 
to have been a minority position, for there are frequent references to the pre-
sumably Korean wives of Ryukyuan boatbuilders,106 although in at least one 
case a Ryukyuan boatbuilder is described as returning to Ryukyu to visit his 
(presumably Ryukyuan) wife.107
Prominent submitting-foreigners such as the Ch’ŏnghae Yi descendants of 
Yi Chiran did indeed intermarry with sajok families and even the royal family, 
but most submitting-foreigners married women of low status. During the reign 
of Sejong, in response to the request by Sigaro and Yattae, two prominent Jurch-
ens, that they be allowed to marry, the court of Sejong specied that they, as 
with later submitting-foreigners, should be given daughters of women of servile 
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background who had married commoner men,108 perhaps because common-
er-base unions were illegal, and thus their ospring could be easily pressed into 
service by the state.109 Commoner women who formed families with servile men 
could also be forced to marry foreigners as punishment, as was the case that came 
to light during the reign of Sejong, when a commoner woman named Ka-I was 
being sentenced for the murder of her Japanese husband, Sonda (Ja. Tadamasa). 
The background to this case was that Ka-i had been punished for illegally form-
ing a relationship and having children with a servile man. In response, the mag-
istrate in charge had her married to the “Japanese bastard” (waeno), an act that 
the Chosŏn court does not seem to have fully supported, as they considered it a 
somewhat mitigating factor in considering Ka-I’s sentence.110
There were, of course, exceptions to this rule. When Möngke Timur’s son 
Tong Ch’ang (Ch. Tong Cang, 1419–1467) requested to marry a woman of a 
good (commoner) family from Hoeryŏng, the court of Sejong referred to it as 
a minor departure of protocol. Although in Chinese history the sending of 
women from ocial families or from the imperial family to marry barbarians 
was done only when no other solution was possible, Tong Ch’ang was merely 
requesting a commoner woman. While that was not in accord with the usual 
practice of providing base-born women or women of mixed commoner-base ori-
gins to Jurchen royal guards (including some of Tong Ch’ang’s own underlings), 
granting Tong Ch’ang’s wish was seen as benecial to the Chosŏn court, as it 
facilitated the expansion of Chosŏn’s inuence over Tong Ch’ang’s network in 
Jianzhou. As a result, Tong Ch’ang’s request was approved.111
Not all agreed that it was undesirable for sajok women to be married to sub-
mitting-foreigners. Yang Sŏngji (1415–1482), for instance, argued that the mar-
riage of all Jurchens, regardless of social status, to women of such low status was 
a violation of the duties of the Chosŏn monarch to show care for people who 
came from far away and also in breach of standard Confucian rituals. Instead, he 
asserted that Jurchen who submitted to the Chosŏn court should have marriages 
arranged for them according to their political strength, with those leading large 
communities married into families of ocials who owed their position to hered-
itary protection (ŭm) privilege, those leading medium-size groups into families 
of ocials in technical elds, those leading the smallest groups into commoner 
families, and Jurchens “in the vicinity of the fortications” with local soldiers 
in the north—presumably leaving ordinary Jurchens to marry with the base 
born.112 Yang advocated, in other words, the organization of Jurchens according 
to Chosŏn’s social hierarchy. It does not seem that his advice was put into eect 
to any great extent.113 Nevertheless, he provides an example of an assimilationist 
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position, even to the extent of associating powerful Jurchen leaders with mem-
bers of Chosŏn’s sajok aristocracy.
The marriage of submitting-foreigners to Chosŏn subjects was useful for 
the Chosŏn court. In the case of Tong Ch’ang’s marriage, some were worried 
that he might leave Chosŏn with his bride. Countering this concern, however, 
was the strengthened connection to Chosŏn that would likely result if Tong 
Ch’ang’s bride then returned to Hoeryŏng to visit family. As Paek Okkyŏng 
argues, the Chosŏn court used intermarriage ultimately as a tool, either to link 
Jurchen potentates more closely to Chosŏn, or to transform the objectionable 
or un-Confucian aspects of Jurchen culture and lifestyles.114 When Yi Sŏnggye 
sent Yi Chiran to administer the Jurchen lands of the northeast, he specically 
encouraged him to “change [the Jurchens’] practice of letting out their hair, to 
cause them to wear hats, change their animalistic customs and accept propriety, 
to have them marry people of our country, to impose on them the same corvée 
and taxation as ordinary subjects, to make them ashamed to be led by their chief 
and to make them all want to become subjects of the kingdom.”115
To be sure, such intermarriage could cause diculties for the Chosŏn court, 
as it created people with ambiguous relationships to Chosŏn. During the reign 
of Chungjong, a man of Jurchen origin named Kim Inbok, who had served as 
a royal guard, requested a slave as payment. Although the Chosŏn ocials dis-
cussing his case agreed that submitting to royal edication and serving as a royal 
guard were beautiful acts, they noted that Kim Inbok’s father, Kim Ch’ŏnsu, 
had already submitted to the Chosŏn court and served in the royal guard and 
that, moreover, not only had Kim Ch’ŏnsu’s mother been Korean but so was 
his wife, Kim Inbok’s mother. Thus, though Kim Inbok had been born in 
Jurchen territory, it was hard to determine whether he should be seen as having 
submitted himself (kisin hyanghwa) or had merely submitted by descent (chaji
hyanghwa).116 Although the court ocials did conclude that, because he had 
been born in the Jurchen homeland (pont’o), Kim Inbok should be treated as 
having submitted himself, King Chungjong personally objected to the grant-
ing of such status to one whose paternal grandmother, father, and mother had 
all been Chosŏn subjects.117 Perhaps reecting heightened suspicion of Jurchens 
during the sixteenth century, both Chungjong and these high ocials also ex-
pressed wariness regarding the reckless mixing in northern Hamgyŏng Province 
between Jurchens who had submitted and those who had not.118
A more troublesome case was that of a Pŏnho named Pak San who had 
employed his riches and his uent Korean to contract numerous marriages 
with submitting-foreigner women in northern Hamgyŏng. The magistrate of 
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Chongsŏng complained that the women in question were from families who 
submitted long ago and so were simply ordinary subjects of the Chosŏn mon-
arch. He thus objected to their removal across the river into Jurchen territory. 
Moreover, concerned that there would be more of Pak San’s sort, the magis-
trate sought to establish bans on such indiscriminate contact between Pŏnhos 
and submitting-foreigners,119 a likely futile program that nevertheless was also 
characteristic of Chosŏn’s administration of Japanese submitting-foreigners in 
Chosŏn, who were discouraged from forming links with Japanese in Japan.120
Attempts to administer and form precise distinctions between foreign 
groups—between Japanese abroad and Japanese settled in Chosŏn, between 
Pŏnhos and submitting-foreigners—were likely rendered futile by the uid cul-
tural and social circumstances of late medieval Northeast Asia and indeed very 
diplomatic structures whereby Chosŏn organized its relationships with peoples 
on its frontiers. There were cases of Japanese who requested the right of domicile 
in Chosŏn on account of Korean parents who had settled in Japan, presumably, 
either because their parents were taken as slaves by Japanese raiders or indeed 
because they participated in raiding themselves.121 Because submitting-foreigner 
status was granted not only to those within Chosŏn territory but also to those 
residing outside of it, the distinction between submitting-foreigners and Pŏnhos 
that was at the core of the Pak San case must have frequently been meaningless.
The purpose of Chosŏn’s diplomatic relations with Japanese and Jurchen po-
tentates was generally to integrate those potentates as a dierent sort of subject 
of the Chosŏn court. In terms of cultural politics, the Chosŏn court actively 
sought to exploit spheres of common identication. Jurchen groups in northern 
Hamgyŏng had, of course, a long-lasting association with the Chosŏn court, 
such that the Chosŏn court could claim, in discussion with the Ming, that they 
were no dierent from any other subjects of the Chosŏn court—and while in 
part this was simply rhetorical, and at other times the Chosŏn could rather treat 
them as an outside force, to a substantial extent it was simply an expression of 
the reality of Chosŏn governance within the Tumen valley region. In the case 
of Japan and Ryukyu, while both states were outside of Chosŏn governance, 
Chosŏn could still rely on historical connections between Japan and Korea 
extending to the Three Kingdoms period, for instance, when a key ally of the 
Chosŏn monarchy, the Ōuchi family of western Honshu, requested that the 
Chosŏn court support their claim of descent from Paekche kings.122
Ultimately, according to circumstances, Jurchens and Japanese could be ordi-
nary subjects, or outsiders coming to receive protection, barbarians coming to re-
ceive edication, or untrustworthy barbarians implacably opposed to civilization. 
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The fourth aspect has dominated recent scholarship on Jurchens and Japanese, 
and it is true that there is no shortage of dehumanizing descriptions of them in 
the Chosŏn Veritable Records. Appearing with some frequency are phrases such 
as “They are not of our family, so their minds must also be dierent,” with de-
scriptions of them as having “the faces of people but the minds of beasts.” While 
the former phrase originated during the Zhou period, when it was used to refer 
to rivalry among aristocratic families, it gained a new meaning within post-Han 
standard histories, in which it was employed to discourage close association with 
the Xiongnu and other nomads of the steppes. In this sense, it could be used to 
describe the dangers of association between barbarians and civilized peoples.123
It gained prevalence during Chosŏn in this sense. For instance, during the reign 
of Sŏngjong, an ocial criticized what he saw to be an excessively lax approach 
to interaction with the Jianzhou Jurchens, whereby “those who came were not 
refused and those who le were not pursued.” Such laxity toward those who 
“are not of our family, so whose minds must also be dierent” could only pose 
military dangers in the future.124 During the reign of Chungjong, the necessity 
of driving o Jurchens who were farming within Chosŏn territory was justied 
through a variation of that phrase: “Although not of our family, they are farming 
in our territory, so it is proper that we drive them o.”125 Two years later similar 
wording was used to justify building up fortications around border towns “to 
prevent the civilized and the barbarians from mixing.”126
Jurchen and Japanese subjects of the Chosŏn monarch, whether Pŏnhos or 
submitting-foreigners, played vital defensive, economic, and ideological roles in 
the Chosŏn state. They could not simply be rejected as troublesome outsiders. 
As Shao-yun Yang has discussed for the Tang, stereotypes concerning barbarians 
could be made to serve diverse purposes, including encouraging greater forbear-
ance toward them.127 As was also true of the discussion of barbarians during 
the Tang, contemptuous phrases concerning Jurchens and Japanese during the 
early Chosŏn were used to argue not for limiting involvement with Jurchens but 
in fact for greater lenience. For instance, aer the defeat of Li Manchu in 1467, 
his sons continued to search for titles, trade, and tribute missions to Hansŏng, 
and the Chosŏn court justied granting titles and ranks to them with the logic 
that, as entities “with the face of humans but the minds of beasts,” any failure 
to accommodate them would result in unrest on the frontier.128 More generally, 
Chosŏn’s Japanese and Jurchen subjects were vital members of the Chosŏn polity 
and played irreplaceable roles in Chosŏn’s defense.129 As a result, in the 1550s, 
during Pŏnho and Udiha revolts at Sŏsura in response to Chosŏn’s establishment 
of a new garrison fort north of the river, even ocials, who argued that Pŏnhos 
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as barbarians were fundamentally inferior to Koreans, could plead in favor of 
forbearance (for what else could one expect of barbarians), and saw it as above all 
vital that the Chosŏn court show its concern to protect the all-important hedge 
provided by Chosŏn’s Pŏnho vassals.130 Certainly, it was accepted by most that, 
despite the revolt, the protection of Chosŏn’s fence of Jurchen allies was of the 
greatest importance. The Chosŏn monarch should, like any Confucian king, 
deal with barbarians by not driving o those who submitted to him and not 
pursuing those who le him.
How did Chosŏn’s Jurchen and Japanese subjects themselves understand 
their relationship to the Chosŏn court? It is rare, of course, to nd any explicit 
documentation of their point of view. Some of the complexities of these circum-
stances can, however, be seen in the deathbed announcement of Yi Chiran, who 
is recorded as having written the following memorial to the king: “Your minister 
is originally a man of the homeland (pont’o) who is dying in a foreign land (iguk). 
Please burn my corpse and return me for burial to the homeland (pont’o). Your 
majesty, please have your ocials bury me according to the practices of the home 
country. And please, your majesty, rule with prudence and cultivate your virtue 
and preserve Chosŏn for all time.”131
Standing out in this passage is not only Yi Chiran’s view of Chosŏn as a foreign 
country, but also his condent use of “homeland” in addressing the king, who 
was also from the same northeastern region. Even a prominent Jurchen like Yi 
Chiran stood out as an outsider in the very state that he had been instrumental in 
constructing, although this outsider status was one he shared, in a sense, with the 
Chosŏn monarchy itself. More generally, Jurchens of submitting-foreigner ori-
gin were brought directly into the Chosŏn state, as subjects accepting the moral 
edication of the Chosŏn king. Further aeld, the Pŏnhos of Chosŏn’s northern 
boundary stood at an ambiguous point between subjects of the Chosŏn state and 
aliens to it and could pass from one side of that line to the other. Chosŏn ocial-
dom dealt with them in diverse ways according to the ideological preconceptions 
of the ocial in charge.
The early Chosŏn, though not as diverse as Koryŏ before and during Yuan 
domination, was nevertheless far from a homogenous realm. Its ocialdom, es-
pecially in the lower ranks, included Uighurs, Mongols, and Han Chinese, and 
its military was made up at least in part of Jurchens and Japanese. Although, in 
contrast to Koryŏ ocials during the period of Mongol dominance, Chosŏn 
ocials were no longer part of a broader Eurasian elite, they were by no means 
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cut o from the wider world. Yuan subjects and their descendants continued to 
reside in Chosŏn, Japanese were a signicant presence on its southern coast, and 
Jurchens dominated much of the northeast. Within a status-conscious Chosŏn 
society, none of these outsiders were able to perturb the preeminence of Chosŏn’s 
sajok aristocracy, although some foreign descent-groups did achieve local promi-
nence or distinction in technical elds such as interpreting.
Chosŏn, as a smaller Chunghwa but not the actual center, was at once a sub-
ordinate participant in the Ming world order and a separate civilizing center in 
its own right. These foreign elements were administered through submitting-
foreigner status, which, in form at least, would seem to imply that Chosŏn was 
treating itself as a civilization center similar to China. Chinese and their de-
scendants, notably, were also administered according to this status. Although 
the Chosŏn court aer the early eenth century was in no position to receive 
Chinese, for the simple reason that there was no longer an intermediate group 
of Chinese travelers available for Chosŏn to receive, this did not, by any means, 
imply that the Chosŏn court in any way considered it improper to bring in 
Chinese people as supplicants in need of edication. Although the distinction 
between the civilized and the barbarian was a vital part of the conceptual frame-
work by which the Chosŏn court managed foreign peoples, it should not be seen 
as the master key by which all of the Chosŏn ocialdom’s responses to foreigners 
should be understood. Ultimately, the Chosŏn court’s interaction with the out-
side world was determined by diverse factors, including its defensive, economic, 
and administrative needs, and it was in the interest of the sajok aristocracy to 
maintain its social and political dominance against all rivals, whether Korean, 
Jurchens, Japanese, Uighur, or indeed Chinese.
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Ch a pter 2
Civilizing Barbarians and Rebellious Allies
Japanese Defectors and Ming Deserters during the Imjin War
T he institutions for managing foreign communities within or at the borders of Chosŏn were put to renewed strain when war broke out in 1592. During the 
	eenth and sixteenth centuries, prior to the 
onset of war, Chosŏn was faced with minor military threats only, the eects of 
which were limited to its outer borders. The largest military crises of the six-
teenth century were of primarily local concern, including the revolt of Jurchen 
subjects under Nit’anggae in 1583, a second Tumen River Jurchen revolt in 1587, 
the Three Ports uprising of Japanese merchants of 1510, and the Ŭlmyo Jap-
anese pirate raid of 1555. The Chosŏn court responded to these crises with a 
number of reforms, including the development of a covered cra	, the p’anoksŏn, 
as the primary naval vessel of the Chosŏn eet, the establishment of a Border 
Defense Command (Pibyŏnsa), and the reorganization of the military into a 
local defense system (chesŭng pangnyak). However, these conicts were not so 
large as to require a fundamental rethinking of its military and diplomatic insti-
tutions and protocols, and Chosŏn’s inecient system for funding the military, 
which was imagined to be a self-supporting militia but in practice was 
nanced 
through a corrupt and burdensome tax that “military support tax payers” did 
their best to avoid, limited the ecacy of any reforms.1
Certainly, none of these disturbances prepared Chosŏn for the Imjin War of 
1592–1598. In 1592, Toyotomi Hideyoshi (ca. 1536–1597), shortly a	er overcom-
ing his last major rivals in Japan, directed the Japanese army to attack Chosŏn 
as a prelude to an invasion of the Ming empire. The Japanese army was per-
haps the largest military force of any country in the world during the sixteenth 
century and was made up of soldiers hardened by the constant strife of Japan’s 
Warring States period.2 A substantial number of the invading Japanese soldiers 
were armed with arquebuses, a weapon with which the Chosŏn military was 
unfamiliar. Within several months the Japanese army overwhelmed much of 
the peninsula, conquering 
rst the southern county of Tongnae (present-day 
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Pusan), destroying much of the Chosŏn army at Ch’ungju, and then forcing the 
Chosŏn monarch to ee the royal capital of Hansŏng, past the forti
ed city of 
P’yŏngyang, and onto the very border of Chosŏn at Ŭiju on the Yalu (Amnok) 
River. One branch of the Japanese army under Katō Kiyomasa even crossed the 
Tumen River in Hamgyŏng Province and launched raids against the Jurchen on 
the northern bank. Despite the superior Chosŏn navy and signi
cant pockets of 
resistance throughout the peninsula, only the arrival of Ming armies pushed the 
Japanese back, with the Ming army under Li Rusong (1549–1598), a Liaodongese 
general of Korean-Chinese origin, defeating the Japanese in the fourth battle of 
P’yŏngyang in the 
rst month of 1593. Even this battle was not decisive, and the 
Ming reversal at the Battle of Pyŏkchegwan by the end of the month allowed the 
Japanese to hold out at its forti
cations on the southern coast for several years 
of stalemate. This stalemate came to an end with the “Chŏngyu Oensive,” the 
second Japanese oensive of 1597–1598, which was launched with the more lim-
ited goal of conquering Chosŏn territory and which devastated the southwestern 
Chŏlla Province that had been largely untouched during the 
rst invasion. This 
oensive also ended in a resounding defeat for the Japanese at the hands of the 
joint Chosŏn-Ming military.3
The Imjin War had substantial demographic implications for Chosŏn. While 
the precise number of dead is unknowable, it is clear that the war resulted in 
widespread civilian death from disease and starvation, in addition to those di-
rectly killed in the 
ghting.4 Many Koreans le	 the peninsula, either as captives 
of the Japanese or willingly, following the Ming armies.5 The armies themselves 
were enormous. Of great signi
cance were the large numbers of foreign soldiers 
who entered Chosŏn. In total, the estimated 150,000 Japanese soldiers who 
served in the 
rst campaign in Chosŏn launched in 1592, with another 140,000 
serving in the second Chŏngyu Oensive launched in 1597, exceeded the popu-
lation of the Chosŏn capital of Hansŏng at its pre–nineteenth-century peak 
of 200,000. The Ming military was signi
cantly smaller, but still signi
cant, 
amounting to approximately 167,000 over the course of the war.6 Beyond that, 
an uncertain number of traders and camp followers also took part, with trad-
ers especially traveling widely throughout the peninsula.7 Assuming a prewar 
population of 9.8 million and postwar population of 7.8 million,8 the combined 
Japanese military presence over the seven years of war came to between 3 and 4 
percent of Chosŏn’s total population, while the Ming military, not considering 
the traders who traveled with them, amounted to approximately 1 to 2 percent.
A substantial number of outsiders established themselves in Chosŏn during 
the conict. Of the many Japanese soldiers who took part in it, at least 10,000 
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remained behind in Chosŏn, frequently serving in the Chosŏn military, as also 
did a signi
cant number of the Ming soldiers brought to Chosŏn. Neither of 
these two groups 
t fully into Chosŏn’s established framework of bringing out-
siders for edi
cation by a civilizing Chosŏn monarch, and both carried with 
them a far greater political risk than the foreigners who had entered Chosŏn 
before the war. At the same time, as with earlier submitting-foreigners, both 
groups brought useful skills. In the crisis of war, the Chosŏn court could not 
easily abandon these skills and so had to adapt its framework for administering 
and integrating outsiders.
Japanese Defectors and the Chosŏn State
The Japanese armies that advanced on to Chosŏn in 1592 were vastly dierent 
from the raiders that had launched attacks on Chosŏn during the fourteenth, 

	eenth, and sixteenth centuries, just as the Japan of Hideyoshi was vastly dif-
ferent from the poorly centralized Muromachi Bakufu. Following the Ōnin War 
(1467–1477) that devastated much of the Japanese capital of Kyōtō, Japan was 
thrown into nearly a century of warfare known as the Warring States period. 
Initially, this conict destroyed the limited unity of the early Muromachi pe-
riod, as daimyō aristocrats, Buddhist monks, peasant groups and local strong-
men formed rival states that made only limited acknowledgment of the shogun. 
However, the nearly constant warfare of the period inevitably resulted in the 
consolidation of these petty states and improvements in military technology and 
techniques. Large armies of peasant infantry equipped by the late sixteenth cen-
tury with European arquebuses partly replaced the cavalry and samurai of the 
early Muromachi. As well, powerful strongmen—
rst Oda Nobunaga (1534–
1582) and then, a	er his assassination, Hideyoshi—brought unity and discipline 
to the previously disunited and disorganized armies of Japan.9
Chosŏn’s established tools for relations with the Japanese were not suited 
to the increasingly uni
ed and militarized Japanese state under the control of 
powerful warlords, and indeed the intermediate position of Tsushima, that had 
been to Chosŏn’s advantage before the Imjin War, became a military tool for 
the invading Japanese. Following the Ōnin War of the mid-
	eenth century, 
Chosŏn had ceased sending envoys past Tsushima, which, depending as it did 
on the pro
ts of trade with Chosŏn, provided only information that was likely 
to please the Chosŏn court. This, combined with the fact that many of the Jap-
anese envoys by the sixteenth century had imposter identities, le	 the Chosŏn 
court with few sources of information on Japan. As a result, on the eve of the 
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war, the Chosŏn court was deeply ignorant of the changing military and politi-
cal situation in Japan under Hideyoshi.10 Worse, the Japanese traders who had 
previously passed to and from Chosŏn and the bicultural and bilingual islanders 
of Tsushima, who had originally been used by the Chosŏn state to pacify pi-
rates and raiders, became the interpreters and guides for Hideyoshi’s conquest of 
Chosŏn.11 Writing shortly a	er the war, Yi Sugwang (1563–1629) expressed pain 
that the inhabitants of Tsushima, whose ancestors he imagined to be Korean 
migrants, should have aided “the plunder” of Korea, especially as the “Japanese 
of Tsushima know everything that is to be known about matters related to our 
country, and understand our country’s language, so they engage in all sorts of 
trickery and deception.”12
Such exible loyalties could work to Chosŏn’s bene
t as well, as signi
cant 
numbers of Japanese soldiers switched sides to Chosŏn.13 Beginning in 1593, 
Japanese soldiers began submitting to Chosŏn, although generally in relatively 
small numbers, with the Ming under Li Rusong (who brought Japanese defectors 
with him to Liaodong) generally being more welcoming to defectors. By 1594, 
Chosŏn began to take a more active role, deliberately encouraging Japanese sol-
diers to switch sides.14 Defect they did—although precise numbers are not avail-
able. In 1595, Sin Ch’ungil (1554–1622), in discussion with an envoy of Nurhaci 
named Ma Sin, claimed that 
ve to six thousand Japanese soldiers had deserted 
to Chosŏn.15 In 1597, ocials discussing Japanese defectors serving with Kim 
Ŭngsŏ (1564–1624) estimated that a thousand Japanese defectors were serving 
under Kim Ŭngsŏ himself, and that, within Chosŏn as a whole, there were likely 
some ten thousand Japanese defectors.16 Considering that Japanese continued to 
desert a	er the end of the war in the early 1600s,17 the number quite likely grew.
What caused the defection of such a signi
cant number of Japanese? In Han 
Munjong’s survey of the war, he points out the decline of morale within the in-
vading Japanese army a	er the initial success in 1592, as the war became drawn 
out over seven years. Caught up in forti
cations on the southern coast with in-
sucient food, and dealing with violent superior ocers, many chose to improve 
their dicult circumstances by escaping to Chosŏn ranks. Thus, in 1597, several 
Japanese soldiers under the command of Katō Kiyomasa were lured by another 
Japanese defector agent, a man named Seiso. These defectors reported to Seiso 
that the labor duty imposed upon them had become excessively heavy, and their 
ocers had become violent and abusive. No longer able to endure the hardship, 
they had ed the camp and defected to Chosŏn. This problem was more com-
mon in the ranks under Katō Kiyomasa, who had lost the support of his own 
troops, of whom “more than one hundred were deserting and escaping back to 
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Japan every day.”18 Contributing to defection, no doubt, was the fact that the 
united Japanese state was a very recent creation, still a work in progress under 
Hideyoshi. Thus, many low-ranked soldiers, especially, are likely to have had no 
strong loyalties to the central state, and thus no great interest in participating 
in the conict.
Beginning in 1594 with the departure of much of the Ming army, the Chosŏn 
court became increasingly active in creating its own inducements to defect. Not 
surprisingly, there was some initial resistance within the Chosŏn court to accept-
ing Japanese defectors, especially during 1593, when the Japanese soldiers were 
being brought back to Liaodong by Li Rusong. That year, Chief State Counselor 
Ch’oe Hŭngwŏn, for instance, complained that Japanese deserters le	 under 
Chosŏn supervision by Ming brigadier commander Shen Weijing could not with 
justice be executed but were not properly contained within the military camps, 
as by forming connections with Chinese (Tang) troops, they were able to travel 
about the villages freely, plundering the possessions of the common people. He 
described the Japanese established in Yongsan, to the immediate south of Nam-
san and the Hansŏng city walls, “as like a tiger that has escaped its cage, or a scor-
pion in our sleeves.” Moreover, he worried that the number of Japanese brought 
up to Hansŏng by the Provincial military commander Li Rusong might possibly 
include those who had made false surrenders in order to spy out the strengths 
and weaknesses of Chosŏn’s defenses.19
Despite the widespread suspicion and hatred of the Japanese, the Chosŏn 
court soon changed course and not only began to accept Japanese defectors but 
actually to take an active role in encouraging defections. Noting the growing 
exhaustion and declining morale within the Japanese ranks, it encouraged de-
fection in exchange for privileges. This policy resulted in a signi
cant number 
of Japanese submitting to Chosŏn, which oered such inducements as food and 
housing and military rank.20 King Sŏnjo in 1594 had already declared the need 
to avoid executing Japanese deserters, saying,
The killing of Japanese defectors is utterly without advantage. I have al-
ready expressed this view. Kim Ŭngsŏ, by not killing enemy soldiers, has 
already been able to gather eighty-nine deserters, while Kim Ch’ungmin 
has also brought six Japanese defectors. Those who leave their ranks and 
come to us must be given rations, so that they don’t starve. They should 
also be given titles to comfort them. In Japan, they kill others freely, and so 
even the people from that country are perturbed and frightened. There will 
certainly be many who hear of our customs and leave their camp for ours. 
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Rewards will also be considered for those who convince many Japanese to 
abandon their own side.21
Indeed, the Chosŏn court actively sent people to encourage Japanese to defect. 
Song Ch’angse, an agent sent in 1594 to sow dissension among the Japanese, 
claimed that “the lower ranks of the Japanese are mutinous, the ocers are 
pained and resentful, and [the Japanese] are in the autumn of heavenly pun-
ishment. We truly have an opportunity to divide the army against itself at this 
moment, and we should not miss the chance by being too suspicious.”22
In addition to the motive of sowing dissension in the ranks of the Japanese 
army and weakening Japanese troop numbers, the fact was that many Japanese 
had key military and technical skills, notably the ability to employ arquebuses 
and Japanese swords. Reference to the employment of Japanese in a military 
capacity begin in 1594, early in the period of active inducement of Japanese to 
surrender. During that year, there are numerous references in the journal of Ad-
miral Yi Sunsin, for instance, concerning the arrival of Japanese deserters, who 
were generally employed either in the unspecialized but vital position of oarsmen 
or in the more specialized role of cannoneer.23 Similarly, in 1594, the Border 
Defense Command reported on its trials of thirty-eight Japanese deserters in 
shooting and swordsmanship. Disappointingly, only two showed the ability to 
shoot, while the rest were found worse than Chosŏn marksmen and were or-
dered sent to Hamgyŏng Province, except for three who claimed an ability to 
make gunpowder, and four who asserted skill in swordsmanship.24 Such eorts 
continued to the end of the war, with particular inducements given to those Jap-
anese who were able to teach superior swordsmanship, gunpowder production, 
and the use and manufacture of guns.25 According to a report by Kwŏn Yul, this 
caused considerable worry to the Japanese military, which was concerned not 
only by the number of Japanese defectors but also by their ecacy and success in 
communicating military techniques to Chosŏn, including improved means for 
building mountain fortresses. Kwŏn Yul’s report also indicated general knowl-
edge among Japanese soldiers of the good treatment (including wives and ocial 
titles) that defectors received from Chosŏn; the main deterrent to defection was 
the risk of execution should their intention to desert become known to their 
superior ocers.26
Japanese, in fact, as the report above suggests, were used in very active roles, 
such as 
ghting against Japanese. They were also used as spies and agents. Of 
course, it was standard practice for Chosŏn ocials to interrogate Japanese de-
fectors for information about the Japanese military in Chosŏn.27 But beyond 
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that, Japanese defectors were also dispatched to sow dissension among Japanese 
troops. As agents, they gathered information concerning the circumstances of 
the Japanese army and encouraged desertion, with some indeed being sent to 
Tsushima to gain intelligence concerning Japan’s domestic circumstances. A 
representative example of espionage is a case in 1597, when two Japanese defec-
tor agents plotted to enter the camp of Katō Kiyomasa to burn supplies and 
weapons and attract defectors as well as to see the state of Katō’s army.28 As for 
military activities, Japanese were used widely by the Chosŏn court in a num-
ber of battles during the second Japanese oensive of 1597, with many rewarded 
for their exemplary success, o	en through military titles and the granting of 
Chosŏn names.29 Even those Japanese whose skills were not so exemplary as to 
be kept in the southern provinces, and who were sent consequently to the north-
eastern border in Hamgyŏng Province, showed their metal, and indeed the Japa-
nese arquebusiers were praised for their contribution to the Chosŏn paci
cation 
of Yŏksu, a forti
ed town controlled by rebellious Jurchen slightly to the north 
of the Tumen River.30 Japanese defectors, despite entering Chosŏn as enemies, 
had become vital elements in Chosŏn’s defense.
Ming Deserters
Posing as many problems as the Japanese deserters were the large numbers of 
Ming soldiers who entered Chosŏn during the war, many of whom, much like 
the Japanese defectors, stayed a	er the withdrawal of the Ming army in 1600. 
Chosŏn, of course, would almost certainly have fallen without Ming military 
support, although, since Hideyoshi’s stated objective for the war was to attack 
the Ming, the Ming military response was motivated in part by self-defense. 
As was suggested in one memorable court discussion, the goal of the Ming in-
tervention was to keep the war out of Ming territory and “in the outer yards 
of China.”31 Yet the presence of a large force of soldiers and ocers connected 
to Chosŏn’s Ming overlord, upon whom, in war time, Chosŏn depended abso-
lutely, le	 an inevitable mark. Politically, Ming generals could and did make 
destructive demands on the Chosŏn court. As has been discussed by both Han 
Myŏnggi and Nam-lin Hur, the economic and ecological burden of maintaining 
a large Ming force on Chosŏn soil was indeed ruinous, requiring a Chosŏn court 
already strapped economically as a result of the destruction brought about by 
the war to redirect scarce supplies toward its Ming allies, further impoverishing 
its own population and considerably weakening its own military capabilities.32
Indeed, one reason for the peace negotiations with Japan following 1593 was the 
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inability of the Chosŏn agricultural economy to support a substantial force of 
Ming soldiers.33 As Han Myŏnggi has discussed, the monarch Sŏnjo in general 
seemed to prefer emphasizing the military role of the Ming (whose aid, he, as 
monarch subordinate to the emperor, had the exclusive right to demand), rather 
than pass credit onto Chosŏn’s own righteous militias who had fought the Jap-
anese in the south a	er his ight to Ŭiju and compared to whom the Chosŏn 
monarch could easily seem to have lost his legitimate right to rule.34 Neverthe-
less, politically, the presence of Ming generals and ocials on Chosŏn soil could 
not but weaken the political position of the Chosŏn monarch, and the peace 
negotiations between the Ming and Japan between 1593 and 1596 were pursued 
with little regard to Chosŏn’s own interests.35
In addition to such political and economic challenges, one must also con-
sider the problem of the Ming soldiers themselves. In the ocial sources we are 
shown the actions of a state attempting to maintain its control over a refractory 
and o	en semicriminal group of soldiers and deserters at the same time as it 
sought to make use of those members of the Ming migrant community who 
had skills useful to the state; popular romances and hagiographic biographies 
contain a similar diversity of images, from descriptions of violent, destructive 
Li Rusong in The Record of the Imjin War (Imjin-rok),36 to Ming soldiers in-
teracting on a friendly and informal level with local people, and even to deeply 
moral Ming loyalists. Ideologically, Ming military enthusiasm for such religious 
practices as the cult of Guan Yu placed them not so much as representatives of 
Chunghwa but as people involved in troublesome and heretical religious ac-
tivities.37 Ultimately, rather than welcoming Ming migrants with open arms, 
the overburdened Chosŏn court attempted to restrict the activities of the com-
munities of Ming deserters, preventing them from establishing themselves on 
Chosŏn soil.
Additionally, the Chosŏn state had to deal with numerous runaway soldiers. 
There is considerable reference in The Chosŏn Veritable Records to violence com-
mitted by Ming deserters, or todangbyŏng (literally, “runaway Tang troops”).38 In 
1601, in the immediate post-Imjin period, Third Royal Secretary Yun Ansŏng 
(1542–1615) emphasized the particular destruction caused by runaway Ming sol-
diers in the P’yŏngan and Hwanghae provinces, which he saw as having nipped 
in the bud the beginnings of the restoration of agriculture in these regions. In-
deed, he claimed that the destruction caused in the region was ten times worse 
than when the Ming army was stationed there.39 While unrest, violence, and 
brigandage were hardly unknown among Korean soldiers during this period,40
Ming deserters were an additional, and signi
cant, source of worry.
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Although the policy of the Ming court itself was to force the return of Ming 
deserters, there seems to have been a general resistance to this from the soldiers 
themselves, many of whom, despite the destructiveness as discussed by Yun An-
sŏng, had put down roots in Chosŏn. Yi Kŭngik described the Ming army as 
comprising “more than 221,500 soldiers .  .  . mobilized from Zhejiang, Shanxi, 
Hubei, Sichuan, Guizhou, Yunnan and Burma.”41 This diverse list no doubt fails 
to cover the full diversity of the Ming army, which also included Mongols and 
Jurchens and many other groups, but it does remind us that, for the diversity 
of peoples from Yunnan or for Mongols from the border of Shanxi, or indeed 
for Chinese-speakers from Sichuan, Chosŏn may have been no more foreign 
than Shandong or Beijing; this, as well as conicts with superiors, o	en encour-
aged Ming deserters to stay in Chosŏn rather than make the trip back to Ming. 
Thus, in 1601, court discussion described a group of runaway soldiers and Ming 
merchants living in Chosŏn. Their reasons for staying in Chosŏn are variously 
given as injury, the loss of their merchandise, or conict with their commanding 
ocer. A	er desertion, they established themselves either as farmers or as salt 
merchants. They were strongly opposed to repatriation, to the extent that some 
threatened to submit to the enemy (the Japanese) rather than return to China.42
Nor was the Chosŏn court’s opposition to the continued presence of Ming 
migrants in any way absolute—in fact, it also made considerable use of Ming 
deserters. Medicine, geomancy, and other technical 
elds became established 
Chinese specialties. Of numerous examples discussed by Han Myŏnggi,43 the 
1596 case of the two Yunnanese Li Yi (K. Yi Ŭl) and Hua Yingchun (K. Hwa 
Ŭngch’un) stands out. The Chosŏn court chose to employ them for their ability 
to make gunpowder and poison powder. They were described as choosing to 
remain in Chosŏn because of illness—closer investigation suggested, however, 
that their real reasons were that, as Yunnanese, they did not want to make the 
return journey, and also because, as associates of an executed Ming ocer, they 
were themselves at risk of arrest.44 Another 
gure also discussed by Han, Sun 
Long (K. Son Yong), who deserted from the Ming military on account of con-
ict with his superiors, was employed in Chŏlla as an instructor in the produc-
tion of gunpowder, poison powder and landmines, activities which “the people 
of our country (Chosŏn) cannot do.”45 Even beyond their military abilities, the 
very presence of Ming deserters could have value as a deterrent—Chosŏn of-

cials deliberately formed a military unit of Ming deserters speci
cally to be 
shown to the Japanese, because they imagined that the Japanese would be less 
likely to repeat an invasion if they imagined that Ming soldiers were still pres-
ent.46 Another common area of specialty associated with Ming deserters was 
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geomancy. Geomancers such as Shi Wenyong were able to 
nd employment in 
the Chosŏn court itself,47 while on a private level Du Shizhong, another deserter, 
seems to have gained a reputation as a geomancer among contemporary sajok 
aristocrats.48
It is impossible to establish with any certainty the number of Ming desert-
ers who remained in Chosŏn—with or without ocial connivance—a	er the 
formal withdrawal of troops. It can be assumed, however, that in the general 
disorder of the post-Imjin period, when death and ight among the commoner 
population rendered the state incapable of raising taxes on one-third of the land, 
and when the household registration system was largely ineectual, far more 
Ming soldiers would have established themselves in Chosŏn than are recorded 
within court documents such as The Chosŏn Veritable Records or in later biog-
raphies. While some Ming deserters, as described above, declared the intention 
of leaving for Japan before they would return to Ming China, or participated 
in uprisings, many more would simply have kept out of the sight of the state in 
the 
rst place. The Chosŏn state responded to them dierently, according to its 
needs. Certain Ming deserters were seen as useful, and their presence in Chosŏn 
was actively supported by authorities, even as attempts were made to gain control 
over the large, sometimes criminalized bands of Ming deserters.
Integration into Chosŏn society did not necessarily make the Ming soldiers 
any more welcome, as their ignoring of obligations to the Ming emperor could 
be seen as contributing to a general failure to ful
ll status obligations in Chosŏn 
as well. At the same time, the context of the Ming camp life, in which large 
numbers of Chosŏn subjects participated, weakened Chosŏn-Ming boundaries, 
and these weakened boundaries ultimately resulted in the departure of Chosŏn 
subjects with the Ming armies, further reducing Chosŏn’s already limited ability 
to demand tax and corvée obligations of its subjects. According to the Military 
Training Agency (Hullyŏn togam) in 1594, many Chosŏn subjects “starving and 
with no means of maintaining their livelihood  .  .  . changed their clothes” as 
preparation for crossing the Yalu River into Ming territory. The oce called 
for the employment of these internal refugees in special military roles to pre-
vent their departure.49 In general, the loss of skilled labor, and especially of po-
tential soldiers, was a matter of considerable concern to the Chosŏn court.50 It 
was 
ghting a losing battle, however, and a great many soldiers in the camp of 
the departing Ming ocer Liu Ting were described as Korean-speakers from 
Kyŏngsang.51 Even as Ming soldiers le	 Chosŏn, Yun Ansŏng, discussing the 
problems caused by deserters in Hwanghae and P’yŏngan, conceded that “one 
cannot know the exact number of Ming deserters scattered about the region, or 
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who is or is not a runaway soldier,” so deeply had they integrated themselves into 
village life in Chosŏn.52
In fact, it was quite easy for Ming and Chosŏn subjects to cross over from 
one aliation to another. Frequently, this was achieved through cross-cultural 
marriages. Just as with other sorts of uncontrolled fraternization, sexual and 
marital unions between Ming and Chosŏn subjects were a matter of consider-
able concern to the court. At the same time, it is clear that such unions were ex-
tremely common indeed. A variety of sources suggest that Ming soldiers during 
the Imjin War quite frequently gained Chosŏn lovers—for instance, Liu Ting 
in 1594 is said to have le	 particular orders to the Chosŏn court to protect his 
lover while he was in China—a request that, on account of his high status, was 
accepted only slightly grudgingly.53 Indeed, in the early seventeenth century, Yi 
Sugwang described a prophecy in which the Imjin War would end when “chil-
dren know their mothers but do not know their own fathers.” This, he argued, 
was proven correct when, as a result of the war “sons grew old but did not know 
their father’s face, while women who were de
led by Ming soldiers would give 
birth to children and not know the father’s surname.”54
The above quotation reveals that the Ming soldier–Chosŏn woman union 
had become a widely recognized type by the time that Yi Sugwang was writing in 
the early seventeenth century, with adulterous Ming-Chosŏn unions becoming 
a stereotype. More stable marriages were also contracted between Ming Chinese 
and Chosŏn Koreans. According to Miscellaneous Records om a Time of War
(Nanjung chamnok), an account written by Cho Kyŏngnam (1570–1641), who 
participated in the war as a member of a righteous militia, many of the Ming sol-
diers under the Liu Ting’s command in Namwŏn had married Chosŏn women 
from Chŏlla and Kyŏngsang provinces. One ocer took a woman of private 
slave origin from Sŏnsan in Kyŏngsang Province as his concubine. Seemingly 
during the period of stalemate between 1593 and 1597 he successfully brazened 
his way past the border guards when he returned with her to Sichuan. There she 
gave birth to a son, and as he had no heir, he had their son raised by his wife. In 
1598, when he returned for the 
nal oensive against the Japanese, he brought 
her with him and purchased her from her original owner for several thousand 
taels of silver. However, such regular unions were not much more popular with 
the authorities than adulterous unions. Indeed, according to Cho Kyŏngnam, 
Chosŏn women departing with their Ming soldier husbands were all stopped by 
the Ming authorities at Shanhaiguan and thus forced to remain in the Liaodong 
and Liaoxi region. According to Cho, the total population of such women in 
Liaodong and Liaoxi reached several tens of thousands, although he also asserted 
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that they were all returned to Chosŏn in 1609.55 Indeed, although the Chosŏn 
court generally treated the departure of women as less serious than that of men, 
it was concerned by the large number of women leaving with Ming soldiers, and, 
in 1593, attempts were made to prevent Chosŏn women secretly leaving in the 
company of Ming soldiers.56 Of course, it is doubtful that either the Chosŏn or 
Ming states were able to eectively prevent the departure of many women, or to 
repatriate them all a	er they had departed to Liaodong.
Despite preventing the departure of such women, the court did not exert it-
self to treat well those who remained behind. Certainly, during the last years of 
Sŏnjo (r. 1567–1608) and the early years of Kwanghae-gun (r. 1608–1623), ocials 
demanded action against women in Hansŏng who had been seduced by Chinese 
soldiers and who were suspected of continuing to engage in sexual relationships 
with the participants of various visiting Ming legations. In shocked tones they 
suggested that the soldiers had been so shameless as to seduce even women of 
good families; even a	er the departure of Ming soldiers, many such women 
became prostitutes for the Ming legations that visited the capital. Under both 
kings, such women were ordered to be sent into exile, either ten li outside of 
Hansŏng or even as far as Pusan. Exceptions were to be made for cases in which 
the women had not entered into the relationships of their own free will—al-
though how such a determination would have been made is unclear.57
There were, in fact, some cases of serious crimes committed by Ming desert-
ers who formed ties with Chosŏn subjects. For instance, in 1599, one Chosŏn 
ocial, Hong Yŏsun, complained about Chosŏn village functionaries (hyangni) 
using Ming soldiers to attack more prominent ocials.58 During the same year, 
a slave from Suwŏn named Maktong who lived in the Ming camp claimed to be 
Chinese in order to attack sajok families within the area, “terrifying sajok wives, 
plundering their possessions, and when he broke in at night, raping female slaves, 
and when someone did not follow his orders, leading Tartar troops and raising 
revolt.” He was able to claim Ming military support, not only because he was 
part of the Ming army but also because “in clothes and language he imitated the 
appearance of a Chinese person (Tangin).”59 By donning Ming uniforms and 
mastering Chinese, Chosŏn subjects could bene
t from the status of a Ming 
subject to leave Chosŏn for Ming China or commit crimes against their supe-
riors in Chosŏn.
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Loyal Outsiders and Disloyal Allies
Why did the Chosŏn state worry about the Ming Chinese intermarrying with, 
or masquerading as, Chosŏn subjects? The Chosŏn state was not a modern 
nation-state, seeking to impose a universal culture on its subjects, but a court 
and elite that maintained authority through the scrupulous protection of status 
distinctions. Both Ming soldiers and Japanese soldiers were alike in providing 
useful military skills to the court, and all could potentially be the source of strife, 
but Japanese submission could be justi
ed ideologically as serving the mainte-
nance of the Chunghwa moral order in a way that Ming soldiers, whose transfer 
to Chosŏn involved an act of desertion from the Ming emperor, could not.
The Neo-Confucian philosopher Kang Hang, who is well known for the role 
he played as prisoner of war in introducing Yi Hwang’s (1501–1570) brand of 
Neo-Confucianism to Japan, is informative in this context.60 He argued against 
killing Japanese defectors, in part because it was a “violation against humanity 
to kill those who have already surrendered.” Moreover, as a Confucian thinker 
himself, he also argued that the attractions of Chosŏn’s benevolent civilization 
would be a powerful lure to ordinary Japanese who had been forced out of their 
families in early youth and a	erward deprived of all rights to a family. This 
made them easy to detach from the Japanese state, as “they do not entertain a 
longing for their hometown, parents, wives or children.” Kang argued that Jap-
anese soldiers with whom he conversed could see a contrast between the harsh 
routine of the Japanese army and the gentle life in the fertile land of Chosŏn. He 
represented his conversations with Japanese soldiers as follows:
When these soldiers gather, they o	en say to one another, “Chosŏn is uto-
pia! Japan is a truly vile country.” One or another [of us] may rejoin with, 
“Our government treats Japanese who surrender with kindness and gener-
osity. It provides them with food and clothing worthy of a general. I even 
heard of a high ocial posted to the third rank.” They could not help being 
amazed by the story and would sincerely wish to surrender.61
To be sure, Kang Hang’s position cannot be extended to include Chosŏn so-
ciety as a whole, as he was in any case a devoted Mencian, believing that human 
nature was naturally good and seeking solutions to the problems of the world by 
activating this nature. However, similar rhetoric of transformation does appear 
with great regularity in The Chosŏn Veritable Records. Notably, during the dis-
cussion between Sin Ch’ungil and Ma Sin of the Jianzhou Jurchen, Sin Ch’ungil 
speci
cally described the Japanese defectors in such a manner. As he said to Ma 
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Sin, when asked by Ma how many Japanese had submitted, he answered not 
only that Chosŏn had provided them with “clothing and headgear,” both estab-
lished accouterments of Chunghwa civilization, but also that “to those Japanese 
defectors who long for morality and come to submit, our country oers them 
food and drink and places them at their ease. They are moved by our kindness 
and hold feelings of gratitude, and we settle them at our borders as a protection 
for the state.”62
Sin Ch’ungil’s rhetoric was no doubt aimed at encouraging the Jianzhou 
Jurchens not only to show a healthy respect for the presence of Japanese defector 
gunmen at the northern border but also to emulate the Japanese in their proper 
appreciation for Chosŏn’s civilizing power. Yet, such language also appears in 
contexts where rhetorical threats are not required. In one especially notable ex-
ample described by Kim Ŭngsŏ, a Japanese soldier named Sabaekku defected to 
Kim Ŭngsŏ, only to be sent on to serve under the military ocial Paek Sarim 
because Kim Ŭngsŏ lacked the necessary resources to support him. During the 
Japanese oensive of 1597, Paek Sarim was in charge of Hwangsŏk Mountain 
fortress, which fell to the Japanese a	er the soldiers from Kimhae ed the for-
tress, having conspired with the Japanese attackers. They le	 their leader Paek 
behind. As Paek had become excessively fat, he could not escape easily and was 
in great danger. Sabaekku, however, did not betray him and not only managed 
to shoot four Japanese attackers but even concealed Paek behind stones and veg-
etation, and by tricking the Japanese guard at the gate, was able to move Paek 
out of the fortress to safety. Sabaekku even managed to enter the fallen fortress 
again to obtain provisions by pretending to be a soldier from the Japanese army. 
As a reward, Sabaekku was given a Korean surname, with Kim Ŭngsŏ noting 
especially: “These days educated people of our country will not save the head of 
their household or their wives and children. Yet, in this case, [even] a barbarian 
reveals an honest mind, which should cause shame to others. Sabaekku should 
be succored with an especially substantial reward. Japanese defectors, already 
knowing the route of self-preservation, wish to form a far-sighted plan and adopt 
Chosŏn names. The court should settle the matter of granting surnames to Jap-
anese defectors quickly.”63
Sabaekku, as a Japanese defector, was assumed to be less capable of acting 
morally than an educated Chosŏn ocial. To the extent that he acted with much 
greater morality and bravery, he attracted the particular praise of the Chosŏn 
court, which, in response to Kim Ŭngsŏ’s request, oered him a Chosŏn name. 




In contrast to such cases one might note the controversy concerning the fa-
mous Ming migrant named Shi Wenyong, who was drawn into the factional 
politics of the period a	er the Imjin War. The son of another Ming ocer, 
Shi was from Pujiang in Zhejiang, but for reasons that are now somewhat ob-
scure, remained in Chosŏn a	er the general departure of Ming troops. Within 
Chosŏn he became associated with an inuential and controversial volunteer 
militia leader of the Pugin faction named Chŏng Inhong (1535–1623), who be-
came known for sheltering several Ming soldiers within his base area of Sŏngju. 
Because of his inuence, and no doubt also because of the signi
cant suspicion 
under which leaders of Imjin-era militias fell during the reign of Sŏnjo, his shel-
tering of Ming migrants became fuel for his political enemies. These criticisms 
were included in somewhat shortened form in The Chosŏn Veritable Records and 
in more complete detail by An Pangjun (1573~1654) in The Collected Records of 
Lies and Truth (Honjŏng p’yŏllok), an anthology of documents related to fac-
tional disputes between 1575–1650.
While the factual basis of the claims of the rival factions is now hard to eval-
uate, as each was clearly seeking to 
nd pretexts to either discredit or defend 
Chŏng Inhong, the nature of the arguments used for understanding the role 
played by Ming deserters in Chosŏn are fascinating for what they reveal about 
attitudes toward Ming deserters. The Revised Veritable Records of King Sŏnjo
(Sŏnjo sujŏng sillok), which was compiled during the reigns of Injo (r. 1623–1649) 
and Hyojong (r. 1649–1659) speci
cally to counter the bias in favor of the Pugin 
faction within the original Veritable Records of Sŏnjo (Sŏnjo sillok), which had 
been published during the reign of Kwanghae-gun (r. 1608–1623), includes an 
attack on Chŏng Inhong by Yi Kwi (1557–1633), a member of the Sŏin faction, 
based primarily on information obtained from his relative Yi Si’ik (1567–1642).64 
Yi Kwi’s accusations against Chŏng were focused on Chŏng’s continued ex-
ploitation of the privileges he enjoyed as a leader of a righteous militia within 
the area of Sŏngju, despite royal commands to disperse and despite the fact that 
the Imjin War had been over for three years. As a part of a general charge that 
Chŏng had abused his power in the region of Sŏngju, Yi Si’ik accused him of 
compelling the daughter of a sajok man to marry a base person (slave) with a 
very close relationship to Chŏng’s family, and forcibly marrying a sajok woman 
(punyŏ), who had previously been taken captive by the Japanese, to a “runaway 
Chinese soldier who knew geomancy.”65
This general accusation of lawlessness by Yi Si’ik could not go unanswered, 
and although The Veritable Records of Sŏnjo may have le	 out Yi Kwi’s original 
memorial, it did include O Yŏon’s memorial in response in defense of Chŏng 
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Inhong. Notably, O’s memorial provided considerable detail absent from Yi 
Kwi’s. O, for instance, developed a counterargument to Yi Kwi’s accusation that 
Chŏng Inhong had forced a sajok woman to marry a man whom Yi Kwi had 
called a “runaway Chinese soldier who knew geomancy.” O partly con
rmed the 
story and indeed identi
ed the soldier as Shi Wenyong, but insisted that Chŏng 
Inhong’s actions were entirely laudable. Chŏng’s ancestor was Zheng Chenbao, 
a man of Pujiang in Zhejiang who le	 for Koryŏ because he refused to serve the 
Yuan a	er the Yuan conquest and so his descendants had remained in Korea. 
This explained Chŏng Inhong’s exemplary treatment of Ming generals serving 
in Chosŏn, including Chen Gang and Mao Guoqi, whom he treated as elders 
from the same village (hyangjang). It also encompassed his good treatment of 
Shi Wenyong, an ocer from Pujiang, who had “fallen behind and had been 
unable to return to the Ming. Shi would occasionally visit Chŏng Inhong, and 
Chŏng had been unable to drive him out simply because of the ancient duties 
of the shared hometown (hyangjong).” Similarly, there was nothing untoward 
in the marriage between Shi Wenyong and a local woman, as the mother of 
the girl was still alive, and the father’s kin were also alive. All suggestions of 
forced marriage were simply inventions of Yi Si’ik.66 In other words, according 
to O, Chŏng’s actions in all respects had been fully in line with Chosŏn’s alli-
ance with the Ming, further strengthened by a familial connection to the fallen 
but much-admired Song dynasty. Chŏng conceded that Shi Wenyong had no 
terribly clear reason for remaining in Chosŏn (although in contrast to Yi Kwi, 
he does not speci
cally refer to him as a deserter or runaway), but ultimately 
described Chŏng Inhong’s actions as inspired by his desire to help a member of 
his own home community.
O Yŏon’s defense itself did not go unanswered and indeed resulted in a much 
more developed attack than that launched by Yi Kwi. Yang Hongju (1550–1610) 
claimed to have built on Yi Kwi’s and Yi Si’ik’s criticisms out of frustration that 
Yi Kwi’s memorial had been so fruitless. His countermemorial, which is found 
in simpli
ed form in The Veritable Records of Sŏnjo, and in much more elaborate 
and detailed form in The Records of Lies and Truth, attacked Chŏng Inhong’s 
activities as speci
cally undermining the Chosŏn status system. He maintained 
that Chŏng Inhong’s home had become a lair for former righteous militia mem-
bers and runaway slaves (both private and public). Yang also developed the accu-
sation as related to Shi Wenyong, clarifying that it was not Shi Wenyong’s wife, 
but his mother-in-law—the wife of Chang Ham—who had been captured by the 
Japanese and (it is implied) raped. Shi Wenyong’s wife, by contrast, was still a 
young girl at the time of capture and so was able to escape rape. As Yang Hongju 
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argued, forcing Chang Ham’s wife to marry a Ming soldier would have been 
bad enough, even though she had been “dirtied” by the Japanese, but to force 
the innocent daughter into such a situation was simply unacceptable—a sign of 
complete contempt for the law of the land and for sajok status.67 As is recorded in 
the more extensive version found in The Records of Lies and Truth, this forcible 
marriage would have been unacceptable for a commoner, many of whom, during 
the chaos of the Imjin War, had experienced captivity, and even more so for the 
daughter of a sajok. “In the customs of our country to marry a person of an alien 
land, not to mention ladies of sajok background, is considered shameful even by 
male and female peddlers.”
Worse, in contrast to O Yŏon’s claim that Chŏng Inhong’s support for Ming 
soldiers was inspired entirely by a feeling of connection to people from Zhejiang, 
Yang Hongju argued that Chŏng Inhong’s actions amounted to disloyalty to the 
Ming court itself, for when the Ming sent an envoy to capture and return Ming 
soldiers hiding in Chosŏn, Chŏng Inhong ignored the order and concealed 
ve 
Chinese deserters, including Shi Wenyong, Zhu Jiansong, and Guan Yinghua, 
at his home. His actions had wider implications as they encouraged hundreds of 
Ming deserters to conceal themselves throughout the two southern provinces of 
Kyŏngsang and Chŏlla. Yang Hongju asked how public order and social hierar-
chies could survive in Chosŏn, “with Chŏng Inhong acting as lord of runaways, 
including Chosŏn commoners of our country eeing from corvée labor, public 
and private slaves rebelling against their masters, and Ming deserters ignoring 
imperial commands?”68
Was the marriage between Shi Wenyong’s and Chang Ham’s daughter forced, 
as the Sŏin faction claimed, or was it with the full consent of her parents, as O 
Yŏon maintained? What was the nature of Chŏng Inhong’s relationship with 
Ming migrant groups—was he merely helping them as people from his ancestral 
hometown, or was there some broader plot on his part to accumulate a private 
army of runaways and deserters? Although it is perhaps impossible now to de-
termine the truth of many of these accusations and counteraccusations, Yang’s 
attacks on Chŏng are meaningful for what they tell us about the continued am-
bivalence concerning the presence of Ming deserters in Chosŏn. The core of the 
Sŏin position, as asserted by Yang Hongju and to a lesser extent already by Yi 
Kwi, was that the presence of Ming deserters in Chosŏn under Chŏng Inhong’s 
leadership was corrosive to the entire social structure of society. Yang Hongju’s 
assertion that it was impossibly shameful for ordinary Koreans to marry for-
eigners can certainly be rejected. There is no shortage of examples of such inter-
marriage, these being in fact a key reward granted to submitting-foreigners of 
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Jurchen and Japanese origin, although as I discussed in chapter 1, these unions 
tended to be with women of low status. Thus, they might well have been shame-
ful for sajok women by the late sixteenth century. In part, Yang Hongju was ar-
guing (falsely) that marriage to a foreigner would always be considered shameful 
in order to establish, despite O Yŏon’s denials, that the marriage between Shi 
Wenyong’s and Chang Ham’s daughters must have been coerced. It is neverthe-
less meaningful that it was possible, even as a rhetorical ourish, to claim that 
Ming soldiers were people of an alien state with whom no union could be con-
templated, much as marriages with Jurchens and Japanese could be considered 
out of bounds for members of ocial and royal families. Ultimately, the problem 
of intermarriage with Ming deserters for Yang Hongju was caught up with the 
general problem of disorder in post-Imjin Chosŏn, including concerns about the 
possible disloyalty of captured Chosŏn commoners.
Alternately, O Yŏon’s defense of Chŏng Inhong sought to emphasize that 
Chŏng’s connections with Ming deserters had thoroughly honorable origins—
and indeed envisioned the connection between Chŏng Inhong and Ming de-
serters in a Zhejiang that crossed state boundaries. In fact, Chinese migrants 
in Chosŏn were administered according to the same submitting-foreigner cate-
gory as Jurchens and Japanese, and in this sense all three could equally be called 
“people of alien lands,” but at the same time Chosŏn sajok possessed a cultural 
identication with Chunghwa, which was not restricted to, but also did not 
ignore, China as a political entity. Nobody envisioned a Chosŏn state existing 
outside of the Ming, but Chosŏn’s sajok aristocrats also considered themselves 
to set a standard of civilization in their own right. Moreover, Chosŏn had an 
ambivalent attitude to the many Ming soldiers in Chosŏn. On the one hand, the 
Ming intervention was vital to Chosŏn’s survival, and an exclusive emphasis on 
it served the interests of the Chosŏn monarchy (which avoided granting honors 
to Korean military leaders). On the other hand, the task of feeding and support-
ing the Ming army had been a logistic nightmare and a source of considerable 
conict between Korean civilians and Ming military. O Yŏon’s emphasis on the 
Zhejiang connection reminded the Chosŏn court of the vital role of the Ming 
military, despite these stresses.
At least during the reign of Kwanghae-gun, O Yŏon’s argument must have 
been successful, as Shi Wenyong was employed in what later became one 
of the scandals of the Kwanghae-gun era—the expensive reconstruction of 
Kyŏngbok-kung, an important royal palace that had been destroyed during 
the Imjin War. Shi Wenyong, along with a Chosŏn monk named Sŏngji, was 
employed prominently in this project as a geomancer.69 The Journal of King 
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Kwanghae-gun (Kwanghae-gun ilgi) includes numerous references to him, but 
because the Journal was compiled under Injo, the editors added derogatory com-
ments about Shi Wenyong in the form of either interpolations or editorial com-
ments.70 The rst reference to Shi Wenyong in the Journal is the statement by 
Sŏng Chinsŏn, the governor of Kyŏngsang Province, that “Shi Wenyong, a Chi-
nese person, knows geomancy very well. He should be given a horse and sent up 
to the capital.” The editors of the intermediate dra (chungch’obon) directed that 
“deserter” be added to “a Chinese” in the expression “Shi Wenyong, a Chinese 
person,”71 an addition that is present in the corrected dra (chŏngch’obon) com-
pleted under Hyojong. More oen, the compilers simply added a note declaring 
Shi Wenyong to be a Ming deserter who was selected through the corrupt inu-
ence of Chŏng Inhong.72 Finally, the Journal notes that Shi’s labors came to an 
end in 1623, when, aer the overthrow of Kwanghae-gun, he attempted to escape 
but was captured and executed.73
Not only could deserting Ming soldiers, by violating their loyalties to the 
Ming emperor, imply the collapse of social order and even the revolt of slaves 
against their masters, but the relationships they formed with Chosŏn women 
threatened the clarity of the Chosŏn court’s own rule over its subjects. In his 
discussion of the Japanese trading colony in Pusan, James B. Lewis describes the 
tightening restrictions on sexual and marital relations between Japanese and 
Chosŏn subjects following the Three Ports uprising and the Imjin War—this 
he argues, was not inspired by Confucian disapproval of irregular unions, or by 
national hostility to foreigners establishing roots in Chosŏn, but by a fear, made 
especially strong following the Imjin War, that mixed subjects with multiple 
political aliations could pose a military threat to the Chosŏn state.74 Similarly, 
although Ming soldiers were subjects of an empire that was seen by most Chosŏn 
ocials as the font of civilization, Chosŏn ocials also oen considered inter-
marriage between Chosŏn subjects with Ming soldiers as a signicant threat to 
the social order.
The Imjin War tore apart the elaborate relationships formed by the Chosŏn 
court with Japanese and Ryukyuans to its south and put considerable strain on 
its relationship with the Ming. Even before the invasion itself, rst Oda Nobun-
aga and then Hideyoshi had eliminated the petty states with which Chosŏn had 
formed its relationships, although the Chosŏn court became aware of this only 
on the eve of war. The invasion itself brought widespread demographic displace-
ment to Chosŏn, including not only departures of Chosŏn subjects—forced or 
willing—to other parts of the world but also the entrance of huge numbers of 
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Japanese and Ming soldiers onto Chosŏn soil. Many of these soldiers became 
migrants, as deserters from both Japanese and Ming armies abandoned their 
posts, formed ties with Chosŏn subjects, and elected to stay in Chosŏn.
For reasons related to both economic diculties and distrust of the loyal-
ties of those arriving, the Chosŏn state sought to police the oating population 
within its borders, making use of the tools for governing foreigners that it had 
developed in the previous two centuries. To a surprising degree, civilizational 
categories (barbarian/Confucian), or what might be termed “proto-national 
categories” (Chinese/Japanese/Korean) mattered less than the security of a 
migrant’s aliation. The Chosŏn court actively sought to attract both skilled 
Japanese and Ming deserters and encouraged, where possible, the settlement of 
both in Chosŏn territory as secure subjects of the Chosŏn monarchy, although 
Ming deserters, who had revolted against the Ming state to which the Chosŏn 
court also claimed to be loyal, posed ideological challenges that Japanese, who 
had been submitting to the Chosŏn monarchy since the beginning of the dy-
nasty, did not.
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Border Peoples and Flexible Loyalties in Chosŏn  
during the Seventeenth Century
T he period of peace in Chosŏn aer the departure of the Ming armies in 1600 was soon followed by renewed conict in Liaodong to Chosŏn’s north, as a new power, the Jianzhou Jurchens, under their 
charismatic leader, Nurhaci, rose to prominence in the borderlands between 
Ming Liaodong and Chosŏn Korea and became a growing challenge to both 
Ming authority and the Chosŏn state. Nurhaci consolidated his control over 
previously disunited Jurchen tribes (increasingly named Manchu during this 
period)1 and indeed over Mongol and other groups as well. Politically, he formed 
the region north of Chosŏn into a centralizing polity under his rule, establish-
ing the Later Jin dynasty in 1616. War erupted in 1618 when Nurhaci countered 
Ming attempts to block his trade in Liaodong by occupying the Liaodongese 
trading town of Fushun. The Ming responded in 1619 by sending a massive 
military force, including troops provided by its allies, such as Mongols, Yehe 
(a Jurchen group), and indeed Chosŏn, but bad coordination caused by rivalry 
among Ming ocers allowed Nurhaci to destroy the Ming force sent against 
him in the decisive battle of Sarhu. Following this, both he and his successor, 
Hong Taiji, as leaders of rst the Later Jin and then the Qing empires, were 
able to pursue the conquest of Liaodong and Liaoxi against a Ming court oth-
erwise weakened by widespread popular unrest. This culminated in 1644 with 
the Qing occupation of the Ming capital of Beijing aer it had already fallen to 
the rebels under Li Zicheng.2
Badly weakened by the Imjin War, Chosŏn’s direct military involvement in 
the conict was limited and controversial. Aer the debacle in Sarhu in 1619, 
Nurhaci chose to spare the Chosŏn contingent, even while executing the other 
surviving Ming soldiers. This resulted in the rumor, spreading among both 
Ming and Chosŏn ocials, of a conspiracy between the then-king Kwang-
hae-gun of Chosŏn and the new Manchu power. This rumor became one of 
the justications for the coup d’état that overthrew Kwanghae-gun and put 
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Injo on the throne in 1623.3 The Chosŏn court under Injo, already beholden 
to the Ming for their military assistance during the Imjin War, had very lit-
tle room for diplomatic maneuvering aer justifying its own takeover of the 
Chosŏn state in part on Ming loyalist grounds. Injo’s regime had a weak base 
of support (as revealed by the 1624 revolt of Injo’s supporter Yi Kwal) and so 
could not devote resources to the defense of its northern border. As a result, it 
suered the Chŏngmyo Invasion by the Later Jin under Hong Taiji in 1627, aer 
which Chosŏn was forced to abandon its direct military assistance to the Ming 
and agree to a younger-brother relationship with the Later Jin.4 When it failed 
to maintain the terms of this agreement and also rejected Hong Taiji’s attempts 
to claim imperial status and a new Qing dynasty in 1636, the Chosŏn court 
suered a second Manchu assault, the Pyŏngja Invasion of 1636–1637, at the 
conclusion of which Injo was forced into a humiliating and public submission 
to Hong Taiji.5 By the terms of the surrender, Chosŏn was required to break 
o all ties to the Ming and accept Qing overlordship. As a surety, Injo had to 
send the Sohyŏn crown prince (Sohyŏn seja, 1612–1645) and his second son, the 
Pongnim great prince (Pongnim taegun, 1619–1659, later Hyojong r. 1649–1659), 
as well as a number of high ocials, as hostages to the Qing capital of Mukden. 
Chosŏn also suered the capture of large numbers of ordinary Chosŏn subjects 
as prisoners of war, the execution of a number of anti-Qing ocials under Qing 
auspices,6 and the forced participation in military activity alongside the Qing 
armies against the Ming.7
Ideologically, these troubles represented a major crisis to Chosŏn’s elite, 
who felt a deep obligation to the Ming empire and to a civilization centered 
on Chunghwa, in which category they did not include the new Qing empire. 
Demographically, however, the Manchu invasions were signicantly less dis-
ruptive than the Imjin War and resulted in far less loss of life. Chosŏn, in fact, 
suered far less than did much of the world during a notoriously troubled sev-
enteenth century, severely aected, as Georey Parker has argued, by a cooling 
climate.8 However, like the Imjin War, the wars between the Manchu and Ming 
in Liaodong generated large numbers of refugees and displaced peoples, notably 
Chinese-speaking Liaodongese and Chosŏn’s own Jurchen vassals, the Pŏnhos 
of the Tumen River. As with the Japanese defectors and Ming deserters of the 
Imjin War, these refugees carried signicant political risks, as all were poten-
tially beholden to other regimes. In particular, Liaodongese refugees, who came 
in huge numbers, placed a heavy economic burden on a Chosŏn state already 
weakened by the Imjin War. Moreover, Pŏnhos and Liaodongese, like the Ming 
and Japanese deserters of the Imjin War, were highly mobile culturally, socially, 
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and politically, and this posed new challenges for the Chosŏn state as it sought 
to maintain its control in the face of chaos in Northeast Asia.
Chosŏn’s Jurchen Subjects during the Rise of the Qing
Beginning with the late sixteenth century, growing unrest threatened the del-
icate balance on Chosŏn’s northern border, with its combination of military 
garrisons and Pŏnho vassals; some of these vassals now cast their lot with the 
deep-dwelling Jurchen groups against whom they were supposed to form a bar-
rier. The elaborate defensive network of relationships that the Chosŏn court had 
formed with Pŏnhos on its northern border had already shown signs of collapse 
with the Nit’anggae uprising of 1583. The Imjin War further weakened Chosŏn’s 
control over the region, as Pŏnhos rose up in revolt during and aer Katō Kiyo-
masa’s occupation of Hamgyŏng Province,9 leading to further unrest in 1594 by 
the Yŏksu tribe that had formed a fortied town north of the Tumen. Among 
other problems, the Imjin War drained the Chosŏn court of the nances needed 
to provide its usual support to its Jurchen allies, including their all-important 
Northeast Asia during the Ming-Qing Transition.  
(Draed by Thomas Quartermain.)
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visits to the capital. Then, immediately following the war, between 1598 and 
1600, Chosŏn su
ered a series of destructive uprisings by Pŏnhos, including the 
Not’o tribe upstream from Hoeryŏng. These were put down only with great 
di	culty.10
In 1599, during a discussion of the Not’o uprising, Yi Tŏkhyŏng (1561–1613) 
expressed concern that if the Not’o were not brought thoroughly under control, 
“abroad the authority of the kingdom will su
er, and domestically we will lose 
the support of the multitude. Far and wide there will be none who do not despise 
us. Then if sundry Jurchens continue to rise in revolt, and someone like Nurhaci 
hears of it, and if that moves his mind toward aggression, then how will we main-
tain control? That is the road to destruction.”11 By “someone like Nurhaci” Yi 
Tŏkhyŏng was referring not only to Nurhaci himself, then indeed causing con-
cern to the Chosŏn court, but to a whole class of powerful new leaders of Jurchen 
confederacies. Although the Ming and Chosŏn together had eliminated pow-
erful Jurchen leaders following the joint attack on Li Manchu of the Jianzhou 
confederacy in 1467, by the late sixteenth century new Jurchen confederacies 
had emerged, driven by economic development in the Jurchen lands, with Jurch-
ens selling ginseng and pelts to Ming and Chosŏn in exchange for handcraed 
goods from both. This trade brought the Jurchen lands into the Ming’s silver 
economy and drove both increased social di
erentiation and the formation of 
fortied towns. These economic and social developments encouraged the for-
mation of new military confederacies, initially in the region north and east of 
Tieling among the “Four Hūlūn,” namely the Ula, Hoifa, Yehe, and Hada. In 
1548, Wan of the Hada established himself as leader of the Four Hūlūn, while 
also extending his control over part of the Jianzhou and Wild Jurchens. Gener-
ally accumulating power with Ming support, he also claimed the Mongol title 
“khan.”12 However, the dominance of the Hada over the Hūlūn did not survive 
Wan’s death in 1582. Closer to Chosŏn’s borders, the Jianzhou Jurchen confeder-
acy experienced somewhat slower political development—one leader, Wang Gao 
(d. 1575), came into conict with the Ming and was defeated by the combined 
force of the Ming and Wang Tai in 1575. In 1583, during the conict that fol-
lowed Wang Tai’s death, Giocangga and Taksi, two prominent leaders of the Ji-
anzhou, were both killed, partly through the connivance of Nikan Wailan, who 
attempted to work with the Ming to advance his own position. This resulted in a 
temporary setback to the Jianzhou Jurchens. Nurhaci, the son of Taksi, gradually 
consolidated power over the Jianzhou Jurchens. Aer Nurhaci’s victory over an 
alliance of the Four Hūlūn and their allies in 1593, he expanded his power more 
broadly over the Jurchens as a whole.13
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The emergence of confederacies to Chosŏn’s north made it increasingly chal-
lenging for Chosŏn to maintain control over the Pŏnhos. Even before Nurhaci, 
the Ula, a branch of the Hūlūn based on the Sunggari River, had sought to exert 
their control over the Pŏnhos of northern Hamgyŏng. Bujantai, the younger 
brother of Mantai of the Ula, was captured aer the Hūlūn defeat in 1593 and 
taken to Jianzhou by Nurhaci. He was allowed by Nurhaci to return to the Ula, 
in theory as a vassal of the Jianzhou, in 1596. Despite the fact that the alliance 
between Bujantai of the Ula and Nurhaci of the Jianzhou was strengthened 
through marital ties, Bujantai actively conspired with Šurgaci (Nurhaci’s then 
co-ruler and younger brother) against Nurhaci himself. Bujantai’s rise ended 
only when he was defeated in battle by Nurhaci in 1613.
In Chosŏn accounts, Bujantai was known initially by an Idu rendering of his 
nickname Hashū, which is perhaps to be glossed as “le-handed archer.”14 His 
group, the Ula, were generally referred to in Chosŏn texts as Hūlūn (K. Horon 
or Hollaon), of which the Ula were only one part.15 Kim Siyang (1581–1643), a 
Chosŏn o	cial who was exiled to the garrison of Chongsŏng near the Tumen 
River between 1608 and 1618, claimed that Bujantai was already intervening in 
the a
airs of the Pŏnhos in 1591.16 This is unlikely, as Bujantai was not then an 
autonomous power, but it is indeed true that when the Hūlūn confederacy, in-
cluding the Ula under Mantai, challenged Nurhaci in 1593, they had allies among 
the Jurchens from Jušeri, in the region of Mt. Paektu on Chosŏn’s northern bor-
der.17As an independent force, the Ula under Bujantai rst appeared in the area 
of Hamgyŏng shortly aer the Imjin War. Between 1601 and 1605, especially, 
Bujantai led the Ula in an active military campaign for dominance over the 
Pŏnhos, launching frequent raids against northern Hamgyŏng and taking pris-
oners and allies back with him as he prepared for conict with his father-in-law 
and erstwhile ally Nurhaci. In 1603, Bujantai deployed a massive army against 
Tonggwan and Chongsŏng in northern Hamgyŏng, successfully preventing the 
Chosŏn military from intervening against his dominance over the Pŏnhos from 
these regions. In order to restore its weakened authority among the Pŏnhos who 
had only learned to fear “the Hūlūn while thinking that Chosŏn could not be 
trusted,”18 Chosŏn sent a military o	cial named Kim Chongdŭk and a Pŏnho 
named T’aktu to lead a force against Bujantai’s temporary base of Kŏnt’oe north 
of the Tumen River. The Chosŏn army, however, su
ered a humiliating military 
defeat and a complete loss of authority over those Pŏnhos still in the vicinity of 
Hamgyŏng Province. With a signicant military victory to his credit, the next 
year Bujantai was able to demand bureaucratic titles and trading privileges from 
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Chosŏn via the Hamgyŏng governor, signicantly improving his position in in-
tra-Jurchen political and military competition.19
Bujantai, however, faced a rival in Nurhaci for the control of the Jurchens. 
During the 1590s, Nurhaci had expanded his power to the extent that he was 
able to o
er military assistance to Chosŏn during the Imjin War. The o
er was 
refused but did result in a limited exchange of communication between the 
Chosŏn court and Nurhaci, despite a general policy of avoiding direct contact 
with the Jianzhou over which the Ming court also exerted its claims.20 Much 
of the discussion between Nurhaci and Chosŏn concerned disputes over the 
northern border, especially illegal Chosŏn ginseng diggers. However, as his ri-
valry with Bujantai grew, Nurhaci increased his e
orts to block the expansion 
of Bujantai’s dominance among the Pŏnhos. He himself clearly had abundant 
connections to Chosŏn’s Pŏnhos. During his visit to Nurhaci’s capital in 1595, 
Sin Ch’ungil was told that a recent raid on Chosŏn was the responsibility of a 
man named Kim Waedu (Ma. Adun), whose father, Jeocangga, had served in 
Hansŏng for eight years under the name of Kim Kisŏng. The son had aban-
doned Chosŏn and moved to Komigae in the region of the “four abandoned 
counties” in the upper Yalu River in the vicinity of Mount Paektu.21 Other ev-
idence, however, suggests that Waedu was not the independent actor described 
in this passage but in fact was a close associate of Nurhaci.22 He was not the only 
member of Chosŏn’s Pŏnhos to form such a connection. In 1601, The Chosŏn
Veritable Records mentions that associates of such rebellious Pŏnhos as Nit’ang-
gae and the Not’o tribe had joined with Nurhaci.23
In fact, Nurhaci did not simply wait for Pŏnhos to come to him but actively 
pressed his claims over those Pŏnhos still under Chosŏn control. In 1595, he sent 
an unprecedented demand to Hŏ Uk (1548–1618), the magistrate of Kanggye, to 
repatriate all Jurchens who lived as submitting-foreigners in Chosŏn, a request 
that Hŏ simply ignored.24 Beyond such minor expansions of Nurhaci’s authority, 
in 1607 Nurhaci directly challenged Bujantai’s forces at Munam/Ogaram on 
the opposite bank from the Chosŏn fortied town of Chongsǒng, even lead-
ing his armies through northern Hamgyŏng. At the conclusion of this ghting, 
which brought Nurhaci’s armies south of the Tumen River, he broke Bujantai’s 
control over the Pŏnhos and gained direct jurisdiction over the Jurchen town of 
Fio-hoton (K. Hyǒnsǒng) north of the mouth of the Tumen River, within the 
administrative region of the present-day city of Hunchun.25 Having eliminated 
Bujantai’s inuence in the region, Nurhaci was able to pursue the active removal 
of Pŏnhos from Chosŏn control into his power base in Jianzhou, taking with 
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him, according to the Old Manchu Archive, two thousand Pŏnho households 
from Hesihe, Fenehe, and Omho Sure.26
Ultimately, Nurhaci’s assertion of control over the Pŏnhos was driven by the 
same material and ideological logic as his expansion over the Jurchens as a whole. 
Like Wan of Hada before him, Nurhaci was organizing a confederacy. He was 
establishing a state centered upon himself by bringing disparate Jurchen political 
structures into his orbit. In common with earlier steppe confederacies, he pur-
sued not only military means but also administrative and cultural strategies to 
fuse diverse Jurchen groups into one coherent identity with a putative common 
ancestry.27 Thus, in 1599, he had his minister, Erdeni Bakši, design a written 
language, allowing for the development of a proper bureaucracy. Nurhaci also 
steadily elevated his political status. He had begun his career as a beile (head-
man) along with his brother Šurgaci, although he oen elevated this title to 
sure (“wise” or “felicitous”) beile. As his power grew, he also asserted his rights 
to the Mongol title khan (Ma. han), that had also previously been claimed by 
Wan of Hada. He further centralized his rule during the early seventeenth cen-
tury by organizing the hunting parties of disparate village units (Ma. gašan) 
into companies (Ma. niru, literally “arrows”). By 1615 he had grouped them into 
eight banners (Ma. gušan), each headed by a Jurchen potentate, but all ultimately 
under the overall direction of Nurhaci himself.28 Beginning under his reign, the 
culturally diverse Jurchen groups, which were at the center of Nurhaci’s khanal 
project, were renamed Manchu, a designation that under his successor was en-
forced legally, such that it became a serious o
ense to use the term “Jurchen.” 
Indeed, Nurhaci and his successor Hong Taiji even appropriated a myth of ori-
gin centered in Changbaishan for their own Aisin Gioro lineage and for the new 
Manchu nation (gurun) as a whole, transforming themselves into an imperial 
lineage that could claim an antiquity to rival the Ming.29
Such ideological consolidation may also be seen in Nurhaci’s rhetoric con-
cerning the Pŏnhos. In Manchu documents concerning the forcible removal 
of the Pŏnhos from Chosŏn, Nurhaci referred to them with the ethnonym 
“Warka” (the Manchu term for the Uriankhai Jurchen) and described them not 
as captives, but as his own estranged subjects. In 1607, for instance, The Old 
Manchu Archives has Nurhaci (there referred to by his khanal title “Sure Kun-
dulen Han”) assert that “We are one country, separated by the Ula far away, so 
you lived submitting to the Ula. But now that I, the Han of our own country, 
have set out and destroyed the army of the Ula, you should submit to [me], the 
Han of our one country.”30
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Chosŏn is notably not mentioned in this passage, although it was almost cer-
tainly Chosŏn Pŏnhos who were being removed from their land. However, an 
explicit reference to the Pŏnhos does appear in a document in The Old Manchu 
Archive, dated to 1609, in which it is claimed that Nurhaci, as “Sure Kundulen 
Han,” had formally requested that the Wanli emperor, referred to as “the Wan 
Lii Han of the Great Chinese State” (Ma. Amba Nikan Gurun), arrange for the 
repatriation of Nurhaci’s subjects living in Chosŏn. This request he based on an 
interpretation of history, whereby during the time of the Han of the Old Jin—
meaning the Jurchen Jin dynasty (1115–1234) that dominated northern China 
and the steppes until it fell to the Mongols—the Warka had scattered, entering 
Korea (Ma. Solho) and living on Korea’s frontiers ever since. Nurhaci requested 
that an investigation be made and that all Warka be returned to him. The doc-
ument claims that the Wanli emperor did indeed order the “Han of Korea” to 
repatriate the Warka to Nurhaci. Additionally, it says that the Han of Korea, 
who at this date would have been Kwanghae-gun, allowed the Sure Kundulen 
Han, then in his y-rst year, to bring back a thousand Warka households on 
the second month of that year.31
The key aspect of both these passages from The Old Manchu Archive is Nur-
haci’s assertion of a preexisting right to all Jurchens. His historical claims to the 
former supporters of Bujantai or to Pŏnhos under Chosŏn’s control were, of 
course, entirely without merit. Certainly, the regular diplomatic exchange re-
ferred to in the second passage has no equivalent in any Ming or Chosŏn source 
that I have been able to check. It is possible that such an exchange occurred not 
with the central Ming state but with local Ming o	cials in Liaodong, although 
it does not, in fact, sound at all like something the Chosŏn court would have 
supported.32 The document, however, is clearly a genuine product of the early 
Manchu state and suggests that Nurhaci, at this point, wished to assert both that 
he had a historically determined right to control all Jurchens, and that his right 
to rule all Jurchens was supported by both the Ming and Chosŏn monarchies.
With Chosŏn, at least, it is quite clear that this was not the case. Although 
even aer Nurhaci’s victory over Bujantai in 1607, when it had entirely lost 
its limited means to defend the Pŏnhos against Nurhaci, it did not cease to 
claim its rights over them. In fact, throughout the troublesome period aer 
the Imjin War, the Chosŏn court was clear that the Pŏnhos were their subjects, 
even though the Pŏnhos fell on the barbarian side of the civilized-barbarian di-
vide. Even in 1594, as Chosŏn planned reprisals against the Pŏnho rebels among 
the Yŏksu Jurchens, the Border Defense Command was at pains to distinguish 
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those Jurchens such as the Yŏksu, “who had forgotten the kindness of [our] 
kingdom to them” and “who had committed such terrible crimes that they 
could not but su
er the celestial punishment of military action in response to 
their crimes” from the other “innocent Pŏnhos,” who maintained their con-
nection to the kingdom, and to whom “greater kindness and care should be 
granted, to prevent them from holding any doubts or fears [concerning the 
Chosŏn state].”33 Such sentiments did not fade as Bujantai and Nurhaci increas-
ingly interfered with Chosŏn’s control over the Pŏnhos. Rather, the Pŏnhos’ 
identity as subjects of the Chosŏn state, and the vital role that they played in 
maintaining Chosŏn control, were mentioned in nearly every discussion of the 
military crisis to Chosŏn’s north. Thus, in 1603, the Border Defense Command 
argued that the military situation was very dire indeed. Before the Imjin War, 
the Pŏnhos at the foot of the fortications could be relied upon to stay loyal, as 
they themselves beneted from their relationship with the Chosŏn court, but 
since the Imjin War, the o	cials at the command worried, Jurchens had noted 
the military weakness of the Six Garrisons and had started to despise them, thus 
bringing about the uprising by the Not’o and Adanggae in the region of Ho-
eryŏng. The most recent violence in the region of Onsŏng and Kyŏngwŏn, they 
worried, threatened to eliminate entirely the Chosŏn “fence” of Pŏnhos, and 
with that gone, the Six Garrisons would be in the situation of “teeth without 
lips.34 Yi Sugwang, probably writing in 1614, used a nearly identical expression 
to describe the problem. He worried that “those Jurchens who live at the foot 
of the fortications and are thus called Pŏnhos” had le the region, either vol-
untarily joining with Nurhaci, or retreating south, or being forcibly removed by 
Nurhaci to Jianzhou, leaving Chosŏn in the situation whereby “though some-
one settles right on our borders, or even illegally enters deep into our territory, 
nobody even dares ask who that person is. When the lips are gone the teeth grow 
cold—this is an unspeakable worry!”35
There are, moreover, frequent references to the Pŏnhos themselves asserting 
the importance of their connection with Chosŏn by eeing south. A secret re-
port in 1609 by the O	ce of the Censor General (Saganwŏn) concerning the 
security of Kanghwa Island suggested a very large number of Jurchens indeed 
had retreated into settlements in Chosŏn proper. According to the report, in 
Hwanghae, Kyŏnggi, Ch’ungch’ŏng, and Chŏlla provinces, so many Jurchen 
settlements had been established that there was no part of those regions with-
out them, with an especially large number residing in coastal Ch’ungch’ŏng 
and Chŏlla, where their skill in shing considerably exceeded that of Koreans. 
Within those four provinces, Jurchens had built with their own hands more 
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than two hundred shing boats—a number that seems rather more impressive 
considering that they had been in the region for no more than a decade.36
During this period, both Jurchens and Japanese begin to appear in a di
er-
ent form of record—namely household registries. Legally, the Chosŏn court 
launched a survey of their population once every three years. The process began 
when the county o	ce collected records of individual households (hogu tanja) 
from the householder (chuho). The county o	ce would then compose dra 
registries, usually on the level of ward (li) or district (myŏn), which were then 
formed into a complete household registry (Hojŏk taejang) for the county as a 
whole, which in turn was submitted to the provincial o	ce and ultimately to 
the central court. According to law, all households were to be recorded, but in 
practice the information was incomplete and became less complete and accurate 
through each stage of its draing, with the result that, by some estimates, the 
population record provided by the household registry was a mere 40 percent 
of the actual population. The fundamental problem was that the household 
registry was not a census so much as a record of tax obligations and a tool of 
governance, and so many people would evade being recorded, although such 
evasion was illegal and failure to be recorded in the household registry also ex-
cluded one from the protection of the state (for instance, in the case of famine). 
While household registry documents contain immensely valuable information, 
they are not comprehensive demographic records but rather are limited by the 
always changing capacity of the state to gather precise information on its sub-
jects and to enforce tax obligations. For instance, following a series of reforms in 
the mid-seventeenth century, their accuracy likely improved, while they seem to 
have declined in quality during the period of political turmoil during the nine-
teenth century.37 Read carefully, household registry documents provide insight 
into how Chosŏn o	cials saw its population and how Chosŏn people responded 
to the power of the state. There is also a great deal of demographic information 
about people too humble to appear consistently in other records.38
Among our surviving household registries from the early seventeenth century 
are those from the two coastal communities of Ulsan and Haenam. These re-
veal a signicant presence of both Japanese defectors and submitting-foreigners, 
who from their clan seats would appear to be of Jurchen origin, either Taewŏn 
(referring to the Mongol Yuan dynasty) or Hŭngnyong-gang (referring to the 
Heilongjiang or Amur River).39 Early seventeenth-century Chosŏn was still re-
covering from the extreme damage to the state caused by the Imjin War, and 
so the household registry documents of 1609 would have been of limited accu-
racy. Nevertheless, The Ulsan Household Registry of 1609 provides an interesting 
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snapshot of a small Jurchen community within a county otherwise revealing 
clear signs of postwar chaos, including the low percentage of slaves (who pos-
sibly ed during the chaos), and a large number of displaced persons (yumin). 
The total recorded population of the surviving portions of The Ulsan Household 
Registry of 1609 amounted to 4,109 persons within 1,245 households, implying 
that (considering missing portions of household register) a total recorded popu-
lation of about 4,500.40 Within Nongso-ri in the Eastern District (Tongmyŏn) 
of Ulsan, there was a single t’ong of eleven households all of which were headed 
by submitting-foreigners as well as an additional submitting-foreigner household 
in the subsequent t’ong, for a total of twenty-seven submitting-foreigner Jurch-
ens (as well as two slaves of seemingly Korean origin).41 Within Yudŭngp’o-ri 
in the Eastern District, in a t’ong otherwise dominated by slave households, 
there were 
ve submitting-foreigners, along with two wives of Korean origin, 
making up three households.42 In the case of the Southern District, there were 
no recorded concentrated communities of submitting-foreigners. However, in 
Onyang-ri in the Southern District there were several cases of people of Jurchen 
ancestry, including a slave woman with a Jurchen father,43 and the Jurchen wife 
of a commoner.44 There were also 
ve households headed by Jurchen household-
ers. Within these 
ve households, four Jurchen men intermarried with Korean 
women, either of a slave background or from the Yangyang Ch’oe descent-group 
of post-station petty ocials, and only one Jurchen married to another Jurchen.45
If non-Jurchen spouses are excluded and their children are included, the total re-
corded population of Jurchens in the surviving portions of The Ulsan Household 
Registry of 1609 comes to forty-two people. In the summaries (isang) of each li, 
six physically mature men (changnam) of submitting-foreigner ancestry are re-
corded for the county center (naebu), eleven for Nongso-ri, two for Yudŭngp’o-ri, 
and seven for Onyang-ri.46 As the number of physically mature males listed in 
the summaries for Nongso-ri, Yudŭngp’o-ri, and Onyang-ri amounts to nearly 
50 percent of their recorded submitting-foreigner population, it seems likely that 
there would have been a total of approximately twelve submitting-foreigners re-
corded for the county center register, which does not now survive. Thus, there 
would likely have been a total of 
y-four submitting-foreigners of Jurchen ori-
gin for Ulsan as a whole, amounting to slightly more than 1 percent of the total 
recorded population of Ulsan.
The Jurchens in this community were thus only one community of displaced 
people in a community of refugees, yet in 1609 they had maintained their dis-
tinctiveness. The community was largely endogamous—they are generally re-
corded as intermarrying with other submitting-foreigners, and there are only 
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a few cases of marriage with non-Jurchen spouses.47Japanese defectors were not 
recorded as submitting-foreigners in Ulsan, and, not surprisingly, married gener-
ally with Korean spouses, reecting no doubt the very di
erent context of their 
migration as deserting soldiers who would overwhelmingly have been single 
men. On the other hand, in the surviving records from Ulsan at least, Japanese 
defectors maintained their distinctiveness for much longer and continued to be 
recorded into the late seventeenth century.
Both Japanese and Jurchens were divided by social status, with some being 
blessed with extensive titles, and some falling to the ranks of slaves and intermar-
rying with them. We are not given much information about the migration his-
tory of either community. In some cases for Onyang-ri, there is evidence that they 
must have been present for some time, as they had ancestors who are recorded 
as (presumably Korean) post-station servants (yŏkcha) or shermen (haech’ŏk), 
oen of the Yangyang Ch’oe descent-group.48 In Nongso-ri or Yudŭngp’o-ri, 
however, there are also two cases of submitting-foreigners described as having 
“crossed the river.” The rst, Yi Munsang, thirty-ve years of age, with the clan 
seat Taewŏn, “crossed the river” at some unspecied date, perhaps in the kihae
year (1599), a date that is attached to his registration, but which cannot be his 
birth date, in contrast to nearly all other Jurchens recorded in this registry. It is 
evident from this that his father, grandfather, and great-grandfather, who are 
listed in the household registry as submitting-foreigners, must have been based 
north of the Tumen, but already possessed a relationship with the Chosŏn state, 
as was also the case with his wife, whose ancestors are similarly all listed as sub-
mitting-foreigners. Another case is that of Yi Yunsŏk, thirty-two years of age, 
also with the clan seat Taewŏn but who shares no ancestors with Yi Munsang. 
In his case, the date attached to him is likely his birth year, which is 1576. He, 
however, was also listed as “crossing the river.” His ancestors, and the ancestors 
of his wife, were all listed as submitting-foreigners.49
Other similar communities would have been formed during this period, as 
Jurchens continued to leave both Nurgan and the Tumen River area through-
out the reign of Kwanghae-gun. There was movement in the other direction 
as well—in 1610, one submitting Jurchen, Pak Yodo, sought to return home 
(whether to Hamgyŏng or Jianzhou is not specied). He received the help of a 
deputy commander (chunggun) to this end. The account suggests that both Pak 
and the deputy commander were severely punished. While surely there must 
have been other such cases (as indeed the report at the time suggested),50 Jurch-
ens continued to enter the Chosŏn state. In 1617, two years before the Battle 
of Sarhu, a Jurchen named Nagada le Jianzhou with eleven others to submit 
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to the Chosŏn court. According to his discussion with the Jurchen-language 
interpreter Ha Seguk, he le with the support of Nurhaci, who sent away some 
Jurchens to Chosŏn to alleviate the hunger caused by recent oods. Yi Siŏn (?–
1624), a provincial military commander from P’yŏngan Province, reporting on 
this matter, expressed concern that the steadily increasing number of Jurchens 
submitting to Chosŏn, “naked and begging for food” (chŏksin kŏlsik), risked ex-
hausting the resources of the already burdened Chosŏn state.51
Even among those Jurchens who could not escape Nurhaci, a number of 
documents point to the continued feeling among them of a link to Chosŏn. 
According to the report preserved in the Journal of King Kwanghae-gun, two 
escaped Korean prisoners informed the court of their conversation with a slave 
of the captured Chosŏn general Kang Hongnip (1560–1627). The slave said that, 
among the former submitting-Jurchens and Pŏnhos, “there were none who did 
not call Nurhaci a great bandit who lusted aer wealth and loved war.” In fact, 
according to their account, the Pŏnhos in Nurhaci’s camp actually wished him 
dead. For that matter, whenever the Pŏnhos of the Six Garrisons spoke about 
“our country” they meant Chosŏn, and they still had not forgotten the benets 
they had received from the o	cials there, and whenever they spoke with Kore-
ans, they would deeply lament their forcible removal to Nurhaci’s camp.52
Whether or not this was self-justifying propaganda on the part of the Chosŏn 
court, it remains signicant that even aer the defeat in the battle of Sarhu it 
still considered the Pŏnhos their subjects and hoped to reassert its claim over 
them. In fact, Chosŏn’s claim to the Pŏnhos and the continued presence of 
submitting-foreigners of Jurchen origin in Chosŏn were the subject of diplo-
matic protest by the Manchu state under both Nurhaci and Hong Taiji. Former 
supporters of the Yi Kwal rebellion who ed to the Manchu in 1625 informed 
the court of Hong Taiji that there were hundreds of Warka households to the 
south of Hansŏng (Ma. Han i hecen), a matter that greatly concerned the Man-
chus.53 The Manchu state continued to make complaints with great regularity, 
until aer the submission of the Chosŏn monarch to the Qing empire in 1637, 
at which point the Qing empire was nally in a position to compel the Chosŏn 
court to repatriate its Jurchen subjects.54
Ultimately, for the Chosŏn court, the Pŏnhos continued to have a signicant 
military and cultural role in the state well aer the rise of the Manchu state. While 
the court was always clear that the Pŏnhos were distinct from other Chosŏn sub-
jects, it asserted its claim over them as long as it could. As with the Japanese de-
fectors during the Imjin War, Pŏnhos possessed abundant cultural and economic 
connections to Chosŏn. The ultimate removal of many of Chosŏn’s Pŏnhos and 
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other Jurchen subjects occurred through the rise of the Manchu khanate and over 
the opposition of both the Chosŏn court and many Pŏnhos themselves.
Liaodongese Refugees Following the Battle of Fushun
Posing other problems for the Chosŏn court were the large numbers of Lia-
odongese Chinese who had also ed to Chosŏn between 1619 and 1637, escap-
ing the war between the rising Manchu state and the persistent Ming military 
e
ort in Liaoxi and the Liaodong peninsula. In part organized by Mao Wen-
long (1576–1629), a Ming general with only weak loyalties to the Ming empire, 
Liaodongese refugees further strained Chosŏn’s already weakened agricultural 
economy, even as they carried with them considerable political risk. While many 
of these migrants were later repatriated to Liaodong by either the Ming or Qing 
armies, a portion also remained in Chosŏn. As with Ming deserters during the 
Imjin War, the dealings of the Chosŏn state with Liaodongese refugees were 
driven by concern for the potential disruption that such a large community of 
nonsubjects could pose, and by the di	culties in providing for them.55 At the 
same time, Liaodongese who were useful to the state obtained positions within 
Chosŏn, while other Liaodongese simply avoided the state as they established 
themselves in their new home.
For the Ming, Liaodong played a vital role, preventing Jurchens from aligning 
themselves with Mongols, and both Jurchens and Mongols from aligning with 
Chosŏn. During the Yuan period, numerous Koreans had settled in the region, 
and there had been Korean speakers in the region at least up to the late eenth 
century.56 Its key cities (Fushun, Tieling, Shenyang, and Kaiyuan) became im-
portant nodes of political interaction with Chahar Mongol and Jurchen groups, 
and many of the leading citizens of these commanderies themselves originated 
from among the Jurchens.57 It was a zone of encounter between Jurchens, Mon-
gols, Han Chinese, and others, with many “transfrontier” Chinese residing in 
Jurchen settlements and acting as intermediaries between Sinophone Liaodong 
and Jurchen Nurgan.58 To the south, the Liaodong peninsula in particular was 
linked via the “Bohai maritime sphere” to the Shandong peninsula, with islands, 
such as those of the Miaodao archipelago between Liaodong and Shandong, 
becoming refuges for tax dodgers and smugglers from Shandong.59
During the two decades following the Ming defeat in 1619, the Manchu 
state steadily expanded its control of Liadodong and Liaoxi. Unfortunately for 
Chosŏn, although it did not send a formal army against the Manchu aer 1619, 
the strength of the ties between the Chosŏn and Ming courts, and the fact that 
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the conict was taking place right at its northern border, meant that Chosŏn 
continued to be intimately involved in the struggle. In particular, in 1621, Mao 
Wenlong was able to reconstitute his army at Zhenjiang at the mouth of the 
Yalu. Shortly aerward, he was pushed across the Yalu into northern P’yŏngan 
Province, moving once more in 1622 to Ka Island o
 the coast of Ch’ŏlsan. Em-
ploying Chosŏn as a base, and demanding considerable logistic support from 
Chosŏn, he organized a large number of Liaodongese refugees. Nearly auton-
omous in his actions, and receiving his support from a community of refugees 
from Liaodong and tax-dodgers and pirates of the Bohai maritime sphere,60 he 
was largely able to control Ming-Chosŏn interaction until, as doubts grew con-
cerning his military e	cacy and rumors spread of his double-dealing, he was 
executed in 1629 by the Ming general Yuan Chonghuan (1584–1630).61 The result 
of this execution, however, was not the elimination of the threat from island 
dwellers and Liaodongese refugees, but the rebellion of Mao’s subordinates. First 
Liu Xingzhi (d. 1631), one of two commanders placed in charge of the island 
in the wake of Mao’s execution, rebelled, killing his fellow commander Chen 
Yingsheng in 1630 and moving his forces against the islands o
 Dengzhou in 
Shandong with the goal of taking control of Dengzhou itself. Unsuccessful in 
this, he retreated and was killed in a Ming attack in 1631. The very brief resto-
ration of Ming control in 1631 came to an end with the overthrow and mutila-
tion of Huang Long (d. 1633) in the same year. This unrest culminated in the 
mutiny of two Liaodongese of Shandong origin, Kong Youde (1602–1652) and 
Geng Zhongming (d. 1649), who overwhelmed Dengzhou in 1632–1633,62 before 
defecting to the Manchu Qing and giving the Qing the navy and gunpowder 
weapons necessary to overcome Chosŏn in 1636–1637 and the Ming in 1644.63
While a certain amount has been written on the large number of Korean pris-
oners of war taken by the Qing armies in 1627 and 1636–1637,64 relatively little has 
been said about the Liaodongese who entered Chosŏn in the preceding period. The 
border between northern P’yŏngan Province and Liaodong had always been some-
what porous and became more so during the Imjin War; aer that war, o	cials 
complained that subjects on either side of the river had begun to make a habit of 
crossing the river “under the pretext of engaging in trade,” with some entering deep 
into each other’s territory.65 The real increase of Liaodongese migrants in Chosŏn 
occurred aer the 1618 Battle of Fushun and the 1619 Battle of Sarhu, with their 
numbers steadily increasing as Nurhaci and his Later Jin dynasty strengthened 
control in the region.66 While precise numbers are not generally given for Ming 
deserters in the pre-Sarhu period, post-Sarhu saw extensive discussions between 
the Ming and Chosŏn courts concerning the Liaodongese refugee community. 
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In 1621, a military o	cial, Tao Langxian, estimated that no fewer than 200,000 
Liaodongese had been forced to take refuge in Chosŏn.67 In 1622, Sun Chengzong, 
who was then in command of the anti-Manchu campaign, estimated a population 
of more than 100,000 Liaodongese migrants in northwestern Chosŏn. He rec-
ommended that they be placed under the control of Mao Wenlong.68 Similarly, in 
1626, shortly before the rst Manchu invasion, the Chosŏn court reported to the 
Ming on the growing troubles caused by Liaodongese refugees and claimed that 
the constantly increasing population of Liaodongese, coupled with the ight of 
Korean commoners and duty soldiers from the chaos of the northern P’yŏngan 
region, had resulted in a state of a
airs where the guests (the Liaodongese) out-
numbered the hosts (Koreans) in the area “south of Ŭiju and Ch’angsŏng and 
north of Sukch’ŏn and Anju,” making up 60 to 70 percent of the population.69
As mentioned in chapter 2, a total of 167,000 Ming soldiers in Chosŏn served 
during the seven years of the Imjin War. However, when Tao Langxiang men-
tions 200,000 Liaodongese refugees, his number refers only to those present 
in Chosŏn in 1621—the total number of Liaodongese who entered Chosŏn 
throughout the period between 1618 and 1637 may be assumed to have been 
much higher, especially if those who ed beyond northern P’yŏngan Province 
are taken into account. If Tao’s number is taken at face value, then in 1621 alone 
the population of Liaodongese who ed to Chosŏn from the lower Yalu was 
equal to that of Hansŏng, the capital, at its pre-nineteenth-century peak of 
200,000 and was approximately 2 percent of the population of Chosŏn70—an 
astonishingly large number, for only one year.71
Merely demographically, such a large number of Liaodongese could not but 
cause social unrest. Thus, in 1624, reference is made to Liaodongese (yomin) 
“scattering throughout Kwansŏ [P’yŏngan]” and plundering the goods of the 
residents of that region.72 Certainly, the appeal made by the Chosŏn court to the 
Ming, cited above, suggests that the large-scale entrance of Liaodongese was a 
source of both violence and of economic hardship. Having recently escaped from 
the “barbarian lair,” and with the coastal islands controlled by Mao insu	cient 
to support them, they were forced to seize what they could in Chosŏn, with 
the strong resorting to force and the weak to begging. The people of northern 
P’yŏngan, however, being seriously burdened by military duties and still recov-
ering from the Imjin War, were ill-equipped to deal with the triple burden of 
supporting Mao’s establishment on the coastal islands, supporting the Chosŏn 
army, and dealing with the depredations of numerous starving Liaodongese; in 
a no doubt considerable overstatement, the Chosŏn court argued that “the land 
farmed by one person is required to feed a hundred.”73
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Exaggeration aside, that northern P’yŏngan Province was overburdened by 
Liaodongese refugees can hardly be doubted. The situation was further wors-
ened by the fact that the Liaodongese were organized militarily by Mao Wen-
long. Clashes between the Chosŏn o	cials and Mao Wenlong were extremely 
frequent, especially during the reign of Injo (r. 1623–1649). Thus, in 1627, Sin 
Taldo, in the process of investigating Mao Wenlong’s activities, discussed nu-
merous violent raids against civilians in P’yŏngan Province, describing both the 
the of goods and oen of people, with the numbers of women taken captive 
to Ka Island by Chinese ships being, in his words, uncountable.74 This in turn 
should not be seen as exclusively an issue of Chosŏn-Ming relations but a general 
di	culty engulng both the Ming and the Manchu, as poor harvests and re-
aligning politics meant that large communities were on the move, both spatially 
and politically. Alongside the increasingly violent atmosphere of Liaodongese in 
Chosŏn must be set the nearly contemporary Liaodongese uprisings against the 
Manchu in 1623 and 1625, with its brutal reprisals,75 as well as the 1622 White 
Lotus uprising in neighboring Shandong.76
In the “Story of Ch’oe Ch’ŏk” (Ch’oech’ŏkchŏn), a Ming soldier of Korean 
extraction, Ch’oe Ch’ŏk, and his son, a Chosŏn soldier, are described slipping 
unseen across the border into Chosŏn and through the peninsula into the south-
ern provinces, while Ch’oe Ch’ŏk’s wife, Yi Ogyŏng, crosses from Shandong 
to Chosŏn by boat.77 In a poetic attack upon that story, Yi Minsŏng made par-
ticular reference to the improbability of people passing into Chosŏn without 
being noticed by the formal state. Surely, they would be caught by the guards 
on the Yalu and subjected to elaborate investigations and lengthy interrogations 
in P’yŏngyang!78 As many of the preceding references have shown, from the last 
years of the Imjin War to the fall of Chosŏn to the Qing, The Chosŏn Verita-
ble Records makes considerable reference to attempts by the state to control the 
movements of Liaodongese. One example is that of Li Chenglong, the descen-
dent of Imjin-era general Li Rumei, who was intercepted in 1630 as he ed by sea 
to Chosŏn and caused considerable embarrassment to the Chosŏn court when 
the Ming military establishment on Ka Island demanded his repatriation.79 His 
case was surely unusual, as the biographical information we have for Liaodong-
ese and Shandongese migrants suggests that most migrants entered Chosŏn with 
little regard to formal bureaucratic procedures. Quite a number of Chinese, in 
fact, are described, like Yi Ogyŏng, as passing over the Yellow Sea into Chosŏn, 
although, as will be discussed in chapter 6, in some cases these stories seem to 
be later inventions. One seemingly genuine example is that of Ma Shunshang, 
reputedly the grandson of Imjin-era Ming general Ma Gui, who was captured 
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by the Manchu aer the Battle of Sarhu, but escaped to Dengzhou in 1625, from 
where he seems to have continued military activities against the Manchu. While 
pursuing his duties around Dengzhou in 1627, the same year as Hong Taiji’s rst 
invasion of Chosŏn, he was blown o
 course near the Miaodao Archipelago, 
coming ashore at P’ungch’ŏn in Hwanghae Province; from there, as the only 
member of the twenty-nine-person crew to survive, he set out for Kwangju in 
Chŏlla Province, where he established himself as a silk farmer and was discov-
ered by the illustrious o	cial Kim Yuk (1580–1658).80 Such stories suggest that 
the narrative of Yi Ogyŏng’s journey over the Yellow Sea is less unusual than Yi 
Minsŏng thought.
The rst-person account of the Liaodongese refugee, Kang Shijue, provides 
a much more vivid image of the chaos of that period and the lack of direct o	-
cial involvement.81 Kang, having been involved in the battle of Sarhu and also 
in the series of conicts with the Later Jin in the early 1620s, was eventually 
captured aer serving in a righteous militia (ŭibyŏng), probably one connected 
with Mao Wenlong, in Mt. Fenghuang near the Chosŏn border at Ŭiju.82 He 
described how he was captured by the Manchu, successfully escaping, however, 
and passing into Chosŏn via Mamp’o in the eighth or ninth month of 1625.83 He 
did not, at this point, join Mao Wenlong’s army but wandered aimlessly around 
the forty-two administrative districts of P’yŏngan and Hwanghae provinces for 
about a year, moving to Hamhŭng in southern Hamgyŏng Province only in the 
seventh month of 1626. Following this, he resided in a series of communities 
(most of them quite isolated) in Hamgyŏng, spending at least half a year and 
generally a much longer time in each. He lived out the remainder of his life in 
that province, coming to the attention of the central court only in the 1660s.84
The Chosŏn court, as quoted in The Ming Veritable Records in 1626, was 
concerned that the large number of Liaodongese in P’yŏngan Province threat-
ened to erase the distinction between “host” and “guest,” and worried that, with 
the overwhelming power of the guests within northern P’yŏngan Province, the 
status of the host was badly shaken, while the situation of the guests was by no 
means secure.85 Far from treating the arriving Liaodongese as representatives of 
a superior Chinese civilization, the Chosŏn court itself, in an o	cial document 
sent to the Ming court, referred to Chinese in Chosŏn as “guests,” and, with full 
expectations of an understanding Ming court, spoke of the need to maintain the 
supremacy of the Korean hosts within Korean territory. However, it would also 
be a mistake to look for some generalized hostility to all foreigners—just as it 
had done during the Imjin War, the Chosŏn court continued to seek to employ 
skilled Ming migrants within Chosŏn. Even more would have settled in areas 
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that were beyond the range of e
ective surveillance by the central government. 
Kang Shijue and Ma Shunshang, along with many others, established themselves 
in various regions of Chosŏn on an informal basis, only coming to the attention 
of the court much later. Nevertheless, even as the Chosŏn state varied in its ap-
proaches to them, the Liaodongese, like Imjin-era Ming deserters, found corners 
of Chosŏn society in which to establish themselves.
Managing Chaos
In earlier Korean scholarship it was once common to assume a state of conict 
between the people of Chosŏn and those outside of the Chosŏn state, to imagine 
the Chosŏn people as a community in full resistance to the foreign outsider, 
with this hostility especially prevalent during the violence of the wars of the late 
sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries.86 However, just as Ming and Japanese 
deserters had passed with considerable ease across the cultural boundary into 
Chosŏn during the Imjin War, Jurchens and Liaodongese, with cultural con-
nections to the Chosŏn state going back many generations, were able to cross 
the barrier with very little di	culty at all, forming links with Chosŏn subjects. 
Faced with bringing the chaotic population under control while under pres-
sure from the Manchu khanate, the Chosŏn state was relatively uninterested in 
“civilizational” categories (barbarian versus Confucian Koreans and Chinese), 
while bureaucratic categories themselves possessed an unstable relationship with 
cultural practices and geographic origin.
Even more so than Ming soldiers, Liaodongese, with their roots on the fron-
tiers of Jurchen and Mongol worlds, were hard to categorize and control. The 
Ming court itself distrusted their loyalties and suspected Liaodongese transfron-
tiersmen of possessing a cultural a	nity to the Manchu enemy.87 Such worries 
were not without their basis. There are numerous records of Liaodongese will-
ingly submitting to Nurhaci. Both the Ming and Chosŏn were worried about 
the proliferation of White Lotus cultists in Liaodong, especially one sect led by 
Jin Deshi based near the Yalu River. From his surname, equivalent to the com-
mon Korean surname Kim, Jin may well have been of either Korean or Jurchen 
origin, and the Ming and Chosŏn courts did, in fact, see him as a potential ally 
of Nurhaci. 88 More broadly, many Liaodongese commoners considered their 
loyalties negotiable, submitting willingly to Nurhaci initially but later rejecting 
Nurhaci and their Manchu overlords through poisonings and outright revolt.89
This uidity was as much a problem for Chosŏn as for the Ming. In the royal 
response to Nam Isin’s report on Jin Deshi’s sect in Qinghebao, reference was 
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made particularly to the fact that, since the Ming intervention in the Imjin War, 
the people of Liaodong had gained extensive knowledge of Chosŏn through fre-
quent trips across the border; moreover, they almost certainly were a mixture of 
Jurchens (I) and Chinese (Han). Aer considering a number of worrisome pos-
sibilities—that Chosŏn might be forced to participate in the suppression, that 
the rebels might conspire with Nurhaci to attack Chosŏn, or that they might be 
forced into Chosŏn by the Ming armies—the monarch suggested an extensive 
program of military preparation, including espionage by local soldiers with good 
knowledge of Chinese who could be dressed in Chinese attire and sent to inves-
tigate the plans of the cultists.90
If Chosŏn functionaries could be sent wearing Chinese clothes to inves-
tigate Liaodongese refugees, they were faced equally with Liaodongese who 
could return the compliment and dress in Korean clothes. Thus, three years 
aer the Battle of Sarhu, in 1621, the governor of P’yŏngan Province, Yi Sanggil 
(1556–1637), made particular reference to the large number of fugitives from the 
Chinese military (Tangjang) in Yongch’ŏn. They had stayed a long time and 
had started wearing Chosŏn clothes. He suggested thorough patrols to control 
them.91 The challenge to the Chosŏn court of the Liaodongese refugees was thus 
not just their military ability but also their participation in multiple cultural 
spheres, including the Korean, which made it hard to distinguish them from the 
population properly present in Chosŏn.
The di	culty with Jurchens, who had been intermarrying with Chosŏn sub-
jects in Hamgyŏng Province and visiting Hansŏng for generations, was even 
greater. Although the Chosŏn court had sought to defend them from Bujantai 
and Nurhaci when they were on Chosŏn’s northern border, as they passed south 
of the border they did indeed cause some concerns about security. Yi Sugwang 
himself, who had earlier expressed his support for the Pŏnhos as a defensive bar-
rier, was nevertheless worried about the large community of submitting-Jurchens 
in Kyŏnggi Province. These were the very Pŏnhos who had ed south rather 
than face assimilation in Nurhaci’s new state, but Yi worried about their density 
in Kyŏnggi Province, where “the res of di
erent Jurchen villages are visible to 
each other.” This large concentration of Jurchens, Yi thought, presaged serious 
unrest.92 He was not alone in this worry. Thus, in 1603, the court debated the 
case of Kilsang, a submitting-Jurchen residing in Hamhŭng, but originally from 
Hoeryŏng, who had participated in the suppression of the Not’o uprising. He 
had illegally le Hamhŭng to move in with his son-in-law in a community called 
Nuwŏn in Yangju, near Hansŏng.93 The village of Nuwŏn to which he ed was 
in fact in the process of becoming exclusively Jurchen. The court demanded 
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that the Jurchens of Nuwŏn be moved to settlements farther from the capital. 
However, the Jurchens themselves resisted such a move, perhaps because they 
had a historical relationship to the capital shaped by the state-sponsored visits to 
Hansŏng during the early Chosŏn. In the end, the court was only able to move 
them as far as Yongin, south of the Han River across from Hansŏng, to an area 
of empty settlements vacated by submitting-foreigners who had ed during the 
Imjin War.94
At times, Jurchens were a source of concern even when they were based in the 
shing communities in the south. In a 1610 report, concern was expressed about 
the large number of Jurchens inhabiting shing communities on the west coast 
of Chosŏn. The O	ce of the Censor-General (Saganwŏn) had been wrestling 
with the implications of these settlements for the security of the militarily vital 
Kanghwa Island to the west of the capital at the mouth of the Han River. “[The 
Jurchens] have become so used to sea routes, that they use boats as if they were 
horses, and in fact far exceed the people of our country. Should there be a serious 
[military] crisis, then they most certainly would be of dual loyalties, perhaps 
communicating with them [the enemy] and blocking [the escape of the court to 
Kanghwa Island]. How can this be a minor worry?”95 Court discussion, however, 
turned against such xenophobic suspicion. As o	cials argued, the a
airs of the 
realm were determined by nothing but the force of circumstances (se)—when 
these are favorable, even Vietnamese and steppe peoples could be friends, and 
when unfavorable, even people in the same boat could become enemies.96
Despite occasional worries, the Chosŏn court was not at all interested in re-
moving either Japanese or Jurchens from its territory and was in fact willing to 
defend their presence in Chosŏn against diplomatic pressure for their repatria-
tion. In 1609, Chosŏn established a treaty with Edo Japan, in part to negotiate 
for the return of Korean captives from Japan. In 1634, however, when the lord 
of Tsushima demanded the return of Japanese defectors, Yi Sŏ (1580–1637) and 
Sin Kyŏngjin (1575–1643) recommended that Chosŏn refuse, because numbered 
among the defectors were highly skilled and unusually brave soldiers: “Not only 
are their technical skills admirable, but when ordered into battle they give no 
thought to their own survival. If treated well, they act a
ectionately toward their 
superiors as they march to the eld of death. When placed within the military, 
the advantages that they provide are not minor.”97
To be sure, Japanese in Chosŏn found other ways of making a living, notably 
farming, trading, and hunting,98 but they excelled in military matters. At times, 
the Chosŏn court seemed at pains to deny this very feature—no doubt to avoid 
excessive demands. Thus, in the wake of the disastrous 1619 defeat of the Ming 
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and its allies, including Chosŏn, at the hands of the Manchu khanate under 
Nurhaci, Chosŏn faced renewed demands to send arquebusiers to the Ming, 
to which the court under Kwanghae-gun responded that use of rearms was 
not a talent characteristic of Chosŏn subjects. The few thousand Japanese ar-
quebusiers in Chosŏn either had been captured by the Manchu or were too old 
and weak even to defend Chosŏn.99 Indeed, in 1622, discussion of defense in the 
Border Defense Command turned to Japanese defectors. It was pointed out that, 
thirty years having passed, the few remaining Japanese defectors were old and 
frail, and of little use, although a few could still be used for training others.100
Nevertheless, in 1624, the year aer Injo’s own coup d’état, there were evidently 
enough trained soldiers among the Japanese defectors and their descendants 
that there were Japanese soldiers among both the government troops and the 
rebel armies during the Yi Kwal uprising. Surrendered Japanese arquebusiers and 
their descendants were used several times in key roles by the rebels. For instance, 
they routed a unit of government forces at Kangt’an near Songdo (Kaesŏng),101
while during the Battle of Hwangju they attacked the Chosŏn army, ourishing 
swords, and succeeded in forcing the Chosŏn army to retreat.102 In response to 
the rebellion, many Japanese defectors within military divisions under Yi Kwal’s 
command or associated with Yi Kwal were executed.103 Indeed, one o	cial, Yi 
Min’gu (1589–1670), wondered if the fundamental di
erences between civilized 
people and barbarians was at the root of Japanese participation in Yi Kwal’s 
rebellion. He stated: “Those Japanese defectors who followed the rebel were es-
pecially murderous. It seems that this is because they are not of our kind, and so 
their minds must also be di
erent. Because there are so many of them . . . let us 
rst criticize them with the purpose of o
ering forgiveness and then divide them 
up and send them north.”104
At the same time, some notable Japanese defectors continued to show consid-
erable loyalty, contradicting Yi Min’gu’s claim of absolute di
erences. One espe-
cially well-known defector, Kim Ch’ungsŏn, also known by his Japanese name 
Sayaga, showed both loyalty to the court and military success.105 Having served 
the Chosŏn court against the Japanese during the Imjin War, in 1628, he once 
more attracted the interest of the Chosŏn monarchy, when he was specically 
praised for his bravery during the Yi Kwal uprising. He was especially lauded 
for the vital role that he played in bringing surrendered Japanese with shaky 
loyalties back under Chosŏn control and presenting to the court the severed 
head of one notable Japanese defector ally of Yi Kwal, an action that is also high-
lighted in the yearly record within Kim Ch’ungsŏn’s collected works.106 More 
broadly, he was described as playing a vital role in the military activities of Injo’s 
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army. He displayed the same loyalty during the Chŏngmyo Manchu invasion 
in 1627, when he spontaneously took twenty men under his command to battle, 
of whom eighteen were cavalry.107 In reward for such loyalty, the Capital Guard 
o	ce (Ŏyŏngch’ŏng) recommended that his sons, among whom some were im-
poverished and without an o	cial position, be employed for their skill with 
arquebuses and swords, and that the Japanese defectors under Kim Ch’ungsŏn 
be formed into a military unit with their own earmarked funding.108
Even as Chosŏn placed Japanese arquebusiers under Kim Ch’ungsŏn, it faced 
growing demands from the emerging Manchu state under Hong Taiji to “re-
patriate” both Han Chinese and Jurchen refugees to the Manchu state. The 
Manchu state demanded the repatriation of Han Chinese based on the simple 
logic of conquest—as Hong Taiji expressed in a diplomatic communication to 
the Chosŏn court in 1636, “heaven” had granted Liaodong to the Manchu khans, 
and so also the right to control the Liaodongese themselves.109 Chosŏn itself 
had no established relationship with the Liaodongese refugees, who had largely 
established themselves in Chosŏn territory without the approval of the Chosŏn 
state. This contrasted markedly with the situation of Jurchen migrants, who 
oen had a relationship with the Chosŏn state and populace that extended over 
several centuries, and over whom the Manchu claimed the right to rule based on 
a supposed historical continuity extending to the Jurchen Jin dynasty that fell 
in the thirteenth century. Thus, a letter sent by the Jacin beile, along with other 
beile of the “Great Manchu Kingdom” to the Chosŏn court in 1627 had spe-
cically complained that, when “our [Manchu] armies” (Ma. meni cooha) were 
taking away “our [Manchu’s] Warka” (Ma. meni Warka), the Chosŏn court had, 
for no good reason, “passed out of the boundaries of the Chosŏn state and at-
tacked our armies.”110
Before 1637, the Chosŏn court was better able to stand up to this demand and 
even write positively of the cross-border identity of its former Jurchen subjects. 
For instance, in 1628, shortly aer the rst Manchu invasion of 1627, the Chosŏn 
court referred to its former Jurchen subjects to resist Later Jin demands for trade 
at the Hoeryŏng border market. The Chosŏn court declared that such a market 
was pointless because of the absence of the Jurchens who had formerly resided in 
the region. As was recorded in the letter of the royal secretariat, “Formerly, a great 
many Pŏnhos lived in the Six Garrisons, and of the merchants of the country, 
many gathered together at that place, but now, since the disturbance of the Imjin 
Year (1592), there is not a single Pŏnho still present, and it has been impossible to 
engage in trade in the region for a long time. The fact that the barbarians of the 
eastern bank are requesting such a market suggests that they know of the former 
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situation, but not of the current one.”111 This letter, in addition to including 
obviously insulting language, referring to what had by then become a brother 
country as “the barbarians on the east bank of the river,” was clearly needling 
the Later Jin about their forcible repatriation of the Pŏnhos of the Six Garrisons 
of northern Hamgyŏng, while avoiding direct reference to that act. Moreover, 
the term “Pŏnho” itself referred specically to the Chosŏn court’s established 
relationships with the Jurchens and thus rejected the Manchu state’s claims.
Still, the concern persisted that essential di
erences among Jurchens and Japa-
nese—a di
erent mindset, the lack of established loyalties to the Chosŏn state—
could become the cause of serious unrest. Yet, although a number of Chosŏn of-
cials did worry about the presence of Jurchens in Chosŏn proper, there seems to 
be no records of actual revolts among Jurchens south of Hamgyŏng. An apparent 
exception is an isolated entry in the Journal of the Royal Secretariat from the 
time of the Pyŏngja Invasion that describes unrest among the Jurchen refugees 
residing in Namyang in Kyŏnggi Province (now part of present-day Hwasŏng). 
Yun Chip (1606–1637) reported with concern about the situation of his family in 
Namyang in Kyŏnggi Province, where his brother Yun Kye (1583–1636) was serv-
ing as magistrate. Yun Chip had heard disturbing news from Sŏ Hŭnnam (?–
1667), a base-born person who had been gathering information for the Chosŏn 
court.112 Sŏ had informed Yun Chip that on his return from Suwŏn he had heard 
that the submitting-Jurchens of Namyang had risen in revolt, such that the mag-
istracy and all the private [commoners’] houses had fallen to the enemy.113
It isn’t clear that the revolt actually happened. Unknown to Yun Chip and Sŏ 
Hŭnnam, Yun Kye had already been executed by the Qing in battle as a leader 
of a loyalist army.114 It seems quite likely that this Jurchen revolt was no more 
than a rumor emerging from the fog of war. If Jurchen migrants did revolt, it 
is not likely that they did so out of loyalty to the Manchu invaders (whom the 
Jurchens had, aer all, ed several decades earlier) but because of feelings of be-
trayal, when they, like Korean fugitives from the Qing, resisted being repatriated 
to the Qing by force.115 More generally, it does not seem that Chosŏn o	cials 
were right to suspect Jurchen refugees of disloyalty or collusion with the enemy.
Aer the defeat of Chosŏn in 1637, the Chosŏn court was no longer able to 
insist on its control over those in its territory, but was forced, by the terms of 
their surrender, to hand over the three categories of people (samsaegin): Koreans 
who had been captured by the Qing and then ed back to Chosŏn (chuhoeja), 
Liaodongese (Hanin) who had ed Liaodong for Chosŏn, and Chosŏn’s Jurchen 
subjects. Despite the inability of the Chosŏn court to resist Qing demands, 
they were nevertheless faced by the di	cult challenge of nding people who 
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had already assimilated into Chosŏn society. Even Liaodongese, despite oen 
limited connections to Chosŏn from before their migration, blended well into 
Chosŏn. Thus, in Ocial Reports om Mukden, a recently recaptured Liaodong-
ese fugitive reported to the Qing that his two fellows, both Liaodongese who 
were competent in Korean, were taken as slaves by a landholder, while only he 
was returned to the Qing. The same passage also reports on a Korean captive 
who ed back to Korea, with his wife, a Ming (that is, “Chinese”) person, and 
who had sought to avoid repatriation by sending his wife back while he himself 
remained in Chosŏn.116 Another later passage, largely concerned with Jurchens 
who had ed back to Korea, describes one man named Sot’ongsa who had made 
a “Han woman (Hannyŏ) his wife, and was living with her.” The Qing court 
demanded that the “Han woman” be repatriated with great haste. Described 
as “living [in] the Pak family household,” Sot’ongsa may possibly have been a 
slave. His name may be translated as a “little interpreter” and perhaps suggests 
a facility in spoken Chinese that might indeed have been useful for someone 
living on the Yalu. It also might explain his marriage to the Han woman.117 On 
the one hand, these cases all suggest that Liaodongese migrants were able to 
vanish into Korean society through personal connections or familiarity with 
Korean language and customs, especially if one considers the near certainty that 
many more, in the chaos of post-Imjin Chosŏn, managed to evade detection by 
the Chosŏn and Qing states altogether. The servile or semiservile positions that 
many Liaodongese fell into in Chosŏn, on the other hand, reminds us that such 
border crossings would not necessarily have been entirely to the benet of the 
Liaodongese fugitives in question.
In the case of the Jurchens, of course, a long period of residence within Chosŏn 
made it most di	cult indeed to remove them. The Ocial Reports om Mukden
records the negotiations for their repatriation in considerable detail. Within this 
text, the Jurchen subjects being repatriated are, in nearly all cases, referred to 
simply as “submitting-foreigners” (hyanghwain), “submitting-foreigner descen-
dants” (hyanghwain chason), “submitting-Jurchens” (hyanghwa hoin), or even as 
“Qing people” (Ch’ŏng’ in). With the crown prince himself in captivity in Muk-
den, the Manchu were able to impose their own particular historical justication 
for the repatriation of the Jurchen onto the Chosŏn court. Thus, in the third 
month of 1638, the Qing generals Mafuta and Inggūldai upbraided the crown 
prince for failing to repatriate more than a few Chosŏn fugitives or submitting- 
foreigners,118 to which the crown prince asserted as his excuse the fact that 
submitting- foreigners, when risking capture, simply went into hiding and were 
thus immensely di	cult to track down.119 Later that same year, when Inggūldai 
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and Mafuta criticized the crown prince for his failure to repatriate any submit-
ting-foreigners other than a single weak and elderly man, the crown prince de-
fended himself by arguing that, since submitting-foreigners had been in Chosŏn 
so long and had intermarried with Chosŏn subjects, repatriating not only those 
who had submitted themselves, but also their descendants, would be impossibly 
di	cult and would cause immense hardship to the population. Moreover, the 
crown prince pointed out that the original agreement between Qing and Chosŏn 
had not required the repatriation of submitting-foreigner descendants.
Inggūldai responded with a brief history lesson:
Our country and Chosŏn both have old historical writings. Has the crown 
prince alone not read them? Of old, the state of Jin was to the le [east] of 
the Liao river, but aer it declined, the subjects of the Jin scattered into 
Chŏlla and Kyŏngsang Provinces. These are indeed the descendants of sub-
mitting-foreigners who we referred to previously as those who do not need 
to be repatriated. However, in the case of those during the current dynasty 
who submitted to the Chosŏn court, even if they are not the ones who 
submitted themselves, as the children and grandchildren of them, they are 
ultimately the same as those who submitted themselves, so how can they 
not be repatriated? The recently repatriated Kang Ch’undang may not have 
submitted himself, but his grandfather was a submitting-foreigner, and so 
equally the grandson is a submitting-foreigner as well. Of submitting-for-
eigners here there are many who still have children and siblings in Chosŏn. 
It is human sentiment to wish that fathers live together with their children, 
and older brothers with younger brothers. Chosŏn people seek to redeem 
their younger siblings and children, so why should submitting-foreigners 
not also follow their desires? .  .  . We have established a list of more than 
690 people, with their area of residence, names and surnames . . . if you do 
not send them all back, then among the two of us one will have to go and 
bring them ourselves.120
The history provided here by Inggūldai is similar to that found in The Old 
Manchu Archives for the reign of Nurhaci, although Inggūldai, in contrast to 
Nurhaci, did not claim all who descended from the diaspora of the Jurchen Jin. 
Inggūldai’s demands were still quite expansive, in that he sought the repatria-
tion of not only the submitting-foreigners but their descendants as well. Even 
though he likely referred only to those Jurchens who had migrated to Chosŏn in 
relatively recent periods, he still made claims to people who had become deeply 
integrated into Chosŏn society.
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Of course, in Chosŏn “submitting-foreigner” had traditionally encompassed 
all foreigners settling in Chosŏn territory, not just Jurchens. The restriction of 
the term in The Ocial Reports om Mukden to refer to Jurchens alone should 
be understood in the context of the negotiation of terminology between Chosŏn 
and the Qing. Thus, in The Ocial Reports om Mukden, Liaodongese refugees 
are nearly invariably referred to as Han people (Hanin), which also happens to 
be the term used to translate Nikan, the preferred Manchu term for Liaodong-
ese. Since, as will be discussed in chapter 4, Chinese were classied as submit-
ting-foreigners in the period following the 1640s, it is unlikely that the Chosŏn 
court felt any ideological objections to using the term “submitting-foreigner” for 
Chinese as well. Rather, the Liaodongese refugees, in contrast to the Jurchens, 
had without exception entered without the permission of the Chosŏn court—
they had not submitted formally to royal edication. By contrast, Jurchens from 
Chosŏn did, at one point, go through the process of submitting to the Chosŏn 
court, or at least their ancestors had done so. More important for the Qing, 
Jurchens were recorded in Chosŏn documents as submitting-foreigners and so 
served as an equivalent of the Manchu term “Warka.” Indeed, in a number of 
texts in The Veritable Records of Emperor Taizong, one may nd entries that 
alternate between the two terms, “Warka” and “submitting-foreigners” (Ch. 
xianghuaren),121 the later a term that was more generally used to describe those 
who had submitted to the Manchu state. By accepting its use when referring to 
Jurchens who had submitted to the Chosŏn state, they were accepting, at least in 
part, an identity for the Warka that was determined by Chosŏn administrative 
categories.
In fact, although the Qing imposed their own historical narrative in order 
to demand the repatriation of the Warka, in order to repatriate those who lived 
south of Hamgyŏng, they needed to make use of Chosŏn records to identify who 
was Warka and who was not. The Qing o	cials themselves clearly acknowledged 
this fact. In one of the rst discussions of the repatriation of Jurchens in Reports 
om Mukden, the generals Inggūldai and Mafuta insisted that the Chosŏn court 
was dishonest when it claimed that it had repatriated all submitting-foreigners 
that it could possibly nd. Rather, the generals declared, it should be able to hunt 
down submitting-foreigners, because when they submitted to the Chosŏn court 
the o	cials in charge would surely have recorded all signicant information 
about them and distributed this information to the regions in which they had 
been settled. Thus, distinguishing those of Jurchen origin from the surrounding 
population should be a simple matter of investigating the records of each county. 
The failure of the Chosŏn court to do so, the two generals insisted, was simply 
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an example of the duplicity and insincerity of Chosŏn o	cialdom, quite like 
its failure to return more than six runaway Korean captives of the at least ten 
thousand who had ed from their Qing masters and the continued presence of 
Chinese fugitives in Chosŏn.122
Chosŏn records themselves, of course, were oen ambiguous, incomplete, 
and open to dispute. Inggūldai and Mafuta had insisted, on the model of Kang 
Ch’ungdan, that descendants of submitting-foreigners also were subject to re-
patriation. In later discussions, the Qing’s chief Korean-language interpreter 
Chŏng Myŏngsu made a long demand for the repatriation of the children of sub-
mitting-foreigners in Chosŏn recorded in a Korean vernacular text that he seem-
ingly had obtained by interrogating submitting-foreigners who had already been 
repatriated. In the process, nevertheless, he conceded that deportation should 
be limited to the descendants of submitting-foreigners on the paternal line, and 
he excluded Korean spouses of submitting-foreigners from demands for depor-
tation,123 although the fact that debates on this subject reoccurred suggests that 
these rules were not observed consistently.124 Inevitably, there were many uncer-
tain cases—and the task of identifying submitting-foreigners themselves was 
complicated by the limited knowledge of the o	cials in charge. For instance, in 
1638, a high civil o	cial Ch’oe Yuyŏn (1587–?) reported from within the Bor-
der Defense Command concerning six submitting-foreigners from Kyŏngsang 
Province who were being prepared for deportation to the Qing. Among them 
was a “Jurchen child” (Ho’a) who, upon investigation, was from Chongsŏng in 
Hamgyŏng Province but was probably not a submitting-foreigner. Ch’oe Yuyŏn 
suggested that an inquiry concerning the child’s ancestry be sent to Chongsŏng 
county, and that the child’s repatriation be delayed until a proper determina-
tion could be made. The court agreed with Ch’oe Yuyŏn and made the general 
statement that in such cases, people should only be repatriated to the Qing aer 
careful consideration. No doubt, the local functionaries in Kyŏngsang Prov-
ince who had likely arranged the original deportation would have assumed that 
any migrant from the alien world of northern Hamgyŏng would have Jurchen 
origins, quite without regard for the child’s actual ancestry—and would not, 
in any case, have necessarily had the documentation to make the determina-
tion. Even for the central government, it was not easy to distinguish a person of 
submitting-foreigner status from other residents of Chongsŏng.125
Ultimately, the porous reality of the social worlds of seventeenth-century 
Chosŏn made it very hard to determine people’s ancestry. Jurchens, especially, 
frequently married Korean spouses, which complicated their status, and es-
pecially the status of their children and their spouses. In general the Chosŏn 
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and Qing courts had agreed to “repatriate” those Jurchens registered as submit-
ting-foreigners and their descendants, but not the Korean wives of Jurchens.126
This solution did not please either court, entirely, and inevitably caused consid-
erable dissatisfaction from the mixed Korean-Jurchen families being split up. 
In one especially interesting case, Kim Kyedŭk, a Korean illegal ginseng digger 
from Hamgyŏng captured in Qing territory, was identied as a Jurchen “sub-
mitting-foreigner” by another “submitting-foreigner” who had already been 
repatriated.127 As the Qing sought to have him and his family repatriated, the 
Chosŏn court rst objected that his wife was in fact a Korean slave attached 
to a post-station in Hamgyŏng Province and so was not the proper object of 
repatriation.128 Later they expanded their objections to claim that Kim Kyedŭk 
was never a registered submitting-foreigner in the rst place but had simply been 
seeking to avoid judgment for his crimes and repayment of his debts that he had 
accumulated through his criminal life as a ginseng smuggler. The Qing response 
was informative—although Kim Kyedŭk may not have been registered as a sub-
mitting-foreigner, as he originated in the heavily Jurchen worlds of Hamgyŏng 
Province, he could be assumed to be a Jurchen.129
Ultimately, Chosŏn o	cials, while fully subscribing to the central importance 
of the Chunghwa tradition then represented by the Ming emperor and court, 
did not consider individual Chinese, and certainly not ordinary Liaodongese 
refugees, to be representatives of that tradition. Whether Liaodongese, Japa-
nese, or Jurchens, the court sought in vain to limit their disruptive entry into 
Chosŏn, especially into areas near the Chosŏn capital. Nor were they eager to 
hand anybody back to the Qing, least of all their new Japanese arquebusiers or 
their long-established Jurchen subjects, especially as the task of distinguishing 
who was Jurchen, who was Liaodongese, and who was Korean was not at all easy.
The Ming-Manchu wars during the early seventeenth century brought 
about a second wave of migrants to Chosŏn, in addition to the already sub-
stantial number of migrants who had come during the Imjin War. As with that 
earlier wave of migrants, Chosŏn’s response was not primarily determined by a 
Confucian desire to distinguish the civilized from the barbarian, although at 
times this did become part of court debates on the subject. Rather, the Chosŏn 
court was oen more favorably disposed toward the Jurchens and Japanese, with 
whom it had an established relationship, than toward Liaodongese migrants, 
whom it could not control and whose loyalties it could not but suspect. Beyond 
that, Chosŏn’s response to the migrants was driven by such concerns as the desire 
to maintain social order and protect the fragile postwar Chosŏn economy.
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The problem faced by all the rival states competing in Northeast Asia was 
that the cultural categories that they sought to impose did not map reliably onto 
the reality of the social and cultural worlds of the populace that they governed. 
During the eenth and sixteenth centuries the distinctions between Jurchens, 
Koreans, and Liaodongese had been by no means precisely drawn, and the initial 
result of the chaos of the wars of the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centu-
ries had been to confuse these distinctions still more, as migrants and refugees 
intermarried with each other and settled in each other’s communities. Chosŏn’s 
response to migrants in its territory inevitably had to take into account the 
rival claims of the Ming empire and the Manchu Qing. All the states involved 
also had to struggle against the resistance and cultural uidity of the migrants 
themselves.
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Administration of Foreign Communities aer the Wars
C hosŏn’s defeat at the hands of the invading Qing in 1637, however disgracefully it may have been seen by many of Chosŏn’s bureaucratic elite, brought an end to a period of nearly constant warfare, leaving Chosŏn 
as an island of peace within the otherwise strife-torn seventeenth-century world. 
It also brought an end to the large-scale migration of peoples that had character-
ized the period following the Imjin War. With a few exceptions, new migrants 
did not settle in Chosŏn, even as turmoil continued to engulf the seas around it, 
as castaways were arriving on its shores, and rumors of the Ming loyalist struggle 
were spreading among high and low. Domestically, communities of Jurchens, 
Han Chinese, and Japanese and their descendants—those who had avoided 
repatriation by the Qing aer 1637—continued to reside in Chosŏn. No doubt 
they became steadily less distinguishable in language and dress throughout the 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, but they continued to be de
ned, much as 
their ancestors were, by the same tax category of “submitting-foreigner.” Despite 
a much-restricted diplomatic sphere aer 1637, Chosŏn continued to administer 
them as foreigners, and indeed to treat them, regardless of whether they were of 
Ming Chinese, Jurchen, or Japanese origin, as outsiders submitting to Chosŏn 
to receive edi
cation from the Chosŏn court.
Migrants and Submitting-Foreigners in a New, Bordered World
In 1637, their eastern 	ank secured by Chosŏn’s submission, the Qing were able 
to launch attacks that gave them control of Beijing by 1644. Warfare continued 
on the Chinese mainland until the Qing suppressed the Revolt of the Three 
Feudatories of southern China in 1681. To the north and west, the Qing con-
tended for control over Mongols as well as with the expanding Russian empire 
in Amuria but managed to largely con
rm its control through a series of treaties 
with Russia in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries.1 The seas 
presented particular challenges to the Qing, and the southern and eastern shores 
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long remained under the control of piratical sea lords, notably those from the 
Zheng family who claimed loyalty to the Ming. Even this challenge, however, 
was brought to an end with the Qing’s successful invasion of the Zheng family’s 
kingdom of Dongning in Taiwan in 1683.2 To Chosŏn’s east, Japan fell to the 
Tokugawa house aer the battle of Sekigahara in 1600. Tokugawa Ieyasu estab-
lished Edo (modern-day Tokyo) as his shogunal capital, and, through a series 
of reforms, centralized Japan to a far greater degree than before, proscribing 
Christianity, banning Iberian traders, restricting Dutch merchants to a single 
port, and preventing Japanese daimyō from military adventurism by banning 
Japanese from overseas travel, bringing an end to its status as an overseas pirate 
haven. As the Edo shogunate established greater control over trade, it limited 
trade with Chosŏn to the exclusive domain of the daimyō of Tsushima.3
Chosŏn, by then an island of relative peace in a tumultuous northeast Asia, 
looked on these events uneasily. Aer 1637, the Qing empire compelled Chosŏn 
to serve it in almost all respects exactly as Chosŏn had previously served the 
Ming, demanding that it send several diplomatic missions each year to the Qing 
capital (
rst Mukden, then Beijing) to make obeisance to the Qing emperor, 
thereby demonstrating that the mandate of heaven had truly passed from the 
Ming to the Qing.4 For this very reason, to most of Chosŏn’s sajok aristocracy, 
Chosŏn’s submission to the Qing in 1637 was a shameful capitulation and a be-
trayal of the Ming empire that had intervened on Chosŏn’s behalf during the 
Imjin War.5 Ostensibly, at least, Chosŏn monarchs continued to represent them-
selves to domestic audiences as loyal to the Ming and opposed to the Qing, with 
Hyojong (r. 1649–1659), especially, plotting a military conspiracy against the 
Qing, called the Northern Expedition (pukpŏllon),6 the discussion of which was 
revived again under Sukchong (r. 1674–1720) during the Revolt of the Three 
Feudatories.7
Although one can doubt how serious these military preparations ever were,8
during the seventeenth century the monarchy and most of the sajok bureau-
cracy of Chosŏn cultivated their self-image as the last remaining heirs to the 
Chunghwa tradition with a responsibility to restore the Ming to its proper place 
in East Asia, a phenomenon that Hŏ T’aeyong calls the Chunghwa Restoration 
Consciousness.9 They continued to date documents unlikely to be seen by the 
Qing according to the calendar of the Ming Chongzhen emperor and to refer 
to the Qing invaders with hostile and delegitimizing language in private con-
texts. Within Chosŏn, sajok aristocrats called for the restoration of the Ming, 
though in practice Chosŏn envoys engaged in the same rituals of obeisance to 
the Qing that they had o ered to the Ming.10 Although there was very little 
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practical military preparation, Chosŏn’s Chunghwa Restoration Consciousness 
was taken very seriously indeed, contributing, as Haboush has argued, to the 
angry factional disputes of the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries. With 
the Pugin (northerner) faction largely driven from the court aer the overthrow 
of Kwanghae-gun in 1623, court politics became divided between the Namin 
(southerner) and Sŏin (westerner) factions, with the generally dominant Sŏin 
faction splitting into Noron (patriarchs) and Soron (disciples) factions during 
the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries. Playing a key role in these 
disputes were questions of court ritual, a matter that was given greater urgency 
by the widespread belief that, with the fall of the Ming, proper Confucian rites 
could be found nowhere outside of Chosŏn itself.11
Although Chosŏn’s sajok aristocrats shared their Ming loyalism with many 
in Southeast Asia, Japan, and with the network of Maritime Chinese in the 
East and South China seas, Chosŏn’s need to avoid renewed con	ict with the 
Qing empire made any alliances or links with Ming loyalist forces outside of 
Chosŏn impractical. Moreover, as both the Edo Bakufu and the Qing empire 
consolidated control over their territories and centralized their administrations, 
Chosŏn no longer had access to the networks of Japanese and Jurchen potentates 
who had acted as intermediaries in trade, diplomacy, and military matters. To 
its north, the Qing reorganization of Manchuria eliminated the Pŏnhos, and as 
the former Jurchens were moved south to serve in the banner armies of the Qing 
in China proper, the area became substantially emptied of population. This re-
moved a major source of migrants to Chosŏn. Furthermore, aer the joint expe-
dition in 1712 to demarcate the border, both the Qing and Chosŏn cooperated 
to limit illicit border crossing in either direction.12 Although Chosŏn resumed 
trade relations with Japan in 1609, it restricted Japanese merchants to the Japan 
House in Tongnae (present-day Pusan). The daimyō of Tsushima continued to 
act as an intermediary and monopolize the trade between Korea and Japan, but 
the Chosŏn court no longer allowed visits to Hansŏng by Japanese potentates, 
and the Chosŏn-Japan trade became a sharply controlled bureaucratic process.13
The seas were less easy to control, as both European and Chinese vessels im-
pinged from time to time on Chosŏn territory.14 Before 1683, maritime Chinese 
owing loyalty to the Ming became at times a source of political controversy in 
Chosŏn,15 although in practice the options were to send them to Japan (which 
would execute them should they prove to be Christians),16 return them to the 
Qing to receive punishment, or have the magistrate push them back out to sea 
without reporting to the capital, to avoid diplomatic controversy. In fact, as such 
supposedly Ming loyalist castaways were associated with piratical regimes, with 
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little relation to any legitimate Ming state, few in the Chosŏn court were inter-
ested in supporting them or accepting them on Chosŏn territory. Aer 1683, 
of course, such castaways could simply be returned to the Qing without any 
controversy at all.17
Bordered by two centralized states, and with a policy of returning castaways 
and outsiders to either Edo or the Qing empire, Chosŏn, with some exceptions 
as late as the early nineteenth century,18 no longer settled foreigners on its soil. 
Nevertheless, submitting-foreigner status continued to be employed to adminis-
ter those foreigners and their descendants who remained. Migrants and their de-
scendants—Chinese, Japanese, Jurchen, and Dutch—still had roles in Chosŏn 
society that marked them as foreigners. Despite the supposed Ming loyalism of 
the post-1637 Chosŏn court, the descendants of Ming migrants were not treated 
notably di erently from those of Jurchens and Japanese, although among sub-
mitting-foreigners and their descendants some few were able to leverage their 
military skills, their connections to prominent sajok aristocrats, or their claims 
of good family background during the Ming to obtain relatively good treatment.
Japanese Defectors aer 1637
Una ected by Qing demands were the Japanese defectors and their descendants. 
To be sure, defectors were not immune from politics. Yang Hŭngsuk discusses 
the case of the Korean-born descendant of a Japanese defector who was impli-
cated in the conspiracy of Sim Kiwŏn (1587–1644).19 Sim was accused of con-
spiring to raise another member of the royal family, Yi Tŏgin (?–1644), to the 
throne and to bring the reputedly Ming loyalist military ocial Im Kyŏngŏp 
(1594–1646) to serve as the leader of the joint Ming-Chosŏn anti-Manchu 
forces.20 Na Yŏngnok (1599–1644), the defector in question, lived in Ansan in 
Kyŏnggi Province and had successfully passed the military exam in 1637. Ac-
cording to the transcript of the investigation, the Chosŏn court, having identi-

ed Na Yŏngnok as a follower of Sim Kiwŏn, attempted to arrest Na Yŏngnok 
and his family, but they had already 	ed. Instead, the court arrested a number 
of people associated with Na Yŏngnok, including his brother, Na Yŏngnam (ini-
tially mistaken for Na Yŏngnok), who had 	ed to Yŏnp’ung in Ch’ungch’ŏng 
Province.21 Na Yŏngnam, under torture, implicated a number of other people, 
including a Japanese defector named Kim Taesu, an ocer in the Capital Guard 
(Ŏyŏnggun), who lived in Chuksan in interior Kyŏnggi Province.22 Na Yŏngnam 
also suggested that his brother and nephews would likely have 	ed with their 
family to the Taegu region of Kyŏngsang Province, to stay with one of the many 
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Japanese defectors in the region.23 His claim was revealed to be correct, when Na 
Yŏngnok and his two sons were indeed captured near the homes of prominent 
Japanese defectors in Taegu.24 The investigation ultimately led to the execution 
of Na Yŏngnok and his two sons,25 although not before they had implicated 
others, including one other person speci
cally referred to as a Japanese defector, 
Yi Kyŏngsŭng of the Capital Guard.26
While clearly a disaster for Na Yŏngnok’s family, was this more broadly a sign 
of discrimination against the descendants of Japanese defectors? Yang thinks 
so, pointing to a decision by Injo not to degrade the name of Ansan (as might 
be expected for the home district of a traitor) because, according to The Ver-
itable Records, “he is the descendant of a Japanese defector, and so should not 
be punished in accordance with the practices for someone of this country.”27
Certainly this suggests, as Yang says, a general belief in the distinctiveness of 
the descendants of Japanese defectors, even where the defector in question had 
taken a Korean name and successfully passed the military exam. Yet the more 
detailed account in the Journal of the Royal Secretariat explains this decision as 
being determined not only by Na Yŏngnok’s status as submitting-foreigner but 
also by the frequency of his moves: “Yŏngnok is a descendant of a Japanese, and 
thus one who has come to submit from abroad, and he has also moved frequently 
and has no established residence. Thus, in accordance with the sage instruction 
[of earlier kings], the law should not be imposed upon him in the same manner 
as upon our country’s people.”28 From this record, one can tell that the usual 
legal distinctions imposed upon submitting-foreigners were also imposed on Na 
Yŏngnok, and that, perhaps because of his foreignness, but explicitly because 
of his frequent moves, Na Yŏngnok was not considered truly a man of Ansan.
From the case as a whole, it is abundantly clear that the root of Na Yŏngnok’s 
troubles was not that he was the descendant of a Japanese defector, but that he 
had the misfortune to be identi
ed as a “close con
dant” (simbok) of Sim Kiwŏn. 
He may have also participated in Sim Kiwŏn’s supposed conspiracy against the 
throne. Court treason investigations of this sort generally began with the ini-
tial targets and spread outward, oen aided by torture, through known “close 
con
dants,” very oen low-status people associated with the palace or the o-
cial under suspicion.29 Military ocials, like Na, were oen at risk of suspicion 
because their military skills would be needed in any coup d’état. Not only Na, 
but a number of other people were investigated for their close association with 
Sim, of whom only four (if Na Yŏngnok’s sons are included) were speci
cally 
described in surviving sources as the descendants of Japanese defectors. There 
is also no reference in the surviving records to any punishment being meted out 
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to the Japanese defectors with whom Na Yŏngnok and his family had sought 
to take refuge. Moreover, although Na Yŏngnok’s brother Na Yŏngnam was 
initially condemned to death,30 he seems later (through a process not entirely 
clear) to have been pardoned, for he was later rewarded for his exemplary co-
operation in helping to identify his brother.31 This case does reveal a continued 
tendency to distinguish Japanese descendants from other Koreans, but we do 
not, in fact, have sucient evidence to say that Japanese status was itself a reason 
for persecution.
It is signi
cant that Na Yŏngnok, Kim Taesu, and Yi Kyŏngsŭng all had 
military positions. The connection between military skills and Japanese defec-
tor origins continued aer the war. Household registry records reveal a con-
tinued close association with military organization among the descendants of 
Japanese defectors. Urok-ri, a community established by Kim Ch’ungsŏn in 
Sunnam-myŏn within Taegu, is especially interesting, because we have not only 
household registry documents, but also writings by Kim Ch’ungsŏn and his de-
scendants, including a genealogy of the family. These family documents provide 
scholars with the context for the public records.
Urok-ri was an unusual village established by Kim Ch’ungsŏn, in part to rep-
resent himself as a Japanese soldier who had submitted to Chosŏn because he 
longed to reside within the cultural sphere of Chunghwa. In “Annals of Deer 
Village” (Nokch’onji), one of his few surviving writings, he referred to his deci-
sion to settle in Urok-ri, or “Befriending Deer Village,” in part being driven by 
his desire to live as a Confucian gentleman in retirement, “befriending deer,” 
and in part modeled on the great Song Confucian philosopher Zhu Xi’s “White 
Deer Grotto.” Such language, of course, would likely please other sajok aristo-
crats in Chosŏn who traced the orthodox Confucian lineage to Zhu Xi. Simi-
larly pleasing to a Chosŏn sajok audience would have been Kim’s claim that he 
named a rock face Phoenix Rock Face (Pongam) because phoenixes, as an omen 
of cultured rule, 	ew during the reign of the legendary sage king Shun, and 
he hoped to see new beginnings of cultured rule in Chosŏn. He also showed 
o  his education by naming one peak Crane Peak (Hakpong), because cranes 
were birds associated with immortals (sŏnin); he appropriately quoted a tale from 
the Chinese tradition to embellish his choice. Otherwise, he described how he 
remained in retirement in the village, only to leap out occasionally in rage at 
various enemies of Chosŏn’s Confucian civilization. He le the village brie	y, 
as discussed in chapter 3, to 
ght against Yi Kwal and the two Manchu inva-
sions. In the end, however, he, like other loyal Chosŏn ocials, was faced by the 
shame of Injo’s submission to the Qing: “Crying out in pain, I said, ‘How can the 
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Country of Rites and Manners in the East endure to bend its knees before those 
of the rank of dogs and sheep,’ for I doubted that the way of honoring the Zhou 
and rejecting barbarians could be maintained between heaven and earth.”32 Even 
if, as Fujiwara Takao points out, some of this Confucian language was added by 
Kim Ch’ungsŏn’s descendants,33 still either he or his descendants were careful to 
represent Kim Ch’ungsŏn as one who shared Chosŏn hostility to the Qing, and 
who had truly submitted to Chosŏn because of what he believed to be its special 
connection to Chunghwa civilization.
The household registry of the village itself strongly shows the imprint of Kim 
Ch’ungsŏn as military hero and leader. Following the analysis by Yang Hŭng-
suk, it is notable that the 1681 household registry for Sunnam-myŏn reveals 
that none of the 143 men listed for the village of Urok-ri, in contrast to other 
villages in Sunnam-myŏn, had positions associated with civil sajok, including 
the humble position of young student (yuhak). Many of the men of Urok-ri are 
listed with military positions, with the more senior positions held especially by 
those known to be sons of Kim Ch’ungsŏn or to have a marital connection to 
Kim Ch’ungsŏn’s family—for instance, one son, Kim Kyŏngwŏn, is listed as 
having the senior third rank of halberd-splitting general (chŏlch’ung changgun), 
while acting as rst deputy commander (sanghogun) of the western command of 
the Five Military Commands. A grandson, Kim Chinmyŏng, had the rank of 
disgrace-blocking general (ŏmo changgun), which was also senior third rank but 
below that of halberd-splitting general. He acted in a junior h rank (pusagwa) 
within the eastern command of the Five Military Commands. Another son, 
Kim Kyŏngsin, had previously held a sixth-rank title (sagwa) in the Five Mili-
tary Commands, while Ha Wich’ŏng, a somewhat distant relative by marriage to 
Kim Kyŏngwŏn, is revealed to have purchased a senior third-rank title (t’ongjŏng 
taebu). Lower ranks represented in the village include a range of military units, 
the most prominent of which is the Special Capital Cavalry Brigade (kyŏngbyŏl-
dae) in which some y-four men of the village were enrolled, either as soldiers 
or as support-tax payers. This would seem to be a later manifestation of the in-
stitution headed up by Kim Ch’ungsŏn himself on the order of Injo in 1627.34
Although the village originated as a community of Japanese defectors, the 
o	cial documents make no use of the term “Japanese defector” (hangwae) to 
describe residents in Urok-ri. This contrast with the much less famous Japanese 
defector descendants recorded in The Ulsan Household Registry who, to an ad-
mittedly decreasing extent during the seventeenth century, had their Japanese 
defector origins recorded.35 Near the village of Urok-ri itself, elsewhere in Sun-
nam-myŏn, a number of people are listed specically as a “support-tax payer for 
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the Japanese Defectors” (hangwae poin) or even as “Japanese Defector Special 
Capital Cavalry Brigade” (hangwae poin kyŏngbyŏldae). Presumably the term 
is not used in Urok-ri proper because the origin of the Special Capital Cavalry 
Brigade within the village was too well known to be worth mentioning.36
In fact, the household registry, especially when combined with the genealogy, 
reveals a strong tendency of the descendants of Japanese defectors to marry the 
descendants of other Japanese defectors and to reside within the village together. 
Kim Kyŏngwŏn, the chief householder (chuho) of the village, married a woman 
surnamed Kim, with the sajok title of ssi (oen translated “Madame”) and the 
clan seat of Ch’ŏngdo. Her father, Kim Kyech’ung, was a Japanese defector who 
had served under Kim Ch’ungsŏn. Another one of Kim Ch’ungsŏn’s sons, Kim 
Kyŏngsin, married another woman surnamed Kim and with the clan seat of 
Ch’ŏngdo, but with the commoner title of choi. Her father, Kim Kusŏng, had 
served with Kim Ch’ungsŏn, as had her grandfather Kim Sŏngin, who was im-
portant enough to have a “Record of His Acts” (Haengnok) appended to Kim 
Ch’ungsŏn’s complete works. All of them likely received the surname Kim ac-
cording to the common practice whereby a company of Japanese defectors were 
granted the same surname.37
Ming Remnants aer the Ming
In the fourth month of 1644, the Chosŏn court received an edict from the Qing’s 
recently enthroned Shunzi emperor (r. 1644–1661) which stated that it had long 
been the desire of the deceased emperor (Ch. huang kao), Hong Taiji, to stop de-
manding that Chosŏn seek out and return remaining Warka in its territory, for 
Chosŏn was fully part of the Qing empire, “if people were within Chosŏn, that 
was no dierent from being within the Qing,” and that the Qing would thus 
forever refrain from demanding the repatriation of people within Chosŏn ter-
ritory.38 In fact, the Shunzi emperor, still a young child, was under the supervi-
sion of the regent Dorgon (1612–1650). Dorgon’s own interests had shied away 
from Chosŏn and toward northern China, for slightly less than a month earlier 
Beijing had fallen to Li Zicheng, and the Chongzhen emperor of the Ming had 
committed suicide, while less than a week aer this edict, Dorgon moved south 
to occupy Beijing with the support of the turncoat Ming general Wu San’gui.39
As he prepared his resources to occupy Beijing and northern China, Dorgon 
likely wished to redirect administrative resources toward the conquest of China, 
while also placating Chosŏn, and his edict likely was designed with this shi in 
mind. Indeed, he succeeded in the latter, for the response of the Chosŏn court 
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was to note with pleasure the greater security implied by describing the edict 
as the original intention of the previous emperor; they resolved to thank the 
Qing ocials during the next diplomatic mission.40 Following this, reference 
to forcible repatriation disappears from Chosŏn court records, no doubt in part 
because, aer occupying Beijing, the Qing were preoccupied with 
ghting ban-
dits and the Ming remnants to its south, and consequently too busy to direct its 
resources to searching out remnants in Chosŏn.
The Qing do not in fact seem to have been much worried by Ming fugitives 
mobilizing militarily in Chosŏn. Consider the case of Tian Haoqian (ca. 1610–
1678). In The Record of Talented People within the World (Pyŏngse chaeŏn rok), 
Yi Kyusang (1727–1799), writing during the eighteenth century but basing his 
description on the tomb inscription (myojimyŏng) by Pak Sech’ae (1631–1695), 
stated that Tian Haoqian was from a family of Ming ocials, including a grand-
father who rose to the rank of minister (shangshu). Through some process not 
made clear, he served against the Manchu in Ka Island and was captured aer 
the Manchu conquest of the island, but was released by the Qing ocer in charge 
because of his “extraordinary physiognomy.” Aer his escape, he wandered about 
Chosŏn begging until he befriended Ku Koeng (1577–1642), a military ocial 
who had played a prominent role in the coup d’état that brought Injo to the 
throne, and who was thus in a position of in	uence. Through the in	uence of 
Ku Koeng and Ku Koeng’s nephew Ku Inhu (1578–1658), who became director 
of the Military Training Agency, Tian, along with a Namman (southern barbar-
ian/southeast Asian) called Pak Yŏn, was placed in charge of a troop of surren-
dered Japanese and Chinese. Aer Hyojong’s ascent to the throne in 1649, Tian 
was o ered a position as border ocer (pyŏnjang), which he refused because of 
his ignorance of Korean. In 1685, during the reign of Sukchong, he was given the 
special rank of fourth deputy commander (puhogun, jr. 4) and at his death was 
buried near the submitting-foreigner village (hyanghwa-ri) on the western slope 
of Surak mountain, in Yangju, near the capital.41
Much is le unclear in this account, of course. How Ku Koeng determined 
Tian’s status and his lineage, and why he selected him from among the many 
Liaodongese refugees, is not clear, although perhaps Ku encountered him earlier 
during his interaction with the Ming outpost on Ka Island. In any case, despite 
Qing pressure on Chosŏn between 1637 and 1644, this pressure did not prevent 
Chosŏn from establishing a military unit under the command of a former Ming 
ocer. Indeed, records suggest signi
cant complicity on the part of the Qing in 
allowing select Han Chinese to enter Chosŏn. Qing muni
cence in this regard 
even extended to women from the Ming palace, of whom a signi
cant number 
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were allowed to take refuge in Chosŏn, with one, Cui Huijie, coming to partic-
ular royal attention on her eightieth birthday in 1699, dying but six years later 
in 1705.42 The Qing also allowed Ming soldiers to enter Chosŏn. At least eleven 
Ming migrants who later came to prominence seem to have traveled to Chosŏn 
with the Sohyŏn crown prince and to have been formally emancipated from 
the Qing by the Pongnim great prince. Described as the “Nine Righteous O-
cials” during the nineteenth century, these migrants, namely Wang Fenggang, 
Feng Sanshi, Huang Gong, Wang Meicheng, Yang Fuji, Wang Wenxiang, Pei 
Sansheng, Zheng Xianjia, and Liu Xishan, were described in later sources as 
vigorous loyalists who chose to accompany the Pongnim great prince to Chosŏn 
in order to full the prince’s heartfelt desire to avenge the Ming. They certainly 
seem to have later become very closely associated with the Pongnim great prince 
(later Hyojong), although precise sources during Hyojong’s life are not available. 
Sources from the Sukchong era suggest that the Ming migrants in question were 
formally emancipated from the Qing at the request of the Chosŏn court,43 as do 
later biographies.44
These Ming migrants presumably included some of the Chinese who were 
under the command of Tian Haoqian. As such, these so-called Ming loyalists 
were clearly present in Hansŏng with the full knowledge of the Qing state. In 
Hansŏng, they were joined by other foreigners, including not only surrendered 
Japanese but also Dutch. The “southern barbarian” Pak Yŏn, described above as 
leading the troop along with Tian Haoqian, was one such example. His origi-
nal name was Jan Janse Weltevree, a Dutch castaway who had arrived with two 
others in 1627, aer pirating a Chinese ship from Amoy and seemingly then 
being put ashore when the Chinese crew successfully mutinied; upon arrival in 
Chosŏn, he and his three companions were enrolled in the military, with him 
acting as their captain or hopman.45 Although his two companions seemingly 
died during the Pyŏngja invasion, he, according to later Chosŏn accounts, mar-
ried a Korean woman, with whom he had two children, and a successful career, 
gaining a good reputation for his military abilities, and for his skills at craing 
cannons. He also had sucient knowledge of Literary Sinitic in order to read 
military classics, and possibly even to pass the military examinations. Both he 
and his descendants (concerning whom sadly nothing is known), served in the 
Military Training Agency as part of the Wheel Register (ch’ajŏk), which likely, 
as Gari Ledyard points out, refers to a class of artisans operating wheel-driven 
machinery in the Military Training Agency.46
More than twenty years aer his arrival, moreover, he was joined by other 
Dutch, who also appear in Korean records simply as “southern barbarian,” which 
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is to say, a Southeast Asian. Famously, in 1653, Hendrik Hamel, a Dutch cast-
away and employee of the Dutch East Asia Company, arrived in Cheju in 1653 
with thirty-
ve others. The Chosŏn ocials who encountered them described 
them as speaking in an “incomprehensible speech and using a strange script,” 
with visages characterized by “large noses, and blue eyes and short beards” and 
with a cargo of medicinal plants, deer skins, and scented wood.47 According 
to Hamel’s own account, which he wrote following his escape from Chosŏn 
in 1666, aer their arrival in Cheju they were apprehended and placed under 
close guard. Their desire to be sent to Nagasaki was refused, bad news which 
was passed on to them by Jan Janse Weltevree, who also informed them that he 
himself had been told, upon his arrival, that: “We do not send strangers away 
from our country. We will take care of you, giving you board and clothing, and 
thus you will have to 
nish your life in this country.”48 They were brought up 
to Hansŏng where they were housed with, and placed under the direction of, 
Chinese soldiers. They were enrolled in military units, given muskets, ordered to 
report to their general twice a month, and given two bolts of hemp cloth to use 
as currency.49 Aer an escape attempt by two Dutch castaways, who endeavored 
to contact the Qing envoy (whom the Chosŏn court bought o  with a bribe), 
the other Dutch castaways were beaten and forced to retreat to the Namhan 
Mountain fortress whenever Qing envoys approached, lest they be detected.50
To prevent them from colluding with each other, they were also eventually sep-
arated and sent to the south where they continued to serve in menial positions 
within military garrisons, such as standing at attention or gathering arrows.
They were also forced into productive activity like pounding rice and making 
rope, and frequently had to supplement their limited income by begging. They 

nally escaped this hardship in 1666 when some of the Dutch castaways success-
fully 	ed to Japan, following which the Edo shogunate had those still remaining 
in Korea repatriated to the Netherlands.51
As has been pointed out, the experiences of Dutch castaways in Chosŏn is 
revelatory of the complex nature of the treatment of submitting-foreigners in 
the seventeenth century, and indeed Weltevree is referred to in some texts as a 
“Namman submitting-foreigner.”52 In contrast to its treatment of the so-called 
Nine Righteous Ming ocials, the Chosŏn court was clearly at pains to con-
ceal the presence of Dutch in Chosŏn from the Qing, presumably because the 
court was hoping to use the Dutch castaways to develop Chosŏn’s military capa-
bilities against the Qing. Indeed, when the Chosŏn court, through Weltevree, 
informed the castaways that “Chosŏn did not allow foreigners who arrived in 
their country to depart,” the court was not telling the truth. As Sin Tonggyu 
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has argued, until 1627, all foreigners from countries with which Chosŏn had no 
relations were sent to Beijing to be repatriated to their homelands by the Ming 
court. In this case of Weltevree, however, such a plan was rendered impossible 
by the Manchu invasion of 1627, and so the Chosŏn court attempted to repa-
triate the three Dutch castaways via Japan, but were rebu ed by the Japanese 
as the three were not Japanese. In the case of Hamel and crew, of course, the 
Chosŏn court could have repatriated them via Beijing (since the route to China 
was no longer blocked) or indeed via Japan (since Japan had by then formed a 
strong relationship with the Dutch), and while a possible humanitarian reason 
may have existed for not sending them to Japan, which had in the past executed 
Christian castaways,53 there was no such humanitarian reason not to send them 
to Beijing. Although I am not convinced by Ledyard’s suggestion that they were 
not returned to the Qing because of concerns about bureaucratic challenges in 
dealing with the Qing,54 in other respects the state of Chosŏn relations with the 
Qing surely played a role. Available Korean sources reveal quite clearly that the 
Chosŏn court con
rmed that the castaways were also Namman and hoped that 
they would, in the same manner as Pak Yŏn previously, be “enrolled in the palace 
guard, for, in general, those people are good with cannons.”55 In other words, the 
speci
c context of covert anti-Manchu military preparation during the reign of 
Hyojong evidently created a demand for military skills, and that, combined with 
wariness within the Chosŏn court of involving the Qing, likely contributed to 
the long imprisonment of the Dutch castaways in Chosŏn.
Indeed, as Sin Tonggyu points out, the lives of the Dutch castaways in Korea 
resembles that of other skilled submitting-foreigners, whether Japanese, Jurch-
ens, or others, both during the early Chosŏn or indeed during the seventeenth 
century itself.56 A signi
cant number of Ming migrants came to the attention of 
court ocials during this period and gained a limited role in the Choson court. 
Records of encounters with Ming migrants are oen brief and episodic. Kim 
Yuk, in his Brush Notes of Master Chamgok (Chamgok sŏnsaeng p’ildam), for 
instance, recorded two encounters of that sort. He described how in Kwangju he 
met Ma Shunshang, a supposed descendant of Ma Gui, who claimed to have ar-
rived in a shipwreck in 1625, and with whom Kim Yuk discussed the sericulture 
methods used in the lower Yangzi.57 Kim Yuk also told a story of another Ming 
migrant from Liaodong, which he heard from an ocial during a diplomatic 
mission to Beijing. This ocial claimed that in 1641 he had met a Chinese man 
named Zhang Yunqi in Hŭnghae in Kyŏngsang Province. Zhang Yunqi called 
himself Zhang the Daoist. According to Kim Yuk’s story, he wandered about 
Kyŏngsang Province until he encountered Ch’oe Kyehun (1601–1657), to whom 
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he revealed an extraordinary ability to tell fortunes.58 Kim Yuk’s son Kim Sŏk-
chu (1634–1684) encountered Zhang Yunqi directly in 1665 and was able to tell 
the story of Zhang Yunqi in greater detail, describing how Zhang Yunqi had 	ed 
from Zhenjiang near Ŭiju into Chosŏn in 1622 and “on account of the war, was 
not able to return, and so disappeared east over the sea.” This initial crossing of 
the sea in 1622 occurred at much the same time as Mao Wenlong’s decampment 
to Ka Island and the migrant-fueled White Lotus uprising in Shandong and 
should be seen in the context of the more general chaos of the era. In Tongnae, 
when Kim Sŏkchu encountered him, “Zhang the Daoist” was employed making 
hemp cloth.59
Considering how fortuitous these encounters with Ming migrants oen were, 
it seems quite likely that a fair number entered Chosŏn but stayed largely out of 
the sight of the state. A colorful example is that of Kang Shijue. Kang, a Ming 
soldier, 	ed to Mamp’o in P’yŏngan Province in 1625. From there he moved to 
Hamgyŏng Province, and eventually settled in a place called Togon on the upper 
Tumen, upstream from Hoeryŏng. In those days, the area around Togon was 
not directly administered by Chosŏn. It was also situated immediately across 
from regions under Qing control. Located though he was in this thoroughly 
isolated place, Kang had the good fortunate to come to the attention of two 
prominent ocials (both later associated with the Soron faction of the Sŏin), 
Nam Kuman (1627–1711) and Pak Sedang (1629–1703). Both ocials advocated 
strengthening Chosŏn’s control of its northern frontier by populating it with 
Korean settlers from farther south, and both recorded their encounters with 
Kang in biographies and poems that were cited in court discussion and by other 
ocials, especially those who were members of the Soron faction.60
Nam’s biography would seem to have been especially in	uential. It was Nam, 
in particular, who described the supposed military glories of Kang’s ancestors 
(probably spurious, as they cannot be con
rmed in Ming sources)61 and his mil-
itary activity against the Qing aer his escape from the Battle of Sarhu. It was 
also Nam who wrote of Kang Shijue’s resistance to border crossing as seen in 
his refusal to purchase Qing products in the market or to thatch his roof with 
reeds (presumably because using reeds would suggest time spent near the river). 
This also would seem to be at least in part spurious, considering that the region 
where he established himself on the Tumen River was originally called Togon, 
which is Manchu for “river crossing” or “ferry point.” Moreover, when he 
rst 
settled there, it was not yet a region of legal habitation, which strongly suggests 
that Kang had a tendency to ignore legal restrictions on his movements. It was 
also Nam who argued for the morally valuable e ect that Kang Shijue had on the 
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region, when he described Kang as refusing his wife’s request to have a shaman 
treat their son when he was ill, in this manner marking Kang as a settling Con-
fucian in	uence in what was deemed a notoriously superstitious region.
The encounter between Kang Shijue and these two high ocials had a trans-
formative e ect on his status. Kang Shijue had clearly settled in an area of border 
crossings but was soon employed to police the border region. Thus, in 1675, he 
was employed as interpreter to deal with an attempt by a number of Chinese 
from Manchuria to take refuge in Chosŏn in the very region in which Kang 
Shijue had established himself, although by then it was called P’ungsan Garrison 
(P’ungsanjin).62 The Chinese fugitives were described in The Veritable Records
as three Qing northern barbarians (ho) and by the ocial in charge as wearing 
Qing clothes, but they shouted out from the opposite bank that they were “Chi-
nese (Tangin) who, since the uprising of Wu San’gui in the Qing, had become 
increasingly weak and lonely, and wanted to take refuge.” The military ocial in 
charge of P’ungsan Garrison, the subarea commander (manho) Kim Kyŏngnok, 
did not of course allow them to enter.63
More consequentially, in 1688, The Chosŏn Veritable Records informs us that 
Sukchong demanded the manumission of the children of Kang Shijue. In this 
text he is referred to as a man of the imperial Ming (Hwangmyŏngin) who had 
entered the northern territory of Chosŏn, where he formed a connection with 
a kisaeng of Kyŏngwŏn and had fathered many children. This manumission of 
Kang Shijue’s children is in turn described as being in response to the report of 
the governor of Hamgyŏng Province.64 This somewhat uninformative report 
received greater elaboration some twelve years later, when Yun Chi’in (1656–
1718) memorialized that the Chinese (Tangin) Kang Shijue was a descendant of 
a scholar-ocial clan of the Ming, whose ancestors had all fallen in battle on be-
half of the Ming, including his father, who had died in the battle of Sarhu. Kang 
Shijue himself, a participant in the same battle, had managed to escape into 
Chosŏn territory, ultimately settling in Hoeryŏng, where he showed great loy-
alty, refusing to purchase Qing products in contrast to other residents of north-
ern Hamgyŏng who depended on Qing traders for clothes. He also requested on 
his deathbed that his many sons and grandsons live together “within the same 
hedge.” Because of the likely good e ect that he would have on the customs of 
northern Hamgyŏng, Yun Chi’in requested that Kang Shijue be given a post-
humous rank at the lowest grade and that his sons and grandsons be rewarded 
with pensions. Sukchong approved this request.65
Why was Kang Shijue selected from the mass of Liaodongese in Chosŏn 
for special treatment—which, notably, was not granted to Zhang Yunqi, who 
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was le to weave hemp cloth in Tongnae, or Ma Shunshang, who remained 
in Kwangju? It would seem that, at least in part, this was because of his good 
luck in meeting high ocials, notably those with a particular interest in the 
northern border. Nam Kuman, especially, advocated resettling areas in north-
ern Hamgyŏng formerly inhabited by Jurchens, in order to keep the Qing from 
returning to the region. This opinion he asserted despite the widespread view 
at the time that northern Hamgyŏng should be kept empty to prevent the Qing 
from retreating through it as they returned to their homeland (in accordance 
with the prevalent belief that the Qing would not survive long as rulers of 
China).66 Thus, the biographies by Nam Kuman and Pak Sedang were careful 
to establish Kang Shijue as a reliable representative in a region without the sajok 
aristocracy upon which the Chosŏn court depended to maintain control of its 
southern provinces. Indeed, a note by the Chongsŏng magistrate Yi Tonguk 
(1646–1708) described Kang Shijue as having a good knowledge of military mat-
ters. Yi reported that Kang addressed precisely how Chosŏn should respond to 
an invasion of Hamgyŏng by the Qing—notably, he advised against retreating 
to the garrison forti
cations, but instead advocated placing troops to block the 
Qing advance at the few feasible crossing points.67 Whether in his ability to act 
as an interpreter, his Confucian morality, or his military skill, Kang Shijue was 
thus seen as an extremely useful person by the Chosŏn court as it expanded 
settlement in northern Hamgyŏng.
Self-evidently, these court measures were of enormous importance to Kang 
Shijue’s descendants. The 
rst act, in 1688, freed Kang Shijue’s descendants from 
the burden of base status, which they inherited from their base-born mother. 
The second act of 1700 described royal action on behalf of Kang Shijue’s de-
scendants as explicitly responding to Kang Shijue’s origin in a high-ranked Ming 
family of loyal subjects, to his own loyalty and hostility to the Qing, and to 
the likely salutary in	uence that he would have on the morality of a famously 
immoral and disloyal border region of northern Hamgyŏng—“edge country” 
(pyŏnji), to use the Chosŏn terminology, far from the edifying in	uence of the 
monarch. By granting Kang Shijue and his descendants rank, the court moved 
them from their former status as base-born border people into the ranks of those 
of intermediate status. Indeed, his descendants were enrolled in the Royal Cav-
alry (ch’ in’giwi) in 1727 and given employment as outpost ocers (kwŏn’gwan, 
jr. 9) by 1730.68
Other submitting-foreigners were also able to improve their social status by 
providing key talents to the Chosŏn court. Some, like Kang Shijue and Huang 
Gong, were employed as interpreters.69 A more prominent example was Wen 
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Keshang, “a guest from Liaodong,” who, in the words of a poem by Ku Ch’iyong 
(1590–1666),70 was specically recruited by Sukchong as an instructor for the 
Chinese interpreters and was provided with a military position, a house, and 
a salary.71 Kim Chinam (1654–?), in the Gazetteer of the Interpreters’ Bureau 
(T’ongungwan ji), noted that Wen achieved promotion to the senior third rank 
and wrote a language textbook, The Chinese Language (Hanŏ). However, Kim 
claimed that Wen was not from Liaodong but from Hangzhou, and that he was 
the descendant of a high ocial during the Song dynasty. According to Kim, in 
1635, Wen’s ship was blown o-course, and he came ashore in Ŭnyul in Hwang-
hae Province. Because his route home was blocked by the Pyŏngja invasion of 
1636, he settled in Ŭnjin in Ch’ungch’ŏng Province. Kim also recorded a poem 
written by Wen.72 Whatever the truth of a Wen’s origins, a southern Chinese 
literati lineage and an ability to write poetry would certainly have helped Wen 
survive Chosŏn’s social hierarchy.
Other Ming migrants and their descendants who could convincingly claim 
an elite background rose in the military ranks. Notable especially are the de-
scendants of Li Chenglong, a descendant of the Ming military ocial Li Rumei, 
who was the brother of Li Rusong, a hero of the Imjin War. According to Kwŏn 
Chŏk in a memorial in 1738, Li Chenglong, aer eeing to Chosŏn following the 
Battle of Sarhu, had come under the protection of the high ocial Chang Man 
(1566–1629), whose family also shielded him from the Qing demands for repatri-
ation and had him settled in Chŏlla, where he married a local woman. His son 
by this marriage, Yi Pŏndŭk, passed the military exams, aer which he served as 
a royal messenger (sŏnjŏn’gwan), a position which, as Eugene Y. Park points out, 
was oen preliminary to a successful military career and was generally restricted 
to members of established clans of military ocials.73 Yi Pŏndŭk had four sons, 
Tongjae, Tongbae, Tongbal, and Tonguk; his son Tongbae beneted from a 
friendship with Yu Tŭgil (1650–1712), a high ocial, and was able to take a po-
sition as border ocer (pyŏnjang) and was even appointed magistrate of Nam-
hae.74 The Journal of the Royal Secretariat is more detailed and describes a very 
successful military career for Yi Tongbae that included becoming a magistrate 
of Sin’gye in P’yŏngan Province in 166775 and also serving as area commander of 
Chemul (present-day Inch’ŏn),76 as commander of an empty palace (kawijang) 
for Kyŏngbok-kung,77 commander of the Five Military Commands (Owijang),78
and garrison commander (ch’ŏmsa) of Ch’angju in P’yŏngan Province,79 before 
nally being sent to serve as magistrate of Namhae.80 Certainly, his career seems 
to have been helped by what was, in Chosŏn, a distinguished family—the de-
scendant of the younger brother of a distinguished Ming military ocer, Li 
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Rusong, who had come to the rescue of Chosŏn during the Imjin War. In 1721, 
another magistrate of Kanghwa by the name of Yi T’aejwa (1660–1739) noted 
the presence on the island of Yi Tongbae’s impoverished nephew, Yi Myŏn. Yi 
Myŏn “had been unable to obtain even the most low-ranking position in the 
military,” but his ancestor was Li Rumei, the younger brother of “the Provincial 
Military Commander Li Rusong, who when the [Ming] was pacifying the East 
during the Imjin Year, came to reestablish the state, and made many extraordi-
nary contributions, such that to the present day people do not cease their praise 
of him. It is most fortunate that his line of descent has not been broken, but 
[that his descendants have] wandered about to reside in the Eastern Land [of 
Korea].” Such merit, Yi T’aejwa argued, was certainly worth a salary for his de-
scendants, among whom, with the death of Yi Tongbae, only Yi Myŏn remained. 
Yi T’aejwa argued that Yi Myŏn should be o ered a military position as subarea 
commander of Ch’oji in Kanghwa, an argument that was indeed accepted by 
the monarch.81 No doubt as a result of this intercession, Yi Myŏn later obtained 
the position of special commander of Changgot in Kanghwa82 and also that of 
subarea commander of Okkang in P’yŏngan Province.83
The descendants of Tian Haoqian, the Ming ocer who had commanded the 
unit in which Hamel had served, also continued to acquire military positions. 
In 1711, Sukchong made a point of enquiring about which descendants of Tian 
Haoqian had taken military positions and was informed that they included Tian 
Haoqian’s son Chŏn Hoe’il, who had risen to the rank of garrison commander 
(ch’ŏmsa), Chŏn Chŏngil, who was then serving in a special patrol (pyŏlch’o) 
of the Capital Guard oce (ŏyŏngch’ŏng), and Chŏn Sŏngil, who was a former 
subarea commander (manho). One of his grandsons Chŏn Manch’u had also 
received a military position serving in the Forbidden Guards (Kŭmgun). An-
other grandson, Chŏn Manch’un, was listed as hallyang, a term that during the 
late Chosŏn was increasingly associated with military ocialdom to the extent 
that it might best be translated as “degreeless military student.”84 Notably, none 
of Tian Haoqian’s descendants had passed the military examinations. Having 
received this report, Sukchong summoned Chŏn Sŏngil, Chŏn Chŏngil, and 
Chŏn Manch’u, the three descendants of Tian Haoqian still pursuing military 
positions, and singled out Chŏn Manch’u by giving him a position with the Spe-
cial Guards established by Hyojong.85 The family continued to acquire military 
oces, with Chŏn Paengnok, a member of the family from Hamgyŏng Province, 
serving as a naval ocer under Sukchong, and Chŏn Sŏngil taking the position 
of commander of the Five Military Commands (Owijang, sr. 3) under Yŏngjo 
as part of a general policy of countering the excessive emphasis on civil skills.86
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In addition to being employed in the military, as descendants of a Ming ocial 
they could also be useful in other ways. Thus, in 1711, Chŏn Chŏngil traveled on 
a diplomatic mission to Beijing. One of the goals of this mission was to investi-
gate pirates o the Chinese coast, and Chŏn Chŏngil, along with several other 
Chosŏn ocials, met and drank with one of his own relatives in Beijing, Tian 
Weishu, through whom they were able to obtain some certainty that the pirates 
would not pose much of a risk to Chosŏn.87
When Sukchong granted Wen Keshang and another Ming refugee named 
Zheng Xianjia positions as instructors in the Interpreters’ Bureau, the high 
ocial Kim Sŏkchu (1634–1684) informed them that “this is not because you 
speak Chinese (Hwaŏ) well, but because we value the fact that you are people of 
the Ming Dynasty (Myŏngjoin).”88 Indeed, for those, such as the descendants of 
Tian Haoqian or Li Chenglong, who could credibly claim a link to a prominent 
Ming ocial, Ming origins could be benecial, at least in maintaining their sta-
tus as military ocials, interpreters, and other members of intermediate status. 
However, Ming origins were not an unalloyed benet. This may be seen in an 
attempt by Yun Hyu (1617–1680), a well-known advocate of a Northern Expe-
dition against the Qing, to manipulate Huang Gong to get the Chosŏn court to 
launch a vigorous military response to the Qing during the Revolt of the Three 
Feudatories. According to The Veritable Records, “the Chinese (Tangin) Huang 
Gong memorialized a request to have him sent as a special envoy across the 
ocean to Zheng Jin,” in Taiwan. To strengthen his point, Huang also presented 
a piece of Hyojong’s own calligraphy, no doubt to underline his connection to 
the deceased monarch, and declared that he was “skilled in the eighteen mili-
tary arts, and wished to be employed to teach soldiers.” This Veritable Records 
historian, however, noted that “Huang Gong was a vapid, arrogant man. Yun 
Hyu was then about to call for establishing diplomatic relations with Zheng Jin 
and thought that as Huang Gong was a Chinese person (Taegugin), he would 
be believed by the king, and so encouraged him to present the memorial. How-
ever, Huang Gong had no actual intention of going [to Taiwan].”89 Conrming 
the historian’s judgment, the next day Yun Hyu responded enthusiastically to 
Huang Gong’s memorial, saying that “sending Huang Gong across the sea, if 
your sage highness could do so, would truly be a grand plan on behalf of the 
state. If Huang Gong does indeed have this intention, it is very good indeed, and 
we must discuss it in secret and plan it with care.”90
If Yun Hyu was really attempting to use Huang Gong’s Ming origins to 
successfully advocate for his plan of a direct military aid to the Revolt of the 
Three Feudatories, he was not convincing, perhaps because his plan had, from 
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the outset, been far too transparently manipulative. Indeed, the next day the 
discussion continued, and Hŏ Chŏk (1610–1680), of the same Namin faction 
as Yun Hyu, went through a list of Huang Gong’s deceptions, describing how, 
despite having been emancipated from the Qing by Hyojong, he had falsely 
claimed to be able to make gunpowder. When 
rst setting up in Ch’ungch’ŏng 
Province, he had announced that the earth there was not suitable and so had 
asked to be sent to Hamgyŏng Province, but aer arriving there, he still did 
not make any gunpowder, for he had only gone there to meet a woman. Oth-
ers chimed in with accusations against Huang Gong: one, a military ocial Yu 
Hyŏg’yŏn (1616–1680), claimed that he had several times asked Huang Gong 
to demonstrate the use of the halberd, but that Huang had each time made an 
excuse at the last minute, pleading illness. Chŏng Sŏnjing (1614–1677) went so 
far as to assert that all the Chinese who had asked to stay in Chosŏn aer 1597 
by promising to teach military skills had proven incompetent.91 To be sure, all 
ocials involved in the discussion, with the exception of Yun Hyu, were in any 
case suspicious of the value of an alliance with either the piratical Zheng Jin or 
the former turncoat Wu San’gui, but Yun Hyu’s attempt to make use of Huang 
Gong as a representative Ming loyalist ran into the diculty that Ming status 
was not treated as universally positive or prestigious within the Chosŏn court.92
Indeed, Huang Gong, along with the other Ming ocials who had served 
under Hyojong, had a clearly de
ned, but not particularly prestigious, status. 
Their military unit seems to have been reorganized under Hyŏnjong in 1673 as 
the Han Ivory Troops (Hanin abyǒng), still under the control of the Military 
Training Agency.93 The precise function or origin of these Han Ivory Troops is 
somewhat unclear. The category was not a particularly distinguished one. “Ivory 
troops” is short for “Soldiers below the Ivory Standard (ch’ iha abyǒng)” and re-
ferred to soldiers stationed as the personal aides of a military commander. In 
Chosŏn, ivory troops were developed as a local regional army under the control of 
the governor during the sixteenth century, when provincial governors responded 
to widespread corvée avoidance by commoners and to the growing problem of 
banditry by recruiting base people to serve.94 These troops became a key aspect 
of Chosŏn’s provincial defense aer the Imjin War. The other key aspect of re-
gional defense, the sog’o troops made up of servile soldiers, were placed under the 
provincial military commanders (pyŏngsa). By contrast, the ivory troops were 
directly under the control of the governor himself and were stationed in the 
provincial capital and were thus considered an important support for guberna-
torial authority. There were also ivory troops within the Anti-Manchu Division 
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(Ch’ongyungch’ŏng) and Royal Defense Command (Suŏch’ŏng), both of which 
were military divisions that were organized to defend the capital, but in practice 
also functioned as the provincial military for Kyŏnggi Province.95
Socially, during the seventeenth century, ivory troops were described by one 
contemporary observer Pak T’aebo (1654–1689) as being selected from among 
wandering people (yumin) who were without roots or who had recently settled 
in a community.96 During the reign of Sukchong, the ivory troops within the 
Anti-Manchu Division on Kanghwa Island were described as being mostly com-
prised of public and private slaves along with a few commoners.97 Many of them 
su ered double service duties both to their owner (either a public oce or a pri-
vate family) and to the ivory troops.98 In this they were socially not far distinct 
from sog’o slave troops in social status.
As for the Han Ivory Troops, they were perhaps the very de
nition of wan-
dering people who had recently put down roots. They were organized as muske-
teers but were supposed to keep themselves alive by 
shing in the Han River.99
Yi Kyusang claimed that this economic activity was as a result of the Zhejiang 
ancestry of many of the troops,100 presumably because he assumed that Zhejiang 
people liked to 
sh. In fact, relatively few of the Ming migrants residing in the 
capital were of Zhejiang origin, in contrast to Kyŏngsang Province, where Ming 
descendants with their clan seat in Zhejiang were very common. Rather, the 
act of 
shing should be understood as a typical tax on submitting-foreigners, 
including Jurchens and Japanese. Along with their association with a military 
unit, which at best was associated with commoner status, their 
shing hardly 
suggests much prominence or importance within Chosŏn society.
The uncertain status of Ming migrants in Chosŏn may be seen in Nam 
Kuman’s biography of Kang Shijue. In it, Nam Kuman claimed that the man-
umission of Kang Shijue’s children was motivated by the concern within the 
court that a descendant of a Ming cap-and-gown household should be tainted 
by base status.101 However, Nam did not consider Kang Shijue typical of Chinese 
migrants. Rather, Nam contrasted him with other migrants and emphasized 
strongly his loyalty to the fallen Ming. According to Nam, Kang Shijue was dif-
ferent from the Chinese in Chosŏn who “were haughty and greedy and begged 
shamelessly.” By contrast, “Only Shijue did not engage in vain boasting, only 
he did not take that which was not his due. He did not speak duplicitously or 
engage in suspicious activities. His reputation spread throughout the village and 
he taught his good habits to his sons. That is why he is worth writing about.”102
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Submitting-Foreigner Tax Status in the Seventeenth Century
The relatively marginal status of Ming migrants and their descendants may also 
be seen in a range of other documents produced during the seventeenth century 
concerning submitting-foreigner status. Although very few foreigners entered 
Chosŏn aer 1637, submitting-foreigner status did not disappear. Although this 
status had been originally designed as a temporary category in order to settle 
people who had come from abroad, in practice it became a permanent and he-
reditary one. Within a hierarchical Chosŏn state primarily driven by the im-
portance of heredity, submitting-foreigners became a new, protected, but not 
particularly desirable social status. In turn, during a seventeenth century much 
preoccupied with the need for tax reform, it was a category that got caught up 
in the statecra debates of the era. Nevertheless, it was a notably ambiguous 
status—in some ways comparable to servitude, and in others, less invidiously, 
classi
able with the intermediate status groups. Until the 1750s, however, vari-
ations in the treatment of submitting-foreigners continued to have very little 
relationship to their country of origin, with those of Jurchen and Japanese origin 
receiving much the same treatment as those of Chinese origin. Above all, it was 
an inherited status in a kingdom in which heredity was extremely important. 
Whether for those of Chinese, Jurchen, or Japanese origin, it provided protec-
tion, but not prestige.
The seventeenth century, cursed as it was by poor harvests, also su ered from 
serious unrest and social strife.103 This did not, however, seriously challenge 
sajok dominance, whether in the capital or in the countryside. Especially in the 
southern provinces, established sajok aristocratic descent-groups, oen centered 
on single-surname villages, maintained their privileges through marriage with 
other sajok, and by their support for private educational and ritual institutions, 
thereby generally maintaining their hold on power at the village level.104 Largely 
able to free themselves from all personal taxes through young scholar (yuhak) 
status, sajok aristocrats paid only a land tax, which was kept deliberately low. 
This caused serious 
scal problems for the early Chosŏn state, which 
nanced 
itself through a mix of taxes and service obligations, including a tax on land, 
corvée labor, and a tribute of special products. As with all aspects of Chosŏn 
society, these were imposed variably according to the social status of the subject 
in question. The sajok aristocrats ultimately evaded personal taxes, including 
especially military taxes, and paid only the land tax, while a large base-born 
population of slaves acted either as the hands and feet of the sajok in the case 
of private slaves or as the workforce of government oces in the case of public 
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slaves. Generally, slaves of both sorts owed service not to the state but to their 
masters. Last, but not least, the majority of the population were commoners who 
bore most tax and service obligations, including military service, with the latter 
oen simply being referred to as commoner service (yangyŏk).
During the early Chosŏn, the tribute in special products required not only 
the provision of said products, but also their transportation to the capital. Con-
sequently, the system was inecient and burdensome and was applied unevenly 
upon taxpayers, generally falling on those too weak to evade what were gener-
ally rotating obligations. By the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries 
it had in practice largely been replaced by levies of grain organized at the local 
level, which were then granted to tribute brokers, who then provided the desired 
product to the palace. Unfortunately, the pro
t motive on the part of the tribute 
broker and the possibilities for corruption among the numerous middlemen, es-
pecially the local clerks, runners, and tribute brokers, meant that tribute became 
a large and unpredictable burden on the commoner population. As for military 
service, aside from the specialized Military Training Agency, the personnel were 
made up of rotating duty soldiers, all being supported by tax payers theoretically 
selected from among the adult male commoner population. However, the larger 
and more expensive armies of the post-Imjin period, corruption and illegal ex-
actions in the collection of the tax, the ability of sajok to exempt themselves 
from military service, the 	ight of commoners from the military tax through 
purchase of sajok status, the growth of the slave population, and the consequent 
worsening of the tax load on those commoners unable to evade the military tax 
all conspired to push the military support system into a state of recurring crisis 
during the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries.105
The challenges with tax collection, in turn, drove the Chosŏn state to pursue 
a range of reforms aimed at increasing intake and reducing the intrusion on the 
commoner population. Although inevitably reforms at times had to step lightly 
around the privilege of the sajok aristocrats and local strongmen who bene
ted 
from the inecient collection of taxes, the overall result of these reforms was to 
provide greater centralization and regularization of local administration. For in-
stance, the Chosŏn court attempted to deal with the corrupt and uneven collec-
tion of tribute through the Uniform Land Tax Equalization Law (Taedong-bŏp), 
which converted tribute payments to a tax on land that was adjusted according 
to productivity. Instituted in a gradual fashion, and interrupted both by oppo-
sition from vested interests and, initially, the lack of local institutions capable 
of putting the reforms into e ect, the Uniform Land Tax Equalization Law 
was 
rst attempted in 1608, and then, aer 
ts and starts, gradually expanded 
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to encompass the entire country by 1708. Although this did not end the prob-
lems of corruption and tax evasion or eliminate all regional tribute levies, it did 
reduce the burden on common people, and as an unintended consequence, it 
also opened up a space for private merchants to sell what had once been tribute 
goods to the palace.106 To compensate for the shortage of commoners to pay 
the military tax, the Chosŏn state responded in the late seventeenth and eigh-
teenth centuries through a mix of policies, none terribly successful. To increase 
the commoner population, attempts were made to impose the matrilineal law 
(Chongmo-bŏp), whereby slave status, which had generally in the past been in-
herited by the children if either parent was a slave, was to be inherited only from 
the mother. This law, associated with the Sŏin faction and opposed by the rival 
Namin faction, was imposed intermittently during periods of Sŏin dominance 
beginning in 1669, but was only rmly established in 1731, and in any case is 
unlikely to have had an immediate impact on slave numbers.107 Additionally, 
during the reigns of Hyŏnjong (r. 1659–1674) and Sukchong, there were increas-
ing eorts on the part of the court to record and track the population of the state 
as a whole. The Household Tally Law (Hop’ae-bŏp), by which all subjects of the 
Chosŏn court were required to possess a household tally establishing their iden-
tity, and the Five Household Control Law (Oga chakt’ong-bŏp), by which groups 
of ve households would be combined together to form a t’ong for the purposes 
of tax, corvée, and social control, were hotly debated during the reign of Hyŏn-
jong and eventually brought into eect under Sukchong, who also, through the 
Revised Rules for Commoner Service (Yangyŏk pyŏnt’ong chŏlmok) and the Vil-
lage Quota System (Ijŏngbŏp), expanded the reach of centralized state control 
into the countryside.108
Submitting-foreigner status is an interesting sideline in the debates concern-
ing tax and corvée reform during the seventeenth century. Although the sev-
enteenth century was no longer characterized by the zonal frontiers that had 
initially driven the formation of submitting-foreigner status, the status category 
did not cease to exist. Indeed, as may be seen in the cases of Tian Haoqian, who 
was buried near the submitting-foreigner village in Yangju, and of the Han Ivory 
Troops, the tax category of submitting-foreigner status continued to include, as 
it had during the early Chosŏn, Chinese descendants. Thus, despite the osten-
sible Ming loyalism of the Chosŏn sajok aristocracy, descendants of Ming mi-
grants were placed within the same category as Jurchens and Japanese. Indeed, in 
1751, Hong Ponghan (1713–1778) described the submitting-foreigners, according 
to documents preserved in the Board of Rites, as including “the Pŏnhos of the 
Six Garrisons, with clan names such as Hŭngnyong-gang (Ch. Heilongjiang; 
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R. Amur) who settled within Chosŏn territory, Japanese who came during the 
Imjin War but did not return to Japan, and 
nally “Liaodongese who 	ed aer 
the kapsin year (1644)109 and who have clan names in Sichuan, Taiyuan and 
Zhejiang; they came and did not return to China. Their descendants are also 
called submitting-foreigners.”110 As the above list suggests, these were the dis-
tant descendants of migrants who entered Chosŏn during the early seventeenth 
century and yet were still categorized as submitting-foreigners. In another re-
cord referring to Chŏlla Province, a secret censor, Han Kwanghoe, described 
submitting-foreigners as divided between Chinese Remnant Subjects (Taeguk 
yumin) and commoners who wandered in from other regions (Iyŏk yumaeng). As 
Han said: “It is clear that they should not have the same corvée duties imposed 
upon them as on ordinary subjects. When they 
rst arrived, the Board of Rites 
provided them with especially generous treatment and worried that they had 
no livelihood, settled them on the coast, and had them 
sh for a living. Submit-
ting-foreigner tax status alleviated their impoverishment by removing personal 
service duties—truly the epitome of the sage monarchs’ desire to comfort people 
who have come from far away.”111
Above all, submitting-foreigner status was used for determining tax, cor-
vée, and military service burdens of people whose ancestors were foreigners. 
As discussed in chapter 1, already during the 
eenth and sixteenth centuries, 
submitting-foreigner status was becoming hereditary. The reports of Han Pong-
han and the Secret Censor Hong Kwanghoe reveal that during the eighteenth 
century the status could be perpetuated over hundreds of years aer it had 
rst 
been granted, and that its recipients, no doubt in most outward respects identical 
to their Korean neighbors, were still seen as outsiders in need of the protection 
of the monarch. This the monarch did provide, by placing them under the Board 
of Rites and exempting them from corvée duties except for a tribute to the Board 
of Rites, with those on the coast providing a tribute in 
sh, and those dwell-
ing in inland communities receiving farming equipment but paying a tribute in 
cloth.112 The category did not provide high social status, and so submitting-for-
eigners were very much exposed to the illegal exactions of petty functionaries 
in the villages.
Hamel and crew, as Dutch castaways, were clearly administered as submit-
ting-foreigners in the same manner as Chinese who had settled in Chosŏn. 
Within his journal, Hamel complained bitterly of the unfair exactions imposed 
upon him and his fellows within the military garrisons, when they had the bad 
luck to be placed under a corrupt or violent commanding ocer.113 Such com-
plaints were made by other submitting-foreigners as well, who su ered from 
128 chapter 4
taxations levied upon them by competing vested interests. Already in 1645, very 
shortly aer Qing pressure on Chosŏn had been loosened with respect to the 
forced repatriation of Jurchens, there are records in the Journal of the Oce of 
the Custodian of Foreign Visitors of a certain Yi Nandolsi, a submitting-foreigner 
of unspeci
ed origin, who appealed to be returned to the Board of Rites. He 
informed the board that he had not been properly cared for since the court had 
transferred the boat tax from the Board of Rites to the then 
nancially strapped 
Board of Taxation in 1637. On the contrary, the Board of Taxation actually had 
him pay taxes to both the Military Training Agency (Hullyŏn togam) and the 
Merit Awards administration (Ch’unghunbu), thus forcing him into untenable 
circumstances. He begged that he and other submitting-foreigners be placed 
once more under the control of the Board of Rites and be treated with the same 
care as before.114 The court ruled, however, that while they recognized his hard-
ship, they could see no great di erence in the consolation provided by the two 
boards. For this reason, his appeal was dismissed, with, however, the recom-
mendation that the earlier protection provided to submitting-foreigners from 
miscellaneous exactions be restored.115
A similar complaint, with a di erent outcome, was made in 1649 before the 
royal procession by Sŏ Pongnyong, the leader of a community of submitting-for-
eigners in Hansan in Ch’ungch’ŏng Province. In his appeal, Sŏ Pongnyong de-
scribed his ancestors as Amur Jurchens who, admiring the beautiful customs of 
Chosŏn, had 	ed to the Tumen River, where they served as Pŏnhos by providing 
information to the Chosŏn court about other Jurchens. With the rise of Nur-
haci, they had been relocated southward by a concerned Chosŏn court, although 
they continued to provide great service to the state by informing it about activ-
ities of the rising Manchu state. They had been settled according to the general 
precedent of submitting-foreigners. Those involved in agriculture were granted 
farming tools and oxen and exemption from personal taxes and corvée, while 
those involved in 
shing were freed from all personal taxes and corvée except for 
a small tribute in 
sh to be provided to the Board of Rites. This state of a airs, 
which Sŏ described as showing true care on the part of the Chosŏn state, was 
interrupted by the Pyŏngja invasion, during which the entire community was 
scattered, and many died. Those who survived, moreover, were faced with wors-
ening conditions, for not only was the boat tax imposed upon them, but they 
also had to pay both a range of miscellaneous taxes and even tribute to the Board 
of Taxation not required of ordinary commoners, while their 
shing boats were 
at risk of being seized by the Merit Awards administration. As rootless people, 
each bearing the tax load of two, they begged for the protection of the state 
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and the restoration of their former status. Indeed, the court took pity on these 
survivors of the Pyŏngja invasion and sent instructions to the various agencies 
to respect their submitting-foreigner status.116
Such interoce con	icts did not cease, however, with the reign of Injo. In-
deed, during the reign of Sukchong and the early part of the reign of Yŏngjo 
(r. 1724–1776), such debates continued, although frequently pleas to the mon-
arch to continue the protection of rootless people who had come from afar were 
mixed with concern from the Board of Rites that a valuable source of earmarked 
revenue might be lost. Thus, in 1677, the Board of Rites expressed worry that 
Injo’s attempts to protect submitting-foreigners from the random extortion of 
various oces had failed. Such were the exactions imposed on submitting-for-
eigners that they would soon be unable to survive. Moreover, these exactions 
were clearly in violation of Injo’s original intentions in this regard and should 
thus be stopped.117 That this was also an institutional demand for the Board of 
Rites was clearly expressed in a number of documents, notably by Yi Suk (1626–
1688), who worried that a temporary decision to move the proceeds of the boat 
tax to Chŏlla Province needed to be reversed, as the Board of Rights, notoriously 
short of funds, needed the earmarked taxation of submitting-foreigners to pay 
its low-ranking clerks.118 This problem was mentioned again under Kyǒngjong 
(r. 1720–1724). Yi Kyo’ak (1653–1728), an ocial in the Board of Rites, expressed 
concern that within the county of Okku in Chŏlla the 
sh provided by submit-
ting-foreigners as part of their boat tax had been illegally redirected toward the 
local Agency for the Elderly (Kiroso). Such a state of a airs, Yi Kyo’ak worried, 
was problematic not only because it violated the original royal purpose of provid-
ing succor to people from other lands but also, once more, because the Board of 
Rites was otherwise very poor and needed the 
sh tax to pay the board’s clerks. 
Moreover, unless this diversion of the boat tax was stopped, it might spread to 
other regions, exposing submitting-foreigners to double taxation.119
The fact that formal requests were also occasionally made to allow for the di-
rection of the boat tax to other agencies such as the Merit Award administration 
suggests that, at times at least, the Board of Rites’ regular appeals on behalf of 
submitting-foreigners had some e ect.120 Indeed, in 1700, a local sajok called for 
the elimination of submitting-foreigner status for the fourth generation of those 
of Chinese origin in Ch’ungch’ŏng Province. He made particular reference to 
those whose ancestors had migrated to Chosŏn before 1591, arguing that if the 
court took his advice it would gain tens of thousands of elite soldiers (a claim 
that seems dubious). The Board of Rites protested vigorously, arguing that to 
change established methods in this case would only cause confusion.121
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In a 1713 report, we are told that the Board of Rites issued a wooden talley to 
conrm the protected status of submitting-foreigners.122 Although it is not clear 
from this statement when the practice began, it is clear that submitting-foreigner 
identity was, like other status categories during the seventeenth century, in-
creasingly organized from the court, and subject to more organized collection 
of household registry information.123 Submitting-foreigners do continue to ap-
pear in household registry documents, although because not many documents 
survive, and because those that do survive are of limited accuracy, it is hard to 
calculate their relative population. The status vanishes from the Ulsan house-
hold registry aer 1609, although it is now unclear whether they were forcibly 
repatriated to the Qing, or whether they had simply dispersed and avoided being 
counted during a period during which the collection of household registries was 
much less intensive than it was to become. The numbers of submitting-foreign-
ers would likely have varied considerably according to region, with larger num-
bers perhaps on the Chŏlla archipelago and in Hamgyŏng Province, and with 
some regions having none or very few. A further challenge is that the house-
hold registry was compiled locally by people with local concerns—thus, as was 
discussed above, Sunnam-myŏn in Taegu recorded some 141 people who were 
clearly Japanese defectors, but whose registry documents do not describe them 
as such, perhaps because their status was well known, and their obligation to the 
military unit was all that needed to be recorded.
In fact, in one of the most complete household registry documents, The 
Tansŏng Household Registry (Kyŏngsangdo Tansŏng-hyŏn hojŏk taejang), there is 
only one household that is described as descended from submitting-foreigners. 
A commoner woman (she is referred to as choi, the usual title for commoner 
women) named Yu is recorded in the 1662 household register as the wife of Ch’oe 
Tongbo of the village of Panghwabok-ri in the district of Saengbiryang. Her 
father, a duty soldier (chŏngbyŏng), is named Yu Moŭlsŏgi, which is probably 
an Idu rendering of the decidedly servile-sounding name of T’ŏldori or “hairy.” 
He is also described as the descendant of submitting-foreigners, as also, pre-
sumably, were her paternal grandfather, Yu Malchilchŏm (perhaps better ren-
dered as Kkŭtchŏm, which might be translatable as “end-point”); her paternal 
great-grandfather, Yu Hŭngbyŏk; and possibly also her maternal grandfather, 
Han Malchilman/Kkŭtman.124 Either because they moved away or because they 
successfully bribed the petty functionaries in charge of the household registry, 
this family does not appear again, as submitting-foreigners or otherwise. It is 
notable that Yu Moŭlsŏgi/T’ŏldori is listed as a duty soldier, suggesting that he 
was no longer freed from commoners’ obligations for military service.
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Even as the Chosŏn state sought to regularize submitting-foreigner status, it 
continued to be a distinctly ambiguous one for its recipients, one that provided 
them with protected but unprestigious status. According to one record included 
in The Law Code of 1746 (Sok Taejŏn), when sorting out the tax and service re-
sponsibilities in those cases where a submitting-foreigner married a woman who 
was a public or private slave, the daughters followed the mother’s status and sons 
followed the father’s status, consistent with the precedent for slaves attached to 
post-stations. However, in the case of marriages between submitting-foreigner 
women and either public or private slaves, all the children followed the mother’s 
status and were entirely under the purview of the Board of Rites, to which they 
were required to provide one p’il of cloth, according to the precedent of the Of-

ce Auxiliaries (Yuch’ŏnggun).125 This was a military unit established through 
the merging under Yŏngjo of the auxiliary troops (Poch’unggun, a military orga-
nization in which the children of sajok and base women were placed as a condi-
tion of manumission) and the Truants’ Army (Nakkanggun, a military organi-
zation established in order to receive tax payments from those commoners who 
had enrolled in county schools to avoid taxes, but who did not attend lectures).
Notably, however, in contrast to the children of sajok who had originally been 
enrolled in the auxiliary troops, submitting-foreigner status was inherited from 
the mother’s side, as with slaves; moreover, in the case of submitting-foreigner 
men, the inheritance of the status was explicitly modeled on post-station slaves.
Submitting-foreigners were a permanent foreign presence within 
Chosŏn. As early as the reign of Injo, it had been recognized that the Jurchen 
community under Sŏ Pongnyong had clearly become subjects of the Chosŏn 
court, although this did not change the intention of the court to protect the 
submitting-foreigners from tax and service obligations. Notably, Sŏ Pongnyong 
continued to place great weight on the story of his ancestor’s origins in the Amur 
region, their long establishment as Pŏnhos in the Tumen Valley, and their un-
successful quarrel with Nurhaci; the fact that he brought up these matters in 
an ocial discussion suggests that this particular historical origin was by no 
means a source of shame. While Sŏ Pongnyong was within living memory a 
member of an active and autonomous Tumen Valley Pŏnho community, even 
in the eighteenth century submitting-foreigners continued to emphasize their 
Jurchen lineages through the Hŭngnyong-gang clan name; whether or not all 
using that name were in fact descendants of Jurchen is perhaps less important 
than the fact that, until the mid-eighteenth century, it was considered desirable 
to have such status in the 
rst place.
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Whatever the original purpose of submitting-foreigner status, during the late 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, it most certainly was not seen as a means 
to assimilation. As with slave status and various forms of taxation or corvée 
labor, submitting-foreigner status developed through the interaction between 
royal commands, established local practice, and the resistance to taxation among 
the populace. As a result, it does not seem to have been unquestionably desir-
able. Submitting-foreigners were, aer all, permanent recipients of protection 
and charity, and e orts on the part of the Board of Rites to protect them from 
other forms of taxation or the imposition of corvée labor seem to have been only 
intermittently successful. Attempts both to reform this status and to preserve 
it, however, faced diculties, because of the distress potentially caused by its 
elimination, and because of widespread locally generated corruption. For the 
submitting-foreigners themselves, whether they were of Japanese, Jurchen, Chi-
nese, or Dutch ancestry, submitting-foreigner status was one more category to 
be manipulated for their bene
t. During the seventeenth and early eighteenth 
centuries, the fact that the status con
rmed upon its bearer foreign and exterior 
status was not a major source of concern to the state.
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Ritual Transformation of Foreign Communities
I n 1790, King Chǒngjo recalled the history of the Han Ivory Troops as he was preparing to engage in the sacricial ceremonies to the Ming emperors. The Ming migrants in question had accompanied the Hyojong court from 
Mukden to Chosŏn, where they settled at the foot of the palace of Ǒǔi-gung, 
which was Hyojong’s birthplace. Yet despite this proof of their loyalty, they were 
organized as an ivory troop under the command of the Military Training Agency 
and were required to support themselves through shing. Even worse, Chǒngjo 
complained, they were forced to wander about without nancial support and 
were so utterly mistreated as to be cast in educational martial arts displays in the 
role of squads of Japanese soldiers—most shameful, Chŏngjo claimed, for the 
descendants of Chinese ocials.1
His description of them would hardly have shocked Chosŏn ocials during 
the seventeenth century, who found no problem in describing Ming migrants as 
submitting to the edication of the Chosŏn monarchy, in much the same man-
ner as Jurchens, Japanese, Dutch, and others. Nor would their shing (a standard 
activity for submitting-foreigners) or their association with Japan (during the 
reign of Injo they had been joined in the Military Training Agency by Dutch 
and Japanese soldiers) have concerned the seventeenth-century court. Yet, in 
1790, Chŏngjo considered all these features as quite unacceptable. Ideological 
changes during the eighteenth century altered the position of Ming descendants, 
as they became exemplars of Chosŏn’s emerging Ming loyalist ritualism. This 
in turn was related to more general changes in Northeast Asia, as the Qing em-
pire, in particular, increasingly divided its subject peoples into state-determined 
categories and treated their loyalties and cultural identication as immutable.
Late Chosŏn Ming Loyalism
During the eighteenth century, the Qing empire, no longer threatened by any se-
rious possibility of a Ming revival, could turn its attention toward consolidating 
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its legacy. Although during the seventeenth century it had been dangerous to ex-
press continued loyalty to the Ming, by the reign of the Qianlong (r. 1735–1796) 
emperor, the Qing regime had become suciently condent of its position to 
espouse the Ming loyalist cause as its own, labeling those Ming turncoats who 
had continued their ocial careers under the Qing as “twice-serving” or “du-
plicitous” ministers (erchen). Alternately, the substantially Liaodongese Han-
jun (Han Martial), who had been a core component of the Qing conquest elite, 
were not similarly accused of duplicity but were reorganized and clearly distin-
guished on the basis of their genealogies from Manchu or Mongol banners.2
Indeed, both Manchus and Mongols were redened under a Qianlong emperor 
who saw himself as the sponsor of both. Mongols were to worship Chinggis, 
use the Mongolian language (which was actively sponsored by the Qing court), 
and serve in Qing-sponsored banners, while Manchus were also dened by their 
language, their skill in mounted archery, their attachment to the Manchu home-
land, and their practice of Manchu shamanism. The Qing court took an active 
role, especially, in dening Manchus, preventing them from abandoning their 
state-mandated Manchu identity, and assimilating with the majority Han Chi-
nese culture. Thus, the Qianlong emperor did not treat Ming loyalty as being in 
conict with loyalty to the Qing, as the Ming was merely one of several cultural 
and dynastic traditions that Qianlong had inherited.3
Chosŏn also experienced an ideological shi during the eighteenth century. 
Whether or not Chosŏn’s Ming restorationists had been sincere in their military 
preparation during the seventeenth century, by the eighteenth century all hope of 
a Ming restoration had been abandoned except within popular rumor and con-
spiracy theories.4 In practice, Chosŏn became a notably compliant subject state 
of the Qing. However, Ming loyalism did not lose its emotional or ideological 
appeal in Chosŏn for the monarch or for sajok aristocrats, even though the Qing 
empire itself embraced its own form of Ming loyalism. In fact, Chosŏn intellec-
tuals increasingly reimagined Chosŏn as the last remaining bastion of the Ming 
empire and of a Chunghwa legitimacy that had elsewhere been destroyed by the 
Qing invasion. As a result, Chosŏn’s loyalty to the Ming was expressed during 
the eighteenth century primarily through shrines, public and private, raised to 
honor the fallen Ming, and through rituals to the Ming that most of Chosŏn’s 
sajok aristocrats were convinced could not be practiced properly anywhere else.
A notable feature of this ideological shi was a renewed attention to the 
ritual commemoration and historical reassessment of loyal martyrs. Similar to 
the commemoration of Ming loyalists in the Qing empire under the Qianlong 
emperor, Chosŏn monarchs including Sukchong, Yŏngjo, and Chŏngjo took 
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an active role in honoring those who had been purged or executed for loyally 
resisting the authority of the Chosŏn dynasty, including the ocials who had 
defended Nosan-gun (r. 1452–1455, renamed Tanjong under Sukchong) when he 
was deposed and then executed by his uncle Sejo,5 and the loyal ocials who had 
refused to abandon their loyalties to the Koryŏ monarch.6
Similarly, numerous shrines were established to commemorate the Imjin War 
and the Pyŏngja Manchu invasion—whereby, following Yi Uk’s analysis, the 
fading memories of these conicts were “ritualized” and kept as part of public 
memory.7 This ritualization of course was primarily concerned with key Korean 
participants in these wars, such as the great admiral Yi Sunsin, and the monk-sol-
dier Yujŏng (1544–1610).8 Shrines had also been established following the Imjin 
War to honor, in some respect or another, Ming soldiers who had served in it. 
Many of these shrines saw revived use beginning in the late seventeenth century. 
Among them, the most prominent was perhaps the Sŏnmusa (Shrine to Mar-
tial Might) in the capital, established in 1598, which honored two Ming ocers 
who were thought to have provided especial aid to Chosŏn. These were Xing 
Jie (1540–1612), who served as Ming minister of the Board of War during the 
war, and, aer 1604, the inspector-general ( jinglüe) Yang Hao (?–1629), who as 
military ocial had been enormously popular in the Chosŏn court. Although 
the Sŏnmusa seems to have been maintained only as a minor shrine through-
out the seventeenth century, it attracted renewed royal interest beginning in 
the early eighteenth century.9 In P’yŏngyang, the Muyŏlsa (Shrine to Martial 
Passion) was established in 1593 in honor of Shi Xing and was later expanded 
to include such notable Ming ocers as Li Rusong, Yang Yuan, Li Rubai, and 
Zhang Shijue. The shrine seems to have been largely neglected, however, until 
in 1709 Sukchong noted the lack of regular rituals at the Muyŏlsa as a serious 
deciency in the ritual calendar and established regular rituals coordinated with 
the more general Ming loyalist ritual of the court.10 Throughout the country, 
small shrines to Guan Yu were established by Ming soldiers, notably two in the 
capital, the Nammyo (Southern Temple to Guan Yu) in 1598 and the Tongmyo 
(Eastern Temple to Guan Yu) in 1602. Although controversial at the time of its 
construction, beginning in the 1690s the Tongmyo also became a place where 
Chosŏn monarchs would themselves formally honor the Ming military e ort.11
During the Imjin War, the Minch’ungdan (Altar for Pitying the Loyal) was 
raised in honor of Ming soldiers who had died in battle. Although it had fallen 
out of use by 1636, sacrice at the altar was once more revived in 1668.12
The politics of ritual commemoration was intimately involved in the com-
petition for power between the state as represented by the monarchy and the 
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civil aristocrats who monopolized the leading positions within the bureaucracy, 
but sought also to exert their power independently without regard to the royal 
court. Thus, by the late seventeenth century, the powerful Noron subfaction 
of the Sŏin, and especially the disciples of Song Siyŏl (1607–1689), had begun 
to advocate for the establishment of a shrine to the Wanli and Chongzheng 
emperors themselves in a site under the control of their faction. Song Siyŏl had 
retired to Hwayang in Chŏngju, Ch’ungch’ŏng Province. In accord with his 
emulation of Zhu Xi, Song Siyŏl ascribed to the landscape within Hwayang 
meanings associated with Zhu Xi and other aspects of the Chinese past that 
he particularly admired. Notably, he carved the calligraphy of Ming emperors 
into the rock face. A line from the Analects—“Do no move if not in accord with 
Ritual” (K. pirye pidong, Ch. feili feidong)—was inscribed, together with four 
other pieces, in the Chongzhen emperor’s own calligraphy. Before Song’s death 
by poison at the order of the monarch in 1689, he instructed his disciple Kwŏn 
Sangha to establish at the site both a school, the Hwayang school (Hwayang 
sŏwŏn), and a shrine to the Wanli and Chongzhen emperors, the Mandongmyo 
(All-Streams-Flow-to-the-East Shrine). This caused considerable controversy 
among ocials of the Noron and Soron subfactions of the Sŏin, but eventually 
the shrine received support from Sukchong and was completed in 1703, with 
sacrices being made there from 1704 onward.13 However, in the same year, Suk-
chong asserted the supremacy of the Chosŏn court through the establishment 
on palace grounds of a shrine to the Ming Wanli emperor, the Taebodan (Altar 
of Great Gratitude), also called the Hwangdan (Imperial Altar).
Sukchong made relatively little use of the Taebodan, but his two successors, 
namely Yŏngjo (r. 1724–1776) and Chŏngjo (r. 1776–1800), made it an essential 
part of the palace calendar. Yŏngjo, notably, expanded the rites at the altar in 
1749 to include the rst and last Ming emperors—the Hongwu emperor (hon-
ored on the tenth day of the h month) and the Chongzhen emperor (hon-
ored on the nineteenth day of the third month)—to supplement rituals already 
o ered to the Wanli emperor on the twenty-rst day of the seventh month. He 
also placed far greater emphasis on his personal involvement in these rituals than 
did Sukchong, performing rituals in person at the altar itself or facing it from 
a palace nearby during all but ve years of his reign following 1749. This prac-
tice of regular personal worship was also maintained by his successor, Chŏngjo, 
who further entrenched Ming loyalist ritualism as an essential aspect of the 
Chosŏn state.14
In e ect, the establishment of these ritual practices, although directed to-
ward the vanished Ming, constituted an elevation of Chosŏn and the Chosŏn 
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monarchy. During the debates concerning the initial establishment of the Man-
dongmyo and Taebodan, Soron ocials had asserted that the rites implied an 
unjustied appropriation of the prerogatives of the Ming emperor by a subordi-
nate lord (chehu). Kwŏn Sangha countered that by performing them, they were 
following in the tradition of the state of Song, which itself had continued the 
rites of the Yin dynasty, and of the state of Qi, which had continued the rites of 
the Xia. He cited Confucius’s description of those two subordinate states, Song 
and Qi, as the nal heirs to the rites and manners of the two dynasties of the Xia 
and the Yin.15 Chosŏn was a subordinate, but just as Qi had exclusively inherited 
the rites of the Xia and Song the rites of the Yin, and indeed as Confucius’s own 
state of Lu had inherited the rites of the Zhou, so Chosŏn also was the exclusive 
heir of the Chunghwa tradition as represented by the Ming.
This marked a transition, to use Hŏ T’aeyong’s terminology, from the 
Chunghwa Restoration Consciousness to the Chunghwa Inheritance Con-
sciousness (Chunghwa kyesŭng ŭisik). In other words, Chosŏn ocials aban-
doned their fantasy of plotting to restore the Ming and instead simply treated 
Chosŏn as the sole legitimate heir of a grand Chinese/Confucian tradition.16
This should not be seen as a move to some sort of protonationalism, as such 
narrow particularism was still alien to Chosŏn thinking, and the possibility of 
the revival of a legitimate realm within the geographic connes of China had 
not yet been completely abandoned. At no point did Chosŏn sajok seek to es-
tablish a particularist Chosŏn identity that could be separated from the broader 
Chunghwa tradition as a whole.17 Still, Chunghwa Inheritance Consciousness 
was without question directed primarily inward, toward the self-identity of 
Chosŏn’s monarchy and sajok aristocracy. The practice of rites to the Ming was 
predicated on the assumption that no other country in the world could now 
appropriately perform them. Moreover, Chunghwa Inheritance Consciousness 
did involve a general reconsideration of Korean history, with people such as Im 
Kyŏngŏp (1594–1646), who had been considered a traitor by Injo when he was 
alive, being transformed into a glorious hero of anti-Qing struggle during the 
reigns of Yŏngjo and Chŏngjo.18 Indeed, aspects of Korean history with no ob-
vious connection to the Ming, such as Koguryŏ’s defeats of the Sui and Tang 
and the story of Kija’s travel to Chosŏn, were brought into a broader narrative 
conrming the existence of an independent Chunghwa tradition in Korea, while 
the courts of Yŏngjo and Chŏngjo made a point of honoring early Korean dy-




These new intellectual trends strongly inuenced Chosŏn’s responses to submit-
ting-foreigners. Despite the ostensible Ming loyalism of the seventeenth-century 
Chosŏn court, court ocials in Chosŏn had seen no problem in categorizing the 
descendants of Ming refugees, together with Jurchens, Japanese, and Dutch, as 
submitting-foreigners. In the decades following the establishment of the Tae-
bodan, however, the court reimagined the Ming migrants, oen considered as 
a nuisance and a threat when they arrived, as loyalist refugees eeing to the last 
remnant of the true Ming tradition in Chosŏn. On the one hand, their presence 
in Chosŏn conrmed the state’s own self-image, and on the other, their cate-
gorization as submitting-foreigners came to be seen as scandalous and a serious 
aw to be rectied. As a result, during the reigns of Yŏngjo and Chŏngjo, those 
submitting-foreigners who could assert Chinese origins were recategorized as 
“Chinese descendants” (Hwain chason), “imperial subjects” (Hwangjoin) or the 
“descendants of imperial subjects” (hwangjoin chason), with the term “imperial 
subject” eventually becoming the standard. This recategorization gave them a 
social status equivalent to intermediate status groups such as chungin specialists 
and low-ranking military ocials.20
Before the eighteenth century, Chinese in Korea had been referred to by a 
variety of terms, not all of them particularly laudatory.21 Tang person (Tangin) 
was probably the most common, although, especially under Qing inuence, Han 
person (Hanin), an equivalent to the Manchu category Nikan and the preferred 
term within the Qing empire, was also used with some frequency. Central Dy-
nasty person (Chungjoin), Superior Country person (Taegugin), and Celestial 
Dynasty person (Ch’ŏnjoin) were also common, although even a term as seem-
ingly positive as Celestial Dynasty person could appear in passages otherwise 
hostile to the Ming people in question.22 “Imperial subject” (Hwangjoin) came 
into use during the reign of Yŏngjo to specify descendants of the Ming residing in 
Chosŏn. Literally meaning “Imperial Dynasty person,” it referred to subjects of 
what was then considered by Chosŏn to be the last imperial dynasty (Hwangjo), 
namely the fallen Ming. The initial uses of the term “imperial subject” were 
nearly always in connection with Ming loyalist ritual, especially at the Taebodan. 
For instance, in 1725, Yŏngjo asked, while discussing the Mandongmyo, which 
imperial subjects other than members of the Chŏn family (the descendants of 
Tian Haoqian) had received ocial employment. He was answered by Hong 
Hoin (1674–?), who said that Yi Tongbae, former magistrate of a special county 
(hyŏllyŏng), and Yi Myŏn, former subarea commander, both of them descendants 
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of Li Rumei, had also received ocial employment.23 In 1735, Yŏngjo expressed 
joy at the good news that Chŏn Tŭgu, the son of Chŏn Manch’u, had shown 
skill in archery, and so he pushed him directly toward the palace military ex-
amination.24 In 1736, Yŏngjo intervened to have another member of the Chŏn 
family, Chŏn Ch’iu, provided with a position in the special guards (pyŏlgunjik),25
a royal guard established by Hyojong and sta ed in part by Ming migrants.26
Yŏngjo’s active interest in Chosŏn imperial subjects grew aer 1749, the year 
that Taebodan rituals were expanded to include the Hongwu and Chongzhen 
emperors. In the third month of that year, for instance, Yŏngjo also called for 
civil and military ocials who were the descendants of imperial subjects or of 
“loyal and chaste” (ch’ungjŏl) Chosŏn people to be granted pensions or employ-
ment by the Board of Personnel or the Board of War.27 As part of this process, 
he ordered all descendants of imperial subjects who were enrolled in the military 
and in possession of a bow or musket to assemble with their weapons before the 
Ch’ŏngyang gate of the royal palace.28 Aer bringing them before him, he called 
for the employment of imperial subjects who demonstrated military skills as rit-
ual guards for the Imperial Altar.29 All this was done in the space of a few days. 
As the result of the show of talent provided by the imperial subjects in question, 
Chŏng Naeju, an extraordinary cavalry ocer (pyŏlmusa) within the Military 
Training Agency, was raised above the senior third rank for his success in the 
archery trials, and two soldiers from the Han Ivory Troop, Wang Tuhwi and 
Wang Hŭngsŏk, were allowed to advance immediately to the nal palace mili-
tary exam on account of their success in musketry trials. Additionally, Yŏngjo 
ordered the promotion of the Chinese company commanders (Hanin ch’ogwan) 
Chŏn Manha and Chŏng Ikchu.30 A few days later, during the fourth month, 
Yŏngjo ordered that ritual guards should be selected especially from among the 
descendants of those Ming people who had followed Hyojong from Mukden 
and were then residing in Ŏŭi-dong.31
Initially, positions were o ered primarily to the descendants of Ming refugees 
who had obtained some signicant bureaucratic position within the Chosŏn 
court upon arrival, with some consideration for talent and ability. The case of 
Ho Tup’il is an especially interesting exception, revealing the increasing cat-
egorization of imperial subjects as a type to be rewarded for their connection 
to the Ming, with little regard for skills or qualications. In 1725, during the 
rst year of Yŏngjo, The Chosŏn Veritable Records informs us that Ho Tup’il, a 
ninth-generation descendant of late Song ocial Hu Anguo (1074–1178), but by 
then living in Pukch’ŏng in southern Hamgyŏng Province, memorialized to the 
court his desire to take a position in the Mandongmyo, so as to show his sincere 
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desire not to forget China (Chungguk). Hwang Cha (1689–?), a civil ocial, 
responded to Ho’s request by saying that this would indeed be in accord with the 
desire of both Hyojong and Sukchong to maintain the greater meaning of the 
Spring and Autumn Annals, as well as the original purpose of the Mandongmyo.
But was Ho Tup’il employable? The account of The Veritable Records suggests 
that there was considerable doubt in this regard. Yŏngjo tried to sweep these 
doubts aside: “How could a descendant of a high ocial of the Superior Coun-
try not become a brilliant general?” As Ho was an imperial subject (hwangjoin), 
Yŏngjo demanded that the local magistrate in southern Hamgyŏng place him 
under the special care of the state, and that an investigation be made to see if 
any of his family had some notable skill in either civil or military matters.32
As for Ho’s abilities, the Journal of the Royal Secretariat also records Yi Sŏng-
nyong’s (1672–1748) much less enthusiastic description of Ho Tup’il as a man 
who, “though not utterly vicious or stupid,” was nevertheless both incapable in 
military matters and illiterate, and thus not really employable by the Chosŏn 
court. There was no evidence, other than hearsay, for the claim that Ho Tup’il 
was descended from a prominent ocial, and indeed Ho’s family maintained 
that their documents had all been burnt. Still, Yi Sŏngnyong did not think that 
Ho could be simply abandoned, as to do so would hardly be in accord with the 
principle of “succoring those who have come from distant regions.” Ho Tup’il 
had a cousin, a resident of Maengsan in interior P’yŏngan Province, who was 
literate and capable in military matters, so Yi Sŏngnyong suggested him as a 
possible alternative.33
Yi Sŏngnyong’s initial statement is consistent with the usual rhetoric concern-
ing submitting-foreigners and the responsibility of the Chosŏn court to succor 
those foreigners who had come from afar. By contrast, Yŏngjo’s response suggests 
the growing idea of a Ming descendant as a Ming loyalist type,34 even if that type 
had not yet solidied into the stable bureaucratic category that it was to become. 
Indeed, in 1731, the court decided to provide Ho Tup’il and his descendants with 
greater privileges. This support was modeled on the precedent already estab-
lished by his fellow northerner Kang Shijue, the Ming migrant discovered by Pak 
Sedang and Nam Kuman during their term of oce in Hamgyŏng Province in 
the late seventeenth century. Yet, in contrast to Kang Shijue, who was described 
by nearly all Chosŏn ocials as both literate and skilled in military matters, Ho 
Tup’il’s general incompetence was still not in doubt. The only common aspect 
shared by Ho and Kang was Ming Chinese ancestry.35
The true expansion of imperial subject status and the privileges attached 
to the descendants of Ming migrants occurred aer 1751, when Yŏngjo went 
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beyond granting royal favors to a few fortunate and well-known Ming descen-
dants. From that time onward, Yŏngjo increasingly treated Ming descent as 
an important category worthy of consideration in itself. This change in atti-
tude also took place a year aer the Equal-Service Tax Law (Kyunyŏk-pŏp) was 
brought into e ect, and was closely associated with it. The Equal-Service Law 
was part of a policy pursued by Yŏngjo to spread the burden of the military tax 
equally across the population. Initially, at least, Yŏngjo had sought to extend 
the tax to encompass sajok aristocrats as well, but when this move attracted too 
much opposition, Yŏngjo abandoned it, instead extending the levy across the 
commoner population, while cutting the tax rate in half. To make up for the loss 
of revenue and to tax sajok to a somewhat greater extent, Yŏngjo also raised the 
land-tax rate, imposed a levy on students who failed qualifying exams, and raised 
a number of other minor levies.36 As discussed by Haboush and Kim Paekch’ŏl, 
apart from the practical problem of military tax reform, the Equal Service Law, 
and the concern for the common people implied by it, was also part of Yŏng-
jo’s own rhetorical self-representation as a sage king in the tradition of Yao and 
Shun, ruling selessly on behalf of the people upon whom the very survival of 
the state depended.37
As with other scal reforms during the late Chosŏn, the reform of 
submitting-foreigner status required the development of institutions capable of 
handling these reforms, and on generating new knowledge and records through 
which these forms could be put into e ect. The challenge facing the Chosŏn 
court was, well into the eighteenth century, that the central state still did not 
know who properly belonged within the submitting-foreigner tax category. 
During the tenth month of 1751, while touring the birthplaces of earlier kings, 
Yŏngjo’s attention turned to the birthplace of Hyojong, and thus to the Ming 
migrants in the Ŏŭi-dong neighborhood, in particular the members of the Han 
Ivory Troops. One ocial, Nam T’aegi (1699–1763), pointed out as a matter of 
concern that the term “submitting-foreigner,” which ordinarily referred to those 
Jurchens and Japanese who had come to settle in Chosŏn, also encompassed all 
imperial subjects who resided in Kyŏngsang Province; these latter were so deeply 
resentful of the term “submitting-foreigner” that they would prefer to accept the 
burden of corvée labor and the heavier tax load of commoners than be included 
in that invidious category. Other ocials in Yŏngjo’s presence noted the same 
trend. Yŏngjo’s response was to lament his own lack of sincerity toward the im-
perial dynasty. He reected on the phrase in The Confucian Analects (Lunyü) 
“that there must be a rectication of names” and called upon the Board of Rites 
to investigate who was classied as a submitting-foreigner.38
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In a very short while, Yŏngjo received responses to his request. In the same year, 
the director of the Capital Guards (ŏyŏng taejang), Hong Ponghan, informed the 
king that, having consulted with provincial governments and broadly investi-
gated documents within the Board of Rites, he was able to establish that the 
category encompassed non-Korean lineages, including former Pŏnhos, Japanese 
defectors, and Chinese who had entered during the Ming-Qing transition. In 
response to Hong Ponghan’s report, Yŏngjo once more demanded the rectica-
tion of names: henceforth, the term “submitting-foreigner” should be restricted 
to the descendants of Jurchens and Japanese, while the descendants of Ming 
migrants should be referred to as Chinese descendants (Hwain chason). Yŏngjo 
then decreed that, while Chinese descendants should continue to be under the 
administration of the Board of Rites, they should be freed from all personal 
taxes and military service requirements. This demand Hong Ponghan accepted 
as showing sage concern on the part of the monarch, but he also worried that if 
the transferal were in name only and included no nancial contribution, then in 
the future other government agencies would look down on the status, and local 
administrations might think that they could expand their source of military 
tax without interfering in any way with the nances of the Board of Rites. To 
prevent such future corruption of Yŏngjo’s sage intentions, he advocated hav-
ing Chinese descendants pay a small contribution in local products insofar as it 
could be collected without any great e ort, so that, if in the future some Chinese 
descendants did have a complaint, the Board of Rites would at least know who 
was under their care and protect them from such extralegal exactions by local 
administrations. This revision Yŏngjo accepted, even as he called for ocials 
in both the capital and the provinces to show greater vigilance in enforcing the 
tax-exempt status of Chinese descendants.39
Indeed, investigation revealed quite a number of prominent Ming migrant 
descendants recorded in The Compendium of Submitting-Foreigners (Hyangh-
wain sŏngch’aek), such as Yi Hwŏn, the h descendant of the Yŏngwŏn Mar-
quis Li Chengliang, and the members of three Ming migrant families, namely 
the descendants of Chu Haichang, Tian Shitai, and Fan Zijian.40 Yŏngjo 
responded by freeing these families from corvée labor in perpetuity and de-
manded that the Hansŏng administration and the Board of Rites should care-
fully review the names within The Compendium of Submitting-Foreigners in 
order to transfer Chinese descendants into The Record of Chinese (Hwain-rok). 
This record was to be distributed to the provinces, to prevent Chinese descen-
dants from su ering unjust exactions. Additionally, the descendants of Chu 
Haichang were freed from the base status that they had gained on account of 
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an ancestor marrying a low-status woman, while Yi Hwŏn was o ered a new 
position in the military.41
From this point on, ocials directed their concern to distinguishing both 
the designation and the tax obligations of Chinese descendants from the diverse 
peoples who were in possession of submitting-foreigner status. The Chosŏn bu-
reaucracy did not, however, have the knowledge or records to make these distinc-
tions easily. In 1754, Yi Ch’ŏnbo referred to a report from Kim Hanch’ŏl, the 
governor of Hamgyŏng Province, who worried that, in putting the new order 
of the Board of Rites into e ect, the bureaucracies of the various local admin-
istrations were faced with the signicant presence of unrelated families mixed 
in with submitting-foreigners and Chinese descendants. As a result, local ad-
ministrations, required to collect a limited tax from submitting-foreigners and 
Chinese descendants, and fearing criticism for not doing so, imposed double 
taxation on a fair number of people, throwing the province into disorder. As this 
certainly was not the original intention of the monarch, Kim Hanch’ŏl recom-
mended that the new policy be delayed until each local magistracy could com-
plete a full investigation of the identity of submitting-foreigners and Chinese de-
scendants within their county. Yi Ch’ŏnbo supported Kim Hanch’ŏl’s request, 
but warned that in some cases local magistracies might simply be looking for 
excuses to delay implementing the policy. He thus advocated following Kim 
Hanch’ŏl’s suggestion while also investigating and punishing any local ocial 
who seemed to be stalling.42
Despite the fact that both Kim Hanch’ŏl and Yi Ch’ŏnbo had been careful 
to distinguish submitting-foreigners from Chinese descendants, Cho Yǒngguk 
responded to them by providing the historical background of these two catego-
ries, pointing out that Chinese (Hwain) included both those Ming soldiers who 
came to Chosŏn during the ten years of the Imjin War and had then remained 
aer the end of the war and those members of Mao Wenlong’s army who had 
wandered into Chosŏn. Submitting-foreigners, alternately, comprised those few 
Jurchens (yain) who avoided being removed by Nurhaci to Jianzhou, but who 
had stayed in Chosŏn. Cho Yŏngguk then added that much of the empty land 
within the Six Garrisons region in northern Hamgyŏng Province had once been 
inhabited by these same Jurchens. Cho’s brief historical background caused em-
barrassment to Yi Ch’ŏnbo, who apologized for discussing the matter without 
rst informing himself properly.43 Yet Cho himself was no closer to sorting out 
the basic problem of distinguishing genuine submitting-foreigners and Chi-
nese descendants from other categories of subjects. Indeed, a year later, Cho 
continued to express concern over the administrative problems associated with 
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submitting-foreigners and Chinese descendants during a general discussion of 
the problems connected to tax collection in Hamgyŏng, including such issues as 
the fraudulent imposition of taxes on nursing babies, and the number of public 
slaves who had managed to falsely claim descent from Yi Sŏnggye’s ancestors.
Yŏngjo responded by pointing out that false identities (moch’ing) of that 
sort were also found in aristocratic genealogies and were an extremely dicult 
problem to solve. Cho agreed but still emphasised how dicult reforming sub-
mitting-foreigners status in northern Hamgyŏng could be. Because submit-
ting-foreigners made up such a large proportion of Hamgyŏng’s population, the 
task of searching out and identifying Chinese descendants from among them 
was extremely onerous. Worse, some of the most common clan seats associated 
with Chinese descendants could in fact refer to Korean place-names, includ-
ing Tŭngju, which could refer to Dengzhou in Shandong but also to Anbyŏn 
in Chosŏn’s Kangwŏn Province, and T’aewŏn, which could refer to Taiyuan 
in Shanxi but also Ch’ungwŏn in Chosŏn’s Ch’ungch’ŏng Province. An in-
vestigation of records would doubtless classify the bearers of these clan seats 
as Chinese descendants, even if they referred to Korean place-names, and Cho 
worried that this would be a source of complaints in the future from those upon 
whom double taxation was imposed as a result. He thus advised that careful 
distinctions be made. Yŏngjo did not respond to his broader administrative 
concerns but reiterated the importance of distinguishing imperial subjects from 
submitting-foreigners.44
The creation of Chinese or imperial subject status did not eliminate concern 
about submitting-foreigner status. In 1758, the Board of Rites noted the loss 
of revenue from submitting-foreigners who were copying Chinese descendants 
by not providing their tribute as before, as well as the excessive growth of the 
category to include “the maternal descendants of maternal descendants.”45 A 
month later, Yŏngjo responded by limiting inheritance to paternal and mater-
nal descendants (presumably eliminating the maternal descendants of maternal 
descendants that had caused concern). 46 He also recognized that, in an era where 
all Chosŏn subjects had had their military tax burden reduced to a single p’il
of cloth, submitting-foreigners, who had already been paying only that levy to 
the Board of Rites, might feel resentment at having received no tax reduction. 
Court ocials also mentioned that submitting-foreigners in Chŏlla Province 
su ered excessive exactions, not only paying the military tax at the same level as 
commoners, but even having duplicate taxes imposed upon the deceased to be 
paid by their descendants. Yŏngjo deplored this burden placed on them, which 
went against the high intentions of his ancestors who had established the status. 
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Regretting that he could not cut their payments in half, let alone completely 
eliminate their military tax burden, he demanded that a Compendium of Sub-
mitting-Foreigners be distributed to the provinces in the same manner as The
Compendium of Chinese, with strict punishments levied against magistrates who 
allowed such unjust exactions to take place.47
Considering the problem of irregular taxation, it is not surprising that sub-
mitting-foreigners aimed to upgrade to Chinese status or, especially during the 
reign of Chŏngjo, imperial subject status. Although even many of the successful 
claims to Chinese status, such as that of Ho Tup’il, seem now to be of doubt-
ful veracity, by no means were all claims accepted. The case of Pak Sŭngbok, 
a self-styled “submitting-foreigner of the Imperial Dynasty” living in Yŏngam 
in Chŏlla Province, is especially interesting in this regard. His case is included 
in a survey of improper petitions in a 1798 entry in Chŏngjo’s Record of Daily 
Reection (Ilsŏngnok). Most of these (which included appeals on behalf of con-
victed murderers) were rejected out of hand, in some instances with an addi-
tional penalty, but a number were seen to be worthy of further consideration, 
among which was that of Pak Sŭngbok. His appeal was conrmed as improper, 
but some aspects concerned Chŏngjo, who ordered a more detailed investiga-
tion. He was concerned by Pak Sŭngbok’s complaint that, as a “descendant of 
submitting-foreigners of the Imperial Dynasty,” he felt that people of his sort 
were no longer being cared for as in the past. Chŏngjo ordered an investigation 
throughout Chŏlla Province of irregular taxation and corvée imposed on sub-
mitting-foreigners as alleged by Pak Sŭngbok. He also demanded that a survey 
be made of improper use of terminology, notably the inappropriate reference to 
Ming descendants as submitting-foreigners and to communities inhabited by 
Ming descendants as submitting-foreigner villages. As Chŏngjo said: “These 
days, the teaching of proper social distinctions has been declining, and those 
in authority no longer know how to foster the worthy. The damage has reached 
helpless submitting-foreigner villages. How can this not be most disturbing! It 
is utterly nonsensical to describe the descendants of imperial subjects who ed 
to our country as submitting-foreigners.”48
In response, an investigation was indeed launched, as a result of which the 
governor of Chŏlla Province, Yi Tŭksin (1742–1802), emphatically dismissed 
Pak Sŭngbok’s claims. He declared baseless or largely baseless each of Pak Sŭng-
bok’s many accusations of corruption. Interestingly, he also rejected Pak Sŭng-
bok’s own claim to imperial subject status. Not only was Pak not a Chinese sur-
name, but the magistrate in charge discovered earlier documents that suggested 
that Pak Sŭngbok and his family were of Jurchen origin—his ancestors had rst 
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used the Jurchen clan seat of Hŭngnyong-gang (Ch. Heilongjiang), although 
they had later corrected it to Taewŏn, which could be either Jurchen or Ming 
Chinese. From this, Yi Tŭksin was able to assert that it was “clear without a 
doubt that Pak is falsely claiming [imperial-subject status].” The general survey 
of submitting-foreigners and imperial subjects throughout Chŏlla Province did 
not turn up any serious failure to rectify names, or indeed any unjust taxation, 
at least at the county level (some customary payments were demanded on the 
level of the commandery or island administrations). In Naju, imperial-subjects 
and submitting-foreigners were scattered about the islands and hills, and so 
there were no collective villages whose names were to be corrected. In Kobu, 
Imp’a, Okku, Muan, Hamp’yŏng, and Puan, those who called themselves sub-
mitting-foreigners lived scattered among other communities or in some cases 
formed their own villages, but when the governor asked about their ancestry, he 
discovered that they knew nothing at all about the subject. In Sunch’ŏn, Posŏng, 
Kimche, Haenam, Hŭngdŏk, Kwangyang, Kangjin, Hŭngyang, and Mujang, 
he found that the names of submitting-foreigner villages and imperial subject 
villages were clearly distinguished from each other. There were also people of 
foreign origin in Yŏnggwang, but, without any clear evidence of their ancestry, 
it was not possible to change the names of their villages to “imperial subject 
villages.” Throughout, the governor noted, there were reports of people who 
claimed imperial subject status but who had, like Pak Sŭngbok’s ancestors, the 
clan seats Hŭngnyong-gang or Taewŏn. Until the early seventeenth century the 
Chosŏn court itself had granted submitting-foreigners clan seats and Korean 
surnames, but this history seems to have been forgotten by the late eighteenth 
century. From the governor’s point of view, the proliferation of the same clan seat 
among people of di erent surnames made no sense, suggesting the “proliferation 
of lies.” Pak Sŭngbok, the governor concluded, “was of the same ilk” as other 
fraudulent imperial subjects.49
Although the decision went strongly against Pak Sŭngbok, whose case be-
came the precedent for rejecting later baseless claims of the same sort,50 it also 
conrmed the term “imperial subject” or “imperial subject descendant” as the 
ocial designation for those who could establish descent from the Ming—and 
indeed other terms largely disappear from the ocial record. Even as the sup-
posed descendants of Ming migrants, during the reigns of Chŏngjo and Sunjo, 
appealed their classication as submitting-foreigners, demanding instead to be 
referred to as imperial subjects, so the Board of Rites struggled, in much the 
same manner as before, to distinguish the false claimants to Ming migrant status 
from the legitimate ones.
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The Formation of Imperial Subject Identity
Both ideological change within the state and the interests of the Chinese descen-
dants themselves encouraged the creation and development of Ming migrant 
descent-groups and the emergence of imperial subject status as distinct from 
submitting-foreigner status. Ming migrants, when requesting imperial subject 
status, frequently claimed to have lost the vital documents. The Chosŏn court, 
in turn, exerted itself to evaluate their claims, investigating the records for any 
documentary evidence of Chinese ancestry. The category of imperial subject or 
Chinese, in other words, developed through the interaction between the scal 
and ideological needs of the Chosŏn court, on the one hand, and the desire for 
social improvement among Ming descendants, on the other. Conversely, to the 
modern scholar, the fact that the category needed to be created and claried 
during the reigns of Yŏngjo and Chŏngjo is a reminder that before that period 
the distinction between the two categories was not made consistently and that 
even in the vigorously anti-Qing political atmosphere during the late seven-
teenth and early eighteenth centuries, Ming Chinese descendants were routinely 
ranked as equal to Jurchens and Japanese.
Angela Zito has described the grand sacrice (dasi) during the Qing under 
the Qianlong emperor as producing “social bodies,” bringing ritual participants 
into hierarchies, and creating the relationship between the yang body of the em-
peror and the yin body of the other participants.51 As social bodies produced 
through key palace rituals involving the Chosŏn monarch, imperial subjects en-
joyed social benets that went far beyond tax advantages. Submitting-foreigners 
during the seventeenth century had in theory enjoyed the special concern of the 
state and exemption from personal taxes. Their marginal status, however, le 
them at the mercy of competing government agencies, each seeking to impose 
taxes upon them. In addition, they inherited their status on the maternal line in 
the same manner as the base born. By contrast, imperial subject status brought 
with it recognition of distinguished ancestry, a family background that accorded 
with late Chosŏn’s state ideology, and privileged access to military examina-
tions. Although Ming migrants in no way rose to the ranks of civil sajok, their 
participation in Ming loyalist ritual gave them a position in the Chosŏn court 
hierarchy and brought them into a social relationship with the Chosŏn monarch 
that they had previously lacked. It also gave them an increasingly visible role in 
the Chosŏn court, from whose point of view the presence of Ming loyalist mi-
grants on Chosŏn soil reected its own self-identity as the last remnant of the 
true Chunghwa tradition.
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During the early Chosŏn, Jurchen and Japanese submitting-foreigners had 
assembled before the Chosŏn monarch during visits to the capital and had even 
been organized as royal guards. Under Yǒngjo, instead of Jurchens and Japa-
nese, descendants of Ming migrants were assembled before the monarch, oen 
as part of the monarch’s participation in Ming loyalist rites at the Taebodan. Just 
as had been the case with the Jurchens and Japanese during the early Chosŏn, 
their presence served, as Kimura Takao has recently pointed out, above all to 
strengthen royal authority.52 At times, these assemblies would also involve a dis-
tribution of provisions to these descendants, presumably in nearly all cases peo-
ple from the area of Ǒǔi-dong. Participation in these rituals continued to grow 
throughout his reign. For instance, in 1771, Yǒngjo, aer a lengthy prostration 
before the altar, called the Ming descendants for review.53 Such royal visitations 
continued to occur under Chǒngjo also, frequently resulting in the widespread 
hiring of Ming migrants for the military bureaucracy.54
Indeed, military traditions according to which Ming migrants had been or-
ganized since 1637 continued to shape their institutional relationship with the 
state. Tian Haoqian’s descendant Chǒn Tǔgu continued to do well, gaining the 
position of provincial military commander (pyŏngsa) of Kyŏngsang Province in 
1773, at the same time that another Ming migrant descendant, Hwang Sejung 
(whose ancestor was Huang Gong), acquired the position of chief commander 
(yŏngjang).55 Kang Shijue’s descendants also maintained their prominence, ob-
taining hereditary positions as sixth-rank military ocers under Chǒngjo.56
According to a contemporary observer, although they continued to be based in 
northern Hamgyŏng Province, they made frequent trips to the capital,57 which 
no doubt raised their position considerably above their neighbors in the isolated 
frontier region of Musan. Beginning in 1764, the Chosŏn court facilitated the 
participation of imperial subjects in the military bureaucracy through the estab-
lishment of the Examination for the Loyal and Good (ch’ungnyanggwa), speci-
cally instituted for the descendants of Ming migrants, as well as the descendants 
of loyal Korean subjects who had fallen resisting the Qing during the Pyŏngja in-
vasion and were honored in the Hyŏnjŏlsa (Shrine to the Wise and Chaste) and 
Ch’ungnyŏlsa (Shrine to the Loyal and Passionate). Indeed, note was made of 
imperial subjects who passed the examinations during the reigns of Yŏngjo and 
Chŏngjo, including a descendant of Li Rusong in 1769,58 the above-mentioned 
Hwang Sejung in 1775,59 and a descendant of Kang Shijue in 1800.60
The linking of imperial subjects with the descendants of loyal ocials 
brought them into the mainstream of Chosŏn’s Chunghwa Inheritance Con-
sciousness. During the reigns of Yŏngjo and his successors, imperial subjects 
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and “descendants of loyal and good” (ch’ungnyang chason) Chosŏn subjects were 
made a constituent part of the Ming loyalist rites, oen with special military 
examinations accompanying the rites. According to The Monograph of the Im-
perial Altar (Hwangdanji), a text from the Chŏngjo era, descendants of imperial 
subjects, descendants of loyal Chosŏn subjects, members of the royal family, and 
military and civil ocials, arrayed according to rank, were brought in to partic-
ipate, generally by standing at attention and bowing at set moments, either to 
the monarch as he passed before them or northward toward the spirit tablets 
of the emperors. Imperial subjects, along with the descendants of loyal Chosŏn 
subjects, participated in nearly all aspects of the Ming loyalist rite, from the 
inspection of the sacricial utensils by the ociant (frequently the monarch or 
crown prince) through to the sacrice itself, and the monarch’s departure.61
In The Veritable Records, most such cases are listed briey, with a passing 
reference to the descendants of imperial subjects and loyal Chosŏn subjects par-
ticipating in the rites,62 or perhaps being called into the presence of the monarch 
aer the rites.63 The Journal of the Royal Secretariat oen provides lists of all 
participants as well, dividing them between civil and military ocials, along 
with their famous ancestor. In 1800, for instance, the Journal lists the people 
participating in the Ming loyalist rites, informing us that two civil ocials of 
imperial subject status, both descendants of Huang Gong who had achieved 
the status of young scholar (yuhak), were brought before the monarch along 
with 156 civil sajok, generally of a similarly low rank, who were descendants of 
thirty-six “loyal and good” Chosŏn subjects. As for military ocials participat-
ing during that year, imperial subjects exceeded the descendants of the loyal and 
good in number, with forty being descendants of ten original migrants (includ-
ing Kang Shijue, and the Chinese who accompanied Hyojong from Mukden), 
and twenty-two being descendants of thirteen loyal and good Chosŏn subjects.64 
The association between imperial subjects and military matters was reected in 
their placement during Ming loyalist rituals. According to the rule established 
by Chŏngjo, during the ritual inspection of the utensils, the imperial subjects 
stood to the west of the music platform facing north toward the shrine, while 
the descendants of loyal subjects were placed to the east of the platform, with 
both groups assembled in front of the civil and military ocials.65 During the 
sacrice itself, imperial subjects were placed to the west with military ocials 
and members of the royal family, while the descendants of loyal subjects were 
placed to the east along with civil ocials.66 This not only put them below the 
descendants of loyal Chosŏn subjects according to the usual civil-military hier-
archy but also placed them in front of other more prominent civil and military 
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ocials and included them in a central ritual practice of the monarch. Socially, 
it brought them into the company of the monarch and high ocials—no small 
matter in a society as hierarchical as Chosŏn.67
The transformation of Ming descendants into ritual subjects of the Chosŏn 
court may also be seen in the reorganization of the Han Ivory Troops, the 
military unit in which many of the Ming descendants residing in Ŏŭi-dong 
had been enrolled. Located near the palace grounds in the eastern ward of 
Kŏndŏk-pang, just north of the main market street of Chongno, and associated 
with the monarchy beginning with Hyojong, Ŏŭi-dong had, as discussed above, 
attracted Yŏngjo’s interest early on. When he arrived for his initial visit in 1751, 
only ve members of the Han Ivory Troops had heard in time to present them-
selves before the monarch. Yŏngjo asked them for their names and origins and 
was informed that they were P’ung Myǒngbok, a descendant of Feng Sanshi; 
Yang Sǒnggǒn, a descendant of Yang Fuji; Wang Suhan, a descendant of Wang 
Wenxiang; Yang Sehǔng, another descendant of Yang Fuji; and Pae Ikhwi, a de-
scendant of Pei Yisheng. Upon establishing their names and antecedents, Yǒngjo 
turned his attention to their tax status, inquiring if they had to provide the local 
urban corvée of Hansŏng residents—the notoriously burdensome “ward corvée” 
(pangyŏk).68 He was informed that they were free of local corvée as well. He also 
inquired about the numbers of Ming migrant descendants in and around the 
Ǒǔi-dong neighborhood and was informed of the presence of more than forty 
Ming migrant households within the neighborhood and more than y outside, 
although those who had le Ǒǔi-dong oen had to provide a certain amount of 
local corvée. Because Ǒǔi-dong was small and cramped, many had decided to 
leave. Yŏngjo was further informed that the population of Ming descendants in 
Ǒǔi-dong had grown since the time of migration from slightly more than twenty 
to over 150. In the end, this was not a very substantial number, even though 
households outside of the neighborhood do not seem to have been included.69
Under Chŏngjo, the organization of the Han Ivory Troops took a new turn. 
As discussed at the beginning of this chapter, in 1790, Chǒngjo outlined the his-
tory of these troops, seeing the category as utterly unbetting the descendants of 
Ming migrants. He inaccurately suggested that this had perhaps been inevitable 
during the period immediately post submission to the Qing “when much had to 
be concealed,” with this statement forgetting or ignoring the fact that the Ming 
migrants of Ŏŭi-dong had come to Chosŏn with the full knowledge and coop-
eration of the Qing. Chŏngjo’s solution was to reorganize the imperial subjects 
militarily by renaming their command the Han Brigade (Hallyŏ), presumably 
as doing so removed the implication of commoner status, or even servile status, 
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inherent in ivory troops. The total number within the Han Brigade he set at 
thirty people, and while he continued to have them administered with the Mili-
tary Training Agency, he had their rank and nancing determined according to 
the precedent of the Agency Exam Passers (kukch’ulsin) among the palace guards 
and the Special Cavalry Brigade (pyŏlgidae) within the Capital Garrison of the 
Military Training Agency. Additionally, Chŏngjo took advantage of this reform 
to reorganize the Taebodan guards (sujikkwan). He lamented that, when the 
Taebodan had rst been established, the guards had been drawn from the ranks 
of eunuchs, later to be supplemented by the base-born cleaning sta  (subok) for 
tombs and temples. In place of such base guards, he ordered that three members 
of the Han Brigade be selected as guards at the Taebodan, thereby strengthening 
their connection to Ming loyalist ritual.70
Constructing the Nongsŏ Yi
Such court involvement in the creation of an imperial subject identity can also 
be observed on the level of individual descent-groups. A notable example is that 
of the Nongsŏ Yi. The Nongsŏ Yi family were descendants of Li Chengliang, a 
prominent Liaodongese military ocial, likely of Hamgyŏng Jurchen ancestry, 
although he was remembered in Chosŏn as Korean in origin. Three of Li Chen-
gliang’s sons, Li Rusong, Li Rumei, and Li Rubai, served against the Japanese 
during the Imjin War, with Li Rusong playing a particularly prominent role. 
As was discussed in chapter 4, during the seventeenth century, the descendants 
of Li Rumei had gained limited status in Chosŏn as military ocials. As they 
were from the same family as a prominent savior of Korea during the Imjin War, 
they attracted regular court attention. Because they were residents of Kanghwa, 
Kanghwa magistrates were especially concerned about their well-being. During 
the reign of Yŏngjo, shortly aer imperial subject status was instituted, Kwŏn 
Chŏk, the magistrate of Kanghwa Island, expressed concern that Yi Myŏn, a 
descendant of Li Rumei, was near starvation on Kanghwa Island, despite the 
earlier intercession of Yi T’aejwa under Kyŏngjong. Considering that Yi Myŏn’s 
ancestor Li Rumei had contributed incomparably more to Chosŏn than the 
ancestor of Chŏn Manch’u (an imperial subject then the focus of considerable 
court interest), Kwŏn Chŏk argued that he should be provided with proper 
employment, if only to prevent the end of Li Rumei’s line.71 Yŏngjo responded 
armatively to Kwŏn Chŏk’s request and, indeed, Yi Myŏn was given a range 
of military positions, including garrison commander of Wŏlgot in 1735,72 com-
mander at the Five Military Commands (Owijang, senior 3),73 h minister in 
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the Oce of Ministers without portfolio (ch’ŏmjisa),74 and commander at the 
Loyal Command (Ch’ungikchang).75 In addition to his military career, Yi Myŏn 
reinforced his status by regularly participating in the rites at the Taebodan, a 
salutary practice that was noticed by Yŏngjo himself.76 Such prominence bene-
ted his descendants. His son Yi Hun was given the position of commander of 
the Five Military Commands (Owi t’ongjesa),77 became a member of the spe-
cial forces unit (pyŏlgunjik),78 and attained the rank of senior fourth minister of 
the Oce of Ministers-without-Portfolio (tongjisa chungch’ubu, jr. 2).79 Under 
Yŏngjo, his grandson Yi Kwangsŏk was also granted the important preliminary 
position of royal messenger.80
However, the interest of the Chosŏn court did not stop at simply benet-
ting the careers of Yi Myŏn and his o spring or encouraging their participation 
in Taebodan ritual. Rather, both Yŏngjo and Chŏngjo actively sought to form 
them into a descent-group worthy of their noble ancestor Li Rumei and to em-
phasize their status as a living connection to General Li Rusong, who had long 
received sacrice at the Muyŏlsa in P’yŏngyang and supplementary honors in 
the Taebodan.81 Thus, in 1740, Yŏngjo asked the minister of the Board of Rites, 
Yi Kijin (1687–1755), whether the descendants of imperial subjects practiced an-
cestral sacrices to their ancestors. Yi Kijin responded that Yi Myŏn had not yet 
made an ancestral tablet (sinju). When Yi Kijin visited Yi Myŏn on Kanghwa 
Island, he noticed that the family did not have the resources even to pay for the 
ritual of moving the ancestral tablet. Yi Kijin recommended that the monarch 
order the Board of Rites to pay for the ritual.82 In fact, Yŏngjo went so far as to 
have the tablet itself made for Yi Myŏn and to order the establishment of a shrine 
at which these rituals to Li Rumei and Li Chengliang could be performed.83 Via 
a diplomatic mission, Yi Chŏ, a cousin of Yi Myŏn, who also pursued a military 
career, was able to obtain an image of Li Chengliang,84 but this itself became a 
source of concern. Kim Yangt’aek (1712–1777), aer participating in rituals at 
the Ch’ungnyŏlsa on Kanghwa Island, noted that Yi Myŏn lived nearby. Re-
membering Yŏngjo’s salutary example of providing salaries to Ming migrant 
descendants, he went to see him. There he discovered that Yi Myŏn, although 
possessing the portraits of both Li Chengliang and Li Rumei and o ering sacri-
ces to them, nevertheless lived in a simple thatched hut. He asked that Yŏngjo 
order the provision of proper utensils and food, so that Yi Myŏn could practice 
the ancestral sacrice properly.85
This interest on the part of the Chosŏn court not only enriched Yi Myŏn’s 
family, but soon expanded it to include two new branches, both direct descen-
dants of Li Rusong. The rst of these new branches was discovered in 1755, 
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during the early period of the construction of imperial subject status. The man 
in question, Yi Hwŏn (later renamed Yi Wŏn),86 beneted from the discovery 
of his status by attaining the rank of company commander (ch’ogwan) with the 
Military Training Agency (Hullyŏn togam) without rst taking the exams.87 He 
continued to rise in the ranks, attaining such positions as right naval inspector 
for Chŏlla Province (Chŏlla usu uhu, sr. 4),88 even becoming local magistrate 
(hyŏn’gam) of Chinhae in Kyŏngsang Province.89 His son Kwangu (who was 
eventually renamed Hyosŭng) also attracted the interest of the monarch and 
served in military posts, holding, among other positions, that of magistrate of 
Kyŏnghŭng.90 They became, in other words, part of the same military sajok de-
scent-group as the descendants of Li Rumei in Kanghwa.
Yi Hwŏn owed this preferment to the declared belief among Chosŏn ocials 
that he was “a remaining descendant of Li Rusong” whose aid to Chosŏn “must 
never be forgotten.”91 The fact that he seems to have been a skilled soldier,92
however, no doubt also furthered his military career. Li Rusong’s shadow, ex-
tended indirectly, had already beneted the Kanghwa branch of the Nongsŏ 
Yi, but certainly direct descendants would have had a stronger claim. Yet the 
evidence for Yi Hwŏn’s ancestry seems to have been very weak indeed. Presum-
ably, the connection to Li Rusong was based on the ocial record found within 
The Compendium of Submitting-Foreigners when Yi Hwŏn was rst identied 
as a Ming migrant in 1755, although it is notable that, at that point, he was still 
described simply as a descendant of Li Chengliang. And even according to com-
ments made by Chŏngjo himself in 1799, before Yi Hwŏn came to the court’s 
attention,93 he “was a plowman on a Ch’unch’ŏn mountain-side, living among 
herders and rewood gatherers. His selection for [military] oce was based only 
on rumor.”94
In fact, following their own genealogical account available to the Chosŏn 
during the late eighteenth century, the historical background of this family 
would seem to be much less certain than that of the Kanghwa branch. Accord-
ing to this account, Li Rusong, before heading out into the battle in which he 
was to fall, told his family that with the rise of the Manchu they should ee to 
Chosŏn, where they could avoid having their heads shaved by the Manchu, and 
where, on account of his good deed in saving Chosŏn, they would not be forced 
into any base occupations.95 Li Rusong’s son Li Xingzhong also fell in battle in 
1644, but rst managed to order his son Yingren to ee to Chosŏn, and indeed 
Li Yingren is described as arriving in Hansŏng in 1648, whereupon he refused 
all oce, “as with his country destroyed and his family gone, what of fame and 
prot?” He then retreated deep into the Kŭmgang mountains, to Changjŏn-li in 
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Hwiyang in Kangwŏn Province, where he was allotted farmland by the Chosŏn 
court. There he became a recluse, and “to the end of his days, he did not change 
his Chinese speech, and his feet did not leave the village. In the days set aside to 
commemorate the Imperial Dynasty, he would climb up the mountain behind 
the house, look to the north and weep.”96
This touching story su ers from being uncorroborated in almost any other 
source and also from being inherently improbable. Leaving aside Li Rusong’s 
prophecy of the Manchu rise, despite his dying in battle against Mongols in 1598, 
Li Yingren’s ight to Chosŏn is supposed to have occurred in 1648, long aer 
historically veriable migration there by Liaodongese had come to an end. In 
contrast to Li Chenglong, he would not have been recognizable by high Chosŏn 
ocials either, since he was the child of a Ming ocial with whom they had no 
previous contact. There were, of course, no contemporary records of his pres-
ence in Chosŏn. Indeed, according to Yi Kyusang, writing in the eighteenth 
century, the Chosŏn court attempted to conrm the lineage of the Nongsŏ Yi 
by importing a genealogy from the Qing empire but was unable to nd support 
for the stories found within Yi Hwŏn’s own lineage. Yi Kyusang assumed that 
this reected genealogical fraud, not on the part of the Chosŏn branch, but on 
that of Li Chengliang’s descendants in the Qing empire, who, he believed, might 
have sought to protect themselves by hiding the evidence.97
In fact, it is clear that the connection between Li Rusong and Yi Hwŏn and 
other members of the Nongsŏ Yi was one that the Chosŏn court worked very 
hard to cultivate, interfering heavily in the compilation of the genealogy itself. 
According to excerpts from the Nongsŏ Yi Genealogy found in The Traces of the 
Acts of Imperial Subjects, in 1754 Yŏngjo, aer removing Yi Hwŏn from The Reg-
ister of Submitting-Foreigners, brought him into his presence, when, coinciden-
tally, Yi Hun was also there. Bringing the two together, Yŏngjo established the 
familial relationship, but contrasted the two, describing Yi Hun as one who had 
taken the military exams long ago, and Yi Hwŏn as a peasant from a mountain 
valley (hyŏmmaeng). To address the di erence, he had Yi Hwŏn’s skills exam-
ined, and Yi Hwŏn did so well as to cause Yŏngjo to exclaim that “you, who have 
never held a bow, can shoot so well because you have received your ancestor’s 
nature.”98 Furthermore, in 1760, Yŏngjo said to Yi Hwŏn that Yi Hun’s son Yi 
Kwangsŏ’s appointment to the rank of messenger (sŏnjŏn’gwan) revealed that 
his family (including both the Kangwŏn and Kanghwa branches) had become 
military sajok. He then took this opportunity to inquire about the genealogical 
information that was available to them. When informed by Yi Hun that they 
had obtained a printed copy of their genealogy from China, Yŏngjo requested 
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that “in all further printings, please make Li Rusong your rst ancestor (sijo), as 
he did so much for our country.”99
The record in the Journal of the Royal Secretariat and The Chosŏn Veritable 
Records suggests a somewhat less smooth process, and less advanced knowledge 
on the part of the monarch, but with much the same royal interest in develop-
ing the genealogy. According to the Journal, Yŏngjo was still sorting out the 
precise genealogical relationship in 1768, when, in an exchange that resulted in 
improved employment for both Yi Hun and Yi Hwŏn, he asked Yi Hun if he was 
the descendant of Li Rusong. Yi Hun answered honestly that he was in fact the 
h-generation descendant of Li Rumei and the sixth of Li Chengliang.100 In 
1771 (aer Yi Hun’s death), Yŏngjo likewise discussed the matter with reference 
to Yi Hwŏn, conrming his status as a descendant of Li Rusong and placing 
great emphasis on the fact that his ancestor Li Chengliang had Korean origins. 
While Yŏngjo mentioned the contribution to Chosŏn of all three sons of Li 
Chengliang, he referred to them as “the three sons, including the Provincial Mil-
itary Commander (K. chedok, Ch. tidu) who contributed so much to Chosŏn,”101
clearly emphasizing Li Rusong, who had attained that rank.
More important, the Chosŏn court actively involved itself in establishing ap-
propriate rituals on behalf of Yi Hwŏn’s descendants, even as it was expanding its 
own personal role in the worship of Li Rusong. Early on in his rise to prominence, 
Yi Hwŏn was given ritual responsibilities involving an altar in honor of Li Ru-
song that was connected to the Sŏnmusa shrine and located in Noryangjin south 
of Hansŏng.102 Moreover, especially under Chŏngjo, the Chosŏn state actively 
worked to establish a shrine to Li Rusong under the direction of the Kangwŏn 
branch. During court discussions, Chŏngjo himself noted that he had heard that 
Yi Myŏn’s descendants lived in “a tiny house with a minute courtyard, barely ca-
pable of keeping out the wind and the rain, and much too small for the o ering 
of sacrice to Li Rusong.” In response, Chŏngjo had a new house purchased for 
them specically to allow them to pursue ritual activities.103 Indeed, having been 
told by Yi Hwŏn that the lineage lacked an ancestral tablet for ancestral sacrices, 
he had one produced for them, based on the erroneous assertion that Li Rusong 
received no sacrices in China.104 The king also composed his own account of Li 
Rusong’s life and had it placed in the shrine to Li Rusong, called the Chedoksa 
(Shrine of the Provincial Commander) and located in Hansŏng.105 In fact, when 
Yi Hwŏn was in P’yŏngyang, Chŏngjo specically had him o er rituals at the 
Muyŏlsa according to the practices of both the Sŏnmusa and the Chedoksa.106
Such were the advantages to descendants and the court alike of a connection 
to Li Rusong that, by 1794, a third branch came to the attention of the court. 
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The person in question, Yi Hǔijang, was described as a descendant of Li Rusong 
and a local woman surnamed Kŭm, whom he had met during his long stay in 
Chosŏn during the Imjin War. This branch had supposedly fallen into obscurity 
on Kŏje Island in Kyŏngsang Province, until, under Chŏngjo, Yi Hŭijang was 
brought to royal attention as a degreeless military student (hallyang) with “some 
limited ability to read [literary Sinitic],” but who, “on account of not having 
reached adulthood, was as yet excluded from archery.”107 Yi Hŭijang’s ancestry 
also seems to have been quite obscure. To be sure, an imperial subject village 
(Hwangjoinch’on) on Kŏje Island had already been commemorated in a poem 
by the important Ming loyalist historian Hwang Kyŏngwŏn (1709–1787), pos-
sibly based on an encounter during his exile to Kŏje in 1761.108 That village was 
later associated with the descendants of Li Rusong, but Hwang does not men-
tion that connection. It would seem most unlikely that Hwang at this point was 
aware of any such link, for, as an enthusiastic Ming loyalist, he most certainly 
would have mentioned had he known about it.109 Otherwise, in none of the o-
cial discussions of the discovery of the Kŏje branch of the Nongsŏ Yi in the 1790s 
was any evidence provided of a genuine tie between Li Rusong and the Kŏje 
branch, which had clearly not been of interest to the Chosŏn court previously, 
despite the immense prominence of their supposed ancestor.
Despite Yi Hǔijang’s inauspicious ignorance of writing and military matters, 
he passed the military examination in 1800. Chŏngjo considered this a cause for 
celebration, as the Kŏje branch, which had not appeared in any records since the 
Imjin War, had nally come into its own.110 The Chosŏn court, in other words, 
connected three families of mountain peasants and island dwellers of uncertain 
relationship with each other, to construct one unied military quasi-sajok de-
scent-group. Ultimately, the formation of this descent-group was a reassertion 
of Chosŏn’s Imjin-era connection with the Ming, a connection that also had 
enormous benets for the families themselves.
Court and Imperial Subject
The active involvement of the Chosŏn court in determining the genealogy of 
the Nongsŏ Yi had its echo in the Qing court of the same period, which also 
launched genealogical investigations to clarify the proper aliation—Manchu, 
Mongol, or Han—of members of its banner armies. Of course, as Pamela Kyle 
Crossley points out, genealogy was a blunt instrument when used to untangle 
families formed by the diverse historical and social circumstances of Northeast 
Asia. While both the Manchu and Hanjun banners under Nurhaci and Hong 
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Taiji had been ethnically diverse and determined more by their lifestyle than 
their ancestry, by the eighteenth century the Qing court under Yongzheng and 
Qianlong pursued an active policy of sorting out members on the basis of ge-
nealogy. As the eighteenth century was also a period during which the Qing 
court actively sought to reduce the size of its Hanjun banners, those Hanjun 
who wished to remain within the banners felt pressed to assert a genealogy that 
linked them securely to the Jurchens of Nurgan, or at the very least established 
their position from among the original Nikan of Liaodong who had served Nur-
haci early on in the conquest. For Manchus themselves, the Qing court reorga-
nized and sanitized their clan aliations, papering over the frequently arbitrary 
manner in which clan aliations themselves had been formed under Nurhaci.111
The Chosŏn court under Yŏngjo and Chŏngjo were faced with a similar 
lack of good genealogical evidence. Whether in the case of the Chenam Wang 
family, or the Nongsŏ Yi, the actual past history of Ming migrant descendants 
did not t well with the category of “imperial subject” that the Chosŏn court 
was in the process of constructing. Chosŏn monarchs nevertheless supported 
such weak claims as those of Yi Hwŏn in Ch’unch’ŏn, Yi Hŭijang of Kŏjedo, 
or Ho Tup’il in Pukch’ŏng, likely because the presence of Ming migrants on 
Chosŏn soil provided ideological support for their own royal authority. Per-
haps the doubt expressed by some high ocials (for instance, by Yi Sŏngnyong 
concerning Ho Tup’il, as discussed above) reected a dierence in the interests 
between civil ocialdom and the monarchy—although of course the Chosŏn 
court itself was made up of high ocials who were fully participant in the poli-
tics of ritual commemoration. The Chosŏn court as a whole pushed forward the 
process of ritual commemoration, re-creating the claimants to the status into 
descent-groups that could appropriately claim their status as imperial subjects, in 
the process of which they received the active support also of the imperial subject 
descent-groups themselves.
For example, in 1791, during the period of Chŏngjo’s rediscovery of the 
Nongsŏ Yi, an additional Ming migrant family was discovered in Kangwŏn 
Province, in this case in Anhyŏp, a county now contained within present-day 
Ch’ŏrwŏn. Two brothers, Sŏk Hanyŏng and Sŏk Hanjun, asserted that they 
were related to the Ming ocial Shi Xing (1538–1599), who in his lifetime had 
been somewhat controversial, but who, by the eighteenth century, was widely 
praised in Chosŏn for his role in directing military aid during the Imjin War. 
When asked by Chŏngjo for a more elaborate description of their origins, they 
answered that they were the descendants of Shi Kui, the younger brother of 
Shi Xing, who, along with a monk named Huizhen, had ed the Manchu by 
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entering Chosŏn through the abandoned four counties in the upper Yalu. From 
there Shi Kui and the monk passed through Mamp’o, eventually arriving at An-
hyŏp, where they had gone into hiding. Shi Kui’s descendants had remained 
there. The two brothers presented to the court The True Facts of the Choju Sŏk
(Choju Sŏk-ssi kisil), written by a local Anhyŏp man named Yi Seyŏng.
Chŏngjo responded to this by reminding the court how greatly Chosŏn was 
indebted to Shi Xing, who had nevertheless died in prison. Chŏngjo initially 
expressed some faith in the truth of this story and had the two brothers partici-
pate in the Ming loyalist rites at the Taebodan. He worried, however, that direct 
descendants of Shi Xing might be discovered who would have a superior claim 
and so hesitated to establish a separate family shrine for them as had been done 
for the descendants of Li Rusong. Instead, he ordered that the Board of War pro-
vide them with post horses to allow them to travel to P’yŏngyang to pay respects 
at the Muyŏlsa where Shi Xing was enshrined. Depending on the nature of the 
genealogical evidence, they would either have a house purchased for them where 
they could continually provide sacrices to Shi Xing, or alternately be given the 
status of a branch family, so they could practice somewhat less prominent rites, 
“for how could Shi Xing accept rites in a Central Plain that had fallen [to the 
barbarians]?”112
The problem, however, was as Chŏng Sangu (1756–?), representing the Capi-
tal Guard Oce and the Oce of Robust and Brave Guards (Changyongyŏng), 
expressed, the evidence for the connection between the two brothers and Shi 
Xing was poor or nonexistent. As he pointed out, the evidence used by the 
Chosŏn court had amounted only to three texts: “True Facts Concerning the 
Choju Sŏk Descent Group, Remnant Subjects of the Imperial Ming” (Hwang-
myŏng yuyŏ Choju Sŏk-ssi sasil), “Tale of Gentleman-in-Retirement Sŏk” (Sŏk
kŏsa chŏn), and a letter supposedly written to a child of the descent-group called 
Sŏk Tohyŏn. Yet, when ocials of those oces had sought to investigate the 
matter, they found that none of those texts could be conrmed in records either 
in Anhyŏp or in the Kangwŏn Provincial Oce, where absolutely no informa-
tion about any Sŏk descent-group could be found. Not only that, it was impos-
sible to nd any information about Yi Seyŏng, the author of the texts, whose 
cognomen (Chŏng Sangu informed the king) was the poetic “Old Man of the 
Foxglove Tree” (Odong noin). Upon asking the two Sŏk brothers themselves, it 
became evident that they been orphaned at an early age and had wandered about 
until they arrived in Yŏnch’ŏn, where they were adopted by a petty shopkeeper 
(chŏmhan) of the Sŏk family called Sŏk Ilhu—and so surely could not have had 
any good knowledge of the subject. As for the texts themselves, Chŏng Sangu 
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began his critique with the statement “your majesty has already read them?” 
seemingly implying that the books were obviously to be doubted.113
Chŏngjo, while accepting that the evidence was weak indeed, nevertheless 
called for a strong e ort to verify the connection, which if found would allow 
the family to participate in Ming loyalist rites. Very few imperial subjects had 
good evidence for their status, he conceded, mentioning as exceptions only the 
descendants of Tian Haoqian, who had a proper genealogy that conrmed their 
origins, and the descendants of Chen Fengyi, a man who had married into the 
Ming imperial family and whose family had in their possession an edict of the 
Wanli emperor, conrming their status as Ming migrants.114 Otherwise, such 
cases of actual documentation were extremely rare. Aer all, as Chŏngjo pointed 
out, the evidence for the direct descendants of Li Rusong had also always been 
initially quite weak, but had since, he thought, been established with some cer-
tainty. He thus ordered that no expense be spared in obtaining a genealogy of 
the Shi descent-group in Beijing.115
Of course, for those claiming the status, the advantages provided by assert-
ing Ming origins were of considerable material and social signicance. Thus, 
people of submitting-foreigner ancestry tended to actively assert their status 
by demanding royal writs (wanmun) conrming special tax protections, tak-
ing advantage of a court that was willing to suspend disbelief. For instance, a 
descent-group of submitting-foreigner status in Kangnŭng with the surname 
Yu has kept records of the process whereby, during the reign of Chŏngjo, they 
were able to achieve imperial subject status based on an entirely undocumented 
connection to a Ming refugee and an elite Song dynasty scholar-ocial fam-
ily.116 Other families, though better positioned socially, also made such re-
quests. For instance, during the reign of Chŏngjo, Ch’o Kak, a descendant of 
Chu Haichang residing in Myŏngch’ŏn in northern Hamgyŏng, with the un-
distinguished but civil-sajok and tax-protected rank of young student (yuhak), 
requested that his status as an imperial subject (hwangjoin) be conrmed on 
the basis of Yŏngjo’s decision in 1754. As his ancestors had participated in the 
rituals at the Taebodan, the court conrmed his status, despite what turned out 
to be a complete absence of documents in the Board of Personnel attesting to 
Chu Haichang’s arrival in Chosŏn.117
Such expansion of the category of Ming loyalist descendants continued under 
Sunjo. For instance, in 1806, two other young students similarly demanded the 
right to participate in the rites at the Taebodan. The rst was Pan Ch’unggyŏm 
of Kŭmhwa in Kangwon Province, who claimed that his ancestor, Pan Tengyun, 
had come to Chosŏn along with Mo Manren and Li Yingren, but had settled in 
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Kŭmhwa, while Li Yingren had settled in Hwiyang. Pan Ch’unggyŏm’s account 
strongly emphasized his ancestors’ Ming loyalism, stating that Pan Tengyun’s 
father had fallen in battle, his mother “had committed suicide in order to avoid 
rape,” and Pan Tengyun himself had moved to Chosŏn to avoid cutting his hair 
in the Qing fashion.118 The other, Ch’ŏn Ilsi of Myŏngch’ŏn in Hamgyŏng Prov-
ince, claimed he was a descendant of Qian Wanli, an Imjin War–era Ming o-
cer who had settled in the area of Andong in Kyŏngsang Province. According to 
Ch’ŏn, Qian Wanli, heartbroken by the events of 1636–1637, had moved north 
and settled in Myŏngch’ŏn because its rst written character, Myŏng, was the 
same as that of the Ming dynasty. Ch’ŏn, however, lacked documentation for 
this story, because most of the relevant texts had unfortunately been burned 
in a house re.119 In this he did not di er from Pan Chunggyŏm, for although 
the Chosŏn court did nd some records that established that Pan Tengyun and 
Qian Wanli were at least Chinese in origin, they could nd no evidence of the 
Ming loyalist activities asserted by Pan Chunggyŏm, or any documents tracing 
their migration. The court nevertheless approved both of their requests to par-
ticipate in the rituals at the Taebodan.120
Indeed, the cases in question were not much di erent from other examples of 
status mobility during the reigns of Yŏngjo and Chŏngjo. A feature of the pol-
itics of commemoration in Chosŏn, much strengthened during the eighteenth 
century, was the granting of ritual roles to the supposed descendants of heroes, 
martyrs, and royalty, as was the case with the T’aewŏn Sŏnu (the supposed de-
scendants of Kija) or the Kaesŏng Wang (the descendants of the Koryŏ royal 
house), and the Ch’angwŏn Kong, who during the eighteenth century were 
treated (erroneously) as the descendants of Confucius.121 Beginning in the late 
seventeenth century, especially, it became common for base-born people with-
out surnames to rise in status, claiming surnames and clan seats (not always in 
that order) and obtaining titles associated with commoners, oen followed by 
military and even civil-sajok titles.122 These benets did not, in fact, entitle them 
to take signicant oce or truly act as rivals to established sajok lineages. This 
also was not much di erent from similar demands by the descendants of lial 
sons and chaste women and of earlier monarchs (including those who claimed 
descent from Silla monarchs). As Kim Hyŏk argues, the very act of requesting 
special privileges through such royal writs revealed conversely that the claimant 
was of low or indi erent status. No true sajok, as it were, needed or wanted to 
make similar claims.123 Yet such documents did provide their recipients with 
an improved social position and tax status.124 In fact, not all families that could 
claim Ming ancestry rose via assertion of imperial subject status. People claiming 
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to be descendants of Qian Wanli in Sŏktae-dong in Tongnae, for instance, also 
rose from non-sajok origins, and in some cases base status, through low-level mil-
itary ranks to low-level civil-sajok ranks by the early nineteenth century,125 yet, 
from my review of the family’s documents, it seems they did not make any claim 
to imperial subject status.126 In the end, those who pursued status advancement 
through an appeal to foreign origins were no di erent from their fellow Chosŏn 
subjects who were similarly accumulating the outward forms of sajok status.
In the case of Ming migrants, however, in improving their social status, they 
reworked their family histories and their ritual identity to accord more closely 
with that of the state-sponsored Chunghwa Inheritance Consciousness. The 
Kŏje branch of the Nongsŏ Yi is once more informative. In 1800, when Chŏngjo 
welcomed Yi Hŭijang, of the Kŏje branch of the Nongsŏ Yi, to the ranks of 
ocialdom, he had Yi Hŭijang o er sacrice at both the Chedoksa and the 
Sŏnmusa, alongside Yi Hwŏn’s son Yi Kwangu (by then renamed Hyosŭng), 
who was the primary heir (pongsason) of the main branch of the Nongsŏ Yi 
descent-group.127 Yi Hŭijang obeyed the royal command but failed to please 
Chŏngjo. As Chŏngjo said:
I have heard that the household tally of the commander’s descendant Yi 
Hŭijang had a [Qing] era name on it. How could a scribe who carries the 
jade [of the ocial] be so pedestrian in his thoughts? He clasped that tally 
while prostrating himself at the shrine! He truly is an ignorant person. I 
do not know whether there was sweat on Hŭijang’s brow, but how could 
the commander, whose spirit ows through the land like water, have been 
pleased when he saw his descendant prostrate himself? Make one house-
hold tally and stamp it with the royal jade seal. Then call [his relative] Yi 
Hyosŭng and have him give the new household tally to Yi Hŭijang. Then 
have the petty functionaries in the Sŏnmusa take him to make another 
prostration at the shrine this very day, aer which he should make another 
prostration within the family shrine. Henceforward, may the household 
tallies of such people, and the royal instructions concerning them, all fol-
low this precedent.128
As a matter of fact, this did indeed become the precedent, as may be seen 
when Kang Pungnam, a descendant of Kang Shijue, passed the exam and was 
provided with a household tally “as is usual for such people, without the [Qing] 
era name but with the kanji alone, following established precedent.”129 Yi Hŭi-
jang himself survived the royal declaration that he was a pedestrian and ignorant 
man, as may be seen in continued court interest in his well-being as a descendant 
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of Li Rusong.130 More signicantly, however, this passage reveals the process by 
which the monarchs themselves transformed the identities of the Ming loyalist 
remnants they claimed to be discovering. Whether or not Yi Hŭijang was re-
ally the descendant of an illegitimate union between Li Rusong and a Chosŏn 
woman, the Chosŏn court believed this to be the case, actively establishing the 
Kŏje branch of the Nongsŏ Yi as subordinate to the Kangwŏn branch repre-
sented by Yi Hyosŭng, making their continued employment in military po-
sitions a matter of state concern and encouraging their involvement in Ming 
loyalist rituals. Yet, Yi Hǔijang had been entirely unaware—indeed shockingly 
ignorant, from Chŏngjo’s point of view—of the Ming loyalist and anti-Qing 
ethos of which he was supposed to be a representative. Such a ritual identity had 
to be imposed upon him and other imperial subjects through royal command.
What had changed? It is impossible to nd the origin in the emergence of 
imperial subject status in some unchanging Confucian admiration for China, as 
the term “submitting-foreigner” had been used to categorize Chinese and their 
descendants, along with Jurchens and Japanese, during an equally Confucian 
seventeenth century. It had become a source of diculty, ultimately, only during 
the eighteenth century.
One should make note rst of what had not changed. Imperial subjects were, 
like submitting-foreigners, distinguished from other Chosŏn subjects by a spe-
cial tax status. As with submitting-foreigners during the early Chosŏn, imperial 
subjects participated in rituals focused on the monarch himself. As these assem-
blies did not occur aer 1637, the development of imperial subject status could, 
in a sense, be seen as a revival. Additionally, like submitting-foreigners during 
the early Chosŏn and like Japanese defectors and Chinese deserters during the 
late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, imperial subjects were frequently 
organized into military units and given military titles.
What had changed was the narrative according to which Ming migrants were 
organized. Before the 1750s, they, like the descendants of Jurchens and Japanese, 
had been described as outsiders submitting to the edication provided by the 
Chosŏn and receiving in exchange succor and protection. Following the 1750s, 
they were still receiving the special protection and concern of the Chosŏn mon-
arch, but not because they had come to Chosŏn to receive edication. As loy-
alists, they had already been edied and civilized, and for this very reason they 
were unable to endure life under the barbarian Qing. Rather than being a sign 
of Chosŏn turning away from assimilation, the new terminology meant that 
they were being formally assimilated into the evolving rituals of the Chunghwa 
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Inheritance Consciousness. Within a Chosŏn state organized according to the 
maintenance of clear status distinctions, the Chosŏn court actively assimilated 
Ming descendants by constructing a new status category for them. By the late 
eighteenth century, the descendants of Ming migrants were in no way a cultur-
ally or linguistically distinct group, and they had already intermarried exten-
sively with the surrounding population. Just as the Qianlong emperor had to 
actively compel Manchus to use the Manchu language, to engage in mounted 
archery, and to marry other Manchus, so the courts of Yŏngjo and Chŏngjo had 
to remove inappropriate claimants to the category of “Chinese descendant.” As 
in the case of Yi Hŭijang, the court of Chŏngjo had to create a consciousness of 
Ming loyalism in the minds of those who were supposed to be the Chunghwa 
Inheritance Consciousness’s prime representatives.
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Ch a pter 6
New Narratives
U ntil the opening of Chosŏn to the imperialist world order in 1876, the descendants of Ming migrants were the largest community in Korea that continued to be classied as foreigners. Substantially Korean, and 
fully part of Chosŏn society, they were nevertheless distinguished from other 
Chosŏn subjects through the imperial subject status that had been developed 
under the courts of Yŏngjo and Chŏngjo. Beyond bureaucratic convention, the 
foreignness of these imperial subjects was produced and maintained also through 
historical narratives that transformed the oen-messy process whereby Liaodong-
ese migrants established themselves on Chosŏn soil into a glorious history of 
Ming loyalist heroism. Pan Ch’unggyŏm, as discussed in chapter 5, transformed 
his ancestor Pan Tengyun (concerning whom the Chosŏn court could nd nearly 
no records) into a Ming loyalist paragon whose father and mother both had been 
martyred for their opposition to the Qing, while Sŏk Hanyŏng presented to the 
court an actual, if rather dubious, text describing his ancestors as Ming loyalists.
Even as the Chosŏn court organized the new category of imperial subject, it 
also sponsored the compilation of biographical anthologies of Ming migrants. 

e descendants of these migrants were no mere passive onlookers but were ac-
tive participants, both creating their own biographical texts and establishing 
private Ming loyalist shrines. Both the written biographies and the physical 
shrines have come to the attention of modern researchers, and much of the mod-
ern scholarship on Ming migrants in Korean, Chinese, and English takes the 
histories provided in these biographies at face value, treating them as genuine 
family chronicles of the migrants themselves.1 It is true that these narratives 
contain a certain amount of genuine information concerning the original mi-
gration of Ming migrants during the late sixteenth and early seventeenth cen-
turies. Yet, written aer the growth of Ming loyalist ritualism and the creation 
of imperial subject status, they overwhelmingly reinterpret the lives of the orig-
inal migrants to reect the new ideological and ritual context of eighteenth-and 
nineteenth-century Chosŏn.
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In this chapter, then, I will engage in a critical discussion of these new nar-
ratives. In part, my purpose is to demonstrate the gap between the seventeenth-
century realities and their eighteenth-century reinterpretations, and by doing 
so, show the problems with treating these narratives as accurate accounts of the 
original migrants during the seventeenth century. Additionally, a close analysis 
of these texts is also informative because it reveals the social and ideological 
processes whereby imperial subject families internalized the Chosŏn court’s 
Chunghwa Inheritance Consciousness, making state ideology part of their 
own identity.




Accepting the Attire of Civilization
By the late eighteenth century, as the Chosŏn state sought to recategorize and 
redene submitting-foreigners, submitting-foreigners themselves responded by 
transforming themselves to t the court-sponsored categories, taking the his-
torical narratives imposed upon them and making them their own. 
is was 
by no means unique to them, and may be seen, following Alexander Woodside 
and Victor Lieberman,2 as part of a broader worldwide shi toward cultural and 
territorial consolidation and the vernacularizing of high culture. In Vietnam, 
during the same period, the dominant Vietnamese spread out to Cham, Khmer, 
and Tay areas, while lower-status people were brought into a “Confucian” ritual 
order associated with the governing ruling class. In Burma, a regularized sys-
tem by which boys were sent to spend time in Buddhist monasteries spread not 
only literacy but also a common language and religious morality to a far larger 
class. Certainly, dierences of social status and ethnicity were not eliminated, 
but East and Southeast Asia in general did experience an expansion of common 
cultural norms across ethnic and social boundaries within increasingly central-
ized polities.
Such vernacularization oen leaves its trace on historical narratives, as people 
rewrote their family histories to t in with their new historical identity. For 
instance, as Michael Szonyi has shown, the process by which Dan shing people 
in coastal Fujian transformed themselves into north Chinese migrants is oen 
still visible. In many cases, it is possible to nd references in both the written 
genealogical materials and the oral traditions to the actual Dan origins of the 
lineages as well as to their adopted northern Chinese origins.3 David Faure, 
studying the formation of lineages in the Pearl River delta, has explored the 
role the state played in dening and organizing lineages as well as the role the 
emerging lineages themselves played in integrating the Pearl River delta into 
the Ming and Qing states. Emerging lineages, dened in part through lijia tax 
status, subsumed local religion into ritual Neo-Confucian orthodoxy and tied 
Pearl River identities to a broader Ming and Qing Han Chinese identity, a pro-
cess that can be uncovered through careful investigation of the discontinuities 
and contradictions within family narratives.4

e late Chosŏn also experienced a general expansion of elite norms and rit-
uals to encompass lower-status people, who in turn rewrote their histories to 
reect their newfound improved status. During the late Chosŏn, for instance, 
the ideal of widow chastity spread to low-status women, a change that was also 
made visible in new narratives of chaste widows that included women from 
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lower-status groups.5 Members of what Kyung Moon Hwang calls “intermedi-
ate status groups” were also notably active in establishing narratives that raised 
their status by associating themselves with the ethos of sajok society. As Kim 
Hyŏnyŏng describes in his study of the T’amjin Ch’oe family, the T’amjin Ch’oe 
of Ch’ŏn’gok in Chŏlla were the descendants of Ch’oe Sarip, a general who died 
ghting the Qing during the Pyŏngja War of 1636–1637. Following the recogni-
tion of his sacrice by Yŏngjo in 1766, this politically and economically marginal 
lineage had produced texts through which they established that their ancestor 
had been declared a merit subject, and so they demanded to be freed of tax and 
corvée burdens. While this document, along with two others—one describing 
the suering of one ancestor during the Kimyo Literati Purge of 1519 and the 
other describing the military activities of Ch’oe Sarip—could hardly rival the 
extensive collection of records held by established sajok families, and although 
the surviving documents contained numerous obvious inaccuracies, they did 
succeed in protecting the T’amjin Ch’oe from tax and corvée, and thereby gave 
them marginal, but still valuable, sajok status.6
Similar processes were also visible for the families of sŏŏl, that is to say, the 
descendants of sajok men and base women, whose criticism of the persecution 
that they experienced was not generally intended to overthrow the system of so-
cial status but to improve their own position within it. It was also characteristic 
of numerous literary works of the period, such as e Mirror of Clerks (Yŏnjo
kwigam), that sought to reveal a depth of scholarship, devotion to Confucian val-
ues, and loyal participation in the kingdom and system of social status by village 
clerks (hyangni), who were otherwise limited in their access to bureaucratic posi-
tions.7 Collections, such as Yu Chaegŏn’s (1793–1880) ings Seen and Heard in 
Ordinary Villages (Ihyang kyŏnmun nok), praised the loyalty and intelligence not 
only of members of intermediate status groups but also of slaves who had shown 
their superior morality by loyally serving the state and their sajok masters.8

is example of intermediate status groups is signicant, as above all the de-
scendants of Ming migrants could not aspire to anything higher. Sŏng Haeŭng 
(1760–1839), for instance, in his “Biographies of the Eight Surnames” (P’alsŏng-
jŏn), noted that when they rst came to Chosŏn, the o cial families (sadaebu) 
“had not treated them as being of equal status.” Sŏng thought this to be in stark 
contrast to earlier Korean tradition, as “numerous Chinese of prominence and 
fame came to the Eastern Kingdom from the 
ree Kingdoms to the Koryŏ pe-
riod,” but only the remnant descendants of the imperial dynasty were so despised 
and mistreated that they all became “townspeople, or hid deep in the mountains 
and countryside, or wandered obscurely at the water’s edge and would net sh 
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to oer as tribute. At rst it was a token oer showing their sincerity, but over 
time it became a most burdensome tax. Also, when they organized militarily, 
they were daily insulted as Japanese soldiers. 
is was a most extreme insult.”9
Sŏng’s history was wrong, of course. As was discussed in chapter 1, Chi-
nese o cials did not oen rise into high o cial ranks in either Koryŏ or early 
Chosŏn Korea but were generally placed clearly in low-ranked clerical or tech-
nical positions. Moreover, although Sŏng viewed the category of townsperson 
as a status reduction, if anything, the evidence suggests that this was not a fall 
but rather a rise in status for most submitting-foreigners of Ming origin or oth-
erwise. Despite oen uncertain origins, and despite contracting marriages with 
base women, Ming migrants during the late Chosŏn were able to improve their 
social status signicantly by obtaining minor posts, generally in the military. 
Although they were never allowed to rival the powerful sajok families of the 
capital, some of them at least were able to rise to the ranks of intermediate status 
groups, enjoying the advantages of military posts and bringing their histories in 
closer accord with that of the o cial ideology of the Chosŏn state.

is process of transforming narratives occurred not only with those of 
Chinese ancestry but also with the descendants of the Japanese defector Kim 
Ch’ungsŏn. In the mid-seventeenth century, this family of Japanese defectors 
was considerably more prominent than most Ming migrants. Not only had they 
established a village for themselves at Urok-ri, but from early on they had sought 
out connections to prominent Chosŏn sajok o cials and had already developed 
a connection with the Neo-Confucian orthodoxy of the Chosŏn court. 
ey 
solidied their status as a family of exceptional Japanese defectors with their 
publication, in 1798, of the complete works of Kim Ch’ungsŏn, called e Col-
lected Works of Mohadang (Mohadangjip), and, in 1842, with an expanded ver-
sion.10 
ese volumes had much more material available to them than was the 
case for Ming migrants, for the simple reason that both Kim Ch’ungsŏn and his 
descendants seem to have been signicantly better educated and more active as 
writers than were most Liaodongese refugees. As a result, in contrast to many 
Ming migrant descent-groups, they did not need to justify a lack of evidence 
with a facile claim that all their vital documents had been destroyed.
As I discussed in chapter 4, writings by Kim Ch’ungsŏn, such as the “An-
nals of Deer Village,” deliberately represented Kim Ch’ungsŏn as submit-
ting to Chosŏn because he saw Chosŏn as being the true representation of 
Chunghwa civilization. To be sure, it is possible, as Fujiwara Takao argues, that 
many of the texts in the collected works were revised by the eighteenth-and 
nineteenth-century editors to t Kim Ch’ungsŏn’s story into the changed 
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ideological context. Certainly, Fujiwara argues eectively that those docu-
ments in the collection that would seem to date Kim Ch’ungsŏn’s defection 
to immediately aer his arrival in 1592, or which declare his defection to be 
motivated by a Confucian admiration for the civilization of Chosŏn, are either 
later works or had been interpolated by later editors. Kim Ch’ungsŏn’s own 
writings are unclear on this subject, but broadly it would seem that he, like 
most Japanese, defected aer 1593. Fujiwara claims also that later editors inter-
polated descriptions of Kim Ch’ungsŏn submitting to Chosŏn out of a longing 
to conform to Chosŏn’s Chunghwa order, which seems quite possible. It also 
seems possible, as I suggest in chapter 4 following work by Yang Hŭngsuk, that 
Kim Ch’ungsŏn and his sons might have themselves included such claims as 
part of their negotiations to survive in Chosŏn during the politically turbulent 
seventeenth century.
A text that clearly ts Fujiwara’s conditions for a late or interpolated text is 
the “Record of Mohadang” (Mohadang-gi). Kim Ch’ungsŏn or his descendants 
named their house “Mohadang”—literally “Longing for China Hall,” with 
“China” in this case represented by the Xia (K. Ha), the semilegendary rst dy-
nasty among the idealized 
ree Dynasties of ancient China. Xia also became 
the standard name for “Chinese” during the Song. 
is also became both Kim 
Ch’ungsŏn’s sobriquet and the title for his complete works. By using it as the 
title of the complete works, his descendants clearly represented his decision to 
defect to Chosŏn in the language of submitting to Chunghwa civilization. 
is 
is explained clearly in the “Record of Mohadang,” which deciphers the title as 
follows: “I longed for the rituals of Chungha (Ch. Zhongxia), I longed for the 
civilization of Chungha, I longed for the clothing of Chungha, and I longed for 
the popular customs of Chungha.” Yet it also leaves no doubt that Chosŏn itself 
was Chungha/Chunghwa:
Even this region of Ch’ŏnggu,11 isolated on a remote corner of the sea, 
has achieved the proper proportion of adornment and simplicity, and has 
achieved perfection in rites and teachings. It maintains the relationships 
of father and son, king and o cial, husband and wife, elder and junior and 
friend with friend. In the conduct of true goodness, righteousness, rites, 
wisdom, liality, respect for elder brothers, loyalty and honesty, one may 
say that it is little dierent from the reigns of Yao and Shun, and one may 
say that it is the fourth of the three dynasties [of Xia, Shang and Zhou]. In 
its hats, clothes and civilization, in comparison to the great Chungha it is 
a lesser Chungha.12
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It was by no means unusual for late Chosŏn sajok aristocrats to express the 
intention of establishing a state that equalled the golden age of Yao and Shun. 
Even the most fulsome atterer might avoid declaring that Chosŏn under 
Sŏnjo had reached a level of civilization that equaled the idealized 
ree Dy-
nasties of early China—that Chosŏn was a fourth dynasty, to accompany the 
Xia, the Shang, and the Zhou, and logically then must have exceeded both the 
Song and Ming in moral excellence. In the mouth of a foreigner—a defector 
to superior civilization, and a submitting-foreigner—such over-the-top praise 
became acceptable. 
e phrasing followed the established ideological content of 
submitting-foreigner status of the early Chosŏn, updated to t the Chunghwa 
Restoration Consciousness of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.
Kim Ch’ungsŏn’s descendants did not have to transform themselves alone. By 
matching their family’s identity so closely to the Chunghwa Restoration Con-
sciousness, they inevitably received the support of prominent civil sajok. For 
instance, Sŏ Chonggŭp (1688–1762), an inuential civil o cial and a disciple 
of the Noron intellectual leader Kwŏn Sangha, wrote a preface for a genealogy 
of Kim Ch’ungsŏn’s descendants, published in 1759 that was also included in 
the 1795 edition of e Collected Works of Mohadang. Sŏ began his preface by 
comparing Kim Ch’ungsŏn to the Chinese sage kings Shun and Wen, who were 
both, according to tradition, born among barbarians but were transformed by 
Chunghwa culture and traditions. It was most unfortunate, Sŏ wrote, that Kim 
Ch’ungsŏn had been born outside Chunghwa civilization and had been forced 
to dress in barbarian fashion. It would have been tragic if he had been forced to 
live that way until the end of his days. It was consequently most fortunate and 
praiseworthy that he should have escaped such a fate. Indeed, Sŏ cited an o cial 
document directed to Kim Ch’ungsŏn’s son Kim Kyŏngwŏn, which stated that 
“the o cer Kim Ch’ungsŏn showed integrity in his submission to edication 
and return to morality, and showed complete loyalty to the kingdom. He is truly 
praiseworthy. May his descendants always be rewarded with salaries and employ-
ment, and may they be granted freedom from personal taxes and corvée duties.”13

e advantages for Kim Ch’ungsŏn’s descendants in a preface of that sort 
are not hard to divine. Kim Ch’ungsŏn’s descendants, like Ming migrants, were 
military o cials based in the countryside, and the attention of Sŏ, an inuen-
tial civil o cial closely associated with the Noron faction, inevitably beneted 
them in terms of social status. Certainly, on the one hand, the decision of Sŏ to 
emphasize the privileges that they were owed in the context of the reworking 
of submitting-foreigner status during the eighteenth century must have been 
welcome. On the other hand, this preface ultimately beneted the Chosŏn state 
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as well, reinforcing the claim by sajok elites that they were the last remnants of 
Chunghwa civilization, and indeed that Japanese could choose Chosŏn, and 
not the Ming, as a place to receive edication. 
e comparison between Kim 
Ch’ungsŏn and Wen and Shun (also present in the “Record of Mohadang” at-
tributed to Kim Ch’ungsŏn), reminded the reader that not only Kim Ch’ungsŏn, 
but Chosŏn itself, had passed from their former barbarian conditions into the 
renements of civilization and Chunghwa.
A similar intervention by sajok elites into the histories of foreign descent-
groups may be noted in the case of the Liaodongese refugee Kang Shijue. Kang 
Shijue was unusual in that he had biographies written of him during the late 
seventeenth century as a result of his fortuitous connections with two promi-
nent o cials concerned with settling the border, namely Nam Kuman and Pak 
Sedang.14 Because this occurred before the formation of imperial subject status, 
many of the details of his early biographies were troublesome and in need of ed-
iting to t the new ideological context. 
is may be seen in a biography of Kang 
Shijue, the “Record of Chu Hat Hall” (Ch’ogwandang-gi), written by Hwang 
Kyŏngwŏn (1709–1787), an o cial and Ming loyalist historian known especially 
for his history of the Southern Ming.

is brief piece begins with the sentence, “
e Chu hat hall is the ancestral 
hall of the Kang descent-group of Hoeryŏng. Hoeryŏng is at the mouth of the 
Tumen River.” Having established in one short passage extreme geographic ig-
norance concerning northern Hamgyŏng Province (rst, because the region in 
which Kang Shijue lived had by then been reorganized as Musan, and second 
because Hoeryŏng is in fact considerably upstream on the Tumen River, and 
nowhere near its mouth), Hwang Kyŏngwŏn proceeded to outline briey the 
history of Kang Shijue and his family by summarizing Nam Kuman’s work. 
Following that, he launched a comparison of Kang’s fate with that of the Ming 
remnant subjects who took refuge in Southeast Asia:
As they moved from the Ming to the south, all the high Ming o cials who 
ed to Burma were killed, and of the eighty imperial princes who entered 
Siam, a minute number did not cut their hair or tattoo their bodies. Only 
Kang Shijue of Hoeryŏng, living out his life in the village, did not change 
his Chu hat. I once said that of all subordinate countries, none has been 
so close to a Chinese dynasty as our country has been with the Ming. Had 
the gentlemen of our country ed to the Ming, then the early emperors 
would surely have accepted them. So when Kang came to our country from 
Fenghuang, he did not worry that he would not be well received.
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Hwang then lamented that the Ming high o cials and princes had not come 
to Chosŏn:
Was it perhaps that the eastern sea is too wild and wide and the ships could 
not pass over the winds and the waves? Was it not because the world had 
already been transformed, and they could no longer move to our king-
dom? Of those gentlemen of the Ming who stayed among the southern 
barbarians, few indeed could preserve themselves, but Kang, residing in 
our country, lived at ease in the village for sixty years and ended his life 
there. So how can the world say that we do not receive the gentlemen of 
the Ming! Alas! Kang le Xingwen and stayed in our country, where he 
could no longer ascend the Jiuyi mountain and could no longer boat in the 
Xiang River. 
ere was no need for him to long for Xingwen, but because 
he grew up there, however old he became, he would never forget it. Even 
as he lived at ease, he never changed his Chu hat. e Classic of Poetry says: 
“He did not change his appearance.” 
is poem could be referring to Kang. 
Aer Kang died, the people of Hoeryŏng all pitied him, and so they named 
his sacricial hall aer his Chu hat. And so I have recounted this. Both of 
Kang’s two sons were good at mounted archery and had the airs of Chu 
gentlemen.15
Hwang Kyŏngwŏn, as a well-established o cial, was also, in his private ca-
pacity, one of the leading Ming loyalist historians of Yŏngjo’s era, writing not 
only a history of the Southern Ming, but also a collection, the “Biographies of 
Secondary Subjects” (Myŏng paesin chŏn), that praised those Chosŏn subjects 
such as Hong Ikhan who had shown exemplary loyalty to the Ming. 
e concept 
of paesin, “subjects of subjects,” connected Chosŏn o cials—who were subjects 
of the Chosŏn king who was in turn a subject of the Ming emperor—within 
the broader Ming world order, and mirrored the ritual category of descendants 
of the loyal and good who had, along with the descendants of imperial subjects, 
been encouraged to participate in Ming loyalist rites at the Taebodan.
Hwang’s ideological orientation to the Chunghwa Inheritance Conscious-
ness caused him to add historical inaccuracy to his geographic illiteracy in his 
account of Kang Shijue. When men like Kang Shijue were rst crossing the 
boundary between Liaodong and Chosŏn, they were accused not of refusing to 
change their Chinese-style clothes but of slyly insisting on changing them the 
better to conceal their identities. And Kang Shijue himself was, as surely Hwang 
Kyŏngwŏn must have known, hardly a good example of how well Chosŏn treated 
all refugees from the Ming. During Hwang’s own lifetime, the descendants of 
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these refugees were seeing their statuses raised by a monarch, Yŏngjo, who spe-
cically lamented the poor treatment they had received in the past. Kang’s Chu 
hat was not noted by Nam Kuman or Pak Sedang or anybody else who encoun-
tered him while he was still alive, and so it seems likely that Hwang invented it 
himself. 
is impression is strengthened by the fact that Hwang mentioned the 
Ming hats of other Ming migrants as well. For instance, in a poem concerning 
the Ming remnant subjects of Tŏkch’on-ri in Kŏje, Hwang began by lament-
ing that “aer the Manchu conquered the divine capital [of Beijing], the whole 
realm wears hair in a barbarian fashion.” Further down, he praised the Ming 
remnant community for concealing themselves in Chosŏn to avoid “changing 
their clothing and hats.”16

e historical inaccuracy of Hwang’s account is less signicant than the ideo-
logical meaning that he imposed upon the imperial subjects. In a similar manner 
to Sŏ Chonggŭp, who had Kim Ch’ungsŏn leave Japan for Chosŏn to accept a 
proper Confucian clothing style, Hwang could describe Kang Shijue and the 
Tŏkch’on-ri villagers as proof of Chosŏn’s unique role as defender and last rem-
nant of Chunghwa culture. As Hwang argued, although a proper Confucian 
clothing style had vanished from all other parts of the world, it continued to sur-
vive in Chosŏn, as proved by Kang Shijue’s retreat there with his Chu hat intact.
Anthologies, O cial and Uno cial
Important though Hwang’s private Ming loyalist historical work was, during 
the reign of Chŏngjo it was subsumed into state-sponsored Ming loyalist his-
toriography. 
rough the Kyujanggak Library established by Chŏngjo near the 
Ch’angdŏk-kung Palace, scholars, many of sŏŏl background, were encouraged by 
Chŏngjo to gather Qing books and produce works of their own that would rival 
the scholarship of the lower Yangzi River region and the Four Treasuries project 
of the Qianlong court.17 While one eect of a wider participation in Qing schol-
arship was a decline in hostility toward the Qing,18 Kyujanggak-based scholars 
were still taking as their starting point the Qing’s illegitimacy and Chosŏn’s ex-
clusive identity as inheritor of Chunghwa civilization. One representative Kyu-
janggak scholar, Sŏng Haeŭng, produced a considerable body of work emphasiz-
ing Chosŏn’s position as heir of the Chunghwa tradition and calling for better 
defenses in Chosŏn’s northern border in preparation for the turmoil of the last 
gasps of the Qing.19 Under the overall direction of Chŏngjo, he participated in 
the draing of e Collected Texts on Honoring the Zhou (Chonju hwip’yŏn), a 
work that explicitly denies the legitimacy of the Qing. Nevertheless, even such 
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openly anti-Qing scholarship showed the evidence of Qianlong-era Qing histo-
riography, including those works, such as e Record of the Dynastic Foundation
(Kaiguo fanglue),20 that attempted to formalize a Manchu heritage that was both 
venerable and free of Chinese inuence.21 Sŏng Haeŭng compiled a work related 
to e Collected Texts on Honoring the Zhou, his Biographies of the Remnant 
Subjects of Imperial Ming (Hwangmyŏng yumin chŏn), partly through reference 
to Qianlong-era texts. As his sources, he listed some simply as authored by “many 
o cials of the Qianlong era,” also referring to such Ming loyalist works as those 
by Huang Zongxi (1610–1694), which presumably had been obtained through 
the Beijing book trade and interaction with Qing o cials by Chosŏn legations.22
In fact, the uncompromising Ming loyalism of the Chosŏn court was not 
necessarily at odds with Qianlong histories of the Ming-Qing transition, which, 
as described by Lynn Struve, aimed generally to “sanitize and dignify the Ming 
versus Qing armed conict,” “defend monarchical control and proper insti-
tutional balance,” and “encourage loyalty unto death for the ruling dynasty,” 
and which consequently tended to demonize those Chinese o cials who 
had abandoned the Ming to serve the Qing.23 Sŏng Haeŭng, in fact, read the 
Qianlong-sponsored Biographies of Twice Serving Ministers (Erchen zhuan) and 
wrote his impression of it, in which he agreed substantially with the Qianlong 
emperor that their disloyalty had been unforgivable. He diered from the Qian-
long emperor in attacking them for serving under “dogs and sheep” like the 
Manchus.24 More positively, Sŏng’s Biographies of Remnant Subjects of the Im-
perial Ming was an anthology of biographies praising those who had refused, in 
some manner, to “serve two surnames” or to “shave their heads.” Whether their 
refusal took the form of courting death, of retreating to the countryside, or of 
eeing to other countries including Chosŏn, he treated them as worthy of admi-
ration.25 Ultimately, although Sŏng was explicitly anti-Qing, he shared much of 
his ideological tendencies with the Qing court under Qianlong.
Such Ming loyalist publications became fertile ground for the creation of an-
thologies of Ming migrant biographies, a process that was also connected with 
the push, during the reign of Chŏngjo, to identify and classify subjects with 
Ming migrant lineages. For instance, the last few pages of e Collected Texts 
on Honoring the Zhou contain a series of biographies of Ming loyalist migrants 
at the end of a long section of biographies of loyal Chosŏn subjects that were 
derived from Hwang’s Biographies of Ming Secondary Subjects. Almost identi-
cal biographies of Ming loyalist refugees in Chosŏn were anthologized by Sŏng 
Haeŭng in his Biographies of Remnant Subjects of the Imperial Ming, and by an-
other Kyujanggak scholar, Yi Tŏngmu (1741–1793), in a collection of biographies 
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called Noble Purpose (Noeroe nangnak). Both Sŏng’s and Yi’s works anthologized 
biographies of Ming loyalist refugees in Chosŏn together with biographies of 
Ming loyalists in China and Southeast Asia. 
e biographies in Collected Texts 
on Honoring the Zhou also closely resemble a collection of sources, possibly gath-
ered as preparatory text material for e Collected Texts, called e Sources for the 
Acts of Imperial Subjects (Hwangjoin sajŏk).26
Anthologies, as 
omas A. Wilson argues, create lineages and hierarchies, 
clarifying the boundaries of the canonical.27 
e migrants whose stories were 
recounted in these biographies were by then a familiar group, beginning with 
Kang Shijue (whose biographical tradition was the oldest) and including the 
supposed descendants of Li Rusong, comprising the Ming migrant community 
in the Chinese Village in Ŏŭi-dong, as well as other more minor gures such 
as Ma Shunshang, Wen Keshang, and so forth. 
is brought the diverse group 
of Ming migrants together into one coherent category, giving a historical shape 
to what had become a key ritual category within the Ming loyalist rites at the 
Taebodan. e Collected Texts of Honoring the Zhou, by combining biographies 
of imperial subjects with those of Chosŏn loyal subjects, put into textual form 
the pairing of imperial subjects and the descendants of Chosŏn loyal subjects 
that was well established in Ming loyalist rites. Moreover, just as imperial sub-
jects were subordinate to Chosŏn loyal subjects in Ming loyalist rites, so too, in 
e Collected Texts of Honoring the Zhou, the biographies of imperial subjects 
comprise a small number of pages at the end of far longer and more extensive 
biographies of Chosŏn loyal subjects. By contrast, Sŏng Haeŭng’s Biographies of 
Remnant Subjects of the Imperial Ming and Yi Tŏngmu’s Noble Purpose linked 
Chosŏn’s imperial subject descent-groups to the broader Ming loyalist world, 
beneting in this from the research into Ming history that improved intellectual 
exchange with Qing scholars had made possible. 
ese Ming loyalist connec-
tions, however, were also anachronistic, as Chosŏn’s plans for restoring the Ming 
during the seventeenth century had been pursued with nearly no actual cooper-
ation with pro-Ming forces elsewhere. 
is fantasy is meaningful, however, as it 
reveals that even Kyujanggak scholars like Yi Tŏngmu and Sŏng Haeŭng could 
at once imagine Ming loyalist migrants in Chosŏn as part of an inward-looking, 
Chosŏn-centric tradition when they participated in the court-sponsored Col-
lected Texts and position themselves as part of a broader Ming loyalist world 
when they wrote privately.
Following Chŏngjo’s death in 1800, anthologies of Ming migrant loyalists 
were produced outside the purview of the court. Two notable examples are e
Record of Remnant Subjects of the Imperial Dynasty,28 written by Wang Tŏkku 
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(1788–1863), a Taebodan guard (sujikkwan) and member of the Chenam Wang 
lineage of Ming migrant descendants,29 and, in 1830, the eclectic but clearly 
sourced Unocial History of a Lesser Chunghwa, by O Kyŏngwŏn (1764–?), 
which also included biographies of Ming migrants and their descendants, di-
vided into three sections: “
ose Who Stayed in Chosŏn aer the War against 
the Japanese,” “
ose Who Had Fled 
eir Land to Come East,” and “
ose 
Imperial Palace Women Who Came East.” Many of O Kyŏngwŏn’s biographies 
followed the account in e Collected Texts on Honoring the Zhou (which is 
cited frequently), as also did Wang Tŏkku’s Record of the Remnant Subjects of 
the Imperial Dynasty. At the same time, O Kyŏngwŏn and Wang Tŏkku both 
brought in a great deal of new information from new sources, and new biogra-
phies of otherwise unanthologized migrants, including the Imjin-era refugee 
Du Shizhong and the seventeenth-century refugee and supposed descendant of 
Shi Xing, Shi Jizu.

ese new, private accounts represented signicant reconsiderations of the 
established court tradition. Indeed, Wang Tŏkku, in his preface, described the 
composition of this new history as a matter of great urgency. He wrote that, “in 
the nal years of the Chongzhen reign, remnant bastards of the Jurchen took the 
capital and controlled China, dressing the Central Continent on the le [in bar-
barian fashion].” As a consequence, “countless numbers of high o cials sailed 
east across the sea [to Chosŏn], while an also incalculable number were taken 
captive, refused to humble themselves and were taken as prisoners to Mukden.” 
As for his own ancestor Wang Fenggang, Wang Tŏkku noted how he and the 
other Ming remnant subjects in Mukden had so impressed the future King Hy-
ojong (in Wang’s account referred to as Sŏnmun-wang) during his captivity in 
Mukden, that when he was allowed to return to Chosŏn he brought Wang Feng-
gang and the other eight Ming loyalist Chinese back with him. In Hansŏng, Hy-
ojong housed the nine outside the palace gate, where “not a day went by that they 
did not discuss the matter of revenge [against the Qing].” Although the death of 
the king brought this great plan to an end, the glorious intention of his ancestors 
and of the other Chinese of Ŏŭi-dong was still worth preserving for later ages. 
Because Wang Tŏkku believed the memory of that spirit was in danger of being 
lost to the changing eras, he “gathered together the traditions of all the families, 
cautiously organizing them together into a book.”30
Of course, the fear he expressed of losing the grand purpose of his ancestors 
would seem to be largely without foundation, since biographies of his ancestors 
and the ancestors of the other Ŏŭi-dong imperial subject families had already 
been produced under court auspices for circulation by prominent scholars. 
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Within these o cial biographies, the ancestors of Wang Tŏkku and his fellow 
imperial subjects had already been clearly described as vigorous opponents of 
the Qing, who had even engaged in eective anti-Qing plotting. 
is is most 
unlikely, as Wang Fenggang and the others had in fact been allowed to move 
to Hansŏng by the express permission of the Qing. Nevertheless, e Collected 
Texts on Honoring the Zhou described Wang Fenggang, also known as Yiwen, 
as from Jinan in Shandong, and as the grandson of a prominent Ming o cial. 
Aer Wang Fenggang had been taken as a prisoner to Mukden, he had encoun-
tered the Sohyŏn crown prince and had been allowed, along with migrants sur-
named Feng, Yang, Zheng, Liu, Pei, and one other, to return with the crown 
prince to Chosŏn aer Beijing fell to the Qing. 
ere he had settled outside 
the palace gates, refusing the oer of a bureaucratic position by Hyojong be-
cause he saw himself as a sinner who had betrayed both emperor and family; he 
wept whenever he heard of matters related to the Ming. Wang Fenggang’s wife 
became a lady-in-waiting to Queen Insŏn (1618–1674). Aer Wang Fenggang’s 
death, those of his descendants who could were encouraged to catch sh and 
present them to the court. e Collected Texts described how they were later 
placed within the Military Training Agency and freed from the responsibility 
of oering sh to the court. Finally, e Collected Texts recounted that all but 
one of the Nine Righteous O cials had many children, becoming an especially 
productive group among the townspeople of the capital aer the establishment 
of the Taebodan by Sukchong.
Wang Tŏkku’s biography of his ancestor, who he called Wang Yiwen, dif-
fers little in the basic outline from that in e Collected Texts on Honoring the 
Zhou but does develop a number of additional interpretations. Some of Wang 
Tŏkku’s elaborations seem plausible, including, for instance, his description 
of Wang Yiwen being captured by Kong Youde’s (?–1652) pirate regime in the 
Gulf of Bohai before being taken to Mukden, in contrast to e Collected Texts, 
which simply had him appear in Mukden with little explanation. However, 
Wang Tŏkku granted his ancestor greater moral independent agency. It was for 
this account that Wang Tŏkku rst coined the name “Nine Righteous O -
cials” (kuŭisa) for those nine Ming loyalists who were redeemed from the Qing 
by Hyojong. 
is new title, as Kimura Takao points out, placed Wang Feng-
gang and others as the driving force of conict with the Qing, instead of simple 
beneciaries of royal grace.31 Wang Tŏkku also largely ignored the history of 
eighteenth-century developments in imperial subject status (although these had 
been of great importance in the o cial court tradition), and, at the same time, 
anachronistically imagined those eighteenth-century developments were fully in 
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place already in the 1640s. For instance, the entire text uses southern Ming era-
names, including Hongguang and Yongli, thereby revealing primarily that Wang 
Tŏkku had beneted from Chosŏn research into the southern Ming during the 
eighteenth century, since of course his ancestor, imprisoned in Mukden or taking 
refuge in Chosŏn at this time, could have been, at best, only dimly aware of the 
dynastic changes occurring in the southern Ming. 
roughout the text, Wang 
Tŏkku referred to the community where Wang Yiwen and other Ming refugees 
resided in Hansŏng as “the imperial subject village,” a term that, in contrast to 
“the Ming village” and the “Chinese village,” was not used to any great extent 
before Chŏngjo. In other cases, he substantially altered the meaning of specic 
events. For instance, Wang Tŏkku discussed Wang Fenggang’s shing, not as an 
aspect of submitting-foreigner status, but as an example of mistreatment under 
Hyŏnjong who, worried about the growing number of Ming remnants residing 
in Hansŏng, had ordered Wang Fenggang placed in an uncompensated position 
within the Military Training Agency. Receiving no salary, he and his sons were 
to survive by shing in the Han River. Wang Tŏkku’s description of the shing, 
however, makes it seem to be neither a tax obligation nor a tool for survival, but 
rather an aesthetic expression of his Ming loyalism. In Wang Tŏkku’s account, 
whenever Wang Fenggang came upon a tree by a picturesque river bank, “he 
would sit all day, from owery morning until moonlit evening, silently weeping, 
attracting the pity of all travelling along the Han River.”32
Beyond such embellishments, perhaps the greatest innovation of Wang Tŏk-
ku’s history was his anachronistic re-creation of the community of imperial 
subjects in the seventeenth century, although they had been formed through 
the activity of Yŏngjo and Chŏngjo during the eighteenth century. 
us, Wang 
Tŏkku added to his biography accounts of his ancestor’s interaction with other 
Ming migrants, including such historically well-attested cases as the Ming pal-
ace women and Tian Haoqian, as well as those who had no recorded connections 
to Hansŏng, namely the descendants of Ma Gui previously encountered by Kim 
Yuk. And it is here that we can clearly see that Wang was not so much preserv-
ing family records as responding creatively to the evolving category of imperial 
subject status at that time.
As was discussed in chapter 4, the only evidence for Ma Shunshang’s migra-
tion to Chosŏn and settlement in Chŏlla Province during the rst half of the 
seventeenth century was a brief note by Kim Yuk (1580–1658) in Brush Notes of 
Master Chamgok.33 
is, along with a story concerning Wen Keshang found in 
the Gazetteer of the Interpreters’ Bureau was enough to allow Chŏngjo to call for 
a general search for the descendants of both men.34 What a monarch searches for 
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he oen nds, and Chŏngjo did turn up claimants to the status, who neverthe-
less had a family tradition that was at odds with the matter-of-fact story of the 
arrival of Ma Shunshang, as described by Kim Yuk. 
e Sanggok Ma discovered 
by Chŏngjo’s court traced their ancestry to a man named Ma Pengzhi (K. Ma 
Pongjik). 
e story of Ma Pengzhi, as recounted by Wang Tŏkku, was certainly 
much more exciting than that of Ma Shunshang. It had Ma Pengzhi leaving 
Chosŏn by boat in 1636 to defend the Ming against Qing aggression, then mov-
ing rst to Huian and then Nanjing to defend the Ming until both fell to the 
Qing, at which point he returned to Chosŏn, staying in T’aean in Ch’ungch’ŏng 
Province. Aer this he moved to Sŏksŏng, where the local sajok purchased a 
farm and house for him, and where he made his living from shing. Other-
wise, he would occasionally climb up onto a high hill, look west, and weep while 
thinking of the Ming. He also made friendships with the Ming remnant subjects 
who settled in Hansŏng, only later to wander o in the mountains of Kangwŏn 
Province, never to be seen again.35 
is new story, although containing clear 
evidence of the submitting-foreigner origins of the Sanggok Ma descent-group 
(notably in the description of his shing), otherwise ts far better into the image 
of the Ming loyalist that Wang Tŏkku himself was cultivating than does the 
story of Ma Shunshang. It was also more interesting, and so Wang Tŏkku made 
use of it, ignoring in its entirety Kim Yuk’s more reliable account.
Similarly, new stories concerning Wen Keshang also came to Wang’s atten-
tion. 
e biographies found in e Biographies of Remnant Subjects of the Impe-
rial Ming and Collected Texts on Honoring the Zhou had followed the original 
account found in e Record of the Interpreters’ Bureau closely by describing Wen 
as traveling from the Yangzi River in 1635 to Ŭryu in Hwanghae Province.36
By contrast, Wang Tŏkku’s Record of Remnant Subjects of the Imperial Dynasty
either expanded upon this description or found an entirely new account, and 
claimed that Wen had been a retiring scholar forced by the advance of the Man-
chu (presumably in 1644–1645) to set out from Shamen for Chosŏn, where he 
engaged in regular conversation with another Ming migrant named Zheng 
Xianjia.37 
e connection between Wen and Zheng is indeed historical, as both 
were employed as translators at the same time during the reign of Sukchong. 
e 
date for Wen’s arrival, however, would seem to be a later invention.
Such elaborations seemingly proved irresistible for later scholars. Writing 
two decades later, and consulting Wang Tŏkku’s work, O Kyŏngwŏn, instead of 
choosing between Ma Shunshang and Ma Pengzhi, took both. Whereas Wang 
Tŏkku had Ma Pengzhi leaving Chosŏn for Nanjing without rst telling us that 
he had arrived in Chosŏn, O Kyŏngwŏn overcame this contradiction by making 
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Ma Pengzhi the son of Ma Shunshang, thus including both Ma Shunshang’s 
original arrival in Chosŏn from the camp of Mao Wenlong and the exciting 
and improbable story of Ma Pengzhi’s later return to the struggle in Nanjing.38
Moreover, O described Ma Pengzhi as the author of a text called, like the 
book by Wang Tŏkku, Record of Remnant Subjects of the Imperial Dynasty. O 
sourced this account to the Sanggok Ma Genealogy (Ma-ssi kasŭng). is text 
seems to have been immensely useful to O, allowing him to give historical re-
ality to a number of gures whose self-styled descendants had claimed imperial 
subject status during the reign of Chŏngjo, notably Shi Jizu and Pan Tengyun, as 
well as such mysterious gures as Liu the Fortune Teller and Chinese Wang. In 
fact, O attributed the “Travels to the East of the Chao and Shi Lineages” (Cho-ssi 
Sŏk-ssi Tongnae ki) to Ma Pengzhi, although this text seems to include the same 
information that was described in court discussions during the reign of Chŏngjo 
as having been authored by Yi Seyŏng. As discussed in chapter 5, Yi Seyŏng was a 
mysterious and, to the Chosŏn court, unreliable Chosŏn wanderer adopted into 
the Sŏk family. Much like the story told by Yi Seyŏng according to court reports 
during the reign of Chŏngjo, the story provided by O also has Shi Jizu eeing 
to Chosŏn with a Daoist, in this case referred to as Grand Preceptor Daoguang. 
However, perhaps in a similar manner to Wang Tŏkku’s rewriting of the history 
of Wen Keshang, either O or the author of the original text—whether Yi Seyŏng 
or Ma Pengzhi—took the phrase “during the disturbances of the kapsin year” 
literally, to mean not just the Ming-Qing transition in general but 1644 itself. 
Indeed, the text, improbably, has the two eeing from the Qing invasion of Bei-
jing in 1644 to Liyin Hermitage in Liaodong. According to the account, only six 
years later they then escaped to Kanggye in P’yŏngan Province, where Shi Jizu 
encountered Li Rusong’s descendants and formed a close connection with Ma 
Pengzhi’s family as well. Eventually, Shi Jizu moved to Anhyŏp, having married 
a woman from there.39
ese narratives clearly developed out of the mainstream historiographic 
tradition—indeed, were frequently linked with the very myth of origin for 
Chosŏn Korea: e story of Kija, the great legendary migrant to Chosŏn of the 
Shang-Zhou transition. Perhaps the earliest account that linked Ming migrants 
to the story of Kija was in discussions of the geomancer and Ming deserter Du 
Shizhong. When Du was still alive and active in Chosŏn, a prominent Sŏin 
minister Yi Sibal (1569–1626) wrote a poem in his honor, in which he compared 
Du’s decision to remain in Chosŏn to Confucius’s expressed desire to live among 
the Nine Yi (o	en interpreted as Chosŏn); Yi ended the poem by suggesting 
that, since the heritage of Kija’s enfeoment is good, there was no reason to 
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leave Chosŏn.40 Although Yi died before the fall of the Ming, he described Ming 
migrants in terms that were echoed the nineteenth-century private histories. 
For instance, O, in the postscript to his “Record of Remnant Subjects of the Im-
perial Dynasty” in e Unocial History of a Lesser Chunghwa, suggested that 
Chosŏn’s exclusive preservation of Confucian clothing and culture, as well as the 
vestiges of Kija’s sage rule, made it worthy of the residence of Ming migrants.41
Additionally, Hwang Kich’ŏn, in his postscript to e Record of Remnant Sub-
jects of the Imperial Dynasty, argued that the preservation of Yin culture in 
Chosŏn by Yin migrants following Kija a	er Yin’s fall to the Zhou was compa-
rable to the preservation of Ming culture in Chosŏn by Ming migrants;42 if any-
thing, it was a far more desperate aair, as Chinese civilization was maintained 
following the rise of the Zhou but was obliterated a	er the rise of the Qing.43
Yet, although these private histories were in many ways in accord with or-
thodox historiography, they were too weakly sourced and unbelievable to be 
credible even during the Chosŏn period. ey certainly did not measure up to 
the evidentiary standards even of the biographies within e Collected Texts on 
Honoring the Zhou. Indeed, Sŏng Haeŭng, one of the key scholars involved in 
compiling those biographies, wrote a response, the “Biographies of the Eight 
Surnames,” to correct what he saw as the inaccuracies of Wang Tŏkku’s ac-
count.44 Presumably writing a	er his retirement from the Kyujanggak in 1815,45
he took a much more critical view of material concerning Ming migrants than 
he had when he was compiling the biographies for e Collected Texts. Although 
he did not appear to doubt the importance of the Ming migrants as a whole, he 
found that the evidence for many Ming migrants’ family histories le	 a great 
deal to be desired. His primary criticism was directed toward Wang Tŏkku’s 
scholarship. As Sŏng said of Wang: “[Wang Tŏkku’s] biographies of the eight 
surnames are called the Record of the Remnant Subjects of the Imperial Ming. 
However, there is much there that does not agree with my own account. All 
of that material lacks reference to proper sources, so that I cannot tell what 
is correct and what is incorrect. I record these matters briey, to wait for the 
investigation of another day.”46
Sŏng especially identied problems in Wang’s account of Wen Keshang. Sŏng 
noted that Wang had Wen Keshang travel directly from the Yangzi River to 
Chosŏn following 1644, which contradicted the ocial record that had him 
arriving in 1635. Moreover, Sŏng suggested that it was far more likely that Wen 
Keshang had, like many Ming migrants, passed into Chosŏn via Mao Wenlong’s 
satrapy on Ka Island.47 Sŏng raised similar doubts about the story of Ma Peng-
zhi as related by Wang Tŏkku, pointing out the contradiction in having two 
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dierent ancestors for the same lineage and also the unreliability of Ma Peng-
zhi’s story, involving as it did Pengzhi traveling from the Yangzi to Chosŏn aer 
the fall of Nanjing; travel by land was clearly to be ruled out, and even travel by 
sea rather unlikely. As he wrote: “
e two records do not agree, and my opin-
ion is that, aer the fall of Nanjing, there would have been no road on which 
Shunshang could travel to Chosŏn; or perhaps we are to suppose that he made 
the trip by sea!”48
In O Kyŏngwŏn’s and Wang Tŏkku’s accounts, both Wen Keshang and Ma 
Pengzhi are described as eeing to Chosŏn aer the fall of Beijing. 
ey also 
more clearly establish the migrants as anti-Qing, pro-Ming heroes, rather than 
the more likely reality of escape from the chaos of Mao Wenlong’s satrapy. For 
Wang Tŏkku, only recently established as a Taebodan guard, this emphasis was 
a response to the state’s reclassication of him and his lineage as Ming loyalists. 
Despite Sŏng’s involvement in, and support for, this very process of classica-
tion, the mythmaking in Wang Tŏkku’s account went beyond what Sŏng, as a 
careful scholar, could accept.
Although Sŏng began his discussion critiquing Wang Tŏkku’s scholarship in 
particular, by the end of his critique he had raised enough doubts to undermine 
much of his own earlier scholarship. In the conclusion he noted that frequently 
the Ming migrant descent-groups were completely without any evidence at all 
for their high status. “
e Liaodongese [refugees] had frequently lost their doc-
uments, and their descendants have generally been stupid, and so cannot clarify 
their descent lines precisely, on account of which people accuse them of having 
transformed themselves and falsied their identities.”49 
is statement he fol-
lowed with a long list of Ming migrant descent-groups—the Sŏk of Anhyŏp, 
the Tu of Turŭng, the Wang of Kanggye, and the Song of Kangnŭng, with the 
regular refrain that “they say that they are the descendants” of some famous Chi-
nese o cial—claims for which “truth and falsehood cannot be distinguished 
clearly.” 
e extent of the certain knowledge of Ming migrants, Sŏng argued, 
was that “many celestial soldiers were le behind in our territory and did not 
return. Following this, their descendants have become numerous.”50
An example of his far more extensive critique may be found in his discussion 
of Chen Fengyi, a migrant who had been considered especially well attested by 
Chŏngjo on account of his possession of an imperial edict conrming Chen’s 
status as an imperial in-law.51 Indeed, a brief biography of Chen Fengyi was in-
cluded in the o cial historiographic tradition of e Collected Texts on Honoring 
the Zhou, in which Sŏng had been involved. 
is biography had been straightfor-
ward and had hinted at no doubts, telling the reader not much more than that 
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Cheng Fengyi had married a woman of the imperial family and had a document 
to attest to this. However, in his “Biographies of the Eight Surnames,” Sŏng took 
a much more critical line, noting that while a fair number of migrants did indeed 
have the story of their arrival in part referred to in contemporary private histo-
ries (Ma Shunshang, of course, was an example, having had his arrival recorded 
by Kim Yuk), this was distinctly not true of Chen Fengyi. As Sŏng pointed out, 
there were no sources attesting to the supposed arrival of Cheng Fengyi during 
the Imjin War, and later histories that discussed this matter claimed that an 
ancestor of the Chin family had found the imperial edict, which provided their 
only evidence of a connection to Chen Fengyi and his imperial bride, in a well. 
Sŏng considered it ridiculous that anybody would hide an imperial edict in a 
well and believed that the lack of documentation otherwise made the status of 
the Chin family very doubtful.
Chŏngjo’s attempts to discover Ming migrant lineages and his support for 
the anthologizing of their biographies resulted, among other things, in a greatly 
expanded list of Ming migrant lineages and biographies. On the one hand, the 
labors of scholars working under his direction in the Kyujanggak, such as Sŏng 
Haeŭng and Yi Tŏngmu, allowed for the collection and rewriting of already ex-
tant documents. On the other hand, just as Yŏngjo’s and Chŏngjo’s push to nd 
Ming migrant lineages resulted in many lineages in isolated regions requesting 
court approval for their claim of Ming migrant descent, so, too, court support 
for the establishment of Ming migrant biographical anthologies had, as one re-
sult, the proliferation of accounts, some of them highly improbable, produced 
by members of imperial subject descent-groups themselves. 
ese biographies 
were part of the classifying activity of the state, but imperial subjects actively 
supported this classication in order to secure their new status.
Private Shrines and New Lineages
Until very recently, the Chojongam continued to be the center of ritual Ming 
loyalist activity, with the families of the Nine Righteous O cials maintaining 
Ming loyalist rituals on behalf of the Ming, even aer they had ceased to be 
practiced in the Taebodan. Indeed, especially under South Korea’s military 
rulers (1961–1987), one member of the P’ung family of Ming migrants, P’ung 
Yŏngsŏp, compiled a collection of sources (generally photocopied texts from the 
Kyujanggak),52 and through this managed to attract considerable attention from 
scholars working in Chinese and Korean.53 He even succeeding in attracting 
the attention of a scholar working in English during the 1990s.54 As a result, the 
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descendants of the descent-groups associated with the Chojongam have become 
established in the scholarship as typical examples of Ming loyalists. 
ey are 
not alone, however, and other imperial subject descent-groups during the nine-
teenth century also asserted a corporate Ming loyalist identity to which they 
gave concrete form through the establishment of shrines to the Ming, or more 
mundanely, the writing of genealogies and collection of documents asserting the 
status of their ancestor as imperial subject.
Although in some literature the shrines established at Chojongam are treated 
as representative of Ming loyalism, in fact, the location was of marginal signi-
cance until the nineteenth century. 
e signicance of the location can be traced 
to the seventeenth century, when three self-rusticated scholars, Hŏ Kyŏk (1607–
1691), Yi Chedu (1626–1687), and Paek Haemyŏng (?–?), noted that the stream 
in the region owed east rather than west, in accord with the famous phrase 
in Xunzi that compared human morality to the fact that all streams must ow 
to the east—a generalization that is true for northern China but not for most 
of Korea.55 Consequently, they carved Confucian phrases into the rocks and 
maintained uno cial Ming loyalist rituals at the location.56 For this they re-
ceived the encouragement of Song Siyŏl,57 whose disciples nevertheless directed 
their interests toward the Mandongmyo—whose very name refers to the phrase 
“All streams ow east” (Ch. wanzhi bidong, K. manjŏl p’ ildong), which deter-
mined the selection of Chojongam’s location. 
e three scholars also received 
some public notice from Chosŏn monarchs during the late seventeenth and early 
eighteenth centuries,58 and a discussion of Chojongam was also included in the 
court-sponsored Collected Texts on Honoring the Zhou.59 Such public praise gave 
the location some status, although it did not grant it anything approaching the 
status of the court-sponsored Taebodan or the Noron-sponsored Mandongmyo. 
Still, by the late eighteenth century, it had already become a site for private com-
memoration of the Ming loyalist cause.60
As Angela Zito, following Catherine Bell, points out, the act of participating 
in rituals should not be seen as separate from the process of theorizing or debat-
ing rituals; ritual practitioners themselves are frequently active theorists of ritual, 
imposing rival meanings and distinctions on the very activities in which they are 
participating.61 Such rival theorizations may also be discovered among imperial 
subject descent-groups, who, as some of the key beneciaries of the new narra-
tives surrounding Chunghwa Inheritance Consciousness, sought to take control 
of Ming loyalist ritual practices and theorizations in order to raise their status 
beyond what they had gained during the late eighteenth century. 
us, in 1831, 
two former Taebodan guards Wang Tŏkku (author of e Records of Remnant 
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Subjects of the Imperial Ming) and his brother Tŏgil, for reasons not completely 
clear, le the capital for Chojongam in Kap’yŏng, Kyŏnggi Province.62 At this 
site, they established two shrines, one to the Nine Righteous O cials called the 
Kuŭi haengsa (Temporary Shrine to the Nine Righteous O cials), and one to 
the Ming Hongwu emperor, called the Taet’ong haengmyo (Temporary Shrine 
to the Ming Calendar). Within these shrines, instead of the Chongzhen era-
names employed by the Chosŏn court and sajok aristocracy, they used the Yongli 
era-name. By the late nineteenth century, their ritual and calendrical practices 
had both come to the attention of the anti-foreign Confucian activist Kim 
P’yŏngmuk (1819–1891), whose discussion of the shrines and the Nine Righteous 
O cials was quoted in the Chojongam Gazetteer (Chojongamji).63 Centered on 
these two new shrines, the group engaged in a range of publication activities, 
producing, among other texts, genealogies that traced the descendants of all of 
the Nine Righteous O cials.64
Wang Tŏkku and Wang Tŏgil, as well as Kim P’yŏngmuk, claimed that 
a major impulse for their formation of the shrine was the declining interest 
and knowledge concerning Ming loyalism and Ming migrant families during 
the nineteenth century. Indeed, hostility to the Qing did decline during the 
nineteenth century, and this resulted in part in a decreasing emphasis by the 
nineteenth-century court on Ming loyalist rituals in the Taebodan,65 although 
Ming loyalism and hostility to the Qing continued to be major features of 
Chosŏn intellectual life until the fall of the dynasty.66 Notably, Wang Tŏgil, in 
a private letter, treated their establishment of a personal shrine as a restoration 
of the order developed under Yŏngjo and Chŏngjo, whereby Ming migrant de-
scendants, as the direct subjects of the Ming, were placed in a superior position 
to the Chosŏn o cialdom; under Chŏngjo, aer all, Ming migrant descendants 
had been placed in front of the court o cials during rituals at the Taebodan.67

is claim is dubious—as was discussed in chapter 5, descendants of Chosŏn 
loyal subjects were also placed in front of court o cials, and by being placed on 
the same side of the ritual space with civil o cials, were situated in a seemingly 
superior position to Ming migrant descendants who were placed before mili-
tary o cials and members of the royal family. Rather than viewing these devel-
opments as the result of worsening treatment of imperial subjects, they should 
rather be understood as part of a process whereby Ming migrant descent-groups 
formed collective identities, by establishing private shrines and separate imperial 
subject villages and, through this, their own private access to Ming legitimacy.68

e descendants or claimed descendants of Ming migrants formed 
descent-groups that, notably, have clan seats located in China. 
e descendants 
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of Wang Fenggang, for instance, use the clan seat Chenam, which is the Korean 
pronunciation of Jinan, in Shandong. 
e P’ung descent-group of descendants of 
Feng Sanshi have the clan seat Imgu, which refers to Linqiu, also in Shandong. 

is is in contrast with the Chinese migrants of late Koryŏ and early Chosŏn who 
were deliberately granted Korean clan seats. Yet, while their Chinese identities 
were marked with their clan seats, the Chosŏn court encouraged them to con-
struct shrines to their ancestors near their homes, strengthening their Chosŏn 
ritual identity. Examples include the shrines to Li Rusong and Li Rumei in Kang-
hwa and Hansŏng, which, as discussed in chapter 5, were established through 
the extensive support of the Chosŏn court even though they were essentially the 
shrines of the Nongsŏ Yi descent-group. 
is process then took on a life of its 
own and, by 1853, in addition to their original establishments in Kanghwa and 
Hansŏng, the Nongsŏ Yi descent-group had formed a Nongsŏ Yi village of mil-
itary sajok in Kang-dong, near P’yŏngyang and the Muyŏlsa shrine. 
ere they 
had obtained the hereditary right to one of the two positions as shrine guardians 
(ch’ambong), with the other going to a local military o cial who had obtained the 
position through merit.69 Other imperial subject villages were formed at various 
locations on the peninsula. By the eighteenth century, Kang Shijue’s descendants 
were recognized as a key descent-group in the county of Musan in Hamgyŏng.70
Indeed, these descendants, the T’ongju (Ch. Tongzhou) Kang, were praised in 
a preface to an early twentieth-century genealogy for being an unusual example 
of a properly organized descent-group in the disordered and déclassé world of 
northern Hamgyŏng.71 
e descendants of Du Shizhong formed a village near 
Taegu, with a building memorializing Du Shizhong’s admiration for the Ming, 
the Momyŏngjae—“the Longing for the Ming Studio”—although its existence 
is not well attested before the twentieth century.72

e descendants of Shi Wenyong are also recorded as establishing a shrine 
to the Ming, initially, at least without the clear support of the Chosŏn state. To 
this day there is a Korean descent-group called the Chŏlgang (Ch. Zhejiang) Si 
claiming to be Shi Wenyong’s descendants. Shi Wenyong, however, is clearly re-
corded in e Veritable Records as having been executed aer the Injo restoration 
on account of his close connection with Chŏng Inhong, Kwanghae-gun, and 
the Pugin faction.73 Well before Chŏng Inhong was rehabilitated, Shi Wenyong 
and his descendants had their good name restored, although in the process of 
the rehabilitation, much of Shi Wenyong’s actual well-documented history had 
to be simply ignored.
Consider, for instance, the account in O Kyŏngwŏn’s Unocial History of a 
Lesser Chunghwa of Shi Wenyong and Xu He, a man supposedly from the same 
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village in Zhejiang as Shi who also founded a descent-group, the Chŏlgang Sŏ. 
O described Shi and Xu as participating in the Ming intervention against the 
Japanese invasion of Korea of 1597. Sadly, however,
Shi Wenyong became extremely ill and could not return, and along with 
Xu He resided below Sŏngsan in the county of Sŏngju in Yŏngnam. He 
erected an altar behind his house on the mountain, and on the rst day of 
each month both men would prostrate themselves four times facing the 
north.  .  .  . 
ey also painted the landscape of Zhejiang on the house, so 
the local people called the village Taemyŏng-dong (Great Ming Village). 
As a result, Sogyŏng-wang [Sŏnjo] took pity upon them in their refuge, 
and recognizing that they had achieved merit worth recording, granted 
Shi Wenyong a pension and the title of Fih Minister in the O ce of the 
Ministers-without-Portfolio.
Following this, O provided an account of Shi Wenyong’s involvement in the 
reconstruction of the Kyŏngbok-kung Palace, “during which he made specic 
and vital suggestions for rehabilitating the foundations, which still survive 
today.” O also noted Shi’s scholarly talents in military matters, fortune-telling, 
and geomancy, subjects on which he wrote three books. Sadly, and predictably, 
none of the books survived. O gave the day of Shi’s death as the kyemi year 
(1643),74 moving his death to a date exactly twenty years later than it actually was 
and thus removing from him the implication of association with the despised 
Kwanghae-gun and Chŏng Inhong.

is seemingly deliberate distortions of Shi Wenyong’s death dates was closely 
tied to the altar, Taemyŏngdan (Great Ming Altar), that became the focus of 
many of the narratives produced concerning him. We know such an altar existed 
already by the eighteenth century. 
ere are references to a Shi descent-group 
residing in the Taemyŏng-dong of Sŏngju during the reign of Chŏngjo in 1793, 
in which Chŏngjo refers to the Taemyŏng-dong as the old residence of the Ming 
soldier Shi Wenyong, “who became a Chosŏn person.” 
e purpose of Chŏngjo’s 
discussion was to ensure that Shi Wenyong’s descendants, like other imperial 
subjects, be freed from all base labor services, although by then they had dis-
persed from Sŏngju.75 Chŏngjo also referred to a Ming loyalist altar behind Shi 
Wenyong’s house, upon which Shi Wenyong had oered obeisance northward 
to the Ming.76 Two years later, e Chosŏn Veritable Records reported that an 
unspecied number of Shi’s descendants were being encouraged to take military 
exams and pursue bureaucratic positions, no doubt thanks to their newly discov-
ered imperial subject status.77
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Although it is clear that an altar to the Ming was raised in the Taemyŏng-dong 
in Sŏngju long enough before 1793 that Chŏngjo could notice it, not all early ac-
counts make reference to it, and there is signicant discrepancy concerning the 
date. Quite a number of accounts from the nineteenth century agree with e
Unocial History of a Lesser Chunghwa in dating the establishment of the altar 
improbably to the period immediately aer Shi Wenyong’s arrival in Chosŏn.78
An exception is a far more elaborate reference by Hong Chikp’il (1776–1852), 
who composed the inscription for a pillar raised at the location of Shi Wenyong’s 
house. In this text Hong described Shi and Xu as raising the altar only aer the 
Qing invasion of Chosŏn in 1636–1637 forced upon them the realization that 
they could never return to their homeland. Hong agreed with other accounts 
in dating the death of Shi Wenyong to 1643, “the year before the Chongzheng 
emperor martyred himself on behalf of the altars of the earth and grain.” By 
dating the establishment of the shrine to the period post-1637, Hong Chikp’il 
could free Shi Wenyong from any implication of disloyalty to the Ming—surely 
a potential problem with many of the earlier accounts. While this date makes 
better sense than the period immediately aer Shi’s arrival in Chosŏn, Hong 
does not explain why Shi would have built an altar to the Ming in 1637, before 
the Qing conquered Beijing.
Whatever else may be said about the original founding of the shrine, Hong 
Chikp’il also discussed the revival of rituals at the Taemyŏngdan during the late 
eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. According to Hong, aer Shi Wen-
yong’s death, those of his descendants who still lived in the village prostrated 
themselves at the altar in the direction of the Ming every new moon. As this was 
not in accord with the rites, they then followed the practices of the Taebodan, 
prostrating themselves on the anniversaries of the deaths of the three emperors. 

e transformation of the descent-group occurred, according to Hong Chikp’il, 
in 1832 (the fourth anniversary of the Imjin War according to the sixty-year 
cycle), when Si Ch’ibak, Shi Wenyong’s seventh-generation descendant, decided 
to gather together the descent-group to rebuild the altar, and again in 1834, when 
he organized the decent-group to build a house, named P’ungch’ŏn, at the loca-
tion where Shi Wenyong’s had been, and also to establish a stone inscription in 
honor of Shi Wenyong, authored, of course, by Hong Chikp’il.79
While it seems unlikely that there would already have been an altar in the 
1640s, there must have been some sort of one by the late eighteenth century for 
Chŏngjo to have noticed it. 
e description of the descent-group practicing Tae-
bodan rites at that altar is certainly credible, and also informative, as it reveals 
the spread of the rites practiced by the Chosŏn court to the remote countryside 
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of Kyŏngsang Province well before the Chenam Wang built their own shrine in 
Kap’yŏng. More broadly, Hong’s account makes it clear that the reconstruction 
of the Taemyŏngdan and the construction of a building called P’ungch’ŏn over 
the remains of Shi Wenyong’s old house played a vital role in forming the corpo-
rate identity of the Chŏlgang Si during the nineteenth century. Whatever the 
beginnings of the Ming loyalist ritualism by Shi Wenyong’s descendants, by the 
early nineteenth century it had become substantially an extension of the Chosŏn 
court’s Ming loyalist rituals at the Taebodan.
Yet, the problem in all cases was that Shi Wenyong was a well-known g-
ure specically associated with the deposed King Kwanghae-gun and Chŏng 
Inhong who had been executed aer Injo’s coup d’état of 1623. Simply, it was 
never possible to claim that Shi Wenyong was an exemplary Ming loyalist, al-
though such attempts were made by the Chŏlgang Si descent-group when they 
produced a collection of writings concerning him in 1917.80 
e Chŏlgang Sŏ 
descent-group, residing in the same community and associated with the same 
shrine, notably made no reference at all to connections to Shi Wenyong in their 
genealogy, clearly in the hope of eliminating any hint of a connection to a famed 
ally of the purged Chŏng Inhong.81
Of course, it is hardly surprising that liberties might be taken with the truth 
in the construction of an appropriate genealogy. But it is notable that the Chosŏn 
state itself was actively involved in Shi’s rehabilitation, while completely ignor-
ing the connection to Chŏng Inhong. Surely, Chŏngjo himself could not have 
been ignorant of the actual history of Shi Wenyong. In fact, one version of Yi 
Kŭngik’s Yŏllyŏsil Narrative (Yŏllyŏsil kisul), for instance, repeated the tradition 
of Shi Wenyong’s Ming loyalism in the supplementary volumes, but did not refer 
to the altar, and moreover, described Shi as a deserter from the Chinese army 
(ch’ŏnbyŏng).82 
e book, moreover, included clear reference to controversies as-
sociated with Shi in its narrative of the reigns of Sŏnjo and Kwanghae-gun.83
Even O Kyŏngwŏn’s Unocial History of a Lesser Chunghwa, quoted above, 
referred to Shi’s involvement in the restoration of Kyŏngbok-kung Palace; al-
though the text did not describe Shi’s involvement negatively, an educated reader 
would surely have recognized the reference to one of the key controversies of 
Kwanghae-gun’s reign.
In contrast to the Chinese migrants who settled in Chosŏn before the Imjin 
War, the clan seats of the imperial subjects clearly marked them as foreign by 
referring specically to locations in China. 
e rites in which they participated, 
and the narratives produced concerning them, all emphasized their foreign sta-
tus. Yet it must also be noted that, even as the descendants of Ming migrants 
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pursued a new designation that conferred upon them o cial foreign status, 
they did so within the particular context of late Chosŏn identity. In terms of 
marriage, surviving genealogies suggest that they only very rarely married with 
other imperial subject lineages. 
ere were notable cases, such as Yi Chŏ, an 
eighteenth-century military o cial and member of the Nongsŏ descent group, 
who married the granddaughter of Tian Haoqian, the Ming migrant who 
led the foreigners’ brigade along with Weltevree.84 However, nearly all of the 
marriage partners of the Chŏlgang Si, the Chŏlgang Sŏ, the Yŏngyang Ch’ŏn, 
and the descendants of the Nine Righteous O cials, had Korean clan seats, 
although (hardly surprising, since imperial subjects were not actually of partic-
ularly prominent status) none showed any signicant sign of marriage to peo-
ple of high bureaucratic rank.85 Seunghyun Han’s analysis of imperial subject 
genealogies has shown that, during the early nineteenth century, there was a 
growth in intermarriage between imperial subject descent-groups, something 
that was extremely rare during the seventeenth, eighteenth, and then twentieth 
centuries. Certainly, Han is correct to understand this as revealing a sense of a 
collective “Ming” identity among imperial subjects,86 although it also should be 
noted that even during the early nineteenth century most marriages were with 
descent-groups with no Ming connection.
Ultimately, imperial subject status, while an improvement over the status that 
they had possessed before, clearly marked them as inferiors to the sajok aristo-
crats who dominated Chosŏn society. U Kyŏngsŏp is correct that many of the 
surviving texts concerning imperial subjects, including those authored by kings 
Yŏngjo and Chŏngjo themselves, lament the poor treatment accorded to Ming 
migrants.87 One such lament discussed in this chapter was by Sŏng Haeŭng, who 
asked why o cials from the Ming who migrated by Chosŏn should be treated so 
much less well than those from earlier Chinese dynasties who had migrated to 
the 
ree Kingdoms or Koryŏ. Yet, his own work served to rationalize just this 
discrimination, when, in the “Biographies of the Eight Surnames,” he pointed 
out how incredibly weak the historical claims of these supposed descendants 
of Ming o cials were. Any sajok o cial could discover, with only a little re-
search, that the Chŏlgang Si’s ancestor had in fact been executed in 1623, that 
Kang Shijue, the ancestor of the T’ongju Kang, had married a kisaeng, and that 
the supposed descendants of Li Rusong had been living obscurely in Kangwŏn 
Province until they were informed of their identities. 
ese narratives at once 
conrmed the status of imperial subjects and clearly set boundaries on their 
social advancement.
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Ming migrants and their descendants, as imperial subjects, gained 
ritualized identities from the Chosŏn court during the late eighteenth century. 

is identity dened them as permanent foreigners within the Chosŏn state, 
even as it brought them into the very heart of Chosŏn court ritual during reg-
ular Ming loyalist rites at the Taebodan. 
rough new bureaucratic categories 
designed to distinguish them from submitting-foreigners of Jurchen and Jap-
anese origin, and through new historical narratives linking them to the eigh-
teenth-century court’s o cial Ming loyalism, those who could claim ancestry 
among Ming migrants following the Imjin War could enjoy signicantly im-
proved social status compared to the invidious status under which most had 
suered during the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries.

is state of ritual “foreignness” did not exclude imperial subjects from the 
Chosŏn state. Late Chosŏn Chunghwa ideology, although clearly centered in 
Chosŏn, imagined Chosŏn not in the terms of modern, racialized nationalism 
but within the broader language and symbolism of the Chunghwa sphere that 
also encompassed China. As Ming migrants gained identities that identied 
them with the key struggles that made up the sacred history of the late Chosŏn 
state, their identities came more closely in line with the o cial ideology of the 
Chosŏn court and Chosŏn’s sajok aristocracy. Within a Chosŏn state organized 
hierarchically according to hereditary status groups, imperial subjects had their 
identities assimilated into the ruling ideology of the Chosŏn state. Nor was it a 
unidirectional process. As imperial subjects beneted from their improved social 
status, they actively produced their own versions of the court-sponsored nar-
ratives of their ancestors, oen in language that went far beyond the relatively 
cautious state-supported histories. As the active role of the Chosŏn monarchy 
in the Ming loyalist rituals in the Taebodan declined, the Ming migrants them-
selves created their own private centers of Ming loyalist ritual practices, building 
shrines and altars to the Ming and making them the focus of their emerging 
imperial subject descent-groups. In ritual terms, they played much the same role 
as the Jurchens and Japanese who oered obeisance to the Chosŏn monarchy 
during the early Chosŏn. However, although imperial subject descent-groups 
were marked as foreign, their acceptance of these new ritualized foreign iden-
tities revealed them to be fully part of late Chosŏn society. 
ese new private 
narratives and rituals thus amounted to a vernacularization of Chosŏn’s ruling 
ideology among previously marginal people.
192
Conclusion
D escent-groups of the Japanese and Ming submitting-foreign-ers still live in Korea. Hardly to be distinguished from other Korean descent-groups, and certainly not in any way part of a diaspora, sites 
associated with them have nevertheless been enshrined as part of regional heri-
tage administrations. Sites related to the Japanese defector Kim Ch’ungsŏn, the 
Ming deserter Du Shizhong, as well as the complex at Chojongam associated 
with the Chenam Wang and Imgu P’ung, have all been developed as locations 
for tourism, with those sites associated with the Chinese oen targeted specif-
ically at Chinese tourists. Although an embarrassing fact during much of the 
twentieth century, twentieth-rst-century South Korea has increasingly cele-
brated these migrants as an aspect of Korea’s multiculturalism.1
While such narratives are valuable for bringing out aspects of the past that 
were largely ignored by earlier scholarship, they risk committing signicant dis-
tortions, for ultimately, the submitting-foreigners and imperial subjects did not 
relate to the Chosŏn state in the same manner as the “ethnic minorities” of the 
twentieth and twenty-rst centuries. The late nineteenth century brought mi-
grants to Korea who were governed by the new concept of citizenship and were 
protected by both consulates and force of arms. They were thus substantially dif-
ferent from the submitting-foreigners and imperial subjects of the Chosŏn.2 At 
the same time, beginning in the late nineteenth century and continuing through 
the twentieth, a Korean diaspora formed communities around the world that 
were governed by states that considered citizenship, race, and ethnicity to be 
primary and oen absolute units of classication.3 Currently, for that matter, the 
multiculturalism of present-day South Korea, like the multiculturalism of other 
countries, does not escape the logic of national categories—like state-sponsored 
multiculturalism around the world, it further entrenches and essentializes na-
tionalism, placing the emphasis on assimilation, and at best celebrating super-
cial markers of dierence—“traditional” clothing, foods, and dance4—a phe-
nomenon that would have made little sense in the late Chosŏn.
Ultimately, it is a distortion to use the language of multiculturalism with refer-
ence to the foreign communities of Chosŏn Korea. Submitting-foreigner status, 
as it developed during the early Chosŏn, was not concerned with “assimilation,” 
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but with submission to the civilizing power of the Chosŏn monarch. Emerging 
from the Koryŏ period, it had originally been used to govern the multiplicity of 
Koryŏ’s relationships with the outside world, while maintaining the broader cen-
tricity of the Koryŏ monarch. During the Chosŏn period, it was primarily used 
to govern Jurchens and Japanese on Chosŏn’s frontiers; it granted to its recipients 
important economic and military roles and conferred upon the Chosŏn mon-
arch the status of civilizing center. Above all, submitting-foreigner status was a 
tool used to manage the culturally uid world of the fourteenth, eenth, and 
sixteenth centuries, creating zones of Chosŏn inuence that extended beyond 
the regions the Chosŏn state could administer directly.
It would have been meaningless, whether during the early, mid-, or late 
Chosŏn, to speak in terms of Korean bloodlines or Korean race. In 2004 the 
football player Hines Ward, the child of a Korean mother and an African Amer-
ican soldier father, attracted a mix of guilt (on account of the discrimination 
experienced by his mother and by mixed-race people in South Korea) and pride 
(on account of his sports success as a Korean in the United States) in South 
Korea.5 During the Chosŏn period itself, however, it would be inconceivable to 
speak of somebody being half-Korean or of Korean blood. When, during the 
sixteenth century, Chosŏn ocials worried about Jurchens who had been born 
in Korea taking a position in the royal guard, the worry was not determined by 
blood quotient but by the seeming success of certain Jurchen gures at gam-
ing the system. The Chosŏn court was equally worried about Pŏnhos pursuing 
multiple relationships with submitting-Jurchen women in Hamgyŏng Province, 
even though all parties involved in these relationships were Jurchens. While the 
Chosŏn court did at times refer to matters such as clothing and marriage and 
funeral customs, as they had a clear relationship to Confucian rites and morality, 
issues that greatly concern the modern state—language, culture, and physical 
appearance—were not part of the conversation.
Indeed, the language of assimilation (tonghwa) requires an object: “Assim-
ilation to what?” Chosŏn, as a society divided by distinctions of social status, 
did not seek to enforce homogeneity or similarity, for people were assumed to 
have dierent roles and orientations according to their social status. Within the 
hierarchical world of Chosŏn, all outsiders—Chinese, Jurchens, Japanese, and 
Koreans—to the close-knit circles of the sajok aristocracy were equally alien and 
unacceptable as marriage partners for sajok. Despite some attempts to match 
Jurchen hierarchies with Chosŏn hierarchies during the early Chosŏn, the wives 
given to submitting-foreigners were the descendants of commoners and slaves; 
the product, in other words, of illegal unions, whose lives could be mobilized 
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by the state with relative ease. When the Chosŏn court reformed the status of 
Ming migrants during the eighteenth century, it reorganized them according to 
patrilines, with little interest in the origins of their female ancestors. In fact, if 
female ancestry were considered, most descendants claiming Jurchen, Japanese, 
or Ming origins would be considered overwhelmingly Korean according to mod-
ern racialized language. The reorganization of submitting-foreigners of Ming 
ancestry in the eighteenth century transformed a group of people of mixed but 
overwhelmingly Korean ancestry into descent-groups with a ritualized foreign 
identity; it neither created, nor responded to, a diaspora.
Nor do we improve matters by attempting to approach the subject via the 
Hua-Yi “Neo-Confucian” dynamic, because such an approach assumes enor-
mous temporal homogeneity within the Chosŏn state and ignores the consid-
erable changes, domestic and international, which occurred during the same 
period. As I discussed in chapter 1, one can nd expressions of hostility toward 
Jurchens quite easily, but by the same token one can nd much more positive 
references elsewhere. For that matter, it is a mistake to imagine that, during 
the wars of the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, Ming Chinese 
migrants were representatives of China and thus welcome, or that Jurchens were 
representatives of barbarity and thus unwelcome. As this book has shown, it was 
not until the reigns of Yŏngjo and Chŏngjo that it was considered at all problem-
atic to classify the descendants of Ming Chinese as submitting-foreigners along 
with Jurchens, Japanese, and other groups such as the Dutch.
Ultimately, Chosŏn Korea was not a society driven by the rigid pursuit of 
Confucian ideals, but a society profoundly inuenced by the social hierarchies 
according to which it was organized, with which these Confucian ideals were 
themselves oen in signicant tension. Chosŏn’s institution of hereditary slav-
ery, for instance, t awkwardly with Confucian understandings of human na-
ture and was not present in China to the same extent.6 In the case of foreigners 
of Chinese origin, sajok ocials and elites may have made their participation 
in the broader Confucian world a core part of their cultural identity but were 
certainly not going to submit to Chinese refugees from outside of their circles. 
During the early Chosŏn, Chinese and other Northeast Asian ocials were 
clearly subordinated to the sajok aristocracy and placed in distinctly supple-
mentary roles as interpreters or clerks, well outside of the ranks of the dominant 
civil sajok descent-groups. None of the Chinese refugees or their descendants 
who came during the Ming-Qing transition gained truly prominent social 
status in Chosŏn. Insofar as they did gain higher status during the reigns of 
Yŏngjo and Chŏngjo, they merely achieved an improved but subordinate and 
Conclusion 195 
supportive role, similar to what was granted to other members of intermediate 
status groups. Kang Shijue (discussed in chapter 4) made himself useful to the 
local administration in northern Hamgyŏng during the 1670s and 1680s, and 
his sons continued to play the role of prominent local elites and low-ranking 
military sajok. Prominent sajok aristocrats like Nam Kuman and Pak Sedang 
may have been willing to appeal to Kang Shijue’s claimed descent from Ming 
ocialdom in order to allow him to play the role of intermediary in northern 
Hamgyŏng, but they were in no danger of actually allowing him to join the 
capital aristocracy in Hansŏng. “Hua and yi” was a logic that helped the Chosŏn 
court and elite make sense of the world around them, but it was imposed variably 
according to the needs—political, ideological, and economic—of the sajok elite.
In many ways, in fact, the transformation of the social status of Ming mi-
grants represented a continuation of their earlier ritual role by bringing them 
into a ritual relationship with the Chosŏn monarchy. By participating in rituals 
in the Taebodan, Ming migrants were playing an almost identical role to Jurchen 
and Japanese leaders of the early Chosŏn court in Hansŏng, with the major dif-
ference being the changing conception of the Chosŏn state. A eenth-century 
Jurchen leader oering tribute in Hansŏng in exchange for a bureaucratic title in 
Hansŏng was conrming Chosŏn’s role as a lesser center in the context of overall 
Ming hegemony. Similarly, when the descendants of Ming migrants, who had re-
ceived the ritualized status of imperial subjects, participated in the rituals at the 
Taebodan, they conrmed the Chosŏn monarch’s status as the one remaining 
representative of the Chunghwa order. Both the Jurchen envoy and the imperial 
subject acted clearly in subordination to the Chosŏn monarch and the sajok civil 
ocials who dominated the court. Despite attempts by people like Wang Tŏgil 
to claim higher status (as a self-styled ocial of the original Ming central court), 
imperial subjects had considerably less power, inuence, and autonomy than the 
Jurchen and Japanese potentates who submitted to the early Chosŏn court, but 
who maintained a base outside of Chosŏn’s eective administration.
To the extent that the language of assimilation is at all appropriate, it is not 
in the sense that it occurs in a modern nation-state, but in the manner of ver-
nacularization as conceptualized by Victor Lieberman. Jurchens, Japanese, and 
others during the Chosŏn period operated in a world where boundaries were 
unclearly dened, and the regions that are now Japan, the Chinese northeast, 
and northern Hamgyŏng were under the control of small and uid polities. 
Chosŏn, emerging from the chaos of the collapse of the Mongol empire, sought 
to establish control over this uid and chaotic frontier by binding the leaders of 
these small polities into a relationship with the Chosŏn court, to make them 
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act as intermediaries on Chosŏn’s behalf. While during the early Chosŏn these 
groups had only been weakly controlled, and oen attached to small polities on 
Chosŏn’s frontiers, geopolitical shis during the seventeenth century eliminated 
these small polities and the borderland peoples who had operated out of them. 
Moreover, the growing centralization of the Chosŏn state during the late seven-
teenth and eighteenth centuries gave Chosŏn’s central court far greater control 
over its subjects. As part of Chosŏn’s assertion of its own Ming loyalist identity, 
the Chosŏn refashioned some people of foreign origin into Ming loyalists. In 
contrast to the Chinese in Koryŏ and early Chosŏn, who had received Korean 
clan seats, during the eighteenth century, Ming migrant descent-groups used 
clan seats that referred to Chinese place-names. Yet, the entire identity of these 
Ming migrant descent-groups, including the shrines at which they practiced 
Ming loyalist rites, integrated them fully into a Chosŏn identity.
Imperial subject status conrmed its recipients as eternal subjects of the fallen 
Ming, and the Chosŏn court under Yŏngjo and Chŏngjo actively sought to en-
trench and clarify their foreign status, nding genealogies or evidence of their 
Ming origins, seeking to limit their residence to clearly dened imperial subject 
villages, and correcting their ritual activities to t better with the Chosŏn court’s 
conception of a Ming loyalist remnant subject. However, ultimately, they were 
not foreigners at all. This is not to say that their genealogical claims were fraud-
ulent, although many likely were. As was discussed in chapter 6, the historian 
Sŏng Haeŭng himself, though an active participant in creating the Ming loyal-
ist histories, revealed that many of the genealogical claims of imperial subjects 
were simply impossible and based on weak or absent sources. I expect that most 
claimants to imperial subject status would have been from submitting-foreigner 
communities, where the Chosŏn court generally went looking for Ming rem-
nants. The Chosŏn court did look for documentation and did reject inappropri-
ate claimants such as Pak Sŭngbok. Yet as the very case of Pak Sŭngbok reveals, 
surnames and lines of descent among submitting-foreigners were oen unsta-
ble, many submitting-foreigners lived outside of submitting-foreigner villages, 
and most submitting-foreigners married with Koreans. The eighteenth-century 
Chosŏn court created the ritualized imperial subject status out of submit-
ting-foreigner communities that had lived for several generations in close as-
sociation with low-status Koreans, with whom, in most respects, they would 
have been completely indistinguishable. The desire to have a ritualized foreign 
element on its soil was such that, even with the vanishing of actual borderland 
communities, the Chosŏn court subsidized and supported a permanent foreign 
community, oen ignoring a complete lack of credible sources, overlooking 
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facile claims that all documentation had been burned, and even accepting, in 
the case of the descendants of Chen Fengyi, that someone might choose to hide 
an imperial edict in a well.
Dipesh Chakrabarty has cautioned against the tendency, within much his-
torical scholarship, to treat regions outside of Europe primarily through their 
success or failure to achieve a normative European standard of historical de-
velopment and to view them through the language of “lack” and inadequacy.”7
As I have argued in this book, the self-identity of Chosŏn during the seven-
teenth and eighteenth centuries can certainly be appropriated for the uses of 
modern nationalists and multiculturalists, but it was structured according to a 
logic of its own. The Chosŏn court and sajok aristocracy imagined themselves 
to be part of a historical entity based in the Korean peninsula that fully par-
ticipated in a Chunghwa identity and believed that, aer the fall of the Ming, 
they were the last representatives of the Chunghwa ideal. This ideal was cer-
tainly not identical to the narrow and exclusionary nationalism that developed 
in Korea post-1894, but it was also clearly oriented to the geographic, social, 
and political space of Chosŏn. For late Chosŏn elites, particularism based on 
Chosŏn was not in conict with a cosmopolitan outlook that embraced China, 
nor did it require homogeneity and resistance to foreign inuences and people. 
There was also no contradiction between admiring the Ming and accepting the 
submission of ordinary Ming Chinese, for the simple reason that identication 
with Chunghwa as a larger political and cultural project did not involve na-
tional identication, and individual subjects of China were not representatives 
of Chunghwa. Ming migrants had to be made representatives of the Ming—by 
discovering genealogies that gave them elite and loyal ancestors—a process that 
brought them into a hierarchical community centered on the Chosŏn court and 
dominated by aristocratic sajok descent-groups. They were not a heterogenous 
element but were people possessing a distinct status in a society where explicit 
status distinctions were normalized, and they were not so much foreigners as 
Chosŏn subjects transformed to support Chosŏn court’s own image of its role 
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33. Sŏnjo sillok 56:26b, Sǒnjo 27 (1594)/10/11 (ŭlmyo).
34. Sŏnjo sillok 169:11a–11b, Sǒnjo 36 (1603)/12/30 (sinhae).
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86. Sŭngjŏngwŏn ilgi 1118:113a, Yŏngjo 31 (1755)/4/24 (chŏngmyo).
87. Sŭngjŏngwŏn ilgi 1113:97b–98a, Yŏngjo 31 (1754)/11/22 (chŏngyu).
88. Sŭngjŏngwŏn ilgi 1194, Yŏngjo 37 (1761)/6/24 (sinmyo).
89. Chŏngjo sillok 12:9a, Chŏngjo 5 (1781)/7/12 (imja).
90. For instance, Sŭngjŏngwŏn ilgi 1489:87a–87b, Chŏngjo 5 (1781)/7/12 (imja); 
Chŏngjo sillok 46:25b, Chŏngjo 21 (1797)/3/19 (kimi). Both name changes occurred 
through royal command, according to Yi Kyusang, 18 segi Chosŏn inmulji, 174.
91. Sŭngjŏngwŏn ilgi 1244:17b, Yŏngjo 41 (1765)/6/22 (chŏngmyo).
92. Sŭngjŏngwŏn ilgi 1109:167a, Yŏngjo 30 (1754)/7/18 (ŭlmyo).
93. In this text, however, Yi Hwŏn’s name had been changed to Wŏn.
94. Chŏngjo sillok 52:12b, Chŏngjo 23 (1799)/7/29 (ŭryu).
95. Hwangjoin sajŏk, fr. 61–62.
96. Hwangjoin sajŏk, fr. 58–59.
97. Yi Kyusang, 18 segi Chosŏn inmulji, 174.
98. Hwangjoin sajŏk, fr. 62.
99. Hwangjoin sajŏk, fr. 63–64.
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Seoul: Yǒgang ch’ulp’ansa, 1985.
Ch’uan kŭp kugan. Original compilation by the Ŭigŭmbu. Original date: 1601–1892. 
Seoul: Asea munhwasa, 1980–1984.
Chungjong sillok. Edited by Yi Chi et al. 1550. DB of National Institute of Korean His-
tory. Accessed via sillok.history.go.kr.
Hamel, Hendrick. Verhaal van hetvergaan van het jacht de Sperwer en van het wederva-
ren der schipbreukelingen op het eilaand Quelpaert en het vasteland van Korea (1653–
1666). The Hague: Linschoten-Vereenigen, 1920.
Hong Chikp’il. Maesan sŏnsaeng munjip. Kyujanggak # ko 3428–322. Accessed via DB 
of Korean Classics: db.itkc.or.kr.
Honjŏng p’yŏllok. Compiled by An Pangjun and An Surok. Original date 1824. In 
Kukyŏk Taedong yasŭng. Seoul: Minjok munhwa ch’ujinhoe, 1971. Accessed via DB 
of Korean Classics: db.itkc.or.kr.
Hwangjoin sajŏk. Aer 1793. Kyujanggak # kyu 2542. Kyujanggak Institute for Korean 
Studies. Accessed via Kyujanggak Archive Search: kyujanggak.snu.ac.kr.
238 Bibliography
Hwang Kyŏngwŏn. Kanghanjip. 1790. Un’gak insŏch’eja edition. Kyujanggak # kyu 
2977-v.1–15. Accessed via DB of Korean Classics: db.itkc.or.kr.
Hyojong sillok. Edited by Yi Kyŏngsŏk et al. 1661. DB of National Institute of Korean 
History. Accessed via sillok.history.go.kr.
Hyŏnjong kaesu sillok. Edited by Kim Suhang et al. 1683. DB of National Institute of 
Korean History. Accessed via sillok.history.go.kr.
Hyŏnjong sillok. Edited by Hŏ Chŏk et al. 1677. DB of National Institute of Korean 
History. Accessed via sillok.history.go.kr.
Injo sillok. Edited by Yi Kyŏngyŏ et al. 1653. DB of National Institute of Korean History. 
Accessed via sillok.history.go.kr.
Jiu Manzhou dang. 10 vols. Taipei: National Palace Museum, 1969.
Kim Chaero, ed. Soktaejŏn. 1746. NL # kojo 33. Accessed via National Library of Korea: 
www.nl.go.kr.
Kim Chinam. T’ongmungwanji. 1720. Kyujanggak # kyu 731-v. 1–3. Kyujanggak In-
stitute for Korean Studies. Accessed via Kyujangak Archive Search: kyujanggak.
snu.ac.kr.
Kim Ch’ungsŏn. Mohadangjip. 1798. Kyujanggak # kyu 4255. Accessed via DB of Ko-
rean Classics: db.itkc.or.kr.
Kim Monghwa. Ch’ iramjip. Compiled by Kim Chunwŏn. 1901. Yugyo net. Yŏngnam 
sarim munjip. Accessed via www.koreanhistory.or.kr.
Kim Siyang. Kwanbuk kimun, vol. 22. In Taedong P’aerim, compiled by Sim No-sung, 
509–566. Seoul: Kukhak charyowon, 1997.
Kim Sŏkchu. Sigam sŏnsaeng yugo. Circa 1680. Kyujanggak # ko 3428–280. Accessed via 
DB of Korean Classics: db.itkc.or.kr.
Kim Yuk. Chamgok sŏnsaeng p’ ildam. Aer 1752. Kyujanggak # kyu 6685. Kyujanggak 
Institute for Korean Studies. Accessed via Kyujanggak Archive Search: kyujanggak.
snu.ac.kr.
Koryŏsa. Edited by Chŏng Inji, Chŏng Ch’angson, et al. 1451. Accessed via DB of Na-
tional Institute of Korean History: db.history.go.kr.
Koryŏ Taehakkyo, Minjok Munhwa Yŏn’guwŏn, and Manju Sillok Yŏkchuhoe, eds. 
Manju sillok yōkchu. Seoul: Somyŏng Ch’ulp’an, 2014.
Ku Ch’iyong. Ugyodang yugo. Yŏnse taehakkyo haksul chŏngbowŏn edition. 1922. Ac-
cessed via DB of Korean Classics: db.itkc.or.kr.
Kugyŏk Taedong yasŭng. 18 vols. Seoul: Minjok munhwa ch’ujinhoe, 1971–1975.
Kukcho pogam pyŏlp’yŏn. 1834–1849. Kyujanggak # kyu 1130-v.1–3.
Kwanghae-gun ilgi. Chungch’obon. Edited by Yun Pang et al. 1634. DB of National 
Institute of Korean History. Accessed via sillok.history.go.kr.
Kyŏngguk taejŏn. 1484. Accessed in Chosŏn sidae pŏmnyŏng charyo via db.history.go.kr.
Kyŏngguk taejŏn chuhae. Circa 1555. Accessed in Chosŏn sidae pŏmnyŏng charyo via 
db.history.go.kr.
Kyŏngsangdo Tansŏnghyŏn hojŏk Taejang, chŏnsan deit’a beisŭ. 5 CDs. Seoul: Tong Asia 
haksul yŏn’guwŏn, Taedong munhwa yŏn’guwon, Sŏnggyun’gwan taehakkyo (The 
Academy of East Asian Studies, Sungkyunkwan University), 2003.
Bibliography 239 
Kyŏngsangdo Ulsanbu kiyusik changjŏk. Kyujanggak # kyu 14986. Kyujanggak Institute 
for Korean Studies. Accessed via Kyujanggak Archive Search: kyujanggak.snu.ac
.kr.
Manbun Rōtō (Tongki Fuka Sindaha Hergen i Dangse). Translated by Kanda Nobuo. 
Tokyo: Toyo Bunko, 1956.
Ming Shenzong xianhuangdi shilu. 1630. DB of National Institute of Korean History. 
Accessed via sillok.history.go.kr.
Ming Xizong Zhehuangdi shilu. 1637. DB of National Institute of Korean History. Ac-
cessed via sillok.history.go.kr.
Munjong sillok. Edited by Chŏng Inji, Chŏng Ch’angsun, et al. 1455. DB of National 
Institute of Korean History. http://sillok.history.go.kr.
Nam Kuman. Yakch’ŏnjip. Aer 1723. Kyujanggak # kyu 11654-v.1–17. Accessed via DB 
of Korean Classics: db.itkc.or.kr.
O Kyŏngwŏn. Sohwa oesa: genbu Wayaku taishō. 2 vols. Keijō: Chōsen Kenkyūkai, 1914.
Pak Ch’anghŭi, trans. Yŏkchu Yongbiŏch’ŏn ka. Sŏngnam: Hangukhak chungang yŏn’gu 
ch’ulp’anbu, 2015. 2 vols.
Pak Sedang. Sŏgyejip. No date. National Library # han 46-ga 728. Accessed via DB of 
Korean Classics: db.itkc.or.kr.
Pak T’aebo, Chŏngjaejip. 1702. Kyujanggak # kyu 5263. Accessed via DB of Korean Clas-
sics: db.itkc.or.kr.
Pibyŏnsa tŭngnok. Original date: 1616–1892. Accessed via DB of National Institute of 
Korean History: db.history.go.kr.
P’ung Hakcho. Hwangjo yumin segye wŏllyu ko. 1828. National Library # ko 2–1817.
P’ung Yŏngsŏp. Taemyŏng yumin sa. Seoul: Myŏng ŭihoe, 1989.
Qing shilu. 61 vols. Beijing: Zhonghuwa shuju, 1986–1987.
Qing Taizu chao lao Man wen yuan dang. Edited by Kwang Lu and Li Xuezhi. Taipei: 
Zhong yang yan jiu yuan li shi yu yan yan jiu suo, 1970–1971.
Sejong sillok. Edited by Hwangbo In et al. 1454. DB of National Institute of Korean 
History. Accessed via sillok.history.go.kr.
Sejo sillok. Edited by Sin Sukchu et al. 1471. DB of National Institute of Korean History. 
Accessed via sillok.history.go.kr.
Simyang changgye. Compiled by Sigangwŏn. 1878. Kyujanggak # kyugwi 1878-v. 1–10. 
Kyujanggak Institute for Korean Studies. Accessed via the Kyujanggak Archive 
Search: kyujanggak.snu.ac.kr.
Sinjŭng Tongguk yŏji sŭngnam. Compiled by Hong Ŏnp’il et al. 1531. Seoul: Myŏng-
mundang, 1994.
Sin Taldo. Mano sŏnsaeng munjip. 1927. National Library # ko 3648–40. Accessed via 
DB of Korean Classics: db.itkc.or.kr.
Si Sŏngsik et al. P’ungch’ŏnjip. 1917. National Library # ko 3648–44–9.
Sŏng Haeŭng. Yŏn’gyŏngjae chŏnjip. Kwainsabon. No date. Accessed via DB of Korean 
Classics: db.itkc.or.kr.
Sŏnjo sillok. Edited by Ki Chahŏn et al. 1616. DB of National Institute of Korean His-
tory. Accessed via sillok.history.go.kr.
240 Bibliography
Sŏngjong sillok. Edited by Sin Sŭngsŏn et al. 1499. DB of National Institute of Korean 
History. Accessed via sillok.history.go.kr.
Sŏnjo sujŏng sillok. Edited by Yi Sik, Ch’ae Yuhu, et al. 1657. DB of National Institute of 
Korean History. Accessed via sillok.history.go.kr.
Sukchong sillok. Edited by Kim Ch’angjip et al. 1728. DB of National Institute of Korean 
History. Accessed via sillok.history.go.kr.
Sŭngjŏngwŏn ilgi. DB of National Institute of Korean History. Accessed via sjw.his-
tory.go.kr.
Sunjo sillok. Edited by Yi Sanghwang et al. 1838. DB of National Institute of Korean 
History. Accessed via sillok.history.go.kr.
T’aejong sillok. Edited by Pyŏn Kyeryang et al. 1432. DB of National Institute of Korean 
History. Accessed via sillok.history.go.kr.
T’aejo sillok. Edited by Ha Ryun et al. 1448. DB of National Institute of Korean History. 
Accessed via sillok.history.go.kr.
T’ongju Kang-ssi sebo. Compiled by Kang Hogyun. 1901. Korea University Rare Books 
Library. Seoul.
Wang Tŏkku. Ch’anghaejip.1880. Kyujanggak # ko 3424–5.
———. Hwangjo yumin rok. 1818. National Library # ko 25669. Kyujanggak Institute 
for Korean Studies. Accessed via Kyujanggak Archive Search: kyujanggak.snu.ac.kr.
Yi Kangsu et al., trans. Simyang changgye: Simyang esŏ on p’yŏnji. Seoul: Ch’angbi, 2008.
Yi Kŭngik. Yŏlllyŏsil kisul. No date. National Library # Hangojo-56na 10. Accessed via 
DB of Korean Classics: db.itkc.or.kr.
Yi Kyusang. 18 segi Chosŏn inmulji: Pyŏngse chaeŏn rok. Translated by Minjok munhak 
yŏn’guso hanmun pun’gwa. Seoul: Ch’angjak kwa pip’yŏngsa, 1997.
Yi Minsŏng. Kyŏngjŏngjip. Changsŏgak edition. 1664. Accessed via DB of Korean Clas-
sics: db.itkc.or.kr.
Yi Sanggil. Tongchŏnjip. Namwŏn: Namwŏn sagok, 1911. National Library # ko 3648–
62. Accessed via National Library of Korea: www.nl.go.kr.
Yi Sibal. Pyŏgo yugo. Chŏngsabon edition, collection of Yi Ch’unhŭi. No Date. Accessed 
via DB of Korean Classics: db.itkc.or.kr.
Yi Sugwang. Chibong yusǒl. 2 vols. Translated by Nam Mansŏng. Seoul: Ŭryu mun-
hwasa, 1994.
Yŏnsan’gun ilgi. Edited by Sŏng Hŭian et al. 1509. Kyujanggak # kyu 12728-v.1–46. DB 
of National Institute of Korean History. Accessed via sillok.history.go.kr.
Yu Chŏnghyŏn. Ch’ imgye sŏnsaeng yugo. No Date. National Library # Han46-ka90. 
Accessed via DB of Korean Classics: db.itkc.or.kr.
Yun Haengim. Sŏkchaego. No date. Compilation in 1933. National Library # ko 
2105-2-48. Accessed via National Library of Korea: www.nl.go.kr.
Bibliography 241 
Secondary Sources
Agnew, Christopher S. “Migrants and Mutineers: The Rebellion of Kong Youde and 
Seventeenth-Century Northeast Asia.” Journal of the Economic and Social History of 
the Orient 52, no. 3 (2009): 505–541.
Ahn, Ji Hyun. “Rearticulating Black Mixed-Race in the Era of Globalization: Hines 
Ward and the Struggle for Koreanness in Contemporary South Korean Media.” Cul-
tural Studies 28, no. 3 (2014): 391–417.
Akamine Mamoru. The Ryukyu Kingdom: Cornerstone of East Asia. Translated by Lina 
Terrell. Edited by Robert Huey. Honolulu: University of Hawai‘i Press, 2017.
Anderson, Benedict. Imagined Communities: Reections on the Origin and Spread of 
Nationalisms. London: Verso Editions and NLB, 1983.
Baker, Don. “Rhetoric, Ritual and Political Legitimacy: Justifying Yi Seong-gye’s As-
cension to the Throne.” Korea Journal 53, no. 4 (Winter 2013): 141–167.
Bell, Catherine. Ritual Theory, Ritual Practice. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009.
Bell, David A. The Cult of the Nation in France: Inventing Nationalism, 1680–1800. 
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2001.
Berry, Mary Elizabeth. Hideyoshi. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1982.
Bohnet, Adam. “Debating Tumen Valley Jurchens during the Late Sixteenth and Early 
Seventeenth Centuries.” Korean Studies 39 (January 2015): 23–44.
———. “From the Chu-Hat-hall Duke to Kang Shijue and Back Again: Biography and 
State Control in Northern Hamgyŏng.” Korean Histories 3, no. 2 (2012): 3–22.
———. “From Liaodongese Refugee to Ming Loyalist: The Historiography of the Sang-
gok Ma, a Ming Migrant Descent Group in Late Chosŏn Korea.” Review of Korean 
Studies 15, no. 1 (June 2012): 109–139.
———. “Lies, Rumours and Sino-Korean Relations: The Pseudo-Fujianese Incident of 
1687.” Acta Koreana 19, no. 2 (2016): 1–29.
———. “Migrant and Border Subjects in Late Choson Korea.” PhD dissertation, Uni-
versity of Toronto, 2008.
———. “On Either Side the River: The Rise of the Manchu State and Chosŏn’s Jurchen 
Subjects.” Toronto Studies in Central and Inner Asia 9 (2008): 111–126.
———. “Ruling Ideology and Marginal Subjects: Ming Loyalism and Foreign Lineages 
in Late Chosŏn Korea.” Journal of Early Modern History 15, no. 6 (2011): 477–505.
Breuker, Remco E. Establishing a Pluralist Society in Medieval Korea, 918–1170: History, 
Ideology, and Identity in the Koryŏ Dynasty. Leiden: Brill, 2010.
———. “Narratives of Inauthenticity, Impurity, and Disorder. Or: How Forgeries, Half-
castes, and Hooligans Shaped Pre-modern Korean History.” Sungkyun Journal of East 
Asian Studies 11, no. 2 (October 2011): 183–208.
Brose, Michael C. “Neo-Confucian Uyghur Semuren in Koryŏ and Chosŏn Korean So-
ciety and Politics.” In Eurasian Inuences on Yuan China, edited by Morris Rossabi, 
178–199. Singapore: ISEAS Publishing, 2013.
———. Subjects and Masters: Uyghurs in the Mongol Empire. Bellingham: Center for 
East Asian Studies, Western Washington University, 2007.
242 Bibliography
Cha, Javier. “To Build a Centralizing Regime: Yangban Aristocracy and Medieval Pat-
rimonialism.” Seoul Journal of Korean Studies 32, no. 1 (2019): 35–80.
Chae, Hyewon. “Was Joseon a Model or an Exception? Reconsidering the Tributary 
Relations during Ming China.” Korea Journal 51, no. 4 (Winter 2011): 33–58.
Chaee, John W. The Muslim Merchants of Premodern China: The History of a Mari-
time Asian Trade Diaspora, 750–1400. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018.
Chakrabarty, Dipesh. Provincializing Europe: Postcolonial Thought and Historical Dif-
ference. Rev. ed. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2008.
Ch’a Munsŏp. “Imnan ihu ŭi yangyŏk kwa kyunyŏkpŏp ŭi sŏngnip.” Sahak yŏn’gu 10 
(April 1961): 115–130, and 11 (June 1961): 495–518.
Chang Chŏngsu. “16 segi mal—17 segi ch’o Chosŏn kwa Kŏnju Yŏjin ŭi paehu kyosŏp 
kwa Sin Ch’ungil ŭi yŏkhal.” Han’guk inmulsa yŏn’gu 25 (March 2016): 133–183.
———. “Sŏnjodae tae Yŏjin pangŏ chŏllyak kwajǒng kwa ŭimi.” Chosŏn sidae sahakpo
67 (December 2013): 169–213.
Che Changmyŏng. “Imjin waeran sigi Hangwae yuch’i wa hwaryong.” Yŏksa wa segye
32 (December 2007): 95–122.
Chin Pyŏngyong. “Tu Sach’ung ŭi saengae wa Momyŏngjae e taehan yŏksajŏk koch’al.” 
Taegu sahak 119, no. 3 (May 2015): 177–209.
Chin, Tamara T. “Antiquarian as Ethnographer: Han Ethnicity in Early China Studies.” 
In Critical Han Studies: The History, Representation, and Identity of China’s Majority, 
edited by Thomas S. Mullaney et al., 128–146. Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 2012.
Ch’oe Chaejin. “Koryŏ mal Tongbungmyŏn ŭi t’ongch’i wa Yi Sŏnggye seryŏk 
sŏngjang—Ssangsŏng ch’onggwanbu Subok ihu rŭl chungsim ŭro.” Sahakchi 26 
(1993): 179–180.
Ch’oe Chongsŏk. “Koryŏ hugi ‘chasin ŭl Iro kanju hanŭn Hwa-I ŭisik’ ŭi t’ansaeng 
kwa naeyanghwa—Chosŏnjŏk chagi chŏngch’esŏng ŭi mot’ae rŭl ch’ajasŏ.” Minjok
munhwa yŏn’gu 74 (February 2017): 161–220.
———. “Koryŏ malgi. Chosŏn ch’ogi yŏngjo ŭirye e kwanhan saeroun ihae mo-
saek—Pŏn’guk ŭiju ŭi sogae wa pogwŏn.” Minjok munhwa yŏn’gu 69 (November 
2015): 269–309.
Ch’oe Sŏnhye. “Chosŏn ŭi munhwajŏk sosuja, hyanghwain.” In’gan yŏn’gu 12 (January 
2007): 93–123.
Ch’oe Yŏnghŭi. Imjin waeran chung ŭi sahoe tongt’ae—ŭibyŏngŭl chungsim ŭro. Seoul: 
Han’guk yŏn’guwŏn, 1975.
Cho, Hwisang. “The Epistolary Brush: Letter Writing and Power in Chosŏn Korea.” 
Journal of Asian Studies 75, no. 4 (2016): 1055–1081.
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Chun Hae-jong (Chǒn Haejong). “Sino-Korean Tributary Relations in the Ch’ing Pe-
riod.” In The Chinese World Order: Traditional China’s Foreign Relations, edited by 
John K. Fairbanks, 90–111. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1968.
Clark, Donald N. “Sino-Korean Tributary Relations under the Ming.” Vol. 8, of The
Cambridge History of China, edited by Denis Twitchet and Frederick W. Mote, 272–
300. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998.
Crossley, Pamela Kyle. “The Imaginal Bound of ‘Empire’ and ‘Civilization’ in Eurasian 
History.” Verge: Studies in Global Asias 2, no. 2 (Fall 2016): 84–114.
———. “Manzhou yuanliu kao and the Formalization of the Manchu Heritage.” Journal 
of Asian Studies 46, no. 4 (November 1987): 761–790.
———. “The Qianlong Retrospective on the Chinese-martial (Hanjun) Banners.” Late 
Imperial China 10, no. 1 (June 1989): 63–107.
———. “The Tong in Two Worlds: Cultural Identities in Liaodong and Nurgan during 
the 13th–17th Centuries.” Ch’ ing-Shih Wen-T’ i 4, no. 9 (June 1983): 21–46.
———. A Translucent Mirror: History and Identity in Qing Imperial Ideology. Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1999.
Crossley, Pamela Kyle, and Gene R. Garthwaite. “Post-Mongol States and Early Mod-
ern Chronology in Iran and China.” Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society 26, no. 1–2 
(January 2016): 293–307.
Deuchler, Martina. “Reject the False and Uphold the Straight: Attitudes toward Het-
erodox Thought in Early Yi Korea.” In The Rise of Neo-Confucianism in Korea, edited 
244 Bibliography
by Wm. Theodore de Bary and JaHyun Kim Haboush, 375–410. New York: Colum-
bia University Press, 1985.
———. Under the Ancestors’ Eyes: Kinship, Status and Locality in Premodern Korea. 
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Asia Center, 2015.
Duncan, John B. “Hwanghwain: Migration and Assimilation in Korea.” Acta Koreana
3 (July 2000): 99–111.
———. The Origins of the Chosŏn Dynasty. Seattle: University of Washington 
Press, 2000.
Dursteler, Eric. Venetians in Constantinople: Nation, Identity, and Coexistence in 
the Early Modern Mediterranean. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University 
Press, 2008.
Eckert, Carter. Ospring of Empire: The Koch’ang Kims and the Colonial Origins of Ko-
rean Capitalism, 1876–1945. Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1991.
Elliott, Mark C. “The Limits of Tartary: Manchuria in Imperial and National Geogra-
phies.” Journal of Asian Studies 59, no. 3 (August 2000): 603–646.
———. The Manchu Way: The Eight Banners and Ethnic Identity in Late Imperial 
China. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2000.
Elman, Benjamin. From Philosophy to Philology. Cambridge, MA: Council on East 
Asian Studies, Harvard University and Harvard University Press, 1984.
Em, Henry H. The Great Enterprise: Sovereignty and Historiography in Modern Korea.
Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2013.
Faure, David. Emperor and Ancestor: State and Lineage in South China. Stanford, CA: 
Stanford University Press, 2007.
Fletcher, Joseph. “The Mongols: Ecological and Social Perspectives.” Harvard Journal 
of Asiatic Studies 46, no. 1 (June 1986): 11–50.
Fujiwara Takao. “Sayak’a (Kim Ch’ungsŏn) ŭi t’uhang yoin kwa sigi ŭi yunsaek munje.” 
Chosŏnsa yŏn’gu 23 (October 2014): 83–116.
———. “Sayak’a no jugaku shisō yōrei.” Yuhak yŏn’gu 24 (August 2011): 321–356.
Guy, Kent. The Emperor’s Four Treasuries: Scholars and the State in the Late Ch’ ien-lung 
Era. Cambridge, MA: Council on East Asian Studies, Harvard University and Har-
vard University Press, 1987.
Haboush, JaHyun Kim. Confucian Kinship in Korea: Yŏngjo and the Politics of Sagacity. 
New York: Columbia University Press, 1988.
———. “Constructing the Center: The Ritual Controversy and the Search for a New 
Identity in Seventeenth-Century Korea.” In Culture and State in Late Chosŏn Korea, 
edited by JaHyun Kim Haboush and Martina Deuchler, 46–90. Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Asian Center and Harvard University Press, 1999.
———. “Contesting Chinese Time, Nationalizing Temporal Space: Temporal Inscrip-
tion in Late Chosŏn Korea.” In Time, Temporality, and Imperial Transition, edited 
by Lynn Struve, 115–141. Honolulu: Association for Asian Studies and University of 
Hawai‘i Press, 2005.
Bibliography 245 
Haboush, JaHyun Kim, William Joseph Haboush, and Jisoo M. Kim. The Great East 
Asian War and the Birth of the Korean Nation. New York: Columbia University 
Press, 2016.
Hang, Xing. Conict and Commerce in Maritime East Asia, c. 1620–1720. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2015.
Han, Kyung-koo. “The Archaeology of the Ethnically Homogeneous Nation-State and 
Multiculturalism in Korea.” Korea Journal 47, no. 4 (Winter 2007): 8–31.
Han Moon Jong (Han Munjong). “Korea’s Pre-war Domestic Situation and Relations 
with Japan.” In The East Asian War, 1592–1598, edited by James B. Lewis, 22–41. 
Abingdon: Routledge, 2015.
Han Munjong. “Chosŏn ch’ogi hyanghwa Waein P’i Sangsŏn ŭi tae-Il kyosŏp hwal-
dong.” Han-Il kwan’gyesa yŏn’gu 51 (August 2015): 7–94.
———. “Chosŏn ch’ogi Waegu taech’aek kwa Taemado chŏngbŏl.” Chŏnbuk sahak
19/20 (1997): 155–177.
———. Chosŏn chŏn’gi hyanghwa sujik waein yŏn’gu. Seoul: Kukhak charyowon, 2001.
———. “Chosŏn chŏn’gi ŭi Yŏjinin chŏptae wa yŏak.” Han-Il kwan’gyesa yŏn’gu 36 (Au-
gust 2010): 39–65.
———. “Chosŏn chŏn’gi waein t’ongjech’aek kwa t’onggyo wibanja ŭi ch’ŏri.” In 
Waegu. Wisa munje wa Han-Il kwan’gye, edited by Han-Il kwan’gyesa yŏn’gu nonjip 
p’yŏnch’an wiwŏnhoe, 223–259. Seoul: Kyŏngin munhwasa, 2005.
———. “Imjin waeran si ŭi Hangwaejang Kim Ch’ungsŏn kwa Mohadangjip.” Han-Il
kwan’gye yŏn’gu 24 (April 2006): 69–99.
———. “Imnan’gi Hangwae ŭi t’uhang kwa paegyŏng kwa yŏkhal.” Inmun kwahak
yŏn’gu 36 (March 2013): 324–325.
Han Myŏnggi. “Chaejo chi ŭn kwa Chosŏn hugi chŏngch’isa—Imjin waeran—Chŏngjo 
sigi rŭl chungsim ŭro.” Taedong munhwa yŏn’gu 59 (September 2007): 191–230.
———. Chŏngmyo pyŏngja horan kwa Tong Asia. Seoul: P’urŭm yŏksa, 2009.
———. Imjin Waeran kwa Han-Jung kwan’gye. Seoul: Yŏksa pip’yŏngsa, 1999.
———. “Imjin waeran sigi Myŏnggun tomangbyŏng munje e taehan ilgo.” Han’gukhak
yŏn’gu 44 (February 2017): 453–483.
———. Kwanghae-gun: T’agwŏrhan oegyo chŏngch’aek ŭl p’yŏlch’ in kunju. Seoul: Yŏksa 
pip’yŏngsa, 2000.
———. Pyŏngja horan. 2 volumes. Seoul: P’urŭn yŏksa, 2013.
———. “Pyŏngja horan p’aejŏn ŭi chŏngch’ijŏk p’ajang—Ch’ŏng ŭi Chosŏn appak kwa 
Injo taeŭng chungsim ŭro.” Tongbang hakchi 119 (2003): 53–94.
Han, Seunghyun. “Ming Loyalist Families and the Changing Meanings of Chojong’am 
in Early Nineteenth Century Chosŏn.” Acta Koreana 21, no. 1 (June 2018): 169–203.
Han Sŏngju. Chosŏn chŏn’gi sujik Yŏjinin yŏn’gu. Seoul: Kyŏngin munhwasa, 2011.
———. “Chosŏn Myŏngjongdae ŭi Chosŏn ibuk chiyŏk ŭi chin sŏlch’i sido.” Han-Il
kwan’gyesa hakpo 42 (August 2012): 149–188.
———. Chosŏn sidae pŏnho yŏn’gu. Seoul: Kyŏng’in munhwasa, 2018.
246 Bibliography
———. “Chosŏn ŭi tae Yŏjinin kwan’gye wa 6 chin chiyŏk saram tŭl.” Han-Il kwan’gyesa
yŏn’gu 49 (December 2014): 3–42.
———. “Chosŏn Yŏnsan’gun dae Tong Ch’ŏngnye ŭi Kŏnju samwi p’agyŏn e taehayŏ.” 
Manju yŏn’gu 14 (December 2012): 7–35.
Han Yŏngu. Chosŏn chŏn’gi sahoe sasang. Seoul: Chisik sanŏpsa, 1983.
Han, Young-woo [Han Yŏngu]. “Kija Worship in the Koryŏ and Early Yi Dynasties: 
A Cultural Symbol in the Relationship between Korea and China.” In The Rise of 
Neo-Confucianism in Korea, edited by Wm. Theodore de Bary and JaHyun Kim Ha-
boush, 349–374. New York: Columbia University Press, 1985.
Hasegawa, Masato. “War, Supply Lines, and Society in the Sino-Korean Borderland 
of the Late Sixteenth Century.” Late Imperial China 37, no. 1 (June 2016): 109–152.
Hasumi Moriyashi. Mindai Ryōtō to Chōsen. Tōkyō: Kyūko shoin, 2014.
Ha Ubong. “Chosŏn chŏn’gi taehoe kwan’gye e nat’anan cha’a insik kwa t’aja insik.” 
Han’guksa yŏn’gu 123 (December 2003): 247–270.
Hawley, Samuel. The Imjin War: Japan’s Sixteenth-Century Invasion of Korea and At-
tempt to Conquer China. Seoul: Royal Asiatic Society, Korea Branch, 2005.
Hazard, Benjamin Harrison. “Japanese Marauding in Medieval Korea: The Wakō Im-
pact on Late Koryŏ.” PhD dissertation, University of California, Berkeley, 1967.
Hong Chongp’il. “Sambŏnnan ŭl chŏnhuhan Hyŏnjong Sukchong yŏn’gan ŭi Puk-
pŏllon - T’ŭkhi yurim kwa Yun Hyu rŭl chungsim ŭro.” Sahak yŏn’gu 27 (June 
1977): 101–107.
Hostetler, Laura. Qing Colonial Enterprise: Ethnography and Cartography in Early Mod-
ern China. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2001.
Hŏ T’aegu. “Sohyŏn seja ŭi Simyang ŏngnyu wa injil ch’ehŏm.” Han’guk sasangsahak
40 (April 2012): 143–176.
Hŏ T’aeyong. “Chŏn’gŭndae Tongguk ŭisik ŭi yŏksajŏk sŏnggyŏk chaegŏmt’o.” Yŏksa
pip’yŏng 111 (May 2015): 443–470.
———. Chosŏn hugi Chunghwaron kwa yŏksa insik. Seoul: Ak’anet, 2009.
———. “Imjin waeran ŭi kyŏnghŏm kwa Koguryŏ insik ŭi kanghwa.” Yŏksa hakpo 190 
(June 2006): 33–60.
———. “17.18 segi pukpŏllon ŭi ch’ui wa pukhangnon ŭi taedu.” Taedong munhwa 
yŏn’gu 69 (2010): 374–418.
Hucker, Charles O. A Dictionary of Ocial Titles in Imperial China. Stanford, CA: 
Stanford University Press, 1985.
Hur, Nam-lin. “The Celestial Warriors: Ming Military Aid and Abuse during the Imjin 
War.” In The East Asian War, 1592–1598: International Relations, Violence and Mem-
ory, edited by James B. Lewis, 239–245. London: Routledge, 2015.
———. “Works in English on the Imjin War and the Challenge of Research.” Interna-
tional Journal of Korean History 18, no. 2 (2013): 53–80.
Hwang, Kyung Moon. Beyond Birth: Social Status in the Emergence of Modern Korea. 
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Asia Center, 2004.
Hwang Paekkang. Imjin waeran kwa silgi munhak. Seoul: Ilchisa, 1992.
Bibliography 247 
Im Ch’ŏrho. Sŏrhwa wa minjung ŭi yŏksa ŭisik—Imjin waeran sŏrhwa chungsim ŭro.
Seoul: Chimmundang, 1989.
Im Haksŏng. “17 segi chŏnban hojŏk charyo rŭl t’onghae pon kwihwa yain ŭi Chosŏn 
esŏ ŭi saenghwal yangsang—Ulsan hojŏk kwa Haenam hojŏk ŭi sarye chungsim ŭro.” 
Komunsŏ yŏn’gu 33 (August 2008): 95–128.
Im Sŏnbin. “Chosŏn ch’ogi kwihwain ŭi sahyang kwa t’ŭkching.” Tongyang kojŏn yŏn’gu
37 (December 2009): 63–91.
Inaba Iwakichi. Kōkaikun jidai no mansen kangkei. Originally published in Keijō: 
Ōsaka Yagō Shoten, Showa 8 (1935). Reprinted in Seoul: Asea munhwasa, 1986.
Jun, Euyryung. “Tolerance, Tamunhwa, and the Creating of the New Citizens.” In 
Multiethnic Korea? Multiculturalism, Migration, and Peoplehood Diversity in Con-
temporary South Korea, edited by John Lie, 80–94. Berkeley: Institute of East Asian 
Studies, 2014.
Jung, Ji-Young. “Widows’ Position and Agency in the Late Chosŏn Dynasty.” Journal of 
Korean Studies 14, no. 1 (Fall 2011): 61–82.
Kang Hang. A Korean War Captive in Japan, 1597–1600: The Writings of Kang Hang. 
Translated by Kenneth R. Robinson and Jahyun Kim Haboush. New York: Colum-
bia University Press, 2013.
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